AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 18601/91
by David ESBESTER
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
2 April 1993, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
J.A. FROWEIN
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
G.B. REFFI
M. NOWICKI
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 26 March 1991 by
David Esbester against the United Kingdom and registered on 25 July
1991 under file No. 18601/91;
Having regard to:
- the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 13 and
28 May 1992 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant
on 13 August 1992;
- the hearing held on 2 April 1993;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen born in 1940 and resident in
London. He is a clerical officer by profession. He is represented
before the Commission by John Wadham of Liberty. The facts as submitted
by the parties may be summarised as follows.
On 11 June 1990, he was offered a post as Administrative Officer
at the Central Office of Information (hereinafter "the COI") "subject
to the satisfactory completion of our enquiries into your age, health
and other matters".
By letter dated 19 July 1990, the COI informed the applicant that
"having completed our inquiries ... we are unable to offer you an
appointment." No further explanation was given.
At the time of his application, the second applicant had been a
member of the Communist Party of Great Britain for many years. He had
also been active in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), anti-
apartheid and various anti-deportation campaigns. In 1977, he had been
arrested and fined £15 for obstruction of the police at the Grunwick
industrial dispute and in 1984 arrested and cautioned after a CND
demonstration.
The applicant unsuccessfully attempted to discover the reasons
for the refusal of the post at COI through his Member of Parliament.
On 1 November 1990, the applicant submitted an application to the
Security Services Tribunal alleging that the Security Services had
provided "vetting information" on him to the COI with the result that
their offer of employment was withdrawn.
On 14 January 1991, the Tribunal Secretary replied that his
complaint had been investigated and that no determination in his favour
had been made.
Relevant domestic law and practice
The Security Service
The Security Service Act 1989 places the Security Service
on a statutory basis.
It provides inter alia:
"1. (1) There shall continue to be a Security Service (in this
Act referred to as "the Service") under the authority of the
Secretary of State.
(2) The function of the Service shall be the protection of
national security and, in particular, its protection against
threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the
activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended
to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political,
industrial or violent means.
(3) It shall also be the function of the Service to safeguard the
economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed
by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British
Islands.
2. (1) The operations of the Service shall continue to be under
the control of a Director-General appointed by the Secretary of
State.
(2) The Director-General shall be responsible for the efficiency
of the Service and it shall be his duty to ensure
(a) that there are arrangements for securing that no
information is obtained by the Service except so far as
necessary for the proper discharge of its functions or
disclosed by it except so far as necessary for that purpose
or for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious
crime; and
(b) that the Service does not take any action to further
the interests of any political party.
(3) The arrangements mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above shall
be such as to ensure that information in the possession of the
Service is not disclosed for use in determining whether a person
should be employed, or continue to be employed, by any person,
or in any office or capacity, except in accordance with
provisions in that behalf approved by the Secretary of State.
(4) The Director-General shall make an annual report on the work
of the Service to the prime minister and the Secretary of State
and may at any time report to either of them on any matter
relating to its work.
3. (1) No entry on or interference with property shall be
unlawful if it is authorized by a warrant issued by the Secretary
of State under this section.
(2) The Secretary of State may on an application made by the
Service issue a warrant under this section authorizing the taking
of such action as is specified in the warrant in respect of any
property so specified if the Secretary of State
(a) thinks it necessary for the action to be taken in order
to obtain information which
(i) is likely to be of substantial value in assisting
the Service to discharge any of its functions; and
(ii) cannot reasonably be obtained by other means; and
(b) is satisfied that satisfactory arrangements are in
force under section 2(2)(a) above with respect to the
disclosure of information obtained by virtue of this
section and that the information obtained under the warrant
will be subject to those arrangements."
The Security Service Tribunal
The Act also provides for a tribunal, known as the Security
Service Tribunal, to deal with complaints:
"5. (1) There shall be a Tribunal for the purpose of
investigating complaints about the Service in the manner
specified in Schedule 1 to this Act...
(4) The decisions of the Tribunal and the Commissioner under that
Schedule (including decisions as to their jurisdictions) shall
not be subject to appeal or liable to be questioned in any
court."
Schedule 1 to the Act provides, inter alia:
"1. Any person may complain to the Tribunal if he is aggrieved
by anything which he believes the Service has done in relation
to him or to any property of his; and, unless the Tribunal
consider that the complaint is frivolous or vexatious, they shall
investigate it in accordance with this Schedule.
2. (1) The Tribunal shall investigate whether the complainant has
been the subject of inquiries by the Service.
(2) If the Tribunal find that the Service has made inquiries
about the complainant but that those inquiries had ceased at the
time when the complaint was made, they shall determine whether,
at the time when the inquiries were instituted, the Service had
reasonable grounds for deciding to institute inquiries about the
complainant in the discharge of its functions.
(3) If the Tribunal find that inquiries by the Service about
the complainant were continuing at the time when the complaint
was made, they shall determine whether, at that time, the Service
had reasonable grounds for deciding to continue inquiries about
the complainant in the discharge of its functions...
4. (1) If and so far as the complainant alleges that anything has
been done by the Service in relation to any property of his, the
Tribunal shall refer the complaint to the Commissioner who shall
investigate whether a warrant has been issued under section 3 of
this Act in respect of that property and if he finds that such
a warrant has been issued he shall, applying the principles
applied by a court on an application for judicial review,
determine whether the Secretary of State was acting properly in
issuing or renewing the warrant.
(2) The Commissioner shall inform the Tribunal of his conclusion
on any complaint so far as referred to him under this paragraph.
5. (1) Where the Tribunal determine under paragraph 2 or 3 above
that the Service did not have reasonable grounds for the decision
or belief in question, they shall
(a) give notice to the complainant that they have made a
determination in his favour under that paragraph; and
(b) make a report of their findings to the Secretary of
State and to the Commissioner.
(2) The Tribunal shall also give notice to the complainant of any
determination in his favour by the Commissioner under paragraph
4 above.
(3) Where in the case of any complaint no such determination as
is mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) or (2) above is made by the
Tribunal or the Commissioner the Tribunal shall give notice to
the complainant that no determination in his favour has been made
on his complaint.
6. (1) Where the Tribunal give a complainant notice of such a
determination as is mentioned in paragraph 5(1) above the
Tribunal may
(a) if the determination is under paragraph 2 above, order
inquiries by the Service about the complainant to be ended
and any records relating to such inquiries to be destroyed;
(b) if the determination is under that paragraph or
paragraph 3 above, direct the Secretary of State to pay to
the complainant such sum by way of compensation as may be
specified by the Tribunal.
(2) Where the Tribunal give a complainant notice of such a
determination as is mentioned in paragraph 5(2) above the
Tribunal may
(a) quash any warrant in respect of any property of the
complainant which the Commissioner has found to have been
improperly issued or renewed and which he considers should
be quashed;
(b) if the Commissioner considers that a sum should be paid
to the complainant by way of compensation, direct the
Secretary of State to pay to the complainant such sum as
the Commissioner may specify."
Pursuant to Schedule 2, the Tribunal consists of 3-5 members each
of whom must be a barrister, solicitor or advocate of not less than ten
years' standing. Members are appointed for a period of five years by
Her Majesty by royal warrant and may be removed from office by Her
Majesty on an address presented to her by both Houses of Parliament.
Pursuant to para. 9(1) of Schedule 1, the Tribunal is limited as
follows:
"9. (1) No complaint shall be entertained under this Schedule if
and so far as it relates to anything done before the date on
which this Schedule comes into force."
The Security Service Commissioner
Pursuant to Section 4 of the Act, the Prime Minister appoints as
a Commissioner a person who holds or has held high judicial office. He
has the role, inter alia, of keeping under review the exercise by the
Secretary of State of his powers under Section 3 to issue warrants.
Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Schedule 1, matters may be referred
to the Commissioner by the Tribunal:
"7. (1) If in a case investigated by the Tribunal under
paragraph 2 above they consider that the Service may not be
justified in regarding all members of a particular category as
requiring investigation they shall refer that matter to the
Commissioner.
(2) If in any case investigated by the Tribunal -
(a) the Tribunal's conclusions on the matters which they
are required to investigate are such that no determination
is made by them in favour of the complainant; but
(b) it appears to the Tribunal from the allegations made by
the complainant that it is appropriate for there to be an
investigation into whether the Service has in any other
respect acted unreasonably in relation to the complainant
or his property,
they shall refer that matter to the Commissioner.
(3) The Commissioner may report any matter referred to him under
this paragraph to the Secretary of State who may take such action
in the light of the report as he thinks fit, including any action
which the Tribunal have power to take or direct under paragraph 6
above."
The Commissioner makes an annual report to the Prime Minister on
the discharge of his functions and the report is then laid before
Parliament.
Police Special Branches
Each of the police forces in England and Wales has its own
Special Branch. Except for the Metropolitan Police Special Branch,
which has responsibilities in relation to Irish Republican extremism
and terrorism throughout Great Britain, the responsibility of each
Special Branch relates only to the area of the force of which it is a
part. The Special Branch is not a separate police force. Members of
the Special Branch of any police force in England and Wales are police
officers with the same powers and under the same duties at law as all
other police officers in the force.
The status and functions of police Special Branches are set out
in Home Office Guidelines on the Work of a Special Branch.
The special functions which most commonly fall to be undertaken
by the Special Branch of a police force include the provision of
assistance to the Security Service in carrying out its task of the
protection of national security. As is further noted, a large part of
this effort is devoted to the study and investigation of terrorism,
including the activities of international terrorists and terrorist
organisations and, in this regard, the police Special Branches provide
information to the Security Service about extremists and terrorist
groups.
The Guidelines contain express provisions concerning the
maintenance and use of records by police Special Branches. It is
emphasised that, because of the particular sensitivity of the
information concerned, it is important that only information relevant
to the special functions of the Special Branch should be recorded.
The Guidelines similarly contain instructions concerning access to
information held by Special Branches, requiring that it should be
limited to those who have a particulars need to know and that under no
circumstances should information be passed to commercial firms or to
employees' organisations.
As appears from Schedule 1 to the Police (Discipline) Regulations
1985 specific provision is made for the unauthorised disclosure of
information: by paragraph 6(a), taken with Regulation 4(1) of the
Police (Discipline)(Senior Officers) Regulations 1985, it is a
disciplinary offence for any member of a police force, including
members of police Special Branches, to communicate without proper
authority to any person any information which he has in his possession
as a member of a police force.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that information as to his private life
was kept on secret files by MI5 and/or police special branches and/or
the Police National Computer and/or the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ). He submits that it is at very least reasonably
likely that the intelligence services have compiled and retained
information about his private life and this, taken with the existence
of practices permitting secret surveillance, constitutes an
infringement of Article 8 para. 1 of the Convention. The use of this
information in the course of negative vetting procedures is an
additional interference, especially since he did not have the
opportunity to refute the information in question.
The applicant further submits that the interference was not in
accordance with law since there is no law governing the compilation and
use of information by police Special Branches, the Police National
Computer or GCHQ. While the Security Service Act 1989 was passed in
response to applications before the Commission, he submits that it only
covers the activities of MI5 and in any case fails to offer an adequate
definition of the function of the Security Service. Further, the
Security Service Tribunal set up by the Act does not provide adequate
protection from abuse.
The applicant submits that the interference fails to satisfy the
other criteria of Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention. In particular,
the Tribunal does not offer adequate and effective protection against
abuse since it only has jurisdiction over the Security Service and
cannot consider the correctness of the Security Service decisions on
whether the Service was justified in retaining the records of its
enquiries. Moreover, its jurisdiction is further limited where
inquiries are made by the Service on the ground that a person is a
member of a category of persons regarded by the Service as requiring
investigation. The Tribunal is also prevented from giving reasons for
its decisions.
The applicant also complains that he had no effective remedy in
respect of his complaints, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 24 May 1990 and registered on
25 July 1991.
On 12 December 1991 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government and to ask for written
observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.
The Government's observations were submitted on 13 and 28 May
1992 after one extension in the time-limit and the applicant's
observations in reply were submitted on 13 August 1992 also after one
extension in the time-limit.
On 12 October 1992, the Commission decided to invite the parties
to make submissions at an oral hearing.
At the oral hearing which was held on 2 April 1993, the parties
were represented as follows:
For the Government:
Mrs. Audrey GLOVER Agent
Mr. Nicolas BRATZA, QC Counsel
Mr. James EADIE Counsel
The Government were assisted by five advisers.
For the applicant:
Mr. Andrew NICOL Counsel
Mr. John WADHAM Solicitor, Liberty
THE LAW
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention
The applicant complains that information concerning his private
life has been compiled, retained and disclosed by the Security Service,
police Special Branches, the Police National Computer or GCHQ. He
invokes Articles 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides as
relevant:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private ...
life...
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
The Government, in line with their policy of not disclosing
information about the operations of the intelligence services, have
neither confirmed nor denied the applicant's allegations.
The Commission recalls that a security check does not per se
constitute an interference with the right to respect for private life
guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. An interference
with this right occurs when security checks are based on information
about a person's private life (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Leander
judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p. 22 para. 45).
The Commission notes that the applicant has no concrete proof to
support his allegation that the any of the intelligence services,
including the Security Service, compiled and continue to retain a file
of personal information about him. The Commission recalls however that
"an individual may, under certain conditions, claim to be a victim of
a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret measures ...
without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to
him" (Eur. Court H.R., Klass judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no.
28, p. 18 para. 34).
Similarly, in the Malone case, the Court agreed with the
Commission that the existence of laws and practices permitting and
establishing a system for effecting secret surveillance amounted in
itself to an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention, apart from any measures actually taken
against him (Eur. Court H.R., Malone judgment of 2 August 1984, Series
A no. 82, p. 31 para. 64).
The Commission has held that this case-law cannot be interpreted
so broadly as to encompass every person in the United Kingdom who fears
that the Security Service may have compiled information about him. An
applicant however cannot be reasonably expected to prove that
information concerning his private life has been compiled and retained.
It is sufficient, in the area of secret measures, that the existence
of practices permitting secret surveillance be established and that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the Security Service has compiled
and retained information concerning his private life (see e.g.
Application No. 12015/86, Dec. 6.7.88, D.R. 57 p.108).
In the present case, the Commission notes that the applicant was
refused a post in the Central Office of Information after initial
approval had been given subject to satisfactory completion of
"enquiries". He was informed by the COI that "having completed our
inquiries... we are unable to offer you the appointment". In these
circumstances the Commission finds that the applicant's assertion that
a security check was carried out and involved reference to information
concerning matters falling within the sphere of "private life" is a
reasonable inference from the facts. Such a check would appear to fall
within the ambit of the Security Service and/or police Special
Branches. There is nothing to indicate any possible involvement by GCHQ
or the Police National Computer.
Against the above background, the Commission finds that the
existence of practices permitting secret surveillance has been
established and that the applicant has established a reasonable
likelihood that the Security Service and /or police Special Branches
have compiled and retained a file concerning his private life, which
was referred to in the course of the security check. It follows that
there has been an interference with the applicant's rights to respect
for his private life guaranteed under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of
the Convention.
The Commission must next determine whether this interference is
justified under the second paragraph of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention, namely whether it was "in accordance with the law" and if
so, whether it was necessary in a democratic society or one or more of
the reasons specified.
"in accordance with the law"
This expression has been interpreted by the Court as importing
three requirements - the interference must have some basis in domestic
law, the law in question must be accessible to the individual concerned
and its consequences for him must also be foreseeable. The Court has
further held that the requirement of foreseeability in the special
context of employment "vetting" in sectors affecting national security
cannot be the same as in many other fields. In the LEANDER case (Eur.
Court H.R., Leander judgment, loc. cit.) it stated:
"Thus, it cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to
foresee precisely what checks will be made in his regard by the
Swedish special police service in its efforts to protect national
security. Nevertheless, in a system applicable to citizens
generally, as under the Personnel Control Ordinance, the law has
to be sufficiently clear in its terms to give them an adequate
indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions
on which the public authorities are empowered to resort to this
kind of secret and potentially dangerous interference with
private life (ibid., p. 32, para. 67)...
In addition, where the implementation of the law consists of
secret measures, not open to scrutiny by the individuals
concerned or by the public at large, the law itself, as opposed
to the accompanying administrative practice, must indicate the
scope of any discretion conferred on the competent authority with
sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the
measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection
against arbitrary interference (see the above-mentioned Malone
judgment, Series A no. 82, pp. 32-33, para. 68)."
The Commission finds that the interference in the present case
had a valid basis in domestic law, namely, the Security Service Act
1989 which placed the Security Service on a statutory footing for the
first time.
The applicant has submitted however that the domestic law
nonetheless lacks the requisite accessibility and foreseeability. In
this context he refers to the only partially defined term of "the
interests of national security" and the fact that the guidelines
produced by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 2 (3) of the
1989 Act governing the Director-General's supervision of the use of
information obtained by the Security Service are unpublished.
The Commission considers however that the principles referred to
above do not necessarily require a comprehensive definition of the
notion of "the interests of national security". Many laws, which by
their subject-matter require to be flexible, are inevitably couched in
terms which are to a greater or lesser extent vague and whose
interpretation and application are questions of practice. The
Commission notes that the exercise of the Security Service's functions
are subject to express limitations and to the supervision of a tribunal
and commissioner appointed pursuant to the 1989 Act. The guidelines
referred to in section 2 (3) of the Act relate only to the
administrative implementation of preceding provisions, which expressly
limit the use of information by the Service to that necessary to fulfil
its functions.
In light of the above, the Commission considers that in the
present case the law is formulated with sufficient precision to enable
the applicant to anticipate the application of vetting procedures and
to the likely nature of the involvement of the Security Service and
police Special Branches with regard to the collection, recording and
release of information relating to himself.
"necessary in a democratic society ..."
The Commission recalls that the notion of necessity implies that
the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, tin
particular that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Regard must also be had on this context to the margin of appreciation
of the respondent state which in the area of assessing the requirements
of and means of pursuing interests of national security has been held
by the Court to be wide (Eur. Court H.R., Leander judgment loc. cit.
p. 25 paras. 58-59).
The aim pursued by the interference in the present case was the
"interests of national security". The Court has acknowledged the
necessity for states to collect and store information on persons and
to use this information when assessing the eligibility of persons for
posts of importance for national security. It is however crucial given
the potential seriousness of resulting invasions of a person's private
sphere that there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse
(Eur. Court H.R., Klaas judgment, loc. cit., p. 23 para. 50).
The Government have pointed to the framework of supervision set
up under the 1989 Act.
The applicant contends that the protection offered is inadequate
and ineffective. He alleges, inter alia, the following defects:
- the wide scope of the term "interests of national security";
- the fact that the Tribunal does not give reasons for its
failure to make a determination in favour of an applicant;
- the fact that the Tribunal is prohibited from examining
inquiries which ceased before the 1989 Act came into force (see
para. 9(1) of Schedule No. 1);
- the limited scope of the Tribunal's inquiries, in particular,
since it cannot examine whether the information if true renders
the person concerned a security risk;
- the inability of the Commissioner to make binding decisions.
The applicant has also submitted that in comparison with the
other systems whose security legislation has come under the scrutiny
of the Convention organs there is significantly no element of
Parliamentary or judicial control. He also has drawn attention to the
framework of legislative controls provided for in the Canadian and
Australian systems which are alleged to provide much greater respect
for the rights of the individual.
The Commission however finds reference to other systems of
limited relevance. One particular system may be more ideal or more
sophisticated than another. The task of the Commission is however to
determine whether the system under examination in the concrete case
before it passes the threshold imposed by the Convention guarantees.
The Commission has already stated above that the term "national
security" is not amenable to exhaustive definition and since sufficient
indication is given of the scope and manner of exercise of the
functions of the Security Service, considers that no problem arises in
this respect. As regards the lack of reasons for the decisions of the
tribunal, the Court considered a similar problem in the KLAAS case
(Eur. Court H.R. Klaas judgment, loc. cit. p. 27 paras. 57-58) but
found that the State could legitimately fear that the efficacy of
surveillance systems might be jeopardised if information is divulged
to the person concerned.
As regard the applicant's assertion that the Tribunal is barred
from investigating matters arising before the Act came into force, the
Commission notes that the provision refers specifically to the
Tribunal's examination of enquiries which have ceased. The Commission
notes that it does not purport to extend to the Security Service's use
of information already collected and accepts the Government's assertion
that the Tribunal could have examined the vetting procedure if applied
to the applicant since it would have taken place after the Act came
into force.
The Commission has examined the applicant's remaining complaints
against the background of the 1989 Act as a whole. It notes that the
Tribunal consists of lawyers of ten years' experience and who act in
an independent capacity. While they do not have jurisdiction to
substitute their opinion for that of the Security Service, it has a
supervisory role which includes examination of whether the Service had
reasonable grounds for a particular belief or decision. It must also
refer to the Commissioner cases where it finds that the Service is not
justified in treating a person as a legitimate object of enquiry merely
on the ground that he is member of a particular group and where it
considers that the Service has acted unreasonably with respect to a
complainant. The Commissioner is a person who holds or who has held
high judicial office and he may make recommendations concerning
complaints to the Secretary of State in addition to making an annual
report to the Houses of Parliament.
As regards any possible involvement of the police special
branches, the Commission recalls that their role is to support the
Security Service and that they pass on to the Service any relevant
information. The use of such information would then appear to fall
within the ambit of supervision of the Tribunal and Commissioner.
In the absence of any evidence or indication that the system is
not functioning as required by domestic law, the Commission finds that
the framework of safeguards achieves a compromise between the
requirements of defending democratic society and the rights of the
individual which is compatible with the provisions of the Convention.
Consequently it concludes that the interference in the present case was
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention
The applicant complains that he has no effective remedy for his
complaints and invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, which
provides that:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
The Commission recalls however that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not
require a remedy under domestic law in respect of any alleged violation
of the Convention. It only applies if the individual can be said to
have an "arguable claim" of a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court
H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p.23,
para. 52).
The Commission finds that the applicant cannot be said, in light
of its findings above to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of his
Convention rights.
It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission by a majority
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C. A. NØRGAARD)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy