EUR-Lex Document 02016R0799-20230821

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►B COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799
of 18 March 2016
implementing Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying
down the requirements for the construction, testing, installation, operation and repair of
tachographs and their components
(Text with EEA relevance)
(OJ L 139, 26.5.2016, p. 1)
Amended by:
Official Journal
No page date
►M1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/502 of 28 February
2018
L 85 1 28.3.2018
►M2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/158 of 5 February
2020
L 34 20 6.2.2020
►M3 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1228 of 16 July 2021 L 273 1 30.7.2021
►M4 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/980 of 16 May 2023 L 134 28 22.5.2023
Corrected by:
►C1 Corrigendum, OJ L 146, 3.6.2016, p. 31 (2016/799)
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 2
COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/799
of 18 March 2016
implementing Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European
Parliament and of the Council laying down the requirements for
the construction, testing, installation, operation and repair of
tachographs and their components
(Text with EEA relevance)
Article 1
Subject matter and scope
1. This Regulation lays down the provisions necessary for the
uniform application of the following aspects regarding tachographs:
(a) recording of the position of the vehicle at certain points during the
daily working period of the driver;
(b) remote early detection of possible manipulation or misuse of smart
tachographs;
(c) interface with intelligent transport systems;
(d) the administrative and technical requirements for the type-approval
procedures of tachographs, including the security mechanisms.
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2. The construction, testing, installation, inspection, operation and
repair of smart tachographs and their components, shall comply with
the technical requirements set out in Annex IC to this Regulation.
3. Tachographs other than smart tachographs shall continue, as
regards construction, testing, installation, inspection, operation and
repair, to comply with the requirements of either Annex I to Regulation
(EU) No 165/2014 or Annex IB to Council Regulation (EEC)
No 3821/85 ( 1 ), as applicable.
▼B
4. Pursuant to Article 10d of Directive 96/53/EC, the remote early
detection facility shall also transmit the weight data provided by an
internal on-board weighing system, for the purpose of early fraud
detection.
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5. This Regulation shall be without prejudice to Directive
2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 2 ).
▼B
Article 2
Definitions
For the purposes of this Regulation, the definitions laid down in
Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 shall apply.
▼B
( 1 ) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 of 20 December 1985 on recording
equipment in road transport (OJ L 370, 31.12.1985, p. 8).
( 2 ) Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 April 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States
relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment and
repealing Directive 1999/5/EC (OJ L 153, 22.5.2014, p. 62).
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In addition, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) ‘digital tachograph’ or ‘first generation tachograph’ means a digital
tachograph other than a smart tachograph;
(2) ‘external GNSS facility’ means a facility which contains the GNSS
receiver when the vehicle unit is not a single unit, as well as other
components needed to protect the communication of data about
position to the rest of the vehicle unit;
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(3) ‘information folder’ means the complete folder, in electronic or
paper form, containing all the information supplied by the manu­
facturer or its agent to the type-approval authority for the purpose
of the type-approval of a tachograph or a component thereof,
including the certificates referred to in Article 12(3) of Regu­
lation (EU) No 165/2014, the performance of the tests defined in
Annex IC to this Regulation, as well as drawings, photographs,
and other relevant documents;
▼B
(4) ‘information package’ means the information folder, in electronic
or paper form, accompanied by any other documents added by the
type-approval authority to the information folder in the course of
carrying out their functions including, at the end of the
type-approval process, the EC type-approval certificate of the
tachograph or a component thereof;
(5) ‘index to the information package’ means the document listing the
numbered contents of the information package identifying all the
relevant parts of this package. The format of that document shall
distinguish the successive steps in the EC type-approval process,
including the dates of any revisions and updating of that package;
(6) ‘remote early detection facility’ means the equipment of the
vehicle unit which is used to perform targeted roadside checks;
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(7) ‘smart tachograph’ or ‘second generation tachograph’ means a
digital tachograph complying with Articles 8, 9 and 10 of
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 as well as with Annex IC to this
Regulation;
(8) ‘tachograph component’ means any of the following elements: the
vehicle unit, the motion sensor, the record sheet, the external
GNSS facility and the external remote early detection facility;
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(9) ‘type-approval authority’ means the authority of a Member State
competent to carry out the type-approval of the tachograph or of
its components, the authorisation process, the issuing and, if appro­
priate, withdrawing of type-approval certificates, acting as the
contact point for the type-approval authorities of other Member
States and ensuring that the manufacturers meet their obligations
relating to the conformity with the requirement of this Regulation;
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(10) ‘vehicle unit’ means the tachograph excluding the motion sensor
and the cables connecting the motion sensor.
It may be a single unit or several units distributed in the vehicle and
includes a processing unit, a data memory, a time measurement
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function, two smart card interface devices for driver and co-driver, a
printer, a display, connectors and facilities for entering the user’s
inputs, a GNSS receiver and a remote communication facility.
The vehicle unit may be composed of the following components
subject to type-approval:
— vehicle unit, as a single component (including GNSS receiver
and remote communication facility),
— vehicle unit main body (including remote communication
facility), and external GNSS facility,
— vehicle unit main body (including GNSS receiver), and
external remote communication facility,
— vehicle unit main body, external GNSS facility, and external
remote communication facility.
If the vehicle unit is composed of several units distributed in the
vehicle, the vehicle unit main body is the unit containing the
processing unit, the data memory, and the time measurement
function.
‘vehicle unit (VU)’ is used for ‘vehicle unit’ or ‘vehicle unit main
body’.
▼B
Article 3
Location-based services
1. Manufacturers shall ensure that smart tachographs are compatible
with the positioning services provided by the Galileo and the European
Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (‘EGNOS’) systems.
2. In addition to the systems referred to in paragraph 1, manu­
facturers may also choose to ensure compatibility with other satellite
navigation systems.
Article 4
Procedure for type-approval of a tachograph and tachograph
components
1. A manufacturer or its agent shall submit an application for
type-approval of a tachograph or any of its components, or group of
components, to the type-approval authorities designated by each
Member State. It shall consist of an information folder containing the
information for each of the components concerned including, where
applicable, the type-approval certificates of other components
necessary to complete the tachograph, as well as any other relevant
documents.
2. A Member State shall grant type-approval to any tachograph,
component or group of components that conforms to the administrative
and technical requirements referred to in Article 1(2) or (3), as
applicable. In that case, the type-approval authority shall issue to the
applicant a type-approval certificate that shall conform to the model laid
down in Annex II to this Regulation.
3. The type-approval authority may request the manufacturer or its
agent to supply any additional information.
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4. The manufacturer or its agent shall make available to the
type-approval authorities, as well as to the entities responsible for
issuing the certificates referred to in Article 12(3) of Regulation (EU)
No 165/2014, as many tachographs or tachograph components as are
necessary to enable the type-approval procedure to be conducted
satisfactorily.
5. Where the manufacturer or its agent seeks a type-approval of
certain components or groups of components of a tachograph, he
shall provide the type-approval authorities with the other components,
already type-approved, as well as other parts necessary for the
construction of the complete tachograph, in order for those authorities
to conduct the necessary tests.
Article 5
Modifications to type-approvals
1. The manufacturer or its agent shall inform without delay the
type-approval authorities that granted the original type-approval, about
any modification in software or hardware of the tachograph or in the
nature of the materials used for its manufacture which are recorded in
the information package and shall submit an application for the modi­
fication of the type-approval.
2. The type-approval authorities may revise or extend an existing
type-approval, or issue a new type-approval according to the nature
and characteristics of the modifications.
A ‘revision’ shall be made where the type-approval authority considers
that the modifications in software or hardware of the tachograph or in
the nature of materials used for its manufacture are minor. In such cases,
the type-approval authority shall issue the revised documents of the
information package, indicating the nature of the modifications made
and the date of their approval. An updated version of the information
package in a consolidated form, accompanied by a detailed description
of the modifications made, shall be sufficient to meet this requirement.
An ‘extension’ shall be made where the type-approval authority
considers that the modifications in software or hardware of the
tachograph or in the nature of materials used for its manufacture are
substantial. In such cases, it may request that new tests be conducted
and inform the manufacturer or its agent accordingly. If those tests
prove satisfactory, the type-approval authority shall issue a revised
type-approval certificate containing a number referring to the
extension granted. The type-approval certificate shall mention the
reason of the extension and its date of issue.
3. The index to the information package shall indicate the date of the
most recent extension or revision of the type-approval, or the date of the
most recent consolidation of the updated version of the type-approval.
4. A new type-approval shall be necessary when the requested modi­
fications to the type-approved tachograph or its components would lead
to the issuance of a new security or interoperability certificate.
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Article 6
Entry into force
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following
that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
It shall apply from 2 March 2016.
▼M1
However, Annex IC shall apply from 15 June 2019 with the exception
of Appendix 16 which shall apply from 2 March 2016.
▼B
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in
all Member States.
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ANNEX I C
Requirements for construction, testing, installation, and inspection
INTRODUCTION
1. DEFINITIONS
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
RECORDING EQUIPMENT
2.1 General characteristics
2.2 Functions
2.3 Modes of operation
2.4 Security
3. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
RECORDING EQUIPMENT
3.1 Monitoring cards insertion and withdrawal
3.2 Speed, position and distance measurement
3.2.1 Measurement of distance travelled
3.2.2 Measurement of speed
3.2.3 Measurement of position
3.3 Time measurement
3.4 Monitoring driver activities
3.5 Monitoring driving status
3.6 Driver's entries
3.6.1 Entry of places where daily work periods begin and/or end
3.6.2 Manual entry of driver activities and driver consent for ITS
interface
3.6.3 Entry of specific conditions
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3.6.4 Entry of load/unload operation
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3.7 Company locks management
3.8 Monitoring control activities
3.9 Detection of events and/or faults
3.9.1 ‘Insertion of a non-valid card’ event
3.9.2 ‘Card conflict’ event
3.9.3 ‘Time overlap’ event
3.9.4 ‘Driving without an appropriate card’ event
3.9.5 ‘Card insertion while driving’ event
3.9.6 ‘Last card session not correctly closed’ event
3.9.7 ‘Over speeding’ event
3.9.8 ‘Power supply interruption’ event
3.9.9 ‘Communication error with the remote communication facility’
event
3.9.10 ‘Absence of position information from GNSS receiver’ event
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3.9.11 ‘Communication error with the external GNSS facility’ event
3.9.12 ‘Motion data error’ event
3.9.13 ‘Vehicle motion conflict’ event
3.9.14 ‘Security breach attempt’ event
3.9.15 ‘Time conflict’ event
3.9.16 ‘Card’ fault
3.9.17 ‘Recording equipment’ fault
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3.9.18 ‘GNSS anomaly’ event
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3.10 Built-in and self-tests
3.11 Reading from data memory
3.12 Recording and storing in the data memory
3.12.1 Equipment identification data
3.12.1.1 Vehicle unit identification data
3.12.1.2 Motion sensor identification data
3.12.1.3 Global Navigation Satellite Systems identification data
3.12.2 Keys and certificates
3.12.3 Driver or workshop card insertion and withdrawal data
3.12.4 Driver activity data
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3.12.5 Places and positions where daily work periods begin, end and/or
where 3 hours accumulated driving time is reached
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3.12.6 Odometer data
3.12.7 Detailed speed data
3.12.8 Events data
3.12.9 Faults data
3.12.10 Calibration data
3.12.11 Time adjustment data
3.12.12 Control activity data
3.12.13 Company locks data
3.12.14 Download activity data
3.12.15 Specific conditions data
3.12.16 Tachograph card data
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3.12.17 Border crossings
3.12.18 Load/unload operations
3.12.19 Digital map
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3.13 Reading from tachograph cards
3.14 Recording and storing on tachograph cards
3.14.1 Recording and storing in first generation tachograph cards
▼B
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3.14.2 Recording and storing in second generation tachograph cards
3.15 Displaying
3.15.1 Default display
3.15.2 Warning display
3.15.3 Menu access
3.15.4 Other displays
3.16 Printing
3.17 Warnings
3.18 Data downloading to external media
3.19 Remote communication for targeted roadside checks
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3.20 Data exchanges with additional external devices
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3.21 Calibration
3.22 Roadside calibration checking
3.23 Time adjustment
3.24 Performance characteristics
3.25 Materials
3.26 Markings
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3.27 Monitoring border crossings
3.28 Software update
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4. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
TACHOGRAPH CARDS
4.1 Visible data
4.2 Security
4.3 Standards
4.4 Environmental and electrical specifications
4.5 Data storage
4.5.1 Elementary files for identification and card management
4.5.2 IC card identification
4.5.2.1 Chip identification
4.5.2.2 DIR (only present in second generation tachograph cards)
4.5.2.3 ATR information (conditional, only present in second generation
tachograph cards)
4.5.2.4 Extended length information (conditional, only present in second
generation tachograph cards)
4.5.3 Driver card
4.5.3.1 Tachograph application (accessible to first and second generation
vehicle units)
4.5.3.1.1 Application identification
4.5.3.1.2 Key and certificates
4.5.3.1.3 Card identification
4.5.3.1.4 Card holder identification
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4.5.3.1.5 Card download
4.5.3.1.6 Driving licence information
4.5.3.1.7 Events data
4.5.3.1.8 Faults data
4.5.3.1.9 Driver activity data
4.5.3.1.10 Vehicles used data
4.5.3.1.11 Places where daily work periods start and/or end
4.5.3.1.12 Card session data
4.5.3.1.13 Control activity data
4.5.3.1.14 Specific conditions data
4.5.3.2 Tachograph generation 2 application (not accessible to first
generation vehicle unit)
4.5.3.2.1 Application identification
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4.5.3.2.1.1 Additional application identification (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
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4.5.3.2.2 Keys and certificates
4.5.3.2.3 Card identification
4.5.3.2.4 Card holder identification
4.5.3.2.5 Card download
4.5.3.2.6 Driving licence information
4.5.3.2.7 Events data
4.5.3.2.8 Faults data
4.5.3.2.9 Driver activity data
4.5.3.2.10 Vehicles used data
4.5.3.2.11 Places and positions where daily work periods start and/or end
4.5.3.2.12 Card session data
4.5.3.2.13 Control activity data
4.5.3.2.14 Specific conditions data
4.5.3.2.15 Vehicle units used data
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4.5.3.2.16 Three hours accumulated driving places data
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4.5.3.2.17 Authentication status for positions related to places where daily
work periods start and/or end (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
4.5.3.2.18 Authentication status for positions where three hours accumulated
driving time are reached (not accessed by version 1 of second
generation vehicle units)
4.5.3.2.19 Border crossings (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
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4.5.3.2.20 Load/unload operations (not accessed by version 1 of second
generation vehicle units)
4.5.3.2.21 Load type entries (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
4.5.3.2.22 VU configurations (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
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4.5.4 Workshop card
4.5.4.1 Tachograph application (accessible to first and second generation
vehicle units)
4.5.4.1.1 Application identification
4.5.4.1.2 Keys and certificates
4.5.4.1.3 Card identification
4.5.4.1.4 Card holder identification
4.5.4.1.5 Card download
4.5.4.1.6 Calibration and time adjustment data
4.5.4.1.7 Events and faults data
4.5.4.1.8 Driver activity data
4.5.4.1.9 Vehicles used data
4.5.4.1.10 Daily work periods start and/or end data
4.5.4.1.11 Card session data
4.5.4.1.12 Control activity data
4.5.4.1.13 Specific conditions data
4.5.4.2 Tachograph generation 2 application (not accessible to first
generation vehicle unit)
4.5.4.2.1 Application identification
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4.5.4.2.1.1 Additional application identification (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
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4.5.4.2.2 Keys and certificates
4.5.4.2.3 Card identification
4.5.4.2.4 Card holder identification
4.5.4.2.5 Card download
4.5.4.2.6 Calibration and time adjustment data
4.5.4.2.7 Events and faults data
4.5.4.2.8 Driver activity data
4.5.4.2.9 Vehicles used data
4.5.4.2.10 Daily work periods start and/or end data
4.5.4.2.11 Card session data
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4.5.4.2.12 Control activity data
4.5.4.2.13 Vehicle units used data
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4.5.4.2.14 Three hours accumulated driving places data
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4.5.4.2.15 Specific conditions data
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4.5.4.2.16 Authentication status for positions related to places where daily
work periods start and/or end (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
4.5.4.2.17 Authentication status for positions where three hours accumulated
driving are reached (not accessed by version 1 of second
generation vehicle units)
4.5.4.2.18 Border crossings (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
4.5.4.2.19 Load/unload operations (not accessed by version 1 of second
generation vehicle units)
4.5.4.2.20 Load type entries (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
4.5.4.2.21 Calibration Additional Data (not accessed by version 1 of second
generation vehicle units)
4.5.4.2.22 VU configurations (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
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4.5.5 Control card
4.5.5.1 Tachograph application (accessible to first and second generation
vehicle units)
4.5.5.1.1 Application identification
4.5.5.1.2 Keys and certificates
4.5.5.1.3 Card identification
4.5.5.1.4 Card holder identification
4.5.5.1.5 Control activity data
4.5.5.2 Tachograph G2 application (not accessible to first generation
vehicle unit)
4.5.5.2.1 Application identification
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4.5.5.2.1.1 Additional application identification (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
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4.5.5.2.2 Keys and certificates
4.5.5.2.3 Card identification
4.5.5.2.4 Card holder identification
4.5.5.2.5 Control activity data
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4.5.5.2.6 VU configurations (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
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4.5.6 Company card
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4.5.6.1 Tachograph application (accessible to first and second generation
vehicle units)
4.5.6.1.1 Application identification
4.5.6.1.2 Keys and certificates
4.5.6.1.3 Card identification
4.5.6.1.4 Card holder identification
4.5.6.1.5 Company activity data
4.5.6.2 Tachograph G2 application (not accessible to first generation
vehicle unit)
4.5.6.2.1 Application identification
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4.5.6.2.1.1 Additional application identification (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
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4.5.6.2.2 Keys and certificates
4.5.6.2.3 Card identification
4.5.6.2.4 Card holder identification
4.5.6.2.5 Company activity data
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4.5.6.2.6 VU configurations (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
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5. INSTALLATION OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT
5.1 Installation
5.2 Installation plaque
5.3 Sealing
6. CHECKS, INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS
6.1 Approval of fitters, workshops and vehicle manufacturers
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6.2 Check of new or repaired components
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6.3 Installation inspection
6.4 Periodic inspections
6.5 Measurement of errors
6.6 Repairs
7. CARD ISSUING
8. TYPE-APPROVAL OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT AND
TACHOGRAPH CARDS
8.1 General points
8.2 Security certificate
8.3 Functional certificate
8.4 Interoperability certificate
8.5 Type-approval certificate
8.6 Exceptional procedure: first interoperability certificates for 2nd
generation recording equipment and tachograph cards
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INTRODUCTION
This Annex contains second generation recording equipment and tachograph
cards requirements.
Since June 15 th 2019, second generation recording equipment is being installed
in vehicles registered in the Union for the first time, and second generation
tachograph cards are being issued.
In order to smoothly implement the second generation tachograph system, second
generation tachograph cards have been designed to be also used in first
generation vehicle units built in accordance with Annex IB to
Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85.
Reciprocally, first generation tachograph cards may be used in second generation
vehicle units. Nevertheless, second generation vehicle units can only be cali­
brated using second generation workshop cards.
The requirements regarding the interoperability between the first and the second
generation tachograph systems are specified in this Annex. In this respect,
Appendix 15 contains additional details on the management of the co-existence
of both generations.
In addition, due to the implementation of new functions such as the use of
Galileo Open Signal Navigation Messages Authentication, detection of border
crossings, entry of load and unload operations, and also to the need to increase
the driver card capacity to 56 days of driver activities, this Regulation introduces
the technical requirements for the second version of the second generation
recording equipment and tachograph cards.
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List of Appendixes
App 1: DATA DICTIONARY
App 2: TACHOGRAPH CARDS SPECIFICATION
App 3: PICTOGRAMS
App 4: PRINTOUTS
App 5: DISPLAY
App 6: FRONT CONNECTOR FOR CALIBRATION AND DOWNLOAD
App 7: DATA DOWNLOADING PROTOCOLS
App 8: CALIBRATION PROTOCOL
App 9: TYPE-APPROVAL AND LIST OF MINIMUM REQUIRED TESTS
App 10: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
App 11: COMMON SECURITY MECHANISMS
App 12: POSITIONING BASED ON GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE
SYSTEM (GNSS)
App 13: ITS INTERFACE
App 14: REMOTE COMMUNICATION FUNCTION
App 15: MIGRATION: MANAGING THE COEXISTENCE OF
EQUIPMENT GENERATIONS
App 16: ADAPTOR FOR M1 AND N1 CATEGORY VEHICLES
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1. DEFINITIONS
In this Annex:
(a) ‘activation’ means:
the phase in which the tachograph becomes fully operational
and implements all functions, including security functions,
through the use of a workshop card;
(b) ‘authentication’ means:
a function intended to establish and verify a claimed identity;
(c) ‘authenticity’ means:
the property that information is coming from a party whose
identity can be verified;
(d) ‘built-in test (BIT)’ means:
tests run at request, triggered by the operator or by external
equipment;
(e) ‘calendar day’ means:
a day ranging from 00:00 hours to 24:00 hours. All calendar
days relate to UTC time (Universal Time Coordinated);
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(f) ‘calibration of a smart tachograph’ means:
updating or confirming vehicle parameters to be held in the
data memory. Vehicle parameters include vehicle identifi­
cation (VIN, VRN and registering Member State) and
vehicle characteristics (w, k, l, tyre size, speed-limiting
device setting (if applicable), current UTC time, current
odometer value, by-default load type); during the calibration
of a recording equipment, the types and identifiers of all
type-approval relevant seals in place shall also be stored in
the data memory;
any update or confirmation of UTC time only, shall be
considered as a time adjustment and not as a calibration,
provided it does not contradict requirement 409 set out in
point 6.4.
calibrating a recording equipment requires the use of a
workshop card;
(g) ‘card number’ means:
a 16-alpha-numerical characters number that uniquely
identifies a tachograph card within a Member State. The
card number includes an identification, which consists in a
driver identification, or in a card owner identification together
with a card consecutive index, a card replacement index and a
card renewal index;
a card is therefore uniquely identified by the code of the
issuing Member State and the card number;
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(h) ‘card consecutive index’ means:
the 14th alphanumerical character of a card number that is
used to differentiate the different cards issued to a company, a
workshop or a control authority entitled to be issued several
tachograph cards. The company, the workshop or the control
authority is uniquely identified by the 13 first characters of
the card number;
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 16
(i) ‘card renewal index’ means:
the 16th alpha-numerical character of a card number which is
incremented each time a tachograph card corresponding to a
given identification, i.e. driver identification or owner identi­
fication together with consecutive index, is renewed;
(j) ‘card replacement index’ means:
the 15 th alpha-numerical character of a card number which is
incremented each time a tachograph card corresponding to a
given identification, i.e. driver identification or owner identi­
fication together with consecutive index, is replaced;
▼B
(k) ‘characteristic coefficient of the vehicle’ means:
the numerical characteristic giving the value of the output
signal emitted by the part of the vehicle linking it with the
recording equipment (gearbox output shaft or axle) while the
vehicle travels a distance of one kilometre under standard test
conditions as defined under requirement 414. The char­
acteristic coefficient is expressed in impulses per kilometre
(w = … imp/km);
(l) ‘company card’ means:
a tachograph card issued by the authorities of a Member State
to a transport undertaking needing to operate vehicles fitted
with a tachograph, which identifies the transport undertaking
and allows for the displaying, downloading and printing of
the data, stored in the tachograph, which have been locked by
that transport undertaking;
(m) ‘constant of the recording equipment’ means:
the numerical characteristic giving the value of the input
signal required to show and record a distance travelled of
one kilometre; this constant shall be expressed in impulses
per kilometre (k = … imp/km);
(n) ‘continuous driving time’ is computed within the recording
equipment as ( 1 ):
the continuous driving time is computed as the current
accumulated driving times of a particular driver, since the
end of his last AVAILABILITY or BREAK/REST or
UNKNOWN ( 2 ) period of 45 minutes or more (this period
may have been split according to Regulation (EC)
No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the
Council ( 3 )). The computations involved take into account,
as needed, past activities stored on the driver card. When
the driver has not inserted his card, the computations
involved are based on the data memory recordings related
to the current period where no card was inserted and
related to the relevant slot;
▼M3
( 1 ) This way of computing the continuous driving time and the cumulative break time serves
in the recording equipment for computing the continuous driving time warning. It does
not prejudge the legal interpretation to be made of these times. Alternative ways of
computing the continuous driving time and the cumulative break time may be used to
replace these definitions if they have been made obsolete by updates in other relevant
legislation.
( 2 ) UNKNOWN periods correspond to periods where the driver card was not inserted in the
recording equipment and for which no manual entry of driver activities was made.
( 3 ) Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road
transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98
and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 1).
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 17
(o) ‘control card’ means:
a tachograph card issued by the authorities of a Member State
to a national competent control authority which identifies the
control body and, optionally, the control officer, and which
allows access to the data stored in the data memory or in the
driver cards and, optionally, in the workshop cards for
reading, printing and/or downloading;
It shall also give access to the roadside calibration checking
function and to data on the remote early detection communi­
cation reader;
(p) ‘cumulative break time’ is computed within the recording
equipment as ( 1 ):
the cumulative break from driving time is computed as the
current accumulated AVAILABILITY or BREAK/REST or
UNKNOWN ( 2 ) times of 15 minutes or more of a particular
driver, since the end of his last AVAILABILITY or
BREAK/REST or UNKNOWN ( 2 ) period of 45 minutes or
more (this period may have been split according to
Regulation (EC) No 561/2006).
The computations involved take into account, as needed, past
activities stored on the driver card. Unknown periods of
negative duration (start of unknown period > end of
unknown period) due to time overlaps between two
different sets of recording equipment, are not taken into
account for the computation.
When the driver has not inserted his card, the computations
involved are based on the data memory recordings related to
the current period where no card was inserted and related to
the relevant slot;
(q) ‘data memory’ means:
an electronic data storage device built into the recording
equipment;
(r) ‘digital signature’ means:
data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a
block of data that allows the recipient of the block of data
to prove the authenticity and integrity of the block of data;
(s) ‘downloading’ means:
the copying, together with the digital signature, of a part, or
of a complete set, of data files recorded in the data memory
of the vehicle unit or in the memory of a tachograph card,
provided that this process does not alter or delete any stored
data;
▼B
( 1 ) This way of computing the continuous driving time and the cumulative break time serves
in the recording equipment for computing the continuous driving time warning. It does
not prejudge the legal interpretation to be made of these times. Alternative ways of
computing the continuous driving time and the cumulative break time may be used to
replace these definitions if they have been made obsolete by updates in other relevant
legislation.
( 2 ) UNKNOWN periods correspond to periods where the driver card was not inserted in the
recording equipment and for which no manual entry of driver activities was made.
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 18
manufacturers of smart tachograph vehicle units and manu­
facturers of equipment designed and intended to download
data files shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the
downloading of such data can be performed with the
minimum delay by transport undertakings or drivers;
The downloading of the detailed speed file may not be
necessary to establish compliance with Regulation (EC)
No 561/2006, but may be used for other purposes such as
accident investigation;
(t) ‘driver card’ means:
a tachograph card, issued by the authorities of a Member
State to a particular driver, which identifies the driver and
allows for the storage of driver activity data;
(u) ‘effective circumference of the wheels’ means:
the average of the distances travelled by each of the wheels
moving the vehicle (driving wheels) in the course of one
complete rotation. The measurement of these distances shall
be made under standard test conditions as defined under
requirement 414 and is expressed in the form ‘l = … mm’.
Vehicle manufacturers may replace the measurement of these
distances by a theoretical calculation which takes into account
the distribution of the weight on the axles, vehicle unladen in
normal running order ( 1 ). The methods for such theoretical
calculation are subject to approval by a competent Member
State authority and can take place only before tachograph
activation;
(v) ‘event’ means:
an abnormal operation detected by the smart tachograph
which may result from a fraud attempt;
(w) ‘external GNSS facility’ means
a facility which contains the GNSS receiver when the vehicle
unit is not a single unit as well as other components needed to
protect the communication of position data to the rest of the
vehicle unit;
(x) ‘fault’ means:
abnormal operation detected by the smart tachograph which
may come from an equipment malfunction or failure;
(y) ‘GNSS receiver’ means:
an electronic device that receives and digitally processes the
signals from one or more Global Navigation Satellite
System(s) (GNSS in English) in order to provide position,
speed and time information;
▼B
( 1 ) Commission Regulation (EU) No 1230/2012 of 12 December 2012 implementing Regu­
lation (EC) No 661/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to
type-approval requirements for masses and dimensions of motor vehicles and their
trailers and amending Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council (OJ L 353, 21.12.2012, p. 31) as last amended.
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 19
(z) ‘installation’ means:
the mounting of a tachograph in a vehicle;
(aa) ‘interoperability’ means:
the capacity of systems and the underlying business processes
to exchange data and to share information;
(bb) ‘interface’ means:
a facility between systems which provides the media through
which they can connect and interact;
(cc) ‘position’ means:
geographical coordinates of the vehicle at a given time;
(dd) ‘motion sensor’ means:
a part of the tachograph, providing a signal representative of
vehicle speed and/or distance travelled;
▼M3
(ee) ‘non-valid card’ means:
a card detected as faulty, or which authentication failed, or
whose start of validity date is not yet reached, or which
expiry date has passed;
a card is also considered as non-valid by the vehicle unit:
— if a card with the same card issuing Member State, the
same identification, i.e. driver identification or owner
identification together with consecutive index, and a
higher renewal index has already been inserted in the
vehicle unit, or
— if a card with the same card issuing Member State, the
same identification, i.e. driver identification or owner
identification together with consecutive index and
renewal index but with a higher replacement index has
already been inserted in the vehicle unit;
▼B
(ff) ‘open standard’ means:
a standard set out in a standard specification document
available freely or at a nominal charge which it is permissible
to copy, distribute or use for no fee or for a nominal fee;
(gg) ‘out of scope’ means:
when the use of the recording equipment is not required,
according to the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006;
(hh) ‘over speeding’ means:
exceeding the authorised speed of the vehicle, defined as any
period of more than 60 seconds during which the vehicle's
measured speed exceeds the limit for setting the speed limi­
tation device laid down in Council Directive 92/6/EEC ( 1 ), as
last amended;
▼B
( 1 ) Council Directive 92/6/EEC of 10 February 1992 on the installation and use of speed
limitation devices for certain categories of motor vehicles in the Community (OJ L 57,
2.3.1992, p. 27).
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 20
(ii) ‘periodic inspection’ means:
a set of operations performed to check that the tachograph
works properly, that its settings correspond to the vehicle
parameters, and that no manipulation devices are attached to
the tachograph;
(jj) ‘printer’ means:
component of the recording equipment which provides
printouts of stored data;
(kk) ‘remote early detection communication’ means:
communication between the remote early detection communi­
cation facility and the remote early detection communication
reader during targeted roadside checks with the aim of
remotely detecting possible manipulation or misuse of
recording equipment;
▼M3
(ll) ‘remote communication facility’, ‘remote communication
module’ or ‘remote early detection facility’ means:
the equipment of the vehicle unit which is used to perform
targeted roadside checks;
▼B
(mm) ‘remote early detection communication reader’ means:
the system used by control officers for targeted roadside
checks.
▼M3
(nn) ‘card renewal’ means:
issue of a new tachograph card when an existing card reaches
its expiry date, or is malfunctioning and has been returned to
the issuing authority;
▼B
(oo) ‘repair’ means:
any repair of a motion sensor or of a vehicle unit or of a cable
that requires the disconnection of its power supply, or its
disconnection from other tachograph components, or the
opening of the motion sensor or vehicle unit;
▼M3
(pp) ‘card replacement’ means:
issue of a new tachograph card in replacement of an existing
card, which has been declared as lost, stolen or malfunc­
tioning and has not been returned to the issuing authority;
▼B
(qq) ‘security certification’ means:
process to certify, by a common criteria certification body,
that the recording equipment (or component) or the
tachograph card under investigation fulfils the security
requirements defined in the relative protection profiles;
(rr) ‘self test’ means:
tests run cyclically and automatically by the recording
equipment to detect faults;
(ss) ‘time measurement’ means:
a permanent digital record of the coordinated universal date
and time (UTC);
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 21
(tt) ‘time adjustment’ means:
an adjustment of current time; this adjustment can be
automatic, using the time provided by the GNSS receiver as
a reference, or performed in calibration mode;
▼B
(uu) ‘tyre size’ means:
the designation of the dimensions of the tyres (external
driving wheels) in accordance with Council Directive
92/23/EEC ( 1 ) as last amended;
(vv) ‘vehicle identification’ means:
numbers identifying the vehicle: vehicle registration
number (VRN) with indication of the registering Member
State and vehicle identification number (VIN) ( 2 );
(ww) for computing sake in the recording equipment ‘week’ means:
the period between 00:00 hours UTC on Monday and 24:00
UTC on Sunday;
(xx) ‘workshop card’ means:
a tachograph card issued by the authorities of a Member State
to designated staff of a tachograph manufacturer, a fitter, a
vehicle manufacturer or a workshop, approved by that
Member State, which identifies the cardholder and allows
for the testing, calibration and activation of tachographs,
and/or downloading from them;
(yy) ‘adaptor’ means:
a device, providing a signal permanently representative of
vehicle speed and/or distance travelled, other than the one
used for the independent movement detection, and which is:
▼M3
— installed and used only in M1 and N1 type vehicles, as
defined in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2018/858 of the
European Parliament and of the Council ( 3 ),
▼B
— installed where it is not mechanically possible to install
any other type of existing motion sensor which is
otherwise compliant with the provisions of this
Annex and its Appendixes 1 to 15,
▼M3
( 1 ) Council Directive 92/23/EEC of 31 March 1992 relating to tyres for motor vehicles and
their trailers and to their fitting (OJ L 129, 14.5.1992, p. 95).
( 2 ) Council Directive 76/114/EEC of 18 December 1975 on the approximation of the laws
of the Member States relating to statutory plates and inscriptions for motor vehicles and
their trailers, and their location and method of attachment (OJ L 24, 30.1.1976, p. 1).
( 3 ) Regulation (EU) 2018/858 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May
2018 on the approval and market surveillance of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of
systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, amending
Regulations (EC) No 715/2007 and (EC) No 595/2009 and repealing Directive
2007/46/EC (OJ L 151, 14.6.2018, p.1)
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 22
— installed between the vehicle unit and where the speed/
distance impulses are generated by integrated sensors or
alternative interfaces,
— seen from a vehicle unit, the adaptor behaviour is the
same as if a motion sensor, compliant with the provisions
of this Annex and its Appendixes 1 to 16, was connected
to the vehicle unit;
use of such an adaptor in those vehicles described above shall
allow for the installation and correct use of a vehicle unit
compliant with all the requirements of this Annex,
for those vehicles, the smart tachograph includes cables, an
adaptor, and a vehicle unit;
(zz) ‘data integrity’ means:
the accuracy and consistency of stored data, indicated by an
absence of any alteration in data between two updates of a
data record. Integrity implies that the data is an exact copy of
the original version, e.g. that it has not been corrupted in the
process of being written to, and read back from, a tachograph
card or a dedicated equipment or during transmission via any
communications channel;
▼M3
(aaa) reserved for future use;
▼B
(bbb) ‘smart tachograph’ system means:
the recording equipment, tachograph cards and the set of all
directly or indirectly interacting equipment during their
construction, installation, use, testing and control, such as
cards, remote communication reader and any other
equipment for data downloading, data analysis, calibration,
generating, managing or introducing security elements, etc.;
▼M3
(ccc) ‘introduction date’ means:
the date set out in Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 as from
which vehicles registered for the first time shall be fitted
with a tachograph in accordance with this Regulation;
▼B
(ddd) ‘protection profile’ means:
a document used as part of certification process according
Common Criteria, providing implementation independent
specification of information assurance security requirements;
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 23
(eee) ‘GNSS accuracy’:
in the context of recording the position from a Global Navi­
gation Satellite System (GNSS) with tachographs, means the
value of the horizontal dilution of precision (HDOP)
calculated as the minimum of the HDOP values collected
on the available GNSS systems;
▼M1
(fff) ‘accumulated driving time’ means:
a value representing the total accumulated number of minutes
of driving of a particular vehicle.
The accumulated driving time value is a free running count of
all minutes regarded as DRIVING by the monitoring of
driving activities function of the recording equipment, and
is only used for triggering the recording of the vehicle
position, every time a multiple of three hours of accumulated
driving is reached. The accumulation is started at the
recording equipment activation. It is not affected by any
other condition, like out of scope or ferry/train crossing.
The accumulated driving time value is not intended to be
displayed, printed, or downloaded.
▼B
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
RECORDING EQUIPMENT
2.1 General characteristics
The purpose of the recording equipment is to record, store, display,
print, and output data related to driver activities.
Any vehicle fitted with the recording equipment complying with the
provisions of this Annex, must include a speed display and an
odometer. These functions may be included within the recording
equipment.
(1) The recording equipment includes cables, a motion sensor,
and a vehicle unit.
(2) The interface between motion sensors and vehicle units
shall comply with the requirements specified in
Appendix 11.
(3) The vehicle unit shall be connected to global navigation
satellite system(s), as specified in Appendix 12.
(4) The vehicle unit shall communicate with remote early
detection communication readers, as specified in
Appendix 14.
▼M3
(5) The vehicle unit shall include an ITS interface, which is
specified in Appendix 13.
The recording equipment may be connected to other
facilities through additional interfaces and/or through the
ITS interface.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 24
(6) Any inclusion in or connection to the recording equipment
of any function, device, or devices, approved or otherwise,
shall not interfere with, or be capable of interfering with,
the proper and secure operation of the recording equipment
and the provisions of this Regulation.
Recording equipment users identify themselves to the
equipment via tachograph cards.
(7) The recording equipment provides selective access rights
to data and functions according to user's type and/or
identity.
The recording equipment records and stores data in its data memory,
in the remote communication facility and in tachograph cards.
▼M3
This is done in accordance with the applicable Union legislation
regarding data protection and in compliance with Article 7 of Regu­
lation (EU) No 165/2014.
▼B
2.2 Functions
(8) The recording equipment shall ensure the following
functions:
— monitoring cards insertions and withdrawals,
— speed, distance and position measurement,
— time measurement,
— monitoring driver activities,
— monitoring driving status,
▼M3
— drivers manual entries:
— entry of places where daily work periods begin
and/or end,
— manual entry of driver activities and driver consent
for ITS interface,
— entry of specific conditions,
— entry of load/unload operations,
▼B
— company locks management,
— monitoring control activities,
— detection of events and/or faults,
— built-in and self-tests,
— reading from data memory,
— recording and storing in data memory,
— reading from tachograph cards,
— recording and storing in tachograph cards,
— displaying,
— printing,
— warning,
— data downloading to external media,
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 25
— remote communication for targeted roadside checks,
— output data to additional facilities,
— calibration,
— roadside calibration check,
— time adjustment,
▼M3
— monitoring border crossings,
— software update.
▼B
2.3 Modes of operation
(9) The recording equipment shall possess four modes of
operation:
— operational mode,
— control mode,
— calibration mode,
— company mode.
(10) The recording equipment shall switch to the following
mode of operation according to the valid tachograph
cards inserted into the card interface devices. In order to
determine the mode of operation, the tachograph card
generation is irrelevant, provided the inserted card is
valid. A first generation workshop card shall always be
considered as non-valid when it is inserted in a second
generation VU.
Mode of operation
Driver slot
No card Driver card Control card Workshop card Company card
C
o-
dr
iv
er
s
lo
t
No card Operational Operational Control Calibration Company
Driver card Operational Operational Control Calibration Company
Control card Control Control Control (*) Operational Operational
Workshop card Calibration Calibration Operational Calibration (*) Operational
Company card Company Company Operational Operational Company (*)
(*) In these situations the recording equipment shall use only the tachograph card inserted in the driver slot.
(11) The recording equipment shall ignore non-valid cards
inserted, except displaying, printing or downloading data
held on an expired card which shall be possible.
(12) All functions listed in 2.2. shall work in any mode of
operation with the following exceptions:
— the calibration function is accessible in the calibration
mode only,
— the roadside calibration checking function is accessible
in the control mode only,
— the company locks management function is accessible
in the company mode only,
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 26
— the monitoring of control activities function is opera­
tional in the control mode only,
▼M3
— The downloading function is not accessible in the op­
erational mode, except:
(a) as provided for in requirement 193,
(b) downloading a driver card when no other card type
is inserted into the VU.
▼B
(13) The recording equipment can output any data to display,
printer or external interfaces with the following exceptions:
— in the operational mode, any personal identification
(surname and first name(s)) not corresponding to a
tachograph card inserted shall be blanked and any
card number not corresponding to a tachograph card
inserted shall be partially blanked (every odd character
— from left to right — shall be blanked),
▼M3
— in the company mode, driver related data (requirements
102, 105, 108, 133a and 133e) can be output only for
periods where no lock exists or no other company
holds a lock (as identified by the first 13 digits of
the company card number),
▼B
— when no card is inserted in the recording equipment,
driver related data can be output only for the current
and 8 previous calendar days,
▼M3
— personal data recorded and produced by either the
tachograph or the tachograph cards shall not be
output through the ITS interface of the VU unless
the consent of the driver to whom the data relates is
verified,
▼M1
— the vehicle units have a normal operations validity
period of 15 years, starting with the vehicle unit
certificates effective date, but vehicle units can be
used for additional 3 months, for data downloading
only.
▼B
2.4 Security
▼M1
The system security aims at protecting the data memory in such a
way as to prevent unauthorised access to and manipulation of the
data and detecting any such attempts, protecting the integrity and
authenticity of data exchanged between the motion sensor and the
vehicle unit, protecting the integrity and authenticity of data
exchanged between the recording equipment and the tachograph
cards, protecting the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged
between the vehicle unit and the external GNSS facility, if any,
protecting the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data
exchanged through the remote early detection communication for
control purposes, and verifying the integrity and authenticity of
data downloaded.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 27
(14) In order to achieve the system security, the following
components shall meet the security requirements
specified in their Protection Profiles, as required in
Appendix 10:
— vehicle unit,
— tachograph card,
— motion sensor,
▼M3
— external GNSS facility (this Profile is only needed and
applicable for the external GNSS facility variant).
▼B
3. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
RECORDING EQUIPMENT
3.1 Monitoring cards insertion and withdrawal
(15) The recording equipment shall monitor the card interface
devices to detect card insertions and withdrawals.
▼M3
(16) Upon card insertion (or remote card authentication) the
recording equipment shall detect whether the card is a
valid tachograph card in accordance with definition (ee)
in section 1, and in such a case identify the card type
and the card generation.
For checking if a card has already been inserted, the
recording equipment shall use the tachograph card data
stored in its data memory, as set out in requirement 133.
▼B
(17) First generation tachograph cards shall be considered as
non-valid by the recording equipment, after the possibility
of using first generation tachograph cards has been
suppressed by a workshop, in compliance with Appendix
15 (req. MIG003).
(18) First generation workshop cards which are inserted in the
second generation recording equipment shall be considered
as non-valid.
(19) The recording equipment shall be so designed that the
tachograph cards are locked in position on their proper
insertion into the card interface devices.
▼M3
(20) The withdrawal of tachograph cards may function only
when the vehicle is stopped and after the relevant data
have been stored on the cards. The withdrawal of the
card shall require positive action by the user.
▼B
3.2 Speed, position and distance measurement
(21) The motion sensor (possibly embedded in the adaptor) is
the main source for speed and distance measurement.
(22) This function shall continuously measure and be able to
provide the odometer value corresponding to the total
distance travelled by the vehicle using the pulses
provided by the motion sensor.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 28
(23) This function shall continuously measure and be able to
provide the speed of the vehicle using the pulses provided
by the motion sensor.
(24) The speed measurement function shall also provide the
information whether the vehicle is moving or stopped.
The vehicle shall be considered as moving as soon as
the function detects more than 1 imp/sec for at least
5 seconds from the motion sensor, otherwise the vehicle
shall be considered as stopped.
(25) Devices displaying speed (speedometer) and total distance
travelled (odometer) installed in any vehicle fitted with a
recording equipment complying with the provisions of this
Regulation, shall comply with the requirements relating to
maximum tolerances (see 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) laid down in
this Annex.
▼M3
(26) To detect manipulation of motion data, information from
the motion sensor shall be corroborated by vehicle motion
information derived from the GNSS receiver and by other
source(s) independent from the motion sensor. At least
another independent vehicle motion source shall be
inside the VU without the need of an external interface.
(27) This function shall measure the position of the vehicle in
order to allow for the recording of:
— positions where the driver and/or the co-driver begins
his daily work period;
— positions where the accumulated driving time reaches a
multiple of three hours;
— positions where the vehicle has crossed the border of a
country;
— positions where operations of load/unload have been
carried out;
— positions where the driver and/or the co-driver ends his
daily work period.
▼B
3.2.1 Measurement of distance travelled
(28) The distance travelled may be measured either:
— so as to cumulate both forward and reverse movements,
or
— so as to include only forward movement.
(29) The recording equipment shall measure distance from 0 to
9 999 999,9 km.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 29
(30) Distance measured shall be within the following tolerances
(distances of at least 1 000 m.):
— ± 1 % before installation,
— ± 2 % on installation and periodic inspection,
— ± 4 % in use.
▼M3
The tolerances shall not be used to intentionally alter the
distance measured.
▼B
(31) Distance measured shall have a resolution better than or
equal to 0,1 km.
3.2.2 Measurement of speed
(32) The recording equipment shall measure speed from 0 to
220 km/h.
▼M3
(33) To ensure a maximum tolerance on speed displayed of
± 6 km/h in use, and taking into account:
— a ± 2 km/h tolerance for input variations (tyre
variations, …),
— a ± 1 km/h tolerance in measurements made during
installation or periodic inspections,
the recording equipment shall, for speeds between 20
and 180 km/h, and for characteristic coefficients of the
vehicle between 2 400 and 25 000 imp/km, measure the
speed with a tolerance of ± 1 km/h (at constant speed).
Note: The resolution of data storage brings an additional
tolerance of ± 0,5 km/h to speed stored by the recording
equipment.
▼B
(34) The speed shall be measured correctly within the normal
tolerances within 2 seconds of the end of a speed change
when the speed has changed at a rate up to 2 m/s 2 .
(35) Speed measurement shall have a resolution better than or
equal to 1 km/h.
3.2.3 Measurement of position
(36) The recording equipment shall measure the absolute
position of the vehicle using the GNSS receiver.
▼M3
(37) The absolute position shall be measured in geographical
coordinates of latitude and longitude in degrees and
minutes with a resolution of 1/10 of a minute.
▼B
3.3 Time measurement
(38) The time measurement function shall measure permanently
and digitally provide UTC date and time.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 30
(39) UTC date and time shall be used for dating data inside the
recording equipment (recordings, data exchange) and for
all printouts specified in Appendix 4 ‘Printouts’.
(40) In order to visualise the local time, it shall be possible to
change the offset of the time displayed, in half hour steps.
No other offsets than negative or positive multiples of
half hours shall be allowed.
▼M3
(41) Time drift shall be ± 1 second per day or less, in
temperature conditions in accordance with requirement
213, in the absence of any time adjustment.
(41a) Time accuracy when time is adjusted by workshops in
accordance with requirement 212 shall be 3 seconds or
better.
(41b) The vehicle unit shall include a drift counter, which
computes the maximal time drift since the last time
adjustment in accordance with point 3.23. The maximal
time drift shall be defined by the vehicle unit manufacturer
and shall not exceed 1 second per day, as set out in
requirement 41.
(41c) The drift counter shall be reset to 1 second after each time
adjustment of the recording equipment in accordance with
point 3.23. This includes:
— automatic time adjustments,
— time adjustments performed in calibration mode.
▼B
(42) Time measured shall have a resolution better than or equal
to 1 second.
(43) Time measurement shall not be affected by an external
power supply cut-off of less than 12 months in type
approval conditions.
3.4 Monitoring driver activities
(44) This function shall permanently and separately monitor the
activities of one driver and one co-driver.
(45) Driver activity shall be DRIVING, WORK, AVAILABIL­
ITY or BREAK/REST.
(46) It shall be possible for the driver and/or the co-driver to
manually select WORK, AVAILABILITY or BREAK/REST.
(47) When the vehicle is moving, DRIVING shall be selected
automatically for the driver and AVAILABILITY shall be
selected automatically for the co-driver.
(48) When the vehicle stops, WORK shall be selected auto­
matically for the driver.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 31
(49) The first change of activity to BREAK/REST or AVAIL­
ABILITY arising within 120 seconds of the automatic
change to WORK due to the vehicle stop shall be
assumed to have happened at the time of vehicle stop
(therefore possibly cancelling the change to WORK).
▼B
(50) This function shall output activity changes to the recording
functions at a resolution of one minute.
(51) Given a calendar minute, if DRIVING is registered as the
activity of both the immediately preceding and the im­
mediately succeeding minute, the whole minute shall be
regarded as DRIVING.
(52) Given a calendar minute that is not regarded as DRIVING
according to requirement 051, the whole minute shall be
regarded to be of the same type of activity as the longest
continuous activity within the minute (or the latest of the
equally long activities).
(53) This function shall also permanently monitor the
continuous driving time and the cumulative break time
of the driver.
3.5 Monitoring driving status
(54) This function shall permanently and automatically monitor
the driving status.
(55) The driving status CREW shall be selected when two valid
driver cards are inserted in the equipment, the driving
status SINGLE shall be selected in any other case.
3.6 Driver's entries
3.6.1 Entry of places where daily work periods begin and/or end
(56) This function shall allow for the entry of places where,
according to the driver and/or the co-driver, his daily work
periods begin and/or end.
▼M3
(57) Places are defined as the country and, in addition where
applicable, the region.
(58) Upon driver (or workshop) card withdrawal, the recording
equipment shall display the current place of the vehicle on
the basis of the GNSS information, and of stored digital
map in accordance with point 3.12.19, and shall request
the cardholder to confirm or to manually rectify the place.
(59) The place entered in accordance with requirement 58 shall
be considered as the place where the daily work period
ends. It shall be recorded in the relevant driver (or
workshop) card as a temporary record, and may
therefore be later overwritten.
Under the following conditions temporary entry made at
last card withdrawal is validated (i.e. shall not be over­
written anymore):
— entry of a place where the current daily work period
begins during manual entry according to requirement
(61);
▼M1
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 32
— the next entry of a place where the current daily work
period begins if the card holder does not enter any
place where the work period begins or ended during
the manual entry according to requirement (61).
Under the following conditions temporary entry made at
last card withdrawal is overwritten and the new value is
validated:
— the next entry of a place where the current daily work
period ends if the card holder does not enter any place
where the work period begins or ended during the
manual input according to requirement (61).
▼B
(60) It shall be possible to input places where daily work
periods begin and/or end through commands in the
menus. If more than one such input is done within one
calendar minute, only the last begin place input and the
last end place input done within that time shall be kept
recorded.
▼M3
The recording equipment shall display the current place of
the vehicle on the basis of the GNSS information, and of
stored digital map(s) in accordance with point 3.12.19 and
shall request the driver to confirm or to manually rectify
the place.
▼B
3.6.2 Manual entry of driver activities and driver consent for ITS
interface
▼M3
(61) Upon driver (or workshop) card insertion, and only at this
time, the recording equipment shall allow manual entries
of activities. Manual entries of activities shall be
performed using local time and date values of the time
zone (UTC offset) currently set for the vehicle unit.
At driver or workshop card insertion the cardholder shall
be reminded of:
— the date and time of his last card withdrawal;
— optionally: the local time offset currently set for the
vehicle unit.
At the first insertion of a given driver card or workshop
card currently unknown to the vehicle unit, the cardholder
shall be invited to express his consent for tachograph
related personal data output through the ITS interface.
For checking if a card has already been inserted, the
recording equipment shall use the tachograph card data
stored in its data memory, as set out in requirement 133.
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 33
At any moment, the driver (resp. workshop) consent can
be enabled or disabled through commands in the menu,
provided the driver (resp. workshop) card is inserted.
It shall be possible to input activities with the following
restrictions:
— Activity type shall be WORK, AVAILABILITY or
BREAK/REST;
— Start and end times for each activity shall be within the
period of the last card withdrawal – current insertion
only;
— Activities shall not be allowed to overlap mutually in
time.
It shall be possible to make manual entries, if required, at
the first insertion of a previously unused driver (or
workshop) card.
The procedure for manual entries of activities shall include
as many consecutive steps as necessary to set a type, a
start time and an end time for each activity. For any part
of the time period between last card withdrawal and
current card insertion, the cardholder shall have the
option not to declare any activity.
During the manual entries associated with card insertion
and if applicable, the card holder shall have the oppor­
tunity to input:
— a place where a previous daily work period ended,
associated to the relevant time (thus overwriting and
validating the entry made at the last card withdrawal),
— a place where the current daily work period begins,
associated to the relevant time (thus validating a
temporary entry made at last card withdrawal).
For the place where the current daily work period begins
entered at the current card insertion, the recording
equipment shall display the current place of the vehicle
on the basis of the GNSS information, and of stored
digital map(s) in accordance with point 3.12.19, and
shall request the driver to confirm or to manually rectify
the place.
If the card holder does not enter any place where the work
period begins or ended, during the manual entries associ­
ated with card insertion, this shall be considered as a
declaration that his work period has not changed since
the last card withdrawal. The next entry of a place
where a previous daily work period ends shall then
overwrite the temporary entry made at the last card
withdrawal.
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 34
If a place is entered, it shall be recorded in the relevant
tachograph card.
Manual entries shall be interrupted if:
— the card is withdrawn or,
— the vehicle is moving and the card is in the driver slot.
Additional interruptions are allowed, e.g. a timeout after a
certain period of user inactivity. If manual entries are inter­
rupted, the recording equipment shall validate any
complete place and activity entries (having either unam­
biguous place and time, or activity type, begin time and
end time) already made.
If a second driver or workshop card is inserted while
manual entries of activities are in progress for a previously
inserted card, the manual entries for this previous card
shall be allowed to be completed before manual entries
start for the second card.
The cardholder shall have the option to insert manual
entries according to the following minimum procedure:
— Enter activities manually, in chronological order, for
the period last card withdrawal – current insertion.
— Begin time of the first activity shall be set to card
withdrawal time. For each subsequent entry, the start
time shall be preset to immediately follow the end time
of the previous entry. Activity type and end time shall
be selected for each activity.
The procedure shall end when the end time of a manually
entered activity equals the card insertion time.
The recording equipment shall allow drivers and
workshops to alternately upload manual entries that need
to be entered during the procedure through the ITS
interface specified in Appendix 13 and, optionally,
through other interfaces.
The recording equipment shall allow the card holder to
modify any activity manually entered, until validation by
selection of a specific command. Thereafter, any such
modification shall be forbidden.
▼B
3.6.3 Entry of specific conditions
▼M3
(62) The recording equipment shall allow the driver to enter, in
real time, the following two specific conditions:
— ‘OUT OF SCOPE’ (begin, end),
— ‘FERRY / TRAIN CROSSING’ (begin, end).
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 35
A ‘FERRY / TRAIN CROSSING’ shall not occur if an
‘OUT OF SCOPE’ condition is opened. If an ‘OUT OF
SCOPE’ condition is opened, the recording equipment
shall not allow users to enter a ‘FERRY / TRAIN
CROSSING’ begin flag.
An opened ‘OUT OF SCOPE’ condition must be auto­
matically closed, by the recording equipment, if a driver
card is inserted or withdrawn.
An opened ‘OUT OF SCOPE’ condition shall inhibit the
following events and warnings:
— Driving without an appropriate card,
— Warnings associated with continuous driving time.
The driver shall enter the FERRY / TRAIN CROSSING
begin flag immediately after selecting BREAK/REST on
the ferry or train.
An opened FERRY / TRAIN CROSSING must be ended
by the recording equipment when any of the following
options occurs:
— the driver manually ends the FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING,
which shall occur upon arrival to destination of the ferry/
train, before driving off the ferry/train,
— an ‘OUT OF SCOPE’ condition is opened,
— the driver ejects his card,
— driver activity is computed as DRIVING during a
calendar minute in accordance with point 3.4.
If more than one specific conditions entry of the same type
is done within one calendar minute, only the last one shall
be kept recorded.
3.6.4 Entry of load/unload operation
(62a) The recording equipment shall allow the driver to enter
and confirm, in real time, information indicating that the
vehicle is being loaded, unloaded or that simultaneous
load/unload operation is being performed.
If more than one load/unload operation entry of the same
type is done within one calendar minute, only the last one
shall be kept recorded.
(62b) Load, unload or simultaneous load/unload operations shall
be recorded as separate events.
(62c) The load/unload information shall be entered before the
vehicle leaves the place where the load/unload operation
is carried out.
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 36
3.7 Company locks management
(63) This function shall allow the management of the locks
placed by a company to restrict data access in company
mode to itself.
(64) Company locks consist in a start date/time (lock-in) and an
end date/time (lock-out) associated with the identification
of the company as denoted by the company card number
(at lock-in).
(65) Locks may be turned ‘in’ or ‘out’ in real time only.
(66) Locking-out shall only be possible for the company whose
lock is ‘in’ (as identified by the first 13 digits of the
company card number), or,
(67) Locking-out shall be automatic if another company locks
in.
(68) In the case where a company locks in and where the
previous lock was for the same company, then it will be
assumed that the previous lock has not been turned ‘out’
and is still ‘in’.
3.8 Monitoring control activities
(69) This function shall monitor DISPLAYING, PRINTING,
VU and card DOWNLOADING, and ROADSIDE CALI­
BRATION check activities carried while in control mode.
(70) This function shall also monitor OVER SPEEDING
CONTROL activities while in control mode. An over
speeding control is deemed to have happened when, in
control mode, the ‘over speeding’ printout has been sent
to the printer or to the display, or when ‘events and faults’
data have been downloaded from the VU data memory.
3.9 Detection of events and/or faults
(71) This function shall detect the following events and/or
faults:
3.9.1 ‘Insertion of a non-valid card’ event
(72) This event shall be triggered at the insertion of any
non-valid card, at the insertion of a driver card already
replaced and/or when an inserted valid card expires.
3.9.2 ‘Card conflict’ event
(73) This event shall be triggered when any of the valid cards
combination noted X in the following table arises:
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 37
Card conflict
Driver slot
No card Driver card Control card Workshop card Company card
C
o-
dr
iv
er
s
lo
t
No card
Driver card X
Control card X X X
Workshop card X X X X
Company card X X X
3.9.3 ‘Time overlap’ event
(74) This event shall be triggered when the date / time of last
withdrawal of a driver card, as read from the card, is later
than the current date / time of the recording equipment in
which the card is inserted.
3.9.4 ‘Driving without an appropriate card’ event
(75) This event shall be triggered for any valid tachograph
cards combination noted X in the following table, when
driver activity changes to DRIVING, or when there is a
change of the mode of operation while driver activity is
DRIVING:
Driving without an appropriate
card
Driver slot
No (or non-valid)
card
Driver card Control card Workshop card Company card
C
o-
dr
iv
er
s
lo
t
No (or non-valid)
card
X X X
Driver card X X X X
Control card X X X X X
Workshop card X X X X
Company card X X X X X
3.9.5 ‘Card insertion while driving’ event
(76) This event shall be triggered when a tachograph card is
inserted in any slot, while driver activity is DRIVING.
3.9.6 ‘Last card session not correctly closed’ event
(77) This event shall be triggered when at card insertion the
recording equipment detects that, despite the provisions
laid down in paragraph 3.1., the previous card session
has not been correctly closed (the card has been
withdrawn before all relevant data have been stored on
the card). This event shall be triggered by driver and
workshop cards only.
3.9.7 ‘Over speeding’ event
(78) This event shall be triggered for each over speeding.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 38
3.9.8 ‘Power supply interruption’ event
(79) This event shall be triggered, while not in calibration or
control mode, in case of any interruption exceeding 200
milliseconds of the power supply of the motion sensor
and/or of the vehicle unit. The interruption threshold
shall be defined by the manufacturer. The drop in power
supply due to the starting of the engine of the vehicle shall
not trigger this event.
3.9.9 ‘Communication error with the remote communication facility’
event
(80) This event shall be triggered, while not in calibration
mode, when the remote communication facility does not
acknowledge the successful reception of remote communi­
cation data sent from the vehicle unit for more than three
attempts.
3.9.10 ‘Absence of position information from GNSS receiver’ event
(81) This event shall be triggered, while not in calibration
mode, in case of absence of position information originat­
ing from the GNSS receiver (whether internal or external)
for more than three hours of accumulated driving time.
3.9.11 ‘Communication error with the external GNSS facility’ event
(82) This event shall be triggered, while not in calibration
mode, in case of interruption of the communication
between the external GNSS facility and the vehicle unit
for more than 20 continuous minutes, when the vehicle is
moving.
3.9.12 ‘Motion data error’ event
▼M3
(83) This event shall be triggered, while not in calibration
mode, in case of interruption of the normal data flow
between the motion sensor and the vehicle unit and/or in
case of data integrity or data authentication error during
data exchange between the motion sensor and the vehicle
unit. This event shall also be triggered, while not in cali­
bration mode, in case the speed calculated from the
motion sensor pulses increases from 0 to more than
40 km/h within 1 second, and then stays above 40km/h
during at least 3 seconds.
▼B
3.9.13 ‘Vehicle motion conflict’ event
▼M3
(84) This event shall be triggered, as specified in Appendix 12,
while not in calibration mode, in case motion information
calculated from the motion sensor is contradicted by motion
information calculated from the internal GNSS receiver or
from the external GNSS facility or by other independent
source(s) in accordance with requirement 26. This event
shall not be triggered during a ferry/train crossing.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 39
3.9.14 ‘Security breach attempt’ event
(85) This event shall be triggered for any other event affecting
the security of the motion sensor and/or of the vehicle unit
and/or the external GNSS facility as required in Appendix
10, while not in calibration mode.
▼M1
3.9.15 ‘Time conflict’ event
▼M3
(86) This event shall be triggered, while not in calibration
mode, when the VU detects a discrepancy between the
time of the vehicle unit’s time measurement function and
the time originating from the authenticated positions trans­
mitted by the GNSS receiver or the external GNSS facility.
A ‘time discrepancy’ is detected if the time difference
exceeds ±3 seconds corresponding to the time accuracy
set out in requirement 41a, the latter increased by the
maximal time drift per day. This event shall be recorded
together with the internal clock value of the recording
equipment. The VU shall perform the check for triggering
the ‘time conflict’ event right before the VU automatically
re-adjusts the VU internal clock, in accordance with
requirement 211.
▼B
3.9.16 ‘Card’ fault
(87) This fault shall be triggered when a tachograph card failure
occurs during operation.
3.9.17 ‘Recording equipment’ fault
(88) This fault shall be triggered for any of these failures, while
not in calibration mode:
— VU internal fault
— Printer fault
— Display fault
— Downloading fault
— Sensor fault
— GNSS receiver or external GNSS facility fault
— Remote Communication facility fault
▼M3
— ITS interface fault.
3.9.18 ‘GNSS anomaly’ event
(88a) This event shall be triggered, while not in calibration
mode, when the GNSS receiver detects an attack, or
when authentication of navigation messages has failed,
as specified in Appendix 12. After a GNSS anomaly
event has been triggered, the VU shall not generate other
GNSS anomaly events for the next 10 minutes.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 40
3.10 Built-in and self-tests
(89) ►M1 The recording equipment shall detect faults through
self-tests and built-in-tests, according to the following
table: ◄
Sub-assembly to test Self-test Built-in-test
Software Integrity
Data memory Access Access, data integrity
Card interface devices Access Access
Keyboard Manual check
Printer (up to manufacturer) Printout
Display Visual check
Downloading
(performed only during
downloading)
Proper operation
Sensor Proper operation Proper operation
Remote communication
facility
Proper operation Proper operation
GNSS facility Proper operation Proper operation
▼M3
ITS interface Proper operation
▼B
3.11 Reading from data memory
(90) The recording equipment shall be able to read any data
stored in its data memory.
3.12 Recording and storing in the data memory
▼M3
For the purpose of this point,
— ‘365 days’ is defined as 365 calendar days of average drivers
activity in a vehicle. The average activity per day in a vehicle is
defined as at least 6 drivers or co-drivers, 6 card insertion with­
drawal cycles, and 256 activity changes. ‘365 days’ therefore
include at least 2 190 drivers or co-drivers, 2 190 card insertion
withdrawal cycles, and 93 440 activity changes,
— the average number of place entries per day is defined as at least
6 entries where the daily work period begins and 6 entries where
the daily work period ends, so that ‘365 days’ include at least
4 380 place entries,
— the average number of positions per day when the accumulated
driving time reaches a multiple of three hours is defined as at
least 6 positions, so that ‘365 days’ include at least 2 190 such
positions,
— the average number of border crossings per day is defined as at
least 20 crossings, so that ‘365 days’ include at least 7 300
border crossings,
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 41
— the average number of load/unload operations per day is defined
as at least 25 operations (irrespective of the type), so that ‘365
days’ include at least 9 125 load/unload operations,
— times are recorded with a resolution of one minute, unless
otherwise specified,
— odometer values are recorded with a resolution of one kilometre,
— speeds are recorded with a resolution of 1 km/h,
— positions (latitudes and longitudes) are recorded in degrees and
minutes, with a resolution of 1/10 of minute, with the associated
GNSS accuracy and acquisition time, and with a flag indicating
whether the position has been authenticated.’.
▼B
(91) Data stored into the data memory shall not be affected by
an external power supply cut-off of less than twelve
months in type approval conditions. In addition, data
stored in the external remote communication facility, as
defined in Appendix 14, shall not be affected by
power-supply cut-off of less than 28 days.
(92) The recording equipment shall be able to record and store
implicitly or explicitly in its data memory the following:
3.12.1 Equipment identification data
3.12.1.1 V e h i c l e u n i t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n d a t a
(93) The recording equipment shall be able to store in its data
memory the following vehicle unit identification data:
— name of the manufacturer,
— address of the manufacturer,
— part number,
— serial number,
— VU generation,
— ability to use first generation tachograph cards,
— software version number,
— software version installation date,
— year of equipment manufacture,
— approval number,
▼M3
— digital map version identifier (requirement 133l).
(94) Vehicle unit identification data are recorded and stored
once and for all by the vehicle unit manufacturer, except
data which may be changed in case of software update in
accordance with this Regulation, and the ability to use first
generation tachograph cards.
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 42
3.12.1.2 M o t i o n s e n s o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n d a t a
(95) The motion sensor shall be able to store in its memory the
following identification data:
— name of the manufacturer,
— serial number,
— approval number,
— embedded security component identifier (e.g. internal
chip/processor part number),
— operating system identifier (e.g. software version
number).
(96) Motion sensor identification data are recorded and stored
once and for all in the motion sensor, by the motion sensor
manufacturer.
▼M3
(97) The vehicle unit shall be able to record and store in its
data memory the following data related to the 20 most
recent successful pairings of motion sensors (if several
pairings happen within one calendar day, only the first
and the last one of the day shall be stored):
▼B
The following data shall be recorded for each of these
pairings:
— motion sensor identification data:
— serial number
— approval number
— motion sensor pairing data:
— pairing date.
3.12.1.3 G l o b a l N a v i g a t i o n S a t e l l i t e S y s t e m s i d e n t i f i ­
c a t i o n d a t a
(98) The external GNSS facility shall be able to store in its
memory the following identification data:
— name of the manufacturer,
— serial number,
— approval number,
— embedded security component identifier (e.g. internal
chip/processor part number),
— operating system identifier (e.g. software version
number).
(99) The identification data are recorded and stored once and
for all in the external GNSS facility, by the external GNSS
facility manufacturer.
▼M3
(100) The vehicle unit shall be able to record and store in its
data memory the following data related to the 20 most
recent successful couplings of external GNSS facilities
(if several couplings happen within one calendar day,
only the first and the last one of the day shall be stored).
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 43
The following data shall be recorded for each of these
couplings:
— external GNSS facility identification data:
— serial number,
— approval number,
— external GNSS facility coupling data:
— coupling date
3.12.2 Keys and certificates
(101) The recording equipment shall be able to store a number
of cryptographic keys and certificates, as specified in
Appendix 11 part A and part B.
3.12.3 Driver or workshop card insertion and withdrawal data
(102) For each insertion and withdrawal cycle of a driver or
workshop card in the equipment, the recording
equipment shall record and store in its data memory:
— the card holder's surname and first name(s) as stored in
the card,
— the card's number, issuing Member State and expiry
date as stored in the card,
— the card generation,
— the insertion date and time,
— the vehicle odometer value at card insertion,
— the slot in which the card is inserted,
— the withdrawal date and time,
— the vehicle odometer value at card withdrawal,
— the following information about the previous vehicle
used by the driver, as stored in the card:
— VRN and registering Member State,
— VU generation (when available),
— card withdrawal date and time,
— a flag indicating whether, at card insertion, the card
holder has manually entered activities or not.
(103) The data memory shall be able to hold these data for at
least 365 days.
(104) When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace
oldest data.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 44
3.12.4 Driver activity data
(105) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory whenever there is a change of activity for the
driver and/or the co-driver, and/or whenever there is a
change of driving status, and/or whenever there is an
insertion or withdrawal of a driver or workshop card:
— the driving status (CREW, SINGLE),
— the slot (DRIVER, CO-DRIVER),
— the card status in the relevant slot (INSERTED, NOT
INSERTED),
— the activity (DRIVING, AVAILABILITY, WORK,
BREAK/REST),
— the date and time of the change.
INSERTED means that a valid driver or workshop card is
inserted in the slot. NOT INSERTED means the opposite
i.e. no valid driver or workshop card is inserted in the slot
(e.g. a company card is inserted or no card is inserted)
Activity data manually entered by a driver are not recorded
in the data memory.
(106) The data memory shall be able to hold driver activity data
for at least 365 days.
(107) When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace
oldest data.
▼M1
3.12.5 Places and positions where daily work periods begin, end and/or
where 3 hours accumulated driving time is reached
(108) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory:
— places and positions where the driver and/or co-driver
begins his daily work period;
— positions where the accumulated driving time reaches a
multiple of three hours;
— places and positions where the driver and/or the
co-driver ends his daily work period.
▼B
(109) When the position of the vehicle is not available from the
GNSS receiver at these times, the recording equipment
shall use the latest available position, and the related
date and time.
(110) Together with each place or position, the recording
equipment shall record and store in its data memory:
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 45
— the driver and/or co-driver card number and card
issuing Member State,
▼B
— the card generation,
— the date and time of the entry,
▼M1
— the type of entry (begin, end or 3 hours accumulated
driving time),
▼B
— the related GNSS accuracy, date and time if applicable;
— the vehicle odometer value,
▼M3
— a flag indicating whether the position has been
authenticated.
(110a) For places where the daily work period begins or ends
entered during the manual entry procedure at card
insertion in accordance with requirement 61, the current
odometer value and position of the vehicle shall be stored.
▼M1
(111) The data memory shall be able to hold places and
positions where daily work periods begin, end and/or
where 3 hours accumulated driving time is reached for at
least 365 days.
▼B
(112) When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace
oldest data.
3.12.6 Odometer data
(113) The recording equipment shall record in its data memory
the vehicle odometer value and the corresponding date at
midnight every calendar day.
(114) The data memory shall be able to store midnight odometer
values for at least 365 calendar days.
(115) When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace
oldest data.
3.12.7 Detailed speed data
▼M1
(116) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory the instantaneous speed of the vehicle and the
corresponding date and time at every second of at least
the last 24 hours that the vehicle has been moving.
▼B
3.12.8 Events data
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be recorded with a
resolution of 1 second.
(117) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory the following data for each event detected
according to the following storage rules:
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 46
Event Storage rules Data to be recorded per event
Insertion of a non-valid
card
— the 10 most recent events. — date and time of event,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of the card
creating the event.
— number of similar events that day
Card conflict — the 10 most recent events. — date and time of beginning of event,
— date and time of end of event,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of the two cards
creating the conflict.
Driving without an appro­
priate card
— the longest event for each of the 10 last
days of occurrence,
— the 5 longest events over the last 365
days.
— date and time of beginning of event,
— date and time of end of event,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of any card
inserted at beginning and/or end of the
event,
— number of similar events that day.
Card insertion while
driving
— the last event for each of the 10 last
days of occurrence,
— date and time of the event,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation,
— number of similar events that day
▼M3
Last card session not
correctly closed
— the 10 most recent events. — date and time of card insertion,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation,
— last session data as read from the card:
— date and time of card insertion.
▼B
Over speeding (1) — the most serious event for each of the
10 last days of occurrence (i.e. the one
with the highest average speed),
— the 5 most serious events over the last
365 days.
— the first event having occurred after the
last calibration
— date and time of beginning of event,
— date and time of end of event,
— maximum speed measured during the
event,
— arithmetic average speed measured
during the event,
— card type, number, issuing Member State
and generation of the driver card (if
applicable),
— number of similar events that day.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 47
Event Storage rules Data to be recorded per event
Power supply interruption
(2)
— the longest event for each of the 10 last
days of occurrence,
— the 5 longest events over the last 365
days.
— date and time of beginning of event,
— date and time of end of event,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of any card
inserted at beginning and/or end of the
event,
— number of similar events that day.
Communication error with
the remote communication
facility
— the longest event for each of the 10 last
days of occurrence,
— the 5 longest events over the last 365
days.
— date and time of beginning of event,
— date and time of end of event,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of any card
inserted at beginning and/or end of the
event,
— number of similar events that day.
Absence of position
information from GNSS
receiver
— the longest event for each of the 10 last
days of occurrence,
— the 5 longest events over the last 365
days.
— date and time of beginning of event,
— date and time of end of event,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of any card
inserted at beginning and/or end of the
event,
— number of similar events that day.
▼M1
Communication error with
the external GNSS facility
— the longest event for each of the 10 last
days of occurrence,
— the 5 longest events over the last 365
days.
— date and time of beginning of event,
— date and time of end of event,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of any card
inserted at beginning and/or end of the
event,
— number of similar events that day.
▼B
Motion data error — the longest event for each of the 10 last
days of occurrence,
— the 5 longest events over the last 365
days.
— date and time of beginning of event,
— date and time of end of event,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of any card
inserted at beginning and/or end of the
event,
— number of similar events that day.
Vehicle motion conflict — the longest event for each of the 10 last
days of occurrence,
— the 5 longest events over the last 365
days.
— date and time of beginning of event,
— date and time of end of event,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of any card
inserted at beginning and/or end of the
event,
— number of similar events that day.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 48
Event Storage rules Data to be recorded per event
Security breach attempt — the 10 most recent events per type of
event.
— date and time of beginning of event,
— date and time of end of event (if
relevant),
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of any card
inserted at beginning and/or end of the
event,
— type of event.
▼M1
Time conflict — the most serious event for each of the
10 last days of occurrence (i.e. the ones
with the greatest difference between
recording equipment date and time,
and GNSS date and time).
— the 5 most serious events over the last
365 days.
— recording equipment date and time
— GNSS date and time,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of any card
inserted at beginning and/or end of the
event,
— number of similar events that day.
▼M3
GNSS anomaly — the longest events for each of the 10
last days of occurrence,
— the 5 longest events over the last 365
days.
— date and time of beginning of event,
— date and time of end of event,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation of any card
inserted at beginning and/or end of the
event,
— number of similar events that day.
▼B
(1) The recording equipment shall also record and store in
its data memory:
— the date and time of the last OVER SPEEDING
CONTROL,
— the date and time of the first over speeding
following this OVER SPEEDING CONTROL,
— the number of over speeding events since the last
OVER SPEEDING CONTROL.
(2) These data may be recorded at power supply recon­
nection only, times may be known with an accuracy to
the minute.
3.12.9 Faults data
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be recorded with a
resolution of 1 second.
(118) The recording equipment shall attempt to record and store
in its data memory the following data for each fault
detected according to the following storage rules:
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 49
Fault Storage rules Data to be recorded per fault
Card fault — the 10 most recent driver card faults. — date and time of beginning of fault,
— date and time of end of fault,
— card(s) type, number, issuing Member
State and generation.
Recording equipment
faults
— the 10 most recent faults for each type
of fault,
— the first fault after the last calibration.
— date and time of beginning of fault,
— date and time of end of fault,
— type of fault,
— card(s) type, number and issuing
Member State and generation of any
card inserted at beginning and/or end
of the fault.
3.12.10 Calibration data
(119) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory data relevant to:
— known calibration parameters at the moment of
activation,
— its very first calibration following its activation,
— its first calibration in the current vehicle (as identified
by its VIN),
— the 20 most recent calibrations (if several calibrations
happen within one calendar day, only the first and the
last one of the day shall be stored).
(120) The following data shall be recorded for each of these
calibrations:
— purpose of calibration (activation, first installation,
installation, periodic inspection),
— workshop name and address,
— workshop card number, card issuing Member State and
card expiry date,
— vehicle identification,
— parameters updated or confirmed: w, k, l, tyre size,
speed limiting device setting, odometer (old and new
values), date and time (old and new values),
— the types and identifiers of all the seals in place,
▼M3
— the serial numbers of the motion sensor, the external
GNSS facility (if any), and the external remote
communication facility (if any),
— the by-default load type associated to the vehicle (load
of either goods or passengers),
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 50
— the country in which the calibration has been
performed, and the date time when the position used
to determine this country was provided by the GNSS
receiver.
▼B
(121) In addition, the recording equipment shall record and store
in its data memory its ability to use first generation
tachograph cards (still activated or not).
(122) The motion sensor shall record and store in its memory the
following motion sensor installation data:
— first pairing with a VU (date, time, VU approval
number, VU serial number),
— last pairing with a VU (date, time, VU approval
number, VU serial number).
(123) The external GNSS facility shall record and store in its
memory the following external GNSS facility installation
data:
— first coupling with a VU (date, time, VU approval
number, VU serial number),
— last coupling with a VU (date, time, VU approval
number, VU serial number).
3.12.11 Time adjustment data
(124) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory data relevant to time adjustments performed in
calibration mode outside the frame of a regular calibration
(def. f)):
— the most recent time adjustment,
— the 5 largest time adjustments.
(125) The following data shall be recorded for each of these time
adjustments:
— date and time, old value,
— date and time, new value,
— workshop name and address,
— workshop card number, card issuing Member State,
card generation and card expiry date.
3.12.12 Control activity data
(126) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory the following data relevant to the 20 most recent
control activities:
— date and time of the control,
— control card number, card issuing Member State and
card generation,
— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or
VU downloading and/or card downloading and/or
roadside calibration checking).
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 51
(127) In case of downloading, the dates of the oldest and of the
most recent days downloaded shall also be recorded.
3.12.13 Company locks data
(128) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory the following data relevant to the 255 most recent
company locks:
— lock-in date and time,
— lock-out date and time,
— company card number, card issuing Member State and
card generation,
— company name and address.
Data previously locked by a lock removed from memory
due to the limit above, shall be treated as not locked.
3.12.14 Download activity data
(129) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory the following data relevant to the last data
memory downloading to external media while in
company or in calibration mode:
— date and time of downloading,
— company or workshop card number, card issuing
Member State and card generation,
— company or workshop name.
3.12.15 Specific conditions data
(130) The recording equipment shall record in its data memory
the following data relevant to specific conditions:
— date and time of the entry,
— type of specific condition.
(131) The data memory shall be able to hold specific conditions
data for at least 365 days (with the assumption that on
average, 1 condition is opened and closed per day).
When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall
replace oldest data.
3.12.16 Tachograph card data
(132) The recording equipment shall be able to store the
following data related to the different tachograph cards
in which had been used in the VU:
— the tachograph card number and its serial number,
— the manufacturer of the tachograph card,
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 52
— the tachograph card type,
— the tachograph card version.
(133) The recording equipment shall be able to store at least 88
such records.
▼M3
3.12.17 Border crossings
(133a) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory the following information about border crossings:
— the country that the vehicle is leaving,
— the country that the vehicle is entering,
— the position where the vehicle has crossed the border.
(133b) Together with countries and position, the recording
equipment shall record and store in its data memory:
— the driver and/or co-driver card number and card
issuing Member State,
— the card generation,
— the related GNSS accuracy, date and time,
— a flag indicating whether the position has been auth­
enticated
— the vehicle odometer value at the time of border
crossing detection.
(133c) The data memory shall be able to hold border crossings for
at least 365 days.
(133d) When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace
oldest data.
3.12.18 Load/unload operations
(133e) The recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory the following information about load and unload
operations of the vehicle:
— the type of operation (load, unload or simultaneous
load/unload),
— the position where the load/unload operation has
occurred.
(133f) When the position of the vehicle is not available from the
GNSS receiver at the time of the load/unload operation,
the recording equipment shall use the latest available
position, and the related date and time.
(133g) Together with the type of operation and position, the
recording equipment shall record and store in its data
memory:
— the driver and/or co-driver card number and card
issuing Member State,
— the card generation,
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 53
— the date and time of the load/unload operation,
— the related GNSS accuracy, date and time if applicable,
— a flag indicating whether the position has been
authenticated,
— the vehicle odometer value.
(133h) The data memory shall be able to store load/unload
operations for at least 365 calendar days.
(133i) When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace
oldest data.
3.12.19 Digital map
(133j) For the purpose of recording the position of the vehicle
when the border of a country is crossed, the recording
equipment shall store in its data memory a digital map.
(133k) Allowed digital maps for supporting the border crossing
monitoring function of the recording equipment shall be
made available by the European Commission for download
from a dedicated secured website, under various formats.
(133l) For each of these maps, a version identifier and a hash
value shall be available on the website.
(133m) The maps shall feature:
— a level of definition corresponding to NUTS level 0,
according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for
Statistics,
— a scale of 1:1 million.
(133n) Tachograph manufacturers shall select a map from the
website and download it securely.
(133o) Tachograph manufacturers shall only use a downloaded
map from the website after having verified its integrity
using the hash value of the map.
(133p) The selected map shall be imported in the recording
equipment by its manufacturer, under an appropriate
format, but the semantic of the imported map shall
remain unchanged.
(133q) The manufacturer shall also store the version identifier of
the map used in the recording equipment.
(133r) It shall be possible to update or replace the stored digital
map by a new one made available by the European
Commission.
(133s) Digital map updates shall be made using the software
update mechanisms set up by the manufacturer, in appli­
cation of requirements 226d and 226e, so that the
recording equipment can verify the authenticity and
integrity of a new imported map, before storing it and
replacing the previous one.
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 54
(133t) Tachograph manufacturers may add additional information
to the basic map referred to in requirement (133m), for
purposes other than recording border crossings, such as the
borders of the EU regions, provided that the semantic of
the basic map is not changed.
▼B
3.13 Reading from tachograph cards
(134) The recording equipment shall be able to read from first
and second generation tachograph cards, where applicable,
the necessary data:
— to identify the card type, the card holder, the
previously used vehicle, the date and time of the last
card withdrawal and the activity selected at that time,
— to check that last card session was correctly closed,
▼M3
— to compute the driver's continuous driving time, cumu­
lative break time and accumulated driving times for the
previous and the current week,
▼B
— to print requested printouts related to data recorded on
a driver card,
— to download a driver card to external media.
This requirement only applies to first generation
tachograph cards if their use has not been suppressed by
a workshop.
(135) In case of a reading error, the recording equipment shall
try again, three times maximum, the same read command,
and then if still unsuccessful, declare the card faulty and
non-valid.
▼M3
(135a) The structure in the ‘TACHO_G2’ application depends on
the version. Version 2 cards contain additional Elementary
Files to the ones of version 1 cards, in particular:
— in driver and workshop cards:
— EF Places_Authentication shall contain the auth­
entication status of the vehicle positions stored in
EF Places. A timestamp shall be stored with each
authentication status, which shall be exactly the
same as the date and time of the entry stored
with the corresponding position in EF Places.
— EF GNSS_Places_Authentication shall contain the
authentication status of the vehicle positions stored
in EF GNSS_Places. A timestamp shall be stored
with each authentication status, which shall be
exactly the same as the date and time of the
entry stored with the corresponding position in
EF Places.
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 55
— EF Border_Crossings, EF Load_Unload_Operations
and EF Load_Type_Entries shall contain data
related to border crossings, load/unload operations
and load types.
— in workshop cards:
— EF Calibration_Add_Data shall contain additional
calibration data to the ones stored in EF Cali­
bration. The old date and time value and the
vehicle identification number shall be stored with
each additional calibration data record, which shall
be exactly the same as the old date and time value
and the vehicle identification number stored with
the corresponding calibration data in EF Cali­
bration.
— in all tachograph cards:
— EF VU_Configuration shall contain the cardholder
tachograph specific settings.
The vehicle unit shall ignore any authentication status found
in EF Places_Authentication or EF GNSS_Places_Authenti­
cation, when no vehicle position with the same timestamp is
found in EF Places or EF GNSS_Places.
The vehicle unit shall ignore the elementary file EF
VU_Configuration in all cards insofar as no specific
rules have been provided with respect to the use of such
elementary file. Those rules shall be set out through an
amendment of Annex IC, which shall include the modifi­
cation or deletion of this paragraph.
▼B
3.14 Recording and storing on tachograph cards
3.14.1 Recording and storing in first generation tachograph cards
(136) Provided first generation tachograph cards use has not
been suppressed by a workshop, the recording equipment
shall record and store data exactly in the same way as a
first generation recording equipment would do.
(137) The recording equipment shall set the ‘card session data’
in the driver or workshop card right after the card
insertion.
(138) The recording equipment shall update data stored on valid
driver, workshop, company and/or control cards with all
necessary data relevant to the period while the card is
inserted and relevant to the card holder. Data stored on
these cards are specified in Chapter 4.
(139) The recording equipment shall update driver activity and
places data (as specified in 4.5.3.1.9 and 4.5.3.1.11), stored
on valid driver and/or workshop cards, with activity and
places data manually entered by the cardholder.
▼M3
(140) All events and faults not defined for the first generation
recording equipment shall not be stored on the first
generation driver and workshop cards.
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 56
(141) Tachograph cards data update shall be such that, when
needed and taking into account card actual storage
capacity, most recent data replace oldest data.
(142) In the case of a writing error, the recording equipment
shall try again, three times maximum, the same write
command and then if still unsuccessful, declare the card
faulty and non-valid.
▼M3
(143) Before releasing a driver or workshop card and after all
relevant data have been stored on the card, the recording
equipment shall reset the ‘card session data’.
▼B
3.14.2 Recording and storing in second generation tachograph cards
(144) Second generation tachograph cards shall contain 2
different card applications, the first of which shall be
exactly the same as the TACHO application of first
generation tachograph cards, and the second the
‘TACHO_G2’ application, as specified in Chapter 4 and
Appendix 2.
▼M3
The structure in the ‘TACHO_G2’ application depends on
the version. Version 2 cards contain additional Elementary
Files to the ones of version 1 cards.
▼B
(145) The recording equipment shall set the ‘card session data’
in the driver or workshop card right after the card
insertion.
(146) The recording equipment shall update data stored on the 2
card applications of valid driver, workshop, company
and/or control cards with all necessary data relevant to
the period while the card is inserted and relevant to the
card holder. Data stored on these cards are specified in
Chapter 4.
(147) The recording equipment shall update driver activity places
and positions data (as specified in 4.5.3.1.9, 4.5.3.1.11,
4.5.3.2.9 and 4.5.3.2.11), stored on valid driver and/or
workshop cards, with activity and places data manually
entered by the cardholder.
▼M3
(147a) On insertion of a driver or workshop card, the recording
equipment shall store on the card the by-default load type
of the vehicle.
(147b) On insertion of a driver or workshop card, and after the
manual entry procedure, the recording equipment shall
check the last place where the daily work period begins
or ends stored on the card. This place may be temporary,
as specified in requirement 59. If this place is in a different
country from the current one in which the vehicle is
located, the recording equipment shall store on the card
a border crossing record, with:
— the country that the driver left: not available,
— the country that the driver is entering: the current
country in which the vehicle is located,
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 57
— the date and time when the driver has crossed the
border: the card insertion time,
— the position of the driver when the border has been
crossed: not available,
— the vehicle odometer value: not available.
▼B
(148) Tachograph cards data update shall be such that, when
needed and taking into account card actual storage
capacity, most recent data replace oldest data.
(149) In the case of a writing error, the recording equipment
shall try again, three times maximum, the same write
command and then if still unsuccessful, declare the card
faulty and non-valid.
(150) Before releasing a driver card and after all relevant data
have been stored on the 2 card applications of the card, the
recording equipment shall reset the ‘card session data’.
▼M3
(150a) The vehicle unit shall ignore the elementary file EF
VU_Configuration in all cards insofar as no specific
rules have been provided with respect to the use of such
elementary file. Those rules shall be set out through an
amendment of Annex IC, which shall include the modifi­
cation or deletion of this paragraph.
▼B
3.15 Displaying
(151) The display shall include at least 20 characters.
(152) The minimum character size shall be 5 mm high and
3.5 mm wide.
(153) The display shall support the characters specified in
Appendix 1 Chapter 4 ‘Character sets’. The display may
use simplified glyphs (e.g. accented characters may be
displayed without accent, or lower case letters may be
shown as upper case letters).
(154) The display shall be provided with adequate non-dazzling
lighting.
(155) Indications shall be visible from outside the recording
equipment.
(156) The recording equipment shall be able to display:
— default data,
— data related to warnings,
— data related to menu access,
— other data requested by a user.
Additional information may be displayed by the recording
equipment, provided that it is clearly distinguishable from
information required above.
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 58
(157) The display of the recording equipment shall use the
pictograms or pictograms combinations listed in
Appendix 3. Additional pictograms or pictograms combi­
nations may also be provided by the display, if clearly
distinguishable from the aforementioned pictograms or
pictograms combinations.
(158) The display shall always be ON when the vehicle is
moving.
(159) The recording equipment may include a manual or
automatic feature to turn the display OFF when the
vehicle is not moving.
Displaying format is specified in Appendix 5.
3.15.1 Default display
(160) When no other information needs to be displayed, the
recording equipment shall display, by default, the
following:
— the local time (as a result of UTC time + offset as set
by the driver),
— the mode of operation,
— the current activity of the driver and the current
activity of the co-driver,
— information related to the driver:
— if his current activity is DRIVING, his current
continuous driving time and his current cumulative
break time,
— if his current activity is not DRIVING, the current
duration of this activity (since it was selected) and
his current cumulative break time.
(161) Display of data related to each driver shall be clear, plain
and unambiguous. In the case where the information
related to the driver and the co-driver cannot be
displayed at the same time, the recording equipment
shall display by default the information related to the
driver and shall allow the user to display the information
related to the co-driver.
(162) In the case where the display width does not allow
displaying by default the mode of operation, the
recording equipment shall briefly display the new mode
of operation when it changes.
(163) The recording equipment shall briefly display the card
holder name at card insertion.
(164) When an ‘OUT OF SCOPE’ or FERRY/TRAIN condition
is opened, then the default display must show using the
relevant pictogram that the particular condition is opened
(it is acceptable that the driver's current activity may not
be shown at the same time).
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 59
3.15.2 Warning display
(165) The recording equipment shall display warning information
using primarily the pictograms of Appendix 3, completed
where needed by additional numerically coded information.
A literal description of the warning may also be added in
the driver's preferred language.
3.15.3 Menu access
(166) The recording equipment shall provide necessary commands
through an appropriate menu structure.
3.15.4 Other displays
(167) It shall be possible to display selectively on request:
— the UTC date and time, and local time offset,
▼M3
— the content of any of the printouts listed in requirement
169 under the same formats as the printouts themselves,
▼B
— the continuous driving time and cumulative break time
of the driver,
— the continuous driving time and cumulative break time
of the co-driver,
▼M3
— the accumulated driving time of the driver for the
previous and the current week,
— the accumulated driving time of the co-driver for the
previous and the current week,
▼B
optional:
— the current duration of co-driver activity (since it was
selected),
▼M3
— the accumulated driving time of the driver for the
current week,
— the accumulated driving time of the co-driver for the
current daily work period,
— the accumulated driving time of the driver for the
current daily work period.
▼B
(168) Printout content display shall be sequential, line by line. If
the display width is less than 24 characters the user shall
be provided with the complete information through an
appropriate mean (several lines, scrolling, …).
Printout lines devoted to hand-written information may be
omitted for display.
▼B
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3.16 Printing
(169) The recording equipment shall be able to print information
from its data memory and/or from tachograph cards in
accordance with the seven following printouts:
— driver activities from card daily printout,
— driver activities from Vehicle Unit daily printout,
— events and faults from card printout,
— events and faults from Vehicle Unit printout,
— technical data printout,
— over speeding printout.
— tachograph card data history for a given VU (see
chapter 3.12.16)
The detailed format and content of these printouts are
specified in Appendix 4.
Additional data may be provided at the end of the
printouts.
Additional printouts may also be provided by the
recording equipment, if clearly distinguishable from the
seven aforementioned printouts.
(170) The ‘driver activities from card daily printout’ and ‘Events
and faults from card printout’ shall be available only when
a driver card or a workshop card is inserted in the
recording equipment. The recording equipment shall
update data stored on the relevant card before starting
printing.
(171) In order to produce the ‘driver activities from card daily
printout’ or the ‘events and faults from card printout’, the
recording equipment shall:
— either automatically select the driver card or the
workshop card if one only of these cards is inserted,
— or provide a command to select the source card or
select the card in the driver slot if two of these cards
are inserted in the recording equipment.
(172) The printer shall be able to print 24 characters per line.
(173) The minimum character size shall be 2.1 mm high and
1.5 mm wide.
(174) The printer shall support the characters specified in
Appendix 1 Chapter 4 ‘Character sets’.
(175) Printers shall be so designed as to produce these printouts
with a degree of definition likely to avoid any ambiguity
when they are read.
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(176) Printouts shall retain their dimensions and recordings
under normal conditions of humidity (10-90 %) and
temperature.
(177) The type approved paper used by the recording equipment
shall bear the relevant type approval mark and an indi­
cation of the type(s) of recording equipment with which
it may be used.
(178) Printouts shall remain clearly legible and identifiable under
normal conditions of storage, in terms of light intensity,
humidity and temperature, for at least two years.
(179) Printouts shall conform at least to the test specifications
defined in Appendix 9.
(180) It shall also be possible to add hand-written notes, such as
the driver's signature, to these documents.
(181) The recording equipment shall manage ‘paper out’ events
while printing by, once paper has been re-loaded, rest­
arting printing from printout beginning or by continuing
printing and providing an unambiguous reference to
previously printed part.
3.17 Warnings
(182) The recording equipment shall warn the driver when
detecting any event and/or fault.
(183) Warning of a power supply interruption event may be
delayed until the power supply is reconnected.
(184) The recording equipment shall warn the driver 15 minutes
before and at the time of exceeding the maximum allowed
continuous driving time.
(185) Warnings shall be visual. Audible warnings may also be
provided in addition to visual warnings.
(186) Visual warnings shall be clearly recognisable by the user,
shall be situated in the driver's field of vision and shall be
clearly legible both by day and by night.
(187) Visual warnings may be built into the recording equipment
and/or remote from the recording equipment.
(188) In the latter case it shall bear a ‘T’ symbol.
(189) Warnings shall have a duration of at least 30 seconds,
unless acknowledged by the user by hitting one or more
specific keys of the recording equipment. This first
acknowledgement shall not erase warning cause display
referred to in next paragraph.
(190) Warning cause shall be displayed on the recording
equipment and remain visible until acknowledged by the
user using a specific key or command of the recording
equipment.
▼B
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(191) Additional warnings may be provided, as long as they do
not confuse drivers in relation to previously defined ones.
3.18 Data downloading to external media
(192) The recording equipment shall be able to download on
request data from its data memory or from a driver card
to external storage media via the calibration/downloading
connector. The recording equipment shall update data
stored on the relevant card before starting downloading.
▼M3
(193) In addition and as an optional feature, the recording
equipment may, in any mode of operation, download
data through any other interface to a company auth­
enticated through this channel. In such a case, company
mode data access rights shall apply to this download.
▼B
(194) Downloading shall not alter or delete any stored data.
(195) The calibration/downloading connector electrical interface
is specified in Appendix 6.
(196) Downloading protocols are specified in Appendix 7.
▼M3
(196a) A transport undertaking which uses vehicles that are fitted
with recording equipment complying with this Annex and
fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006,
shall ensure that all data are downloaded from the
vehicle unit and driver cards.
The maximum period within which the relevant data are
downloaded shall not exceed:
— 90 days for data from vehicle unit;
— 28 days for data from the driver card.
(196b) Transport undertakings shall keep the data downloaded
from the vehicle unit and driver cards for at least twelve
months following recording.
▼B
3.19 Remote communication for targeted roadside checks
(197) When the ignition is on, the Vehicle Unit shall store every
60 seconds in the remote communication facility the most
recent data necessary for the purpose of targeted roadside
checks. Such data shall be encrypted and signed as
specified in Appendix 11 and Appendix 14.
(198) Data to be checked remotely shall be available to remote
communication readers through wireless communication,
as specified in Appendix 14.
▼B
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(199) Data necessary for the purpose of targeted roadside checks
shall be related to:
— the latest security breach attempt,
— the longest power supply interruption,
— sensor fault,
— motion data error,
— vehicle motion conflict,
— driving without a valid card,
— card insertion while driving,
— time adjustment data,
— calibration data including the dates of the two latest
stored calibration records,
— vehicle registration number,
— speed recorded by the tachograph ,
▼M3
— vehicle position,
— an indication if the driver may currently infringe the
driving times.
3.20 Data exchanges with additional external devices
(200) The recording equipment shall also be equipped with an
ITS interface in accordance with Appendix 13, allowing
the data recorded or produced by either the tachograph or
the tachograph cards to be used by an external facility.
In operational mode, the driver consent shall be needed for
the transmission of personal data through the ITS interface.
Nevertheless, the driver consent shall not apply to
tachograph or card data accessed in control, company or
calibration mode. The data and functional access rights for
these modes are specified in requirements 12 and 13.
The following requirements shall apply to ITS data made
available through that interface:
— personal data shall only be available after the verifiable
consent of the driver has been given, accepting that
personal data can leave the vehicle network.
A set of selected existing data that can be available via
the ITS interface, and the classification of the data as
personal or not personal are specified in Appendix 13.
Additional data may also be output in addition to the
set of data provided in Appendix 13. The VU manu­
facturer shall classify those data as ‘personal’ or ‘not
personal’, being the driver consent applicable to those
data classified as ‘personal’,
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 64
— at any moment, the driver consent can be enabled or
disabled through commands in the menu, provided the
driver card is inserted,
— in any circumstances, the presence of the ITS interface
shall not disturb or affect the correct functioning and
the security of the vehicle unit.
Additional vehicle unit interfaces may co-exist, provided
they fully comply with the requirements of Appendix 13 in
terms of driver consent. The recording equipment shall
have the capacity to communicate the driver consent
status to other platforms in the vehicle network and to
external devices.
For personal data injected in the vehicle network, which
are further processed outside the vehicle network, it shall
not be the responsibility of the tachograph manufacturer to
have that personal data process compliant with the
applicable Union legislation regarding data protection.
The ITS interface shall also allow for data entry during the
manual entry procedure in accordance with requirement
61, for both the driver and the co-driver.
The ITS interface may also be used to enter additional
information, in real time, such as:
— driver activity selection, in accordance with requirement 46,
— places in accordance with requirement 56,
— specific conditions, in accordance with requirement 62,
— load/unload operations, in accordance with requirement
62a.
This information may also be entered through other
interfaces.
(201) The serial link interface as specified in Annex IB to Regu­
lation (EEC) No 3821/85, as last amended, can continue to
equip tachographs for back compatibility. The serial link is
classified as a part of the vehicle network, in accordance
with requirement 200.
▼B
3.21 Calibration
(202) The calibration function shall allow:
— to automatically pair the motion sensor with the VU,
— to automatically couple the external GNSS facility with
the VU if applicable,
— to digitally adapt the constant of the recording
equipment (k) to the characteristic coefficient of the
vehicle (w),
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 65
— to adjust the current time within the validity period of
the inserted workshop card,
— to adjust the current odometer value,
— to update motion sensor identification data stored in
the data memory,
— to update, if applicable, external GNSS facility identi­
fication data stored in the data memory,
— to update the types and identifiers of all the seals in
place,
▼M3
— to update or confirm other parameters known to the
recording equipment: vehicle identification, w, l, tyre
size and speed limiting device setting if applicable, and
by-default load type,
— to automatically store the country in which the cali­
bration has been performed, and the date time when
the position used to determine this country was
provided by the GNSS receiver.
▼B
(203) In addition, the calibration function shall allow to supress
the use of first generation tachograph cards in the
recording equipment, provided the conditions specified in
Appendix 15 are met.
(204) Pairing the motion sensor to the VU shall consist, at least,
in:
— updating motion sensor installation data held by the
motion sensor (as needed),
— copying from the motion sensor to the VU data
memory the necessary motion sensor identification
data.
▼M3
(205) Coupling the external GNSS facility to the VU shall
consist, at least, in:
— updating external GNSS facility installation data held
by the external GNSS facility (as needed),
— copying from the external GNSS facility to the VU
data memory the necessary external GNSS facility
identification data including the serial number of the
external GNSS facility.
▼B
(206) The calibration function shall be able to input necessary
data through the calibration/downloading connector in
accordance with the calibration protocol defined in
Appendix 8. The calibration function may also input
necessary data through other means.
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3.22 Roadside calibration checking
(207) The roadside calibration checking function shall allow
reading the motion sensor serial number (possibly
embedded in the adaptor) and the external GNSS facility
serial number (when applicable), connected to the vehicle
unit, at the time of the request.
(208) This reading shall at least be possible on the vehicle unit
display through commands in the menus.
(209) The roadside calibration checking function shall also allow
controlling the selection of the I/O mode of the calibration
I/O signal line specified in Appendix 6, via the K-line
interface. This shall be done through the ECUAdjustment­
Session, as specified in Appendix 8, section 7 Control of
Test Pulses — Input output control functional unit.
▼M3
When the I/O mode of the calibration I/O signal line is
active according to this requirement, the ‘Driving without
an appropriate card’ warning (requirement 75) shall not be
triggered by the vehicle unit.
▼B
3.23 Time adjustment
(210) The time adjustment function shall allow for automatically
adjusting the current time. Two time sources are used in
the recording equipment for time adjustment: 1) the
internal VU clock, 2) the GNSS receiver.
▼M3
(211) The time setting of the VU internal clock shall be auto­
matically re-adjusted at variable time intervals. The next
automatic time re-adjustment shall be triggered between
72h and 168h after the previous one, and after the VU
can access to GNSS time through a valid authenticated
position message in accordance with Appendix 12. Never­
theless, the time adjustment shall never be bigger than the
accumulated maximal time drift per day, as calculated by
the VU manufacturer in accordance with requirement 41b.
If the difference between internal VU clock time and
GNSS receiver time is bigger than the accumulated
maximum time drift per day, then the time adjustment
shall bring the VU internal clock as close as possible to
the GNSS receiver time. The time setting may only be
done if the time provided by the GNSS receiver is
obtained using authenticated position messages as set out
in Appendix 12. The time reference for the automatic time
setting of the VU internal clock shall be the time provided
in the authenticated position message.
(212) The time adjustment function shall also allow for triggered
adjustment of the current time, in calibration mode.
Workshops may adjust time:
— either by writing a time value in the VU, using the
WriteDataByIdentifier service in accordance with
section 6.2 of Appendix 8,
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 67
— or by requesting an alignment of the VU clock to the
time provided by the GNSS receiver. This may only be
done if the time provided by the GNSS receiver is
obtained using authenticated position messages. In
this latter case, the RoutineControl service shall be
used in accordance with section 8 of Appendix 8.
▼B
3.24 Performance characteristics
(213) The Vehicle Unit shall be fully operational in the
temperature range – 20 °C to 70 °C, the external GNSS
facility in the temperature range – 20 °C to 70 °C, and the
motion sensor in the temperature range – 40 °C to 135 °C.
Data memory content shall be preserved at temperatures
down to – 40 °C.
(214) The tachograph shall be fully operational in the humidity
range 10 % to 90 %.
(215) The seals used in the smart tachograph shall withstand the
same conditions than those applicable to the tachograph
components to which they are affixed.
(216) The recording equipment shall be protected against
over-voltage, inversion of its power supply polarity, and
short circuits.
(217) Motion sensors shall either:
— react to a magnetic field disturbing vehicle motion
detection. In such circumstances, the vehicle unit will
record and store a sensor fault (requirement 88) or,
— have a sensing element that is protected from, or
immune to, magnetic fields.
(218) The recording equipment and the external GNSS facility
shall conform to international regulation UN ECE R10 and
shall be protected against electrostatic discharges and
transients.
3.25 Materials
(219) All the constituent parts of the recording equipment shall
be made of materials of sufficient stability and mechanical
strength and with stable electrical and magnetic char­
acteristics.
(220) For normal conditions of use, all the internal parts of the
equipment shall be protected against damp and dust.
(221) The Vehicle Unit and the external GNSS facility shall
meet the protection grade IP 40 and the motion sensor
shall meet the protection grade IP 64, as per standard
IEC 60529:1989 including A1:1999 and A2:2013.
(222) The recording equipment shall conform to applicable
technical specifications related to ergonomic design.
(223) The recording equipment shall be protected against acci­
dental damage.
▼M3
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3.26 Markings
(224) If the recording equipment displays the vehicle odometer
value and speed, the following details shall appear on its
display:
— near the figure indicating the distance, the unit of
measurement of distance, indicated by the abbreviation
‘km’,
— near the figure showing the speed, the entry ‘km/h’.
The recording equipment may also be switched to display
the speed in miles per hour, in which case the unit of
measurement of speed shall be shown by the abbreviation
‘mph’. The recording equipment may also be switched to
display the distance in miles, in which case the unit of
measurement of distance shall be shown by the
abbreviation ‘mi’.
▼M1
(225) A descriptive plaque shall be affixed to each separate
component of the recording equipment and shall show
the following details:
— name and address of the manufacturer,
— manufacturer's part number and year of manufacture,
— serial number,
— type-approval mark.
(226) When physical space is not sufficient to show all above
mentioned details, the descriptive plaque shall show at
least: the manufacturer's name or logo and the part
number.
▼M3
3.27 Monitoring border crossings
(226a) This function shall detect when the vehicle has crossed the
border of a country, which country has been left and
which country has been entered.
(226b) The border crossing detection shall be based on the
position measured by the recording equipment, and
stored digital map in accordance with point 3.12.19.
(226c) Border crossings related to the presence of the vehicle in a
country for a shorter period than 120s shall not be
recorded.
3.28 Software update
(226d) The vehicle unit shall incorporate a function for the im­
plementation of software updates whenever such updates
do not involve the availability of additional hardware
resources beyond the resources set out in requirement
226f, and the type-approval authorities give their authoris­
ation to the software updates based on the existing
type-approved vehicle unit, in accordance with Article 12(5)
of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.
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(226e) The software update function shall be designed for
supporting the following functional features, whenever
they are legally required:
— modification of the functions referred to in point 2.2,
except the software update function itself,
— the addition of new functions directly related to the
enforcement of Union legislation on road transport,
— modification of the modes of operation in point 2.3,
— modification of the file structure such as the addition
of new data or the increase of the file size,
— deployment of software patches to address software as
well as security defects or reported attacks on the
functions of the recording equipment.
(226f) The vehicle unit shall provide free hardware resources of
at least 35% for software and data needed for the im­
plementation of requirement 226e and free hardware
resources of at least 65% for the update of the digital
map based on the hardware resources required for the
NUTS 0 map version 2021.
▼B
4. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
TACHOGRAPH CARDS
4.1 Visible data
The front page shall contain:
(227) the words ‘Driver card’ or ‘Control card’ or ‘Workshop
card’ or ‘Company card’ printed in capital letters in the
official language or languages of the Member State issuing
the card, according to the type of the card.
(228) the name of the Member State issuing the card (optional);
(229) the distinguishing sign of the Member State issuing the
card, printed in negative in a blue rectangle and
encircled by 12 yellow stars. The distinguishing signs
shall be as follows:
B
BG
CZ
CY
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Cyprus
LV
L
LT
M
Latvia
Luxembourg
Lithuania
Malta
DK Denmark NL The Netherlands
D
EST
Germany
Estonia
A
PL
Austria
Poland
▼M3
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GR Greece P
RO
SK
SLO
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
E Spain FIN Finland
F
HR
H
France
Croatia
Hungary
S Sweden
IRL Ireland UK The United
Kingdom
I Italy
(230) information specific to the card issued, numbered as
follows:
Driver card Control Card Company or Workshop card
1. surname of the driver control body name company or workshop
name
2. first name(s) of the driver surname of the controller
(if applicable)
surname of card holder
(if applicable)
3. birth date of the driver first name(s) of the
controller
(if applicable)
first name(s) of card holder
(if applicable)
4.a card start of validity date
4.b card expiry date
4.c the name of the issuing authority (may be printed on reverse page)
4.d a different number from the one under heading 5, for administrative purposes
(optional)
5. a Driving licence number
(at the date of issue of the
driver card)
— —
5. b Card number
6. Photograph of the driver photograph of the controller
(optional)
photograph of the fitter
(optional)-
7. Signature of the holder (optional)
8. Normal place of residence,
or postal address of the
holder (optional).
Postal address of control
body
postal address of company
or workshop
(231) dates shall be written using a ‘dd/mm/yyyy’ or
‘dd.mm.yyyy’ format (day, month, year).
The reverse page shall contain:
(232) an explanation of the numbered items which appear on the
front page of the card;
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 71
(233) with the specific written agreement of the holder,
information which is not related to the administration of
the card may also be added, such addition will not alter in
any way the use of the model as a tachograph card.
(234) Tachograph cards shall be printed with the following back­
ground predominant colours:
— driver card: white,
— control card: blue,
— workshop card: red,
— company card: yellow.
(235) Tachograph cards shall bear at least the following features
for protection of the card body against counterfeiting and
tampering:
— a security design background with fine guilloche
patterns and rainbow printing,
— in the area of the photograph, the security design back­
ground and the photograph shall overlap,
— at least one two-coloured microprint line.
► (1) M1
► (2) M3
(236) After consulting the Commission, Member States may add
colours or markings, such as national symbols and security
features, without prejudice to the other provisions of this
Annex.
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(237) Temporary cards referred to in Article 26.4 of Regu­
lation (EU) No. 165/2014 shall comply with the provisions
of this Annex.
4.2 Security
The system security aims at protecting integrity and authenticity of
data exchanged between the cards and the recording equipment,
protecting the integrity and authenticity of data downloaded from
the cards, allowing certain write operations onto the cards to
recording equipment only, decrypting certain data, ruling out any
possibility of falsification of data stored in the cards, preventing
tampering and detecting any attempt of that kind.
(238) In order to achieve the system security, the tachograph
cards shall meet the security requirements defined in
Appendixes 10 and 11.
(239) Tachograph cards shall be readable by other equipment
such as personal computers.
4.3 Standards
(240) Tachograph cards shall comply with the following
standards:
— ISO/IEC 7810 Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
— ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards — Integrated circuit
cards:
— Part 1: Physical characteristics,
— Part 2: Dimensions and position of the contacts
(ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007),
— Part 3: Electrical interface and transmission
protocols (ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006),
— Part 4: Organisation, security and commands for
interchange (ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 + Cor 1:2014),
— Part 6: Interindustry data elements for interchange
(ISO/IEC 7816-6:2004 + Cor 1:2006),
— Part 8: Commands for security operations (ISO/IEC
7816-8:2004).
— Tachograph cards shall be tested in accordance to
ISO/IEC 10373-3:2010 Identification cards — Test
methods — Part 3: Integrated circuit cards with
contacts and related interface devices.
4.4 Environmental and electrical specifications
(241) Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating correctly in
all the climatic conditions normally encountered in
Community territory and at least in the temperature
range – 25 °C to + 70 °C with occasional peaks of up
to + 85 °C, ‘occasional’ meaning not more than 4 hours
each time and not over 100 times during the life time of
the card.
(242) Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating correctly in
the humidity range 10 % to 90 %.
(243) Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating correctly
for a five-year period if used within the environmental and
electrical specifications.
(244) During operation, tachograph cards shall conform to ECE
R10, related to electromagnetic compatibility, and shall be
protected against electrostatic discharges.
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 73
4.5 Data storage
For the purpose of this paragraph,
— times are recorded with a resolution of one minute, unless
otherwise specified,
— odometer values are recorded with a resolution of one kilometre,
— speeds are recorded with a resolution of 1 km/h,
— positions (latitudes and longitudes) are recorded in degrees and
minutes with a resolution of 1/10 of minute.
The tachograph cards functions, commands and logical structures,
fulfilling data storage requirements are specified in Appendix 2.
If not otherwise specified, data storage on tachograph cards shall be
organized in such a way, that new data replaces stored oldest data in
case the foreseen memory size for the particular records is
exhausted.
(245) This paragraph specifies minimum storage capacity for the
various application data files. Tachograph cards shall be
able to indicate to the recording equipment the actual
storage capacity of these data files.
▼M3
(246) Any additional data may be stored on tachograph cards,
provided that the storage of those data complies with the
applicable legislation regarding data protection.
▼B
(247) Each Master File (MF) of any tachograph card shall
contain up to five Elementary Files (EF) for card
management, application and chip identifications, and
two Dedicated Files (DF):
— DF Tachograph, which contains the application
accessible to first generation vehicle units, which is
also present in first generation tachograph cards,
— DF Tachograph_G2, which contains the application
only accessible to second generation vehicle units,
which is only present in second generation tachograph
cards.
▼M3
Note: version 2 of second generation cards contains ad­
ditional Elementary Files in DF Tachograph_G2.
▼B
The full details of the tachograph cards structure are
specified in Appendix 2.
4.5.1 Elementary files for identification and card management
4.5.2 IC card identification
(248) Tachograph cards shall be able to store the following smart
card identification data:
— clock stop,
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 74
— card serial number (including manufacturing references),
— card type approval number,
— card personaliser identification (ID),
— embedder ID,
— IC identifier.
4.5.2.1 C h i p i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
(249) Tachograph cards shall be able to store the following Inte­
grated Circuit (IC) identification data:
— IC serial number,
— IC manufacturing references.
4.5.2.2 D I R ( o n l y p r e s e n t i n s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n t a c h o g r a p h
c a r d s )
(250) Tachograph cards shall be able to store the application
identification data objects specified in Appendix 2.
4.5.2.3 A T R i n f o r m a t i o n ( c o n d i t i o n a l , o n l y p r e s e n t
i n s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n t a c h o g r a p h c a r d s )
(251) Tachograph cards shall be able to store the following
extended length information data object:
— in the case the tachograph card supports extended
length fields, the extended length information data
object specified in Appendix 2.
4.5.2.4 E x t e n d e d l e n g t h i n f o r m a t i o n ( c o n d i t i o n a l , o n l y
p r e s e n t i n s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n t a c h o g r a p h c a r d s )
(252) Tachograph cards shall be able to store the following
extended length information data objects:
— in the case the tachograph card supports extended
length fields, the extended length information data
objects specified in Appendix 2.
4.5.3 Driver card
4.5.3.1 T a c h o g r a p h a p p l i c a t i o n ( a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t a n d
s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s )
4.5.3.1.1 Application identification
(253) The driver card shall be able to store the following appli­
cation identification data:
— tachograph application identification,
— type of tachograph card identification.
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 75
4.5.3.1.2 Key and certificates
(254) The driver card shall be able to store a number of crypto­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11
part A.
4.5.3.1.3 Card identification
(255) The driver card shall be able to store the following card
identification data:
— card number,
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue
date,
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date.
4.5.3.1.4 Card holder identification
(256) The driver card shall be able to store the following card
holder identification data:
— surname of the holder,
— first name(s) of the holder,
— date of birth,
— preferred language.
4.5.3.1.5 Card download
(257) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to card download:
— date and time of last card download (for other purposes
than control).
(258) The driver card shall be able to hold one such record.
4.5.3.1.6 Driving licence information
(259) The driver card shall be able to store the following driving
licence data:
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name,
— driving licence number (at the date of the issue of the
card).
4.5.3.1.7 Events data
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be stored with a
resolution of 1 second.
(260) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the
following events detected by the recording equipment
while the card was inserted:
— Time overlap (where this card is the cause of the
event),
— Card insertion while driving (where this card is the
subject of the event),
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 76
— Last card session not correctly closed (where this card
is the subject of the event),
— Power supply interruption,
— Motion data error,
— Security breach attempts.
(261) The driver card shall be able to store the following data for
these events:
— Event code,
— Date and time of beginning of the event (or of card
insertion if the event was on-going at that time),
— Date and time of end of the event (or of card with­
drawal if the event was on-going at that time),
— VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which
the event happened.
Note: For the ‘Time overlap’ event:
— Date and time of beginning of the event shall
correspond to the date and time of the card withdrawal
from the previous vehicle,
— Date and time of end of the event shall correspond to
the date and time of card insertion in current vehicle,
— Vehicle data shall correspond to the current vehicle
raising the event.
Note: For the ‘Last card session not correctly closed’
event:
— date and time of beginning of event shall correspond to
the card insertion date and time of the session not
correctly closed,
— date and time of end of event shall correspond to the
card insertion date and time of the session during
which the event was detected (current session),
— Vehicle data shall correspond to the vehicle in which
the session was not correctly closed.
(262) The driver card shall be able to store data for the six most
recent events of each type (i.e. 36 events).
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 77
4.5.3.1.8 Faults data
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be recorded with a
resolution of 1 second.
(263) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the
following faults detected by the recording equipment while
the card was inserted:
▼M1
— Card fault (where this card is the subject of the fault),
▼B
— Recording equipment fault.
(264) The driver card shall be able to store the following data for
these faults:
— Fault code,
— Date and time of beginning of the fault (or of card
insertion if the fault was on-going at that time),
— Date and time of end of the fault (or of card with­
drawal if the fault was on-going at that time),
— VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which
the fault happened.
(265) The driver card shall be able to store data for the twelve
most recent faults of each type (i.e. 24 faults).
4.5.3.1.9 Driver activity data
(266) The driver card shall be able to store, for each calendar
day where the card has been used or for which the driver
has entered activities manually, the following data:
— the date,
— a daily presence counter (increased by one for each of
these calendar days),
— the total distance travelled by the driver during this
day,
— a driver status at 00:00,
— whenever the driver has changed of activity, and/or has
changed of driving status, and/or has inserted or
withdrawn his card:
— the driving status (CREW, SINGLE),
— the slot (DRIVER, CO-DRIVER),
— the card status (INSERTED, NOT INSERTED),
— the activity (DRIVING, AVAILABILITY, WORK,
BREAK/REST),
— the time of the change.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 78
(267) The driver card memory shall be able to hold driver
activity data for at least 28 days (the average activity of
a driver is defined as 93 activity changes per day).
(268) The data listed under requirements 261, 264 and 266 shall
be stored in a way allowing the retrieval of activities in the
order of their occurrence, even in case of a time overlap
situation.
4.5.3.1.10 Vehicles used data
(269) The driver card shall be able to store, for each calendar
day where the card has been used, and for each period of
use of a given vehicle that day (a period of use includes all
consecutive insertion / withdrawal cycle of the card in the
vehicle, as seen from the card point of view), the
following data:
— date and time of first use of the vehicle (i.e. first card
insertion for this period of use of the vehicle, or 00h00
if the period of use is on-going at that time),
— vehicle odometer value at that time,
— date and time of last use of the vehicle, (i.e. last card
withdrawal for this period of use of the vehicle, or
23h59 if the period of use is on-going at that time),
— vehicle odometer value at that time,
— VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle.
(270) The driver card shall be able to store at least 84 such
records.
4.5.3.1.11 Places where daily work periods start and/or end
(271) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to places where daily work periods begin and/or
end, entered by the driver:
— the date and time of the entry (or the date/time related
to the entry if the entry is made during the manual
entry procedure),
— the type of entry (begin or end, condition of entry),
— the country and region entered,
— the vehicle odometer value.
(272) The driver card memory shall be able to hold at least 42
pairs of such records.
4.5.3.1.12 Card session data
(273) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the
vehicle which opened its current session:
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 79
— date and time the session was opened (i.e. card
insertion) with a resolution of one second,
— VRN and registering Member State.
4.5.3.1.13 Control activity data
(274) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to control activities:
— date and time of the control,
— control card number and card issuing Member State,
— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or
VU downloading and/or card downloading (see note)),
— Period downloaded, in case of downloading,
— VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle in
which the control happened.
Note: card downloading will only be recorded if performed
through a recording equipment.
(275) The driver card shall be able to hold one such record.
4.5.3.1.14 Specific conditions data
(276) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to specific conditions entered while the card was
inserted (whatever the slot):
— Date and time of the entry,
— Type of specific condition.
(277) The driver card shall be able to store at least 56 such
records.
▼M3
4.5.3.2 T a c h o g r a p h g e n e r a t i o n 2 a p p l i c a t i o n ( n o t
a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s ,
a c c e s s i b l e t o v e r s i o n 1 a n d v e r s i o n 2 o f s e c o n d
g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s )
▼B
4.5.3.2.1 Application identification
(278) The driver card shall be able to store the following appli­
cation identification data:
— tachograph application identification,
— type of tachograph card identification.
▼M3
4.5.3.2.1.1 Additional application identification (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
(278a) The driver card shall be able to store additional application
identification data only applicable for version 2.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 80
4.5.3.2.2 Keys and certificates
(279) The driver card shall be able to store a number of crypto­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11
part B.
4.5.3.2.3 Card identification
(280) The driver card shall be able to store the following card
identification data:
— card number,
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue
date,
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date.
4.5.3.2.4 Card holder identification
(281) The driver card shall be able to store the following card
holder identification data:
— surname of the holder,
— first name(s) of the holder,
— date of birth,
— preferred language.
4.5.3.2.5 Card download
(282) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to card download:
— date and time of last card download (for other purposes
than control).
(283) The driver card shall be able to hold one such record.
4.5.3.2.6 Driving licence information
(284) The driver card shall be able to store the following driving
licence data:
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name,
— driving licence number (at the date of the issue of the
card).
4.5.3.2.7 Events data
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be stored with a
resolution of 1 second.
(285) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the
following events detected by the recording equipment
while the card was inserted:
— Time overlap (where this card is the cause of the
event),
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 81
— Card insertion while driving (where this card is the
subject of the event),
— Last card session not correctly closed (where this card
is the subject of the event),
— Power supply interruption,
— Communication error with the remote communication
facility,
— Absence of position information from GNSS receiver
event,
— Communication error with the external GNSS facility
— Motion data error,
— Vehicle motion conflict,
— Security breach attempts,
— Time conflict.
(286) The driver card shall be able to store the following data for
these events:
— Event code,
— Date and time of beginning of the event (or of card
insertion if the event was on-going at that time),
— Date and time of end of the event (or of card with­
drawal if the event was on-going at that time),
— VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which
the event happened.
Note: For the ‘Time overlap’ event:
— Date and time of beginning of the event shall
correspond to the date and time of the card withdrawal
from the previous vehicle,
— Date and time of end of the event shall correspond to
the date and time of card insertion in current vehicle,
— Vehicle data shall correspond to the current vehicle
raising the event.
Note: For the ‘Last card session not correctly closed’
event:
— date and time of beginning of event shall correspond to
the card insertion date and time of the session not
correctly closed,
— date and time of end of event shall correspond to the
card insertion date and time of the session during
which the event was detected (current session),
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 82
— Vehicle data shall correspond to the vehicle in which
the session was not correctly closed.
▼M3
(287) The driver card shall be able to store data for the 12 most
recent events of each type (i.e. 132 events).
▼B
4.5.3.2.8 Faults data
For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be recorded with a
resolution of 1 second.
(288) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the
following faults detected by the recording equipment while
the card was inserted:
▼M1
— Card fault (where this card is the subject of the fault),
▼B
— Recording equipment fault.
(289) The driver card shall be able to store the following data for
these faults:
— Fault code,
— Date and time of beginning of the fault (or of card
insertion if the fault was on-going at that time),
— Date and time of end of the fault (or of card with­
drawal if the fault was on-going at that time),
— VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which
the fault happened.
▼M3
(290) The driver card shall be able to store data for the 24 most
recent faults of each type (i.e. 48 faults).
▼B
4.5.3.2.9 Driver activity data
(291) The driver card shall be able to store, for each calendar
day where the card has been used or for which the driver
has entered activities manually, the following data:
— the date,
— a daily presence counter (increased by one for each of
these calendar days),
— the total distance travelled by the driver during this
day,
— a driver status at 00:00,
— whenever the driver has changed of activity, and/or has
changed of driving status, and/or has inserted or
withdrawn his card:
— the driving status (CREW, SINGLE)
— the slot (DRIVER, CO-DRIVER),
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 83
— the card status (INSERTED, NOT INSERTED),
— the activity (DRIVING, AVAILABILITY, WORK,
BREAK/REST).
— the time of the change,
▼M3
(292) The driver card memory shall be able to hold driver
activity data for 56 days (the average activity of a driver
is defined for this requirement as 117 activity changes per
day).
▼B
(293) The data listed under requirements 286, 289 and 291 shall
be stored in a way allowing the retrieval of activities in the
order of their occurrence, even in case of a time overlap
situation.
4.5.3.2.10 Vehicles used data
(294) The driver card shall be able to store, for each calendar
day where the card has been used, and for each period of
use of a given vehicle that day (a period of use includes all
consecutive insertion / withdrawal cycle of the card in the
vehicle, as seen from the card point of view), the
following data:
— date and time of first use of the vehicle (i.e. first card
insertion for this period of use of the vehicle, or 00h00
if the period of use is on-going at that time),
— vehicle odometer value at that first use time,
— date and time of last use of the vehicle, (i.e. last card
withdrawal for this period of use of the vehicle, or
23h59 if the period of use is on-going at that time),
— vehicle odometer value at that last use time,
— VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle,
— VIN of the vehicle.
▼M3
(295) The driver card shall be able to store 200 such records.
▼B
4.5.3.2.11 Places and positions where daily work periods start and/or end
(296) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to places where daily work periods begin and/or
end, entered by the driver:
— the date and time of the entry (or the date/time related
to the entry if the entry is made during the manual
entry procedure),
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 84
— the type of entry (begin or end, condition of entry),
— the country and region entered,
— the vehicle odometer value,
— the vehicle position,
— the GNSS accuracy, date and time when the position
was determined.
▼M3
(297) The driver card memory shall be able to hold 112 such
records.
▼B
4.5.3.2.12 Card session data
(298) The driver card shall be able to store data related to the
vehicle which opened its current session:
— date and time the session was opened (i.e. card
insertion) with a resolution of one second,
— VRN and registering Member State.
4.5.3.2.13 Control activity data
(299) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to control activities:
— date and time of the control,
— control card number and card issuing Member State,
— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or
VU downloading and/or card downloading (see note)),
— Period downloaded, in case of downloading,
— VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle in
which the control happened.
Note: security requirements imply that card downloading
will only be recorded if performed through a recording
equipment.
(300) The driver card shall be able to hold one such record.
4.5.3.2.14 Specific conditions data
(301) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to specific conditions entered while the card was
inserted (whatever the slot):
— Date and time of the entry,
— Type of specific condition.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 85
(302) The driver card shall be able to store 112 such records.
▼B
4.5.3.2.15 Vehicle units used data
(303) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to the different vehicle units in which the card was
used:
— the date and time of the beginning of the period of use
of the vehicle unit (i.e. first card insertion in the
vehicle unit for the period),
— the manufacturer of the vehicle unit,
— the vehicle unit type,
— the vehicle unit software version number.
▼M3
(304) The driver card shall be able to store 200 such records.
▼M1
4.5.3.2.16 Three hours accumulated driving places data
(305) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to the position of the vehicle where the
accumulated driving time reaches a multiple of three
hours:
— the date and time when the accumulated driving time
reaches a multiple of three hours,
— the position of the vehicle,
— the GNSS accuracy, date and time when the position
was determined,
— the vehicle odometer value.
▼M3
(306) The driver card shall be able to store 336 such records.
4.5.3.2.17 Authentication status for positions related to places where daily
work periods start and/or end (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
(306a) The driver card shall be able to store additional data
related to places where daily work periods begin and/or
end, entered by the driver in accordance with
point 4.5.3.2.11:
— the date and time of the entry, which shall be exactly
the same date and time as the one stored in EF Places
under the DF Tachograph_G2,
— a flag indicating whether the position has been
authenticated.
(306b) The driver card memory shall be able to hold 112 such
records.
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 86
4.5.3.2.18 Authentication status for positions where three hours accumulated
driving time are reached (not accessed by version 1 of second
generation vehicle units)
(306c) The driver card shall be able to store additional data
related to the position of the vehicle where the
accumulated driving time reaches a multiple of three hours
in accordance with point 4.5.3.2.16:
— the date and time when the accumulated driving time
reaches a multiple of three hours, which shall be
exactly the same date and time as the one stored in
EF GNSS_Places under the DF Tachograph_G2,
— a flag indicating whether the position has been
authenticated.
(306d) The driver card shall be able to store 336 such records.
4.5.3.2.19 Border crossings (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
(306e) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to border crossings either upon card insertion in
accordance with requirement 147b or with the card
already inserted:
— the country that the vehicle is leaving,
— the country that the vehicle is entering,
— the date and time when the vehicle has crossed the
border,
— the position of the vehicle when the border was
crossed,
— the GNSS accuracy,
— a flag indicating whether the position has been
authenticated,
— the vehicle odometer value.
(306f) The driver card memory shall be able to store 1120 such
records.
4.5.3.2.20 Load/unload operations (not accessed by version 1 of second
generation vehicle units)
(306g) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to load/unload operations:
— operation type (load, unload or simultaneous load/
unload),
— the date and time of the load/unload operation,
— the position of the vehicle,
— the GNSS accuracy, date and time when the position
was determined,
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 87
— a flag indicating whether the position has been
authenticated,
— the vehicle odometer value.
(306h) The driver card shall be able to store 1624 load/unload
operations.
4.5.3.2.21 Load type entries (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
(306i) The driver card shall be able to store the following data
related to load type automatically entered by the VU at
each card insertion:
— the load type entered (goods or passengers),
— the date and time of the entry.
(306j) The driver card shall be able to store 336 such records.
4.5.3.2.22 VU configurations (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
(306k) The driver card shall be able to store the cardholder
tachograph specific settings.
(306l) The driver card storage capacity for cardholder tachograph
specific settings shall be 3072 bytes.
▼B
4.5.4 Workshop card
4.5.4.1 T a c h o g r a p h a p p l i c a t i o n ( a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t a n d
s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s )
4.5.4.1.1 Application identification
(307) The workshop card shall be able to store the following
application identification data:
— tachograph application identification,
— type of tachograph card identification.
4.5.4.1.2 Keys and certificates
(308) The workshop card shall be able to store a number of
cryptographic keys and certificates, as specified in
Appendix 11
part A.
(309) The workshop card shall be able to store a Personal Identi­
fication Number (PIN code).
4.5.4.1.3 Card identification
(310) The workshop card shall be able to store the following
card identification data:
— card number,
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue
date,
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date.
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 88
4.5.4.1.4 Card holder identification
(311) The workshop card shall be able to store the following
card holder identification data:
— workshop name,
— workshop address,
— surname of the holder,
— first name(s) of the holder,
— preferred language.
4.5.4.1.5 Card download
(312) The workshop card shall be able to store a card download
data record in the same manner as a driver card.
4.5.4.1.6 Calibration and time adjustment data
(313) The workshop card shall be able to hold records of cali­
brations and/or time adjustments performed while the card
is inserted in a recording equipment.
(314) Each calibration record shall be able to hold the following
data:
— Purpose of calibration (activation, first installation,
installation, periodic inspection,),
— Vehicle identification,
— Parameters updated or confirmed (w, k, l, tyre size,
speed limiting device setting, odometer (new and old
values), date and time (new and old values)),
— Recording equipment identification (VU part number,
VU serial number, motion sensor serial number).
(315) The workshop card shall be able to store at least 88 such
records.
(316) The workshop card shall hold a counter indicating the total
number of calibrations performed with the card.
(317) The workshop card shall hold a counter indicating the
number of calibrations performed since its last download.
4.5.4.1.7 Events and faults data
(318) The workshop card shall be able to store events and faults
data records in the same manner as a driver card.
(319) The workshop card shall be able to store data for the three
most recent events of each type (i.e. 18 events) and the six
most recent faults of each type (i.e. 12 faults).
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 89
4.5.4.1.8 Driver activity data
(320) The workshop card shall be able to store driver activity
data in the same manner as a driver card.
(321) The workshop card shall be able to hold driver activity
data for at least 1 day of average driver activity.
4.5.4.1.9 Vehicles used data
(322) The workshop card shall be able to store vehicles used
data records in the same manner as a driver card.
(323) The workshop card shall be able to store at least 4 such
records.
4.5.4.1.10 Daily work periods start and/or end data
(324) The workshop card shall be able to store daily works
period start and/or end data records in the same manner
as a driver card.
(325) The workshop card shall be able to hold at least 3 pairs of
such records.
4.5.4.1.11 Card session data
(326) The workshop card shall be able to store a card session
data record in the same manner as a driver card.
4.5.4.1.12 Control activity data
(327) The workshop card shall be able to store a control activity
data record in the same manner as a driver card.
4.5.4.1.13 Specific conditions data
(328) The workshop card shall be able to store data relevant to
specific conditions in the same manner as the driver card.
(329) The workshop card shall be able to store at least 2 such
records.
▼M3
4.5.4.2 T a c h o g r a p h G e n e r a t i o n 2 a p p l i c a t i o n ( n o t
a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s ,
a c c e s s i b l e t o v e r s i o n 1 a n d v e r s i o n 2 o f s e c o n d
g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s )
▼B
4.5.4.2.1 Application identification
(330) The workshop card shall be able to store the following
application identification data:
— tachograph application identification,
— type of tachograph card identification.
▼M3
4.5.4.2.1.1 Additional application identification (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
(330a) The workshop card shall be able to store additional appli­
cation identification data only applicable for version 2.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 90
4.5.4.2.2 Keys and certificates
(331) The workshop card shall be able to store a number of
cryptographic keys and certificates, as specified in
Appendix 11 part B.
(332) The workshop card shall be able to store a Personal Identi­
fication Number (PIN code).
4.5.4.2.3 Card identification
(333) The workshop card shall be able to store the following
card identification data:
— card number,
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue
date,
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date.
4.5.4.2.4 Card holder identification
(334) The workshop card shall be able to store the following
card holder identification data:
— workshop name,
— workshop address,
— surname of the holder,
— first name(s) of the holder,
— preferred language.
4.5.4.2.5 Card download
(335) The workshop card shall be able to store a card download
data record in the same manner as a driver card.
4.5.4.2.6 Calibration and time adjustment data
(336) The workshop card shall be able to hold records of cali­
brations and/or time adjustments performed while the card
is inserted in a recording equipment.
(337) Each calibration record shall be able to hold the following
data:
— purpose of calibration (activation, first installation,
installation, periodic inspection,),
— vehicle identification,
— parameters updated or confirmed (w, k, l, tyre size,
speed limiting device setting, odometer (new and old
values), date and time (new and old values),
— recording equipment identification (VU part number,
VU serial number, motion sensor serial number,
remote communication facility serial number and
external GNSS facility serial number, if applicable),
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 91
— seal type and identifier of all seals in place,
— ability of the VU to use first generation tachograph
cards (enabled or not).
▼M3
(338) The workshop card shall be able to store 255 such records.
▼B
(339) The workshop card shall hold a counter indicating the total
number of calibrations performed with the card.
(340) The workshop card shall hold a counter indicating the
number of calibrations performed since its last download.
4.5.4.2.7 Events and faults data
(341) The workshop card shall be able to store events and faults
data records in the same manner as a driver card.
(342) The workshop card shall be able to store data for the three
most recent events of each type (i.e. 33 events) and the six
most recent faults of each type (i.e. 12 faults).
4.5.4.2.8 Driver activity data
(343) The workshop card shall be able to store driver activity
data in the same manner as a driver card.
▼M3
(344) The workshop card shall be able to hold driver activity
data for 1 day containing 240 activity changes.
▼B
4.5.4.2.9 Vehicles used data
(345) The workshop card shall be able to store vehicles used
data records in the same manner as a driver card.
▼M3
(346) The workshop card shall be able to store 8 such records.
4.5.4.2.10 Places and positions where daily work periods start and/or end data
(347) The workshop card shall be able to store places and
positions where daily work periods begin and/or end
data records in the same manner as a driver card.
(348) The workshop card shall be able to store 4 pairs of such
records.
▼B
4.5.4.2.11 Card session data
(349) The workshop card shall be able to store a card session
data record in the same manner as a driver card.
▼B
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4.5.4.2.12 Control activity data
(350) The workshop card shall be able to store a control activity
data record in the same manner as a driver card.
4.5.4.2.13 Vehicle units used data
(351) The workshop card shall be able to store the following
data related to the different vehicle units in which the
card was used:
— the date and time of the beginning of the period of use
of the vehicle unit (i.e. first card insertion in the
vehicle unit for the period),
— the manufacturer of the vehicle unit,
— the vehicle unit type,
— the vehicle unit software version number.
▼M3
(352) The workshop card shall be able to store 8 such records.
▼M1
4.5.4.2.14 Three hours accumulated driving places data
(353) The workshop card shall be able to store the following
data related to the position of the vehicle where the
accumulated driving time reaches a multiple of three
hours:
— the date and time when the accumulated driving time
reaches a multiple of three hours,
— the position of the vehicle,
— the GNSS accuracy, date and time when the position
was determined,
— the vehicle odometer value.
▼M3
(354) The workshop card shall be able to store 24 such records.
▼B
4.5.4.2.15 Specific conditions data
(355) The workshop card shall be able to store data relevant to
specific conditions in the same manner as the driver card.
▼M3
(356) The workshop card shall be able to store 4 such records.
4.5.4.2.16 Authentication status for positions related to places where daily
work periods start and/or end (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
(356a) The workshop card shall be able to store additional data
related to places where daily work periods start and/or end
in the same manner as a driver card.
▼B
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(356b) The workshop card memory shall be able to store 4 pairs
of such records.
4.5.4.2.17 Authentication status for positions where three hours accumulated
driving are reached (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
(356c) The workshop card shall be able to store additional data
related to the position of the vehicle where the
accumulated driving time reaches a multiple of three hours
in the same manner as a driver card.
(356d) The workshop card shall be able to store 24 such records.
4.5.4.2.18 Border crossings (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
(356e) The workshop card shall be able to store the border
crossings in the same manner as a driver card.
(356f) The workshop card memory shall be able to store 4 such
records.
4.5.4.2.19 Load/unload operations (not accessed by version 1 of second
generation vehicle units)
(356g) The workshop card shall be able to store the load/unload
operations in the same manner as a driver card.
(356h) The workshop card shall be able to store 8 load, unload or
simultaneous load/unload operations.
4.5.4.2.20 Load type entries (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
(356i) The workshop card shall be able to store the load type
entries in the same manner as a driver card.
(356j) The workshop card shall be able to store 4 such records.
4.5.4.2.21 Calibration Additional Data (not accessed by version 1 of second
generation vehicle units)
(356k) The workshop card shall be able to store additional cali­
bration data only applicable for version 2:
— the old date and time and the vehicle identification
number, which shall be exactly the same values as
the one stored in EF Calibration under the DF
Tachograph_G2,
— the by-default load type entered during this calibration,
— the country in which the calibration has been
performed, and the date time when the position used
to determine this country was provided by the GNSS
receiver.
(356l) The workshop card shall be able to store 255 such records.
▼M3
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4.5.4.2.22 VU configurations (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
(356m) The workshop card shall be able to store the cardholder
tachograph specific settings.
(356n) The workshop card storage capacity for cardholder
tachograph specific settings shall be 3072 bytes.
▼B
4.5.5 Control card
4.5.5.1 T a c h o g r a p h a p p l i c a t i o n ( a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t a n d
s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s )
4.5.5.1.1 Application identification
(357) The control card shall be able to store the following appli­
cation identification data:
— tachograph application identification,
— type of tachograph card identification.
4.5.5.1.2 Keys and certificates
(358) The control card shall be able to store a number of crypto­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11
part A.
4.5.5.1.3 Card identification
(359) The control card shall be able to store the following card
identification data:
— card number,
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue
date,
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date (if
any).
4.5.5.1.4 Card holder identification
(360) The control card shall be able to store the following card
holder identification data:
— control body name,
— control body address,
— surname of the holder,
— first name(s) of the holder,
— preferred language.
4.5.5.1.5 Control activity data
(361) The control card shall be able to store the following
control activity data:
— date and time of the control,
▼M3
— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or
VU downloading and/or card downloading),
▼B
— period downloaded (if any),
▼M3
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— VRN and Member State registering authority of the
controlled vehicle,
— card number and card issuing Member State of the
driver card controlled.
(362) The control card shall be able to hold at least 230 such
records.
4.5.5.2 T a c h o g r a p h G 2 a p p l i c a t i o n ( n o t a c c e s s i b l e t o
f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t )
4.5.5.2.1 Application identification
(363) The control card shall be able to store the following appli­
cation identification data:
— tachograph application identification,
— type of tachograph card identification.
▼M3
4.5.5.2.1.1 Additional application identification (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
(363a) The control card shall be able to store additional appli­
cation identification data only applicable for version 2.
▼B
4.5.5.2.2 Keys and certificates
(364) The control card shall be able to store a number of crypto­
graphic keys and certificates, as specified in Appendix 11
part B.
4.5.5.2.3 Card identification
(365) The control card shall be able to store the following card
identification data:
— card number,
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue
date,
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date (if
any).
4.5.5.2.4 Card holder identification
(366) The control card shall be able to store the following card
holder identification data:
— control body name,
— control body address,
— surname of the holder,
— first name(s) of the holder,
— preferred language.
4.5.5.2.5 Control activity data
(367) The control card shall be able to store the following
control activity data:
— date and time of the control,
▼B
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— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or
VU downloading and/or card downloading and/or
roadside calibration checking)
— period downloaded (if any),
— VRN and Member State registering authority of the
controlled vehicle,
— card number and card issuing Member State of the
driver card controlled.
(368) The control card shall be able to hold at least 230 such
records.
▼M3
4.5.5.2.6 VU configurations (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
(368a) The control card shall be able to store the cardholder
tachograph specific settings.
(368b) The control card storage capacity for cardholder
tachograph specific settings shall be 3072 bytes.
▼B
4.5.6 Company card
4.5.6.1 T a c h o g r a p h a p p l i c a t i o n ( a c c e s s i b l e t o f i r s t a n d
s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t s )
4.5.6.1.1 Application identification
(369) The company card shall be able to store the following
application identification data:
— tachograph application identification,
— type of tachograph card identification.
4.5.6.1.2 Keys and Certificates
(370) The company card shall be able to store a number of
cryptographic keys and certificates, as specified in
Appendix 11 part A.
4.5.6.1.3 Card identification
(371) The company card shall be able to store the following card
identification data:
— card number,
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue
date,
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date (if
any).
4.5.6.1.4 Card holder identification
(372) The company card shall be able to store the following card
holder identification data:
— company name,
— company address.
▼B
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4.5.6.1.5 Company activity data
(373) The company card shall be able to store the following
company activity data:
— date and time of the activity,
— type of the activity (VU locking in and/or out, and/or
VU downloading and/or card downloading)
— period downloaded (if any),
— VRN and Member State registering authority of
vehicle,
— card number and card issuing Member State (in case of
card downloading).
(374) The company card shall be able to hold at least 230 such
records.
4.5.6.2 T a c h o g r a p h G 2 a p p l i c a t i o n ( n o t a c c e s s i b l e t o
f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n v e h i c l e u n i t )
4.5.6.2.1 Application identification
(375) The company card shall be able to store the following
application identification data:
— tachograph application identification,
— type of tachograph card identification.
▼M3
4.5.6.2.1.1 Additional application identification (not accessed by version 1
of second generation vehicle units)
(375a) The company card shall be able to store additional appli­
cation identification data only applicable for version 2.
▼B
4.5.6.2.2 Keys and certificates
(376) The company card shall be able to store a number of
cryptographic keys and certificates, as specified in
Appendix 11 part B.
4.5.6.2.3 Card identification
(377) The company card shall be able to store the following card
identification data:
— card number,
— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue
date,
— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date (if
any).
4.5.6.2.4 Card holder identification
(378) The company card shall be able to store the following card
holder identification data:
— company name,
— company address.
▼B
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4.5.6.2.5 Company activity data
(379) The company card shall be able to store the following
company activity data:
— date and time of the activity,
— type of the activity (VU locking in and/or out, and/or
VU downloading and/or card downloading)
— period downloaded (if any),
— VRN and Member State registering authority of
vehicle,
— card number and card issuing Member State (in case of
card downloading).
(380) The company card shall be able to hold at least 230 such
records.
▼M3
4.5.6.2.6 VU configurations (not accessed by version 1 of second generation
vehicle units)
(380a) The company card shall be able to store the cardholder
tachograph specific settings.
(380b) The company card storage capacity for cardholder
tachograph specific settings shall be 3072 bytes.
▼B
5. INSTALLATION OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT
5.1 Installation
(381) New recording equipment shall be delivered non-activated
to fitters or vehicle manufacturers, with all calibration
parameters, as listed in Chapter 3.21, set to appropriate
and valid default values. Where no particular value is
appropriate, literal parameters shall be set to strings of
‘?’ and numeric parameters shall be set to ‘0’. Delivery
of security relevant parts of the recording equipment can
be restricted if required during security certification.
(382) Before its activation, the recording equipment shall give
access to the calibration function even if not in calibration
mode.
▼M3
(383) Before its activation, the recording equipment shall neither
record nor store data referred to by the requirements 102 to
133 inclusive. Nevertheless, before its activation, the
recording equipment may record and store the security
breach attempt events in accordance with requirement
117, and the recording equipment faults in accordance
with requirement 118.
▼B
(384) During installation, vehicle manufacturers shall pre-set all
known parameters.
(385) Vehicle manufacturers or fitters shall activate the installed
recording equipment at the latest before the vehicle is used
in scope of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006.
▼B
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(386) The activation of the recording equipment shall be
triggered automatically by the first insertion of a valid
workshop card in either of its card interface devices.
(387) Specific pairing operations required between the motion
sensor and the vehicle unit, if any, shall take place auto­
matically before or during activation.
(388) In a similar way, specific coupling operations between the
external GNSS facility and the vehicle unit, if any, shall
take place automatically before or during activation.
(389) After its activation, the recording equipment shall fully
enforce functions and data access rights.
(390) After its activation, the recording equipment shall
communicate to the remote communication facility the
secured data necessary for the purpose of targeted
roadside checks.
(391) The recording and storing functions of the recording
equipment shall be fully operational after its activation.
▼M3
(392) Installation shall be followed by a calibration. The first
calibration may not necessarily include entry of the
vehicle registration identification (VRN and Member
State), when it is not known by the approved workshop
having to undertake this calibration. In these circum­
stances, it shall be possible, for the vehicle owner, and
at this time only, to enter the VRN and the Member
State using his company card prior to using the vehicle
in scope of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 (e.g by using
commands through an appropriate menu structure of the
vehicle unit's man-machine interface). Any update or
confirmation of this entry shall only be possible using a
workshop card.
▼B
(393) The installation of an external GNSS facility requires the
coupling with the vehicle unit and the subsequent verifi­
cation of the GNSS position information.
(394) The recording equipment must be positioned in the vehicle
in such a way as to allow the driver to access the
necessary functions from his seat.
5.2 Installation plaque
(395) ►M3 After the recording equipment has been checked on
installation, an installation plaque, engraved or printed in a
permanent way, which is clearly visible and easily
accessible shall be affixed onto the recording equipment.
In cases where this is not possible, the plaque shall be
affixed to the vehicle's ‘B’ pillar so that it is clearly
visible. For vehicles that do not have a ‘B’ pillar, the
installation plaque should be affixed in the area of the
door of the vehicle and be clearly visible in all cases. ◄
After every inspection by an approved fitter or workshop,
a new plaque shall be affixed in place of the previous one.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 100
(396) The plaque shall bear at least the following details:
— name, address or trade name of the approved fitter or
workshop,
— characteristic coefficient of the vehicle, in the form
‘w = … imp/km’,
— constant of the recording equipment, in the form
‘k = … imp/km’,
— effective circumference of the wheel tyres in the form
‘l = … mm’,
— tyre size,
— the date on which the characteristic coefficient of the
vehicle and the effective circumference of the wheel
tyres were measured,
— the vehicle identification number,
— the presence (or not) of an external GNSS facility,
— the serial number of the external GNSS facility, if
applicable,
▼M3
— the serial number of the remote communication
facility, if any,
▼M1
— the serial number of all the seals in place,
— the part of the vehicle where the adaptor, if any, is
installed,
— the part of the vehicle where the motion sensor is
installed, if not connected to the gear-box or an
adaptor is not being used,
— a description of the colour of the cable between the
adaptor and that part of the vehicle providing its
incoming impulses,
— the serial number of the embedded motion sensor of
the adaptor.
▼M3
— the by-default load type associated to the vehicle.
▼B
(397) For M1 and N1 vehicles only, and which are fitted with an
adaptor in conformity with Commission Regulation (EC)
No 68/2009 ( 1 ) as last amended and where it is not
possible to include all the information necessary, as
described in Requirement 396, a second, additional,
plaque may be used. In such cases, this additional
plaque shall contain at least the last four indents
described in Requirement 396.
▼M1
( 1 ) Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2009 of 23 January 2009 adapting for the ninth time
to technical progress Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in
road transport (OJ L 21, 24.1.2009, p. 3).
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 101
This second, additional plaque, if used, shall be affixed
next to or beside the first primary plaque described in
Requirement 396, and shall have the same protection
level. Furthermore the secondary plaque shall also bear
the name, address or trade name of the approved fitter
or workshop that carried out the installation, and the
date of installation.
5.3 Sealing
(398) The following parts shall be sealed:
— Any connection which, if disconnected, would cause
undetectable alterations to be made or undetectable
data loss (this may e.g. apply for the motion sensor
fitting on the gearbox, the adaptor for M1/N1 vehicles,
the external GNSS connection or the vehicle unit);
— The installation plaque, unless it is attached in such a
way that it cannot be removed without the markings
thereon being destroyed.
▼M1
(398a) The seals mentioned above shall be certified according to
the standard EN 16882:2016.
▼B
(399) The seals mentioned above may be removed:
— In case of emergency,
— To install, to adjust or to repair a speed limitation
device or any other device contributing to road
safety, provided that the recording equipment
continues to function reliably and correctly and is
resealed by an approved fitter or workshop (in
accordance with Chapter 6) immediately after fitting
the speed limitation device or any other device
contributing to road safety or within seven days in
other cases.
(400) On each occasion that these seals are broken a written
statement giving the reasons for such action shall be
prepared and made available to the competent authority.
(401) Seals shall hold an identification number, allocated by its
manufacturer. This number shall be unique and distinct
from any other seal number allocated by any other seals
manufacturer.
▼M1
This unique identification number is defined as:
MMNNNNNNNN by non-removable marking, with MM
as unique manufacturer identification (database registration
to be managed by EC) and NNNNNNNN seal alpha-
numeric number, unique in the manufacturer domain.
▼B
(402) The seals shall have a free space where approved fitters,
workshops or vehicle manufacturers can add a special
mark according the Article 22(3) of Regulation (EU)
No 165/2014.
▼B
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This mark shall not cover the seal identification number.
▼M1
(403) Seals manufacturers shall be registered in a dedicated
database when they get a seal model certified according
to EN 16882:2016 and shall make their identification seals
numbers public through a procedure to be established by
the European Commission.
(404) Approved workshops and vehicle manufacturers shall, in
the frame of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014, only use seals
certified according to EN 16882:2016 from those of the
seals manufacturers listed in the database mentioned
above.
▼B
(405) Seal manufacturers and their distributors shall maintain full
traceability records of the seals sold to be used in the
frame of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 and shall be
prepared to produce them to competent national authorities
whenever need be.
(406) Seals unique identification numbers shall be visible on the
installation plaque.
6. CHECKS, INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS
Requirements on the circumstances in which seals may be removed,
as referred to in Article 22(5) of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014, are
defined in Chapter 5.3 of this annex.
6.1 Approval of fitters, workshops and vehicle manufacturers
The Member States approve, regularly control and certify the bodies
to carry out:
— installations,
— checks,
— inspections,
— repairs.
Workshop cards shall be issued only to fitters and/or workshops
approved for the activation and/or the calibration of recording
equipment in conformity with this annex and, unless duly justified:
— who are not eligible for a company card;
— and whose other professional activities do not present a potential
compromise of the overall security of the system as required in
Appendix 10.
▼M1
6.2 Check of new or repaired components
(407) Every individual device, whether new or repaired, shall be
checked in respect of its proper operation and the accuracy
of its reading and recordings, within the limits laid down
in Chapter 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.3.
▼B
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6.3 Installation inspection
▼M1
(408) When being fitted to a vehicle, the whole installation
(including the recording equipment) shall comply with
the provisions relating to maximum tolerances laid down
in Chapter 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.3. The whole instal­
lation shall be sealed in accordance with Chapter 5.3 and it
shall include a calibration.
▼B
6.4 Periodic inspections
▼M3
(409) Periodic inspections of the equipment fitted to the vehicles
shall take place after any repair of the equipment, or after
any alteration of the characteristic coefficient of the vehicle
or of the effective circumference of the tyres, or after
equipment UTC time is wrong by more than 5 minutes,
or when the VRN has changed, and at least once within
two years (24 months) of the last inspection.
▼B
(410) These inspections shall include the following checks:
— that the recording equipment is working properly,
including the data storage in tachograph cards function
and the communication with remote communication
readers,
— that compliance with the provisions of chapter 3.2.1
and 3.2.2 on the maximum tolerances on installation
is ensured,
— that compliance with the provisions of chapter 3.2.3
and 3.3 is ensured,
— that the recording equipment carries the type approval
mark,
— that the installation plaque, as defined by Requirement
396, and the descriptive plaque, as defined by
Requirement 225, are affixed,
— the tyre size and the actual circumference of the tyres,
— that there are no manipulation devices attached to the
equipment,
— that seals are correctly placed, in good state, that their
identification numbers are valid (referenced seal manu­
facturer in the EC database) and that their identification
numbers correspond to the installation plaque markings
(see requirement 401).
▼M3
— that the version identifier of the stored digital map is
the most recent one.
(410a) In case of detection of a manipulation by the competent
national authorities, the vehicle may be sent to an auth­
orised workshop for a recalibration of the recording
equipment.
▼B
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(411) If one of the events listed in Chapter 3.9 (Detection of
Events and/or Faults) is found to have occurred since the
last inspection and is considered by tachograph manu­
facturers and/or national authorities as potentially putting
the security of the equipment at risk, the workshop shall:
a. make a comparison between the motion sensor identi­
fication data of the motion sensor plugged into the
gearbox with that of the paired motion sensor registered
in the vehicle unit;
b. check if the information recorded on the installation
plaque matches with the information contained within
the vehicle unit record;
c. check if the motion sensor serial number and approval
number, if printed on the body of the motion sensor,
matches the information stored in the recording
equipment data memory;
d. compare identification data marked on the descriptive
plaque of the external GNSS facility, if any, to the ones
stored in the vehicle unit data memory;
(412) Workshops shall keep traces in their inspection reports of
any findings concerning broken seals or manipulations
devices. These reports shall be kept by workshops for at
least 2 years and made available to the Competent
Authority whenever requested to do so.
(413) These inspections shall include a calibration and a
preventive replacement of the seals whose fitting is
under the responsibility of workshops.
6.5 Measurement of errors
(414) The measurement of errors on installation and during use
shall be carried out under the following conditions, which
are to be regarded as constituting standard test conditions:
— vehicle unladen, in normal running order,
— tyre pressures in accordance with the manufacturer's
instructions,
— tyre wear, within the limits allowed by national law,
— vehicle movement:
— the vehicle shall advance under its own engine power
in a straight line on level ground and at a speed of
50 ± 5 km/h. The measuring distance shall be at least
1 000 m.
— provided that it is of comparable accuracy, alternative
methods, such as a suitable test bench, may also be
used for the test.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 105
6.6 Repairs
(415) Workshops shall be able to download data from the
recording equipment to give the data back to the appro­
priate transport company.
(416) Approved workshops shall issue to transport companies a
certificate of data un-downloadability where the malfunction
of the recording equipment prevents previously recorded
data to be downloaded, even after repair by this workshop.
The workshops will keep a copy of each issued certificate
for at least two years.
7. CARD ISSUING
The card issuing processes set-up by the Member States shall
conform to the following:
(417) The card number of the first issue of a tachograph card to
an applicant shall have a consecutive index (if applicable)
and a replacement index and a renewal index set to ‘0’.
(418) The card numbers of all non-personal tachograph cards
issued to a single control body or a single workshop or
a single transport company shall have the same first 13
digits, and shall all have a different consecutive index.
(419) A tachograph card issued in replacement of an existing
tachograph card shall have the same card number than
the replaced one except the replacement index which
shall be raised by ‘1’ (in the order 0, …, 9, A, …, Z).
(420) A tachograph card issued in replacement of an existing
tachograph card shall have the same card expiry date as
the replaced one.
(421) A tachograph card issued in renewal of an existing
tachograph card shall have the same card number as the
renewed one except the replacement index which shall be
reset to ‘0’ and the renewal index which shall be raised by
‘1’ (in the order 0, …, 9, A, …, Z).
(422) The exchange of an existing tachograph card, in order to
modify administrative data, shall follow the rules of the
renewal if within the same Member State, or the rules of a
first issue if performed by another Member State.
(423) The ‘card holder surname’ for non-personal workshop or
control cards shall be filled with workshop or control body
name or with the fitter or control officer's name would
Member States so decide.
(424) Member States shall exchange data electronically in order
to ensure the uniqueness of driver cards that they issue in
accordance with Article 31 of Regulation (EU)
No 165/2014.
▼B
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8. TYPE-APPROVAL OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT AND
TACHOGRAPH CARDS
8.1 General points
▼M1
For the purpose of this chapter, the words ‘recording equipment’
mean ‘recording equipment or its components’. No type approval is
required for the cable(s) linking the motion sensor to the VU, the
external GNSS facility to the VU or the external remote communi­
cation facility to the VU. The paper, for use by the recording
equipment, shall be considered as a component of the recording
equipment.
Any manufacturer may ask for type approval of recording
equipment component(s) with any other recording equipment
component(s), provided each component complies with the
requirements of this annex. Alternately, manufacturers may also
ask for type approval of recording equipment.
As described in definition (10) in Article 2 of this Regulation,
vehicle units have variants in components assembly. Whatever the
vehicle unit components assembly, the external antenna and (if
applicable) the antenna splitter connected to the GNSS receiver or
to the remote communication facility are not part of the vehicle unit
type approval.
Nevertheless, manufacturers having obtained type approval for
recording equipment shall maintain a publicly available list of
compatible antennas and splitters with each type approved vehicle
unit, external GNSS facility and external remote communication
facility.
▼B
(425) Recording equipment shall be submitted for approval
complete with any integrated additional devices.
(426) Type approval of recording equipment and of tachograph
cards shall include security related tests, functional tests
and interoperability tests. Positive results to each of these
tests are stated by an appropriate certificate.
▼M1
(427) Member States type approval authorities will not grant a
type approval certificate as long as they do not hold:
— a security certificate (if requested by this Annex),
— a functional certificate,
— and an interoperability certificate (if requested by this
Annex)
for the recording equipment or the tachograph card, subject
of the request for type approval.
▼B
(428) Any modification in software or hardware of the
equipment or in the nature of materials used for its manu­
facture shall, before being used, be notified to the authority
which granted type-approval for the equipment. This
authority shall confirm to the manufacturer the extension
of the type approval, or may require an update or a confir­
mation of the relevant functional, security and/or interoper­
ability certificates.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 107
(429) Procedures to update in-situ recording equipment software
shall be approved by the authority which granted type
approval for the recording equipment. Software update
must not alter nor delete any driver activity data stored
in the recording equipment. Software may be updated
only under the responsibility of the equipment
manufacturer.
(430) Type approval of software modifications aimed to update a
previously type approved recording equipment may not be
refused if such modifications only apply to functions not
specified in this Annex. Software update of a recording
equipment may exclude the introduction of new character
sets, if not technically feasible.
▼B
8.2 Security certificate
(431) The security certificate is delivered in accordance with the
provisions of Appendix 10 of this Annex. Recording
equipment components to be certified are vehicle unit,
motion sensor, external GNSS facility and tachograph
cards.
(432) In the exceptional circumstance that the security certifi­
cation authorities refuse to certify new equipment on the
ground of obsolescence of the security mechanisms, type
approval shall continue to be granted only in these specific
and exceptional circumstances, and when no alternative
solution, compliant with the Regulation, exists.
(433) In this circumstance the Member State concerned shall,
without delay, inform the European Commission, which
shall, within twelve calendar months of the grant of the
type approval, launch a procedure to ensure that the level
of security is restored to its original levels.
8.3 Functional certificate
(434) Each candidate for type approval shall provide the
Member State's type approval authority with all the
material and documentation that the authority deems
necessary.
(435) Manufacturers shall provide the relevant samples of type
approval candidate products and associated documentation
required by laboratories appointed to perform functional
tests, and within one month of the request being made.
Any costs resulting from this request shall be borne by the
requesting entity. Laboratories shall treat all commercially
sensitive information in confidence.
(436) A functional certificate shall be delivered to the manu­
facturer only after all functional tests specified in
Appendix 9, at least, have been successfully passed.
(437) The type approval authority delivers the functional
certificate. This certificate shall indicate, in addition to
the name of its beneficiary and the identification of the
model, a detailed list of the tests performed and the results
obtained.
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 108
(438) The functional certificate of any recording equipment
component shall also indicate the type approval numbers
of the other type approved compatible recording
equipment components tested for its certification.
(439) The functional certificate of any recording equipment
component shall also indicate the ISO or CEN standard
against which the functional interface has been certified.
8.4 Interoperability certificate
(440) Interoperability tests are carried out by a single laboratory
under the authority and responsibility of the European
Commission.
(441) The laboratory shall register interoperability test requests
introduced by manufacturers in the chronological order of
their arrival.
(442) Requests will be officially registered only when the
laboratory is in possession of:
— the entire set of material and documents necessary for
such interoperability tests,
— the corresponding security certificate,
— the corresponding functional certificate,
The date of the registration of the request shall be notified
to the manufacturer.
▼M3
(443) No interoperability tests shall be carried out by the
laboratory, for recording equipment or tachograph cards
that have not passed the vulnerability analysis of their
security evaluation and a functional evaluation, except in
the exceptional circumstances described in requirement
432.
▼B
(444) Any manufacturer requesting interoperability tests shall
commit to leave to the laboratory in charge of these tests
the entire set of material and documents which he provided
to carry out the tests.
(445) The interoperability tests shall be carried out, in
accordance with the provisions of Appendix 9 of this
Annex, with respectively all the types of recording
equipment or tachograph cards:
— for which type approval is still valid or,
— for which type approval is pending and that have a
valid interoperability certificate.
(446) The interoperability tests shall cover all generations of
recording equipment or tachograph cards still in use.
▼M3
(447) The interoperability certificate shall be issued by the
laboratory to the manufacturer only after all required inter­
operability tests have been successfully passed and after
the manufacturer has shown that both a valid functional
certificate and a valid security certificate for the product
has been granted, except in the exceptional circumstances
described in requirement 432.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 109
(448) If the interoperability tests are not successful with one or
more of the recording equipment or tachograph card(s), the
interoperability certificate shall not be delivered, until the
requesting manufacturer has realised the necessary modifi­
cations and has succeeded the interoperability tests. The
laboratory shall identify the cause of the problem with the
help of the manufacturers concerned by this interoper­
ability fault and shall attempt to help the requesting manu­
facturer in finding a technical solution. In the case where
the manufacturer has modified its product, it is the manu­
facturer's responsibility to ascertain from the relevant auth­
orities that the security certificate and the functional
certificates are still valid.
(449) The interoperability certificate is valid for six months. It is
revoked at the end of this period if the manufacturer has
not received a corresponding type approval certificate. It is
forwarded by the manufacturer to the type approval
authority of the Member State who has delivered the func­
tional certificate.
(450) Any element that could be at the origin of an interoper­
ability fault shall not be used for profit or to lead to a
dominant position.
8.5 Type-approval certificate
(451) The type approval authority of the Member State may
deliver the type approval certificate as soon as it holds
the three required certificates.
(452) The type approval certificate of any recording equipment
component shall also indicate the type approval numbers
of the other type approved interoperable recording
equipment.
(453) The type approval certificate shall be copied by the type
approval authority to the laboratory in charge of the inter­
operability tests at the time of deliverance to the
manufacturer.
(454) The laboratory competent for interoperability tests shall
run a public web site on which will be updated the list
of recording equipment or tachograph cards models:
— for which a request for interoperability tests have been
registered,
— having received an interoperability certificate (even
provisional),
— having received a type approval certificate.
8.6 Exceptional procedure: first interoperability certificates for 2 nd
generation recording equipment and tachograph cards
(455) Until four months after a first couple of 2 nd generation
recording equipment and 2 nd generation tachograph cards
(driver, workshop, control and company cards) have been
certified to be interoperable, any interoperability certificate
delivered (including the first ones), regarding requests
registered during this period, shall be considered
provisional.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 110
(456) If at the end of this period, all products concerned are
mutually interoperable, all corresponding interoperability
certificates shall become definitive.
(457) If during this period, interoperability faults are found, the
laboratory in charge of interoperability tests shall identify
the causes of the problems with the help of all manu­
facturers involved and shall invite them to realize the
necessary modifications.
(458) If at the end of this period, interoperability problems still
remain, the laboratory in charge of interoperability tests,
with the collaboration of the manufacturers concerned and
with the type approval authorities who delivered the corre­
sponding functional certificates shall find out the causes of
the interoperability faults and establish which modifi­
cations should be made by each of the manufacturers
concerned. The search for technical solutions shall last
for a maximum of two months, after which, if no
common solution is found, the Commission, after having
consulted the laboratory in charge of interoperability tests,
shall decide which equipment(s) and cards get a definitive
interoperability certificate and state the reasons why.
(459) Any request for interoperability tests, registered by the
laboratory between the end of the four month period
after the first provisional interoperability certificate has
been delivered and the date of the decision by the
Commission referred to in requirement 455, shall be
postponed until the initial interoperability problems have
been solved. Those requests are then processed in the
chronological order of their registration.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 111
Appendix 1
DATA DICTIONARY
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Approach for definitions of data types
1.2. References
2. DATA TYPE DEFINITIONS
2.1. ActivityChangeInfo
2.2. Address
2.3. AESKey
2.4. AES128Key
2.5. AES192Key
2.6. AES256Key
2.7. BCDString
2.8. CalibrationPurpose
2.9. CardActivityDailyRecord
2.10. CardActivityLengthRange
2.11. CardApprovalNumber
▼M3
2.11a. CardBorderCrossing
2.11b. CardBorderCrossingRecord
▼B
2.12. CardCertificate
2.13. CardChipIdentification
2.14. CardConsecutiveIndex
2.15. CardControlActivityDataRecord
2.16. CardCurrentUse
2.17. CardDriverActivity
2.18. CardDrivingLicenceInformation
2.19. CardEventData
2.20. CardEventRecord
2.21. CardFaultData
2.22. CardFaultRecord
2.23. CardIccIdentification
2.24. CardIdentification
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 112
2.24a. CardLoadTypeEntries
2.24b. CardLoadTypeEntryRecord
2.24c. CardLoadUnloadOperations
2.24d. CardLoadUnloadRecord
▼B
2.25. CardMACertificate
2.26. CardNumber
▼M3
2.26a. CardPlaceAuthDailyWorkPeriod
▼B
2.27. CardPlaceDailyWorkPeriod
2.28. CardPrivateKey
2.29. CardPublicKey
2.30. CardRenewalIndex
2.31. CardReplacementIndex
2.32. CardSignCertificate
2.33. CardSlotNumber
2.34. CardSlotsStatus
2.35. CardSlotsStatusRecordArray
2.36. CardStructureVersion
2.37. CardVehicleRecord
2.38. CardVehiclesUsed
2.39. CardVehicleUnitRecord
2.40. CardVehicleUnitsUsed
2.41. Certificate
2.42. CertificateContent
2.43. CertificateHolderAuthorisation
2.44. CertificateRequestID
2.45. CertificationAuthorityKID
2.46. CompanyActivityData
2.47. CompanyActivityType
2.48. CompanyCardApplicationIdentification
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 113
2.48a. CompanyCardApplicationIdentificationV2
▼B
2.49. CompanyCardHolderIdentification
2.50. ControlCardApplicationIdentification
▼M3
2.50a. ControlCardApplicationIdentificationV2
▼B
2.51. ControlCardControlActivityData
2.52. ControlCardHolderIdentification
2.53. ControlType
2.54. CurrentDateTime
2.55. CurrentDateTimeRecordArray
2.56. DailyPresenceCounter
2.57. Datef
2.58. DateOfDayDownloaded
2.59. DateOfDayDownloadedRecordArray
2.60. Distance
▼M3
2.60a. DownloadInterfaceVersion
▼B
2.61. DriverCardApplicationIdentification
▼M3
2.61a. DriverCardApplicationIdentificationV2
▼B
2.62. DriverCardHolderIdentification
▼M1
2.63. Reserved for future use
▼B
2.64. EGFCertificate
2.65. EmbedderIcAssemblerId
2.66. EntryTypeDailyWorkPeriod
2.67. EquipmentType
2.68. EuropeanPublicKey
2.69. EventFaultRecordPurpose
2.70. EventFaultType
2.71. ExtendedSealIdentifier
2.72. ExtendedSerialNumber
2.73. FullCardNumber
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 114
2.74. FullCardNumberAndGeneration
2.75. Generation
2.76. GeoCoordinates
2.77. GNSSAccuracy
▼M1
2.78. GNSSAccumulatedDriving
2.79. GNSSAccumulatedDrivingRecord
▼M3
2.79a. GNSSAuthAccumulatedDriving
2.79b. GNSSAuthStatusADRecord
2.79c. GNSSPlaceAuthRecord
▼B
2.80. GNSSPlaceRecord
2.81. HighResOdometer
2.82. HighResTripDistance
2.83. HolderName
▼M3
2.84. Reserved for future use
▼B
2.85. K-ConstantOfRecordingEquipment
2.86. KeyIdentifier
2.87. KMWCKey
2.88. Language
2.89. LastCardDownload
▼M3
2.89a. LengthOfFollowingData
▼B
2.90. LinkCertificate
▼M3
2.90a. LoadType
▼B
2.91. L-TyreCircumference
2.92. MAC
2.93. ManualInputFlag
2.94. ManufacturerCode
2.95. ManufacturerSpecificEventFaultData
2.96. MemberStateCertificate
2.97. MemberStateCertificateRecordArray
2.98. MemberStatePublicKey
2.99. Name
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 115
2.100. NationAlpha
2.101. NationNumeric
▼M3
2.101a. NoOfBorderCrossingRecords
▼B
2.102. NoOfCalibrationRecords
2.103. NoOfCalibrationsSinceDownload
2.104. NoOfCardPlaceRecords
2.105. NoOfCardVehicleRecords
2.106. NoOfCardVehicleUnitRecords
2.107. NoOfCompanyActivityRecords
2.108. NoOfControlActivityRecords
2.109. NoOfEventsPerType
2.110. NoOfFaultsPerType
▼M1
2.111. NoOfGNSSADRecords
▼M3
2.111a. NoOfLoadUnloadRecords
▼B
2.112. NoOfSpecificConditionRecords
▼M3
2.112a. NoOfLoadTypeEntryRecords
▼B
2.113. OdometerShort
2.114. OdometerValueMidnight
▼M3
2.114a. OperationType
▼B
2.115. OdometerValueMidnightRecordArray
2.116. OverspeedNumber
▼M3
2.116a. PlaceAuthRecord
2.116b. PlaceAuthStatusRecord
▼B
2.117. PlaceRecord
▼M3
2.117a. PositionAuthenticationStatus
▼B
2.118. PreviousVehicleInfo
2.119. PublicKey
2.120. RecordType
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 116
2.121. RegionAlpha
2.122. RegionNumeric
2.123. RemoteCommunicationModuleSerialNumber
2.124. RSAKeyModulus
2.125. RSAKeyPrivateExponent
2.126. RSAKeyPublicExponent
2.127. RtmData
2.128. SealDataCard
2.129. SealDataVu
2.130. SealRecord
2.131. SensorApprovalNumber
2.132. SensorExternalGNSSApprovalNumber
2.133. SensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecord
2.134. SensorExternalGNSSIdentification
2.135. SensorExternalGNSSInstallation
2.136. SensorExternalGNSSOSIdentifier
2.137. SensorExternalGNSSSCIdentifier
2.138. SensorGNSSCouplingDate
2.139. SensorGNSSSerialNumber
2.140. SensorIdentification
2.141. SensorInstallation
2.142. SensorInstallationSecData
2.143. SensorOSIdentifier
2.144. SensorPaired
2.145. SensorPairedRecord
2.146. SensorPairingDate
2.147. SensorSCIdentifier
2.148. SensorSerialNumber
2.149. Signature
2.150. SignatureRecordArray
2.151. SimilarEventsNumber
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 117
2.152. SpecificConditionRecord
2.153. SpecificConditions
2.154. SpecificConditionType
2.155. Speed
2.156. SpeedAuthorised
2.157. SpeedAverage
2.158. SpeedMax
▼M3
2.158a. TachographCardsGen1Suppression
▼B
2.159. TachographPayload
▼M1
2.160. Reserved for future use
▼B
2.161. TDesSessionKey
2.162. TimeReal
2.163. TyreSize
2.164. VehicleIdentificationNumber
2.165. VehicleIdentificationNumberRecordArray
2.166. VehicleRegistrationIdentification
▼M3
2.166a. VehicleRegistrationIdentificationRecordArray
▼B
2.167. VehicleRegistrationNumber
2.168. VehicleRegistrationNumberRecordArray
2.169. VuAbility
2.170. VuActivityDailyData
2.171. VuActivityDailyRecordArray
2.172. VuApprovalNumber
2.173. VuCalibrationData
2.174. VuCalibrationRecord
2.175. VuCalibrationRecordArray
2.176. VuCardIWData
2.177. VuCardIWRecord
2.178. VuCardIWRecordArray
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 118
2.179. VuCardRecord
2.180. VuCardRecordArray
2.181. VuCertificate
2.182. VuCertificateRecordArray
2.183. VuCompanyLocksData
2.184. VuCompanyLocksRecord
2.185. VuCompanyLocksRecordArray
▼M3
2.185a. VuConfigurationLengthRange
▼B
2.186. VuControlActivityData
2.187. VuControlActivityRecord
2.188. VuControlActivityRecordArray
2.189. VuDataBlockCounter
2.190. VuDetailedSpeedBlock
2.191. VuDetailedSpeedBlockRecordArray
2.192. VuDetailedSpeedData
▼M3
2.192a. VuDigitalMapVersion
▼B
2.193. VuDownloadablePeriod
2.194. VuDownloadablePeriodRecordArray
2.195. VuDownloadActivityData
2.196. VuDownloadActivityDataRecordArray
2.197. VuEventData
2.198. VuEventRecord
2.199. VuEventRecordArray
2.200. VuFaultData
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 119
2.201. VuFaultRecord
2.202. VuFaultRecordArray
▼M1
2.203. VuGNSSADRecord
▼M3
2.203a. VuBorderCrossingRecord
2.203b. VuBorderCrossingRecordArray
▼M1
2.204. VuGNSSADRecordArray
▼M3
2.204a. VuGnssMaximalTimeDifference
▼B
2.205. VuIdentification
2.206. VuIdentificationRecordArray
2.207. VuITSConsentRecord
2.208. VuITSConsentRecordArray
▼M3
2.208a. VuLoadUnloadRecord
2.208b. VuLoadUnloadRecordArray
▼B
2.209. VuManufacturerAddress
2.210. VuManufacturerName
2.211. VuManufacturingDate
2.212. VuOverSpeedingControlData
2.213. VuOverSpeedingControlDataRecordArray
2.214. VuOverSpeedingEventData
2.215. VuOverSpeedingEventRecord
2.216. VuOverSpeedingEventRecordArray
2.217. VuPartNumber
2.218. VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodData
2.219. VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecord
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 120
2.220. VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecordArray
2.221. VuPrivateKey
2.222. VuPublicKey
▼M3
2.222a. VuRtcTime
▼B
2.223. VuSerialNumber
2.224. VuSoftInstallationDate
2.225. VuSoftwareIdentification
2.226. VuSoftwareVersion
2.227. VuSpecificConditionData
2.228. VuSpecificConditionRecordArray
2.229. VuTimeAdjustmentData
▼M1
2.230. Reserved for future use
2.231. Reserved for future use
▼B
2.232. VuTimeAdjustmentRecord
2.233. VuTimeAdjustmentRecordArray
2.234. WorkshopCardApplicationIdentification
▼M3
2.234a. WorkshopCardApplicationIdentificationV2
2.234b. WorkshopCardCalibrationAddData
2.234c. WorkshopCardCalibrationAddDataRecord
▼B
2.235. WorkshopCardCalibrationData
2.236. WorkshopCardCalibrationRecord
2.237. WorkshopCardHolderIdentification
2.238. WorkshopCardPIN
2.239. W-VehicleCharacteristicConstant
2.240. VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecord
2.241. VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecordArray
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 121
2.242. VuSensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecordArray
2.243. VuSensorPairedRecordArray
3. VALUE AND SIZE RANGE DEFINITIONS
4. CHARACTER SETS
5. ENCODING
6. OBJECT IDENTIFIERS UND APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS
6.1. Object Identifiers
6.2. Application Identifiers
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix specifies data formats, data elements, and data structures
for use within the recording equipment and tachograph cards.
1.1. Approach for definitions of data types
This appendix uses Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) to define
data types. This enables simple and structured data to be defined
without implying any specific transfer syntax (encoding rules) which
will be application and environment dependent.
ASN.1 type naming conventions are done in accordance with ISO/IEC
8824-1. This implies that:
— where possible, the meaning of the data type is implied through the
names being selected,
— where a data type is a composition of other data types, the data type
name is still a single sequence of alphabetical characters
commencing with a capital letter, however capitals are used within
the name to impart the corresponding meaning,
— in general, the data types names are related to the name of the data
types from which they are constructed, the equipment in which data
is stored and the function related to the data.
If an ASN.1 type is already defined as part of another standard and if it
is relevant for usage in the recording equipment, then this ASN.1 type
will be defined in this appendix.
To enable several types of encoding rules, some ASN.1 types in this
appendix are constrained by value range identifiers. The value range
identifiers are defined in paragraph 3 and Appendix 2.
1.2. References
The following references are used in this Appendix:
ISO 639 Code for the representation of names of languages.
First Edition: 1988.
ISO 3166 Codes for the representation of names of countries
and their subdivisions — Part 1: Country codes, 2013
ISO 3779 Road vehicles — Vehicle identification number
(VIN) — Content and structure. 2009
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 122
ISO/IEC 7816-5 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part
5: Registration of application providers.
Second edition: 2004.
ISO/IEC 7816-6 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part
6: Interindustry data elements for interchange, 2004
+ Technical Corrigendum 1: 2006
ISO/IEC 8824-1 Information technology — Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation. 2008 +
Technical Corrigendum 1: 2012 and Technical Corri­
gendum 2: 2014.
ISO/IEC 8825-2 Information technology — ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Packed Encoding Rules (PER). 2008.
ISO/IEC 8859-1 Information technology — 8 bit single-byte coded
graphic character sets — Part 1: Latin alphabet
No.1. First edition: 1998.
ISO/IEC 8859-7 Information technology — 8 bit single-byte coded
graphic character sets — Part 7: Latin/Greek
alphabet. 2003.
ISO 16844-3 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Motion
Sensor Interface. 2004 + Technical Corrigendum 1:
2006..
TR-03110-3 BSI / ANSSI Technical Guideline TR-03110-3,
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token —
Part 3 Common Specifications, version 2.20, 3.
February 2015
2. DATA TYPE DEFINITIONS
▼M3
For any of the following data types, the default value for an ‘unknown’
or a ‘not applicable’ content will consist in filling the data element with
Hex ‘FF’ bytes, unless otherwise specified.
All data types are used for Generation 1 and Generation 2 applications
unless otherwise specified. Data types only used for Generation 2,
version 2 applications are indicated.
For card data types used for Generation 1 and Generation 2 applications,
the size specified in this Appendix is the one for Generation 2 appli­
cation. The size for Generation 1 application is supposed to be already
known by the reader. The Annex IC requirement numbers related to
such data types cover both Generation 1 and Generation 2 applications.
Card data types not defined for Generation 1 cards are not stored in
Generation 1 application of Generation 2 cards. In particular:
— Type approval numbers stored in Generation 1 application of
Generation 2 cards are truncated to the 8 first characters where
needed,
— Only the ‘FERRY / TRAIN CROSSING begin’ of a ‘FERRY /
TRAIN CROSSING’ specific condition is stored in Generation 1
application of Generation 2 cards.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 123
2.1. ActivityChangeInfo
This data type enables to code, within a two bytes word, a slot status at
00:00 and/or a driver status at 00:00 and/or changes of activity and/or
changes of driving status and/or changes of card status for a driver or
a co-driver. This data type is related to Annex 1C requirements 105,
266, 291, 320, 321, 343, and 344.
Value assignment — Octet Aligned: ‘scpaattttttttttt’B (16 bits)
For Data Memory recordings (or slot status):
‘s’B Slot:
‘0’B: DRIVER,
‘1’B: CO-DRIVER,
‘c’B Driving status:
‘0’B: SINGLE,
‘1’B: CREW,
‘p’B Driver (or workshop) card status in the relevant slot:
‘0’B: INSERTED, a card is inserted,
‘1’B: NOT INSERTED, no card is inserted (or a card
is withdrawn),
‘aa’B Activity:
‘00’B: BREAK/REST,
‘01’B: AVAILABILITY,
‘10’B: WORK,
‘11’B: DRIVING,
‘ttttttttttt’B Time of the change: Number of minutes since 00h00
on the given day.
For Driver (or Workshop) card recordings (and driver status):
‘s’B Slot (not relevant when ‘p’=1 except note below):
‘0’B: DRIVER,
‘1’B: CO-DRIVER,
‘c’B Driving status (case ‘p’=0) or
Following activity status (case ‘p’=1):
‘0’B: SINGLE,
‘0’B: UNKNOWN
‘1’B: CREW,
‘1’B: KNOWN (=manually entered)
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‘p’B Card status:
‘0’B: INSERTED, the card is inserted in a recording
equipment,
‘1’B: NOT INSERTED, the card is not inserted (or
the card is withdrawn),
‘aa’B Activity (not relevant when ‘p’=1 and ‘c’=0 except
note below):
‘00’B: BREAK/REST,
‘01’B: AVAILABILITY,
‘10’B: WORK,
‘11’B: DRIVING,
‘ttttttttttt’B Time of the change: Number of minutes since 00h00
on the given day.
Note for the case ‘card withdrawal’:
When the card is withdrawn:
— ‘s’ is relevant and indicates the slot from which the card is
withdrawn,
— ‘c’ must be set to 0,
— ‘p’ must be set to 1,
— ‘aa’ must code the current activity selected at that time,
As a result of a manual entry, the bits ‘c’ and ‘aa’ of the word (stored in
a card) may be overwritten later to reflect the entry.
2.2. Address
An address.
codePage specifies a character set defined in Chapter 4,
address is an address encoded using the specified character set.
2.3. AESKey
Generation 2:
An AES key with a length of 128, 192 or 256 bits.
Value assignment: not further specified.
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2.4. AES128Key
Generation 2:
An AES128 key.
length denotes the length of the AES128 key in octets.
aes128Key is an AES key with a length of 128 bits.
Value assignment:
The length shall have the value 16.
2.5. AES192Key
Generation 2:
An AES192 key.
length denotes the length of the AES192 key in octets.
aes192Key is an AES key with a length of 192 bits.
Value assignment:
The length shall have the value 24.
2.6. AES256Key
Generation 2:
An AES256 key.
length denotes the length of the AES256 key in octets.
aes256Key is an AES key with a length of 256 bits.
Value assignment:
The length shall have the value 32.
2.7. BCDString
BCDString is applied for Binary Code Decimal (BCD) representation.
This data type is used to represent one decimal digit in one semi octet (4
bits). BCDString is based on the ISO/IEC 8824-1 ‘CharacterStringType’.
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BCDString uses an ‘hstring’ notation. The leftmost hexadecimal digit
shall be the most significant semi octet of the first octet. To produce a
multiple of octets, zero trailing semi octets shall be inserted, as needed,
from the leftmost semi octet position in the first octet.
Permitted digits are: 0, 1, .. 9.
2.8. CalibrationPurpose
Code explaining why a set of calibration parameters was recorded. This
data type is related to Annex 1B requirements 097 and 098 and
Annex 1C requirements 119.
Value assignment:
Generation 1:
‘00’H reserved value,
‘01’H activation: recording of calibration parameters
known, at the moment of the VU activation,
‘02’H first installation: first calibration of the VU after
its activation,
‘03’H installation: first calibration of the VU in the
current vehicle,
‘04’H periodic inspection.
Generation 2:
In addition to generation 1 the following values are used:
‘05’H entry of VRN by company,
‘06’H time adjustment without calibration,
‘07’H to ‘7F’H RFU,
‘80’H to ‘FF’H Manufacturer specific.
2.9. CardActivityDailyRecord
Information, stored in a card, related to the driver activities for a
particular calendar day. This data type is related to Annex 1C
requirements 266, 291, 320 and 343.
activityPreviousRecordLength is the total length in bytes of the
previous daily record. The maximum value is given by the length of
the OCTET STRING containing these records (see CardActivityLeng­
thRange Appendix 2 paragraph 4). When this record is the oldest daily
record, the value of activityPreviousRecordLength must be set to 0.
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activityRecordLength is the total length in bytes of this record. The
maximum value is given by the length of the OCTET STRING
containing these records.
activityRecordDate is the date of the record.
activityDailyPresenceCounter is the daily presence counter for the card
this day.
activityDayDistance is the total distance travelled this day.
activityChangeInfo is the set of ActivityChangeInfo data for the driver
this day. It may contain at maximum 1440 values (one activity change
per minute). This set always includes the activityChangeInfo coding the
driver status at 00:00.
2.10. CardActivityLengthRange
Number of bytes in a driver or a workshop card, available to store driver
activity records.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
2.11. CardApprovalNumber
Type approval number of the card.
Value assignment:
The approval number shall be provided as published on the corre­
sponding European Commission web site, i.e. for example including
hyphens if any. The approval number shall be left-aligned.
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2.11a. CardBorderCrossings
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the border
crossings of the vehicle when the latter has crossed the border of a
country (Annex IC requirements 306f and 356f).
borderCrossingPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated
card border crossing record.
Value assignment is the number corresponding to the numerator of the
card border crossing record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence
of the card border crossing record in the structure.
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cardBorderCrossingRecords is the set of card border crossing records.
2.11b. CardBorderCrossingRecord
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the border
crossings of the vehicle when the latter has crossed the border of a
country (Annex IC requirements 147b, 306e and 356e).
countryLeft is the country which was left by the vehicle, or ‘no
information available’ according to Annex IC requirement 147b. ‘Rest
of the World’ (NationNumeric code ‘FF’H) shall be used when the
vehicle unit is not able to determine the country where the vehicle is
located (e.g. the current country is not part of the stored digital maps).
countryEntered is the country into which the vehicle has entered, or the
country in which the vehicle is located at card insertion time. ‘Rest of
the World’ (NationNumeric code ‘FF’H) shall be used when the vehicle
unit is not able to determine the country where the vehicle is located
(e.g. the current country is not part of the stored digital maps).
gnssPlaceAuthRecord contains information related to the position of the
vehicle, when the vehicle unit has detected that the vehicle has crossed
the border of a country, or ‘no information available’ according to
requirement 147b of Annex IC, and its authentication status.
vehicleOdometerValue is the odometer value when the vehicle unit has
detected that the vehicle has crossed the border of a country, or ‘no
information available’ according to requirement 147b of Annex IC.
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2.12. CardCertificate
Generation 1:
Certificate of the public key of a card.
2.13. CardChipIdentification
Information, stored in a card, related to the identification of the card's
Integrated Circuit (IC) (Annex 1C requirement 249). The icSerialNumber
together with the icManufacturingReferences identifies the card chip
uniquely. The icSerialNumber alone does not uniquely identify the
card chip.
icSerialNumber is the IC serial number.
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icManufacturingReferences is the IC manufacturer specific identifier.
2.14. CardConsecutiveIndex
A card consecutive index (definition h)).
Value assignment: (see Annex 1C chapter 7)
Order for increase: ‘0, …, 9, A, …, Z, a, …, z’
2.15. CardControlActivityDataRecord
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the last
control the driver has been subject to (Annex 1C requirements 274,
299, 327, and 350).
controlType is the type of the control.
controlTime is the date and time of the control.
controlCardNumber is the FullCardNumber of the control officer
having performed the control.
controlVehicleRegistration is the VRN and registering Member State of
the vehicle in which the control happened.
controlDownloadPeriodBegin and controlDownloadPeriodEnd is the
period downloaded, in case of downloading.
2.16. CardCurrentUse
Information about the actual usage of the card (Annex 1C requirement
273, 298, 326, and 349).
sessionOpenTime is the time when the card is inserted for the current
usage. This element is set to zero at card removal.
sessionOpenVehicle is the identification of the currently used vehicle,
set at card insertion. This element is set to zero at card removal.
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2.17. CardDriverActivity
Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to the
activities of the driver (Annex 1C requirements 267, 268, 292, 293,
321 and 344).
activityPointerOldestDayRecord is the specification of the begin of the
storage place (number of bytes from the beginning of the string) of the
oldest complete day record in the activityDailyRecords string. The
maximum value is given by the length of the string.
activityPointerNewestRecord is the specification of the begin of the
storage place (number of bytes from the beginning of the string) of
the most recent day record in the activityDailyRecords string. The
maximum value is given by the length of the string.
activityDailyRecords is the space available to store the driver activity
data (data structure: CardActivityDailyRecord) for each calendar day
where the card has been used.
Value assignment: this octet string is cyclically filled with records of
CardActivityDailyRecord. At the first use storing is started at the first
byte of the string. All new records are appended at the end of the
previous one. When the string is full, storing continues at the first
byte of the string independently of a break being inside a data
element. Before placing new activity data in the string (enlarging
current activityDailyRecord, or placing a new activityDailyRecord) that
replaces older activity data, activityPointerOldestDayRecord must be
updated to reflect the new location of the oldest complete day record,
and activityPreviousRecordLength of this (new) oldest complete day
record must be reset to 0.
2.18. CardDrivingLicenceInformation
Information, stored in a driver card, related to the card holder driver
licence data (Annex 1C requirement 259 and 284).
drivingLicenceIssuingAuthority is the authority responsible for issuing
the driving licence.
drivingLicenceIssuingNation is the nationality of the authority that
issued the driving licence.
drivingLicenceNumber is the number of the driving licence.
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2.19. CardEventData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the events
associated with the card holder (Annex IC requirements 260 and 318).
CardEventData is a sequence, ordered by ascending value of Event­
FaultType, of cardEventRecords (except security breach attempts related
records which are gathered in the last set of the sequence).
cardEventRecords is a set of event records of a given event type (or
category for security breach attempts events).
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the events
associated with the card holder (Annex IC requirements 285 and 341).
CardEventData is a sequence, ordered by ascending value of Event­
FaultType, of cardEventRecords (except security breach attempts related
records which are gathered in the last set of the sequence).
cardEventRecords is a set of event records of a given event type (or
category for security breach attempts events).
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2.20. CardEventRecord
Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to an event
associated to the card holder (Annex 1C requirements 261, 286, 318 and
341).
eventType is the type of the event.
eventBeginTime is the date and time of beginning of event.
eventEndTime is the date and time of end of event.
eventVehicleRegistration is the VRN and registering Member State of
vehicle in which the event happened.
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2.21. CardFaultData
Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to the faults
associated to the card holder (Annex 1C requirements 263, 288, 318, and
341).
CardFaultData is a sequence of Recording Equipment faults set of
records followed by card faults set of records.
cardFaultRecords is a set of fault records of a given fault category
(Recording Equipment or card).
2.22. CardFaultRecord
Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to a fault
associated to the card holder (Annex 1C requirement 264, 289, 318, and
341).
faultType is the type of the fault.
faultBeginTime is the date and time of beginning of fault.
faultEndTime is the date and time of end of fault.
faultVehicleRegistration is the VRN and registering Member State of
vehicle in which the fault happened.
2.23. CardIccIdentification
Information, stored in a card, related to the identification of the inte­
grated circuit (IC) card (Annex 1C requirement 248).
clockStop is the Clockstop mode as defined in appendix 2.
cardExtendedSerialNumber is the IC card unique serial number as
further specified by the ExtendedSerialNumber data type.
cardApprovalNumber is the type approval number of the card.
cardPersonaliserID is the card personaliser ID encoded as Manufac­
turerCode.
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embedderIcAssemblerId provides information about the embedder/IC
assembler.
icIdentifier is the Identifier of the IC on the card and its IC manu­
facturer as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-6.
2.24. CardIdentification
Information, stored in a card, related to the identification of the card
(Annex 1C requirements 255, 280, 310, 333, 359, 365, 371, and 377).
cardIssuingMemberState is the code of the Member State issuing the
card.
cardNumber is the card number of the card.
cardIssuingAuthorityName is the name of the authority having issued
the Card.
cardIssueDate is the issue date of the Card to the current holder.
cardValidityBegin is the first date of validity of the card.
cardExpiryDate is the date when the validity of the card ends.
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2.24a. CardLoadTypeEntries
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the load type
entries when the card is inserted in a vehicle unit (Annex IC
requirements 306j and 356j).
loadTypeEntryPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated
card load type entry record.
Value assignment: number corresponding to the numerator of the card
load type entry record, beginning with '0' for the first occurrence of the
card load type entry record in the structure.
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cardLoadTypeEntryRecords is the set of records containing the date
and time of the entry and the load type entered.
2.24b. CardLoadTypeEntryRecord
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the load type
changes entered when the card is inserted in a vehicle unit (Annex IC
requirements 306i and 356i).
timeStamp is the date and time when the load type was entered.
loadTypeEntered is the load type entered.
2.24c. CardLoadUnloadOperations
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to load/unload
operations of the vehicle (Annex IC requirements 306h and 356h).
loadUnloadPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated card
load/unload record.
Value assignment: is the number corresponding to the numerator of the
card load/unload record, beginning with '0' for the first occurrence of the
card load/unload record in the structure.
cardLoadUnloadRecords is the set of records containing the indication
of the type of operation performed (load, unload, or simultaneous load
and unload), the date and time the load/unload operation has been
entered, information about the position of the vehicle, and the vehicle
odometer value.
2.24d. CardLoadUnloadRecord
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to load/unload
operations of the vehicle (Annex IC requirements 306g and 356g).
timeStamp is the date and time at the beginning of the load/unload
operation.
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operationType is the type of operation entered (load, unload, or simul­
taneous load/unload).
gnssPlaceAuthRecord contains information related to the position of the
vehicle.
vehicleOdometerValue is the odometer value related to the beginning of
the load/unload operation.
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2.25. CardMACertificate
Generation 2:
Certificate of the card public key for mutual authentication with a VU.
The structure of this certificate is specified in Appendix 11.
2.26. CardNumber
A card number as defined by definition g).
driverIdentification is the unique identification of a driver in a Member
State.
ownerIdentification is the unique identification of a company or a
workshop or a control body within a member state.
cardConsecutiveIndex is the card consecutive index.
cardReplacementIndex is the card replacement index.
cardRenewalIndex is the card renewal index.
The first sequence of the choice is suitable to code a driver card number,
the second sequence of the choice is suitable to code workshop, control,
and company card numbers.
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2.26a. CardPlaceAuthDailyWorkPeriod
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, providing the auth­
entication status of places where daily work periods begin and/or end
(Annex IC requirements 306b and 356b).
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placeAuthPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated place
authentication status record.
Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the place
authentication status record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence
of the place authentication status records in the structure.
placeAuthStatusRecords is the set of records containing the place auth­
entication status of the places entered.
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2.27. CardPlaceDailyWorkPeriod
Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to the places
where daily work periods begin and/or end (Annex 1C requirements 272,
297, 325, and 348).
placePointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated place
record.
Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the place
record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of the place records in
the structure.
placeRecords is the set of records containing the information related to
the places entered.
2.28. CardPrivateKey
Generation 1:
The private key of a card.
2.29. CardPublicKey
The public key of a card.
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2.30. CardRenewalIndex
A card renewal index (definition i)).
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Value assignment: (see this Annex chapter 7).
‘0’ First issue.
Order for increase: ‘0, …, 9, A, …, Z’
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2.31. CardReplacementIndex
A card replacement index (definition j)).
Value assignment: (see this Annex chapter VII).
‘0’ Original card.
Order for increase: ‘0, …, 9, A, …, Z’
2.32. CardSignCertificate
Generation 2:
Certificate of the card public key for signature. The structure of this
certificate is specified in Appendix 11.
2.33. CardSlotNumber
Code to distinguish between the two slots of a Vehicle Unit.
Value assignment: not further specified.
2.34. CardSlotsStatus
Code indicating the type of cards inserted in the two slots of the vehicle
unit.
Value assignment — Octet Aligned: ‘ccccdddd’B
‘cccc’B Identification of the type of card inserted in the
co-driver slot,
‘dddd’B Identification of the type of card inserted in the driver
slot,
with the following identification codes:
‘0000’B no card is inserted,
‘0001’B a driver card is inserted,
‘0010’B a workshop card is inserted,
‘0011’B a control card is inserted,
‘0100’B a company card is inserted.
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2.35. CardSlotsStatusRecordArray
Generation 2:
The CardSlotsStatus plus metadata as used in the download protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (CardSlotsStatus). Value
Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the CardSlotsStatus in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of CardSlotsStatus records.
2.36. CardStructureVersion
Code indicating the version of the implemented structure in a tachograph
card.
Value assignment: ‘aabb’H:
‘aa’H Index for changes of the structure.
‘00’H for Generation 1 applications
‘01’H for Generation 2 applications
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‘bb’H Index for changes concerning the use of the data
elements defined for the structure given by the high
byte.
‘00’H for Generation 1 applications
‘00’H for version 1 of Generation 2 applications
‘01’H for version 2 of Generation 2 applications.
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2.37. CardVehicleRecord
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to a period of
use of a vehicle during a calendar day (Annex 1C requirements 269,
294, 322, and 345).
Generation 1:
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vehicleOdometerBegin is the vehicle odometer value at the beginning
of the period of use of the vehicle.
vehicleOdometerEnd is the vehicle odometer value at the end of the
period of use of the vehicle.
vehicleFirstUse is the date and time of the beginning of the period of
use of the vehicle.
vehicleLastUse is the date and time of the end of the period of use of
the vehicle.
vehicleRegistration is the VRN and the registering Member State of the
vehicle.
vuDataBlockCounter is the value of the VuDataBlockCounter at last
extraction of the period of use of the vehicle.
Generation 2:
In addition to generation 1 the following data element is used:
VehicleIdentificationNumber is the vehicle identification number
referring to the vehicle as a whole.
2.38. CardVehiclesUsed
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the vehicles
used by the card holder (Annex 1C requirements 270, 295, 323, and
346).
vehiclePointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated vehicle
record.
Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the
vehicle record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of the
vehicle records in the structure.
cardVehicleRecords is the set of records containing information on
vehicles used.
2.39. CardVehicleUnitRecord
Generation 2:
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Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to a vehicle
unit that was used (Annex 1C requirement 303 and 351).
timeStamp is the beginning of the period of use of the vehicle unit (i.e.
first card insertion in the vehicle unit for the period).
manufacturerCode identifies the manufacturer of the Vehicle Unit.
deviceID identifies the Vehicle Unit type of a manufacturer. The value
is manufacturer specific.
vuSoftwareVersion is the software version number of the Vehicle Unit.
2.40. CardVehicleUnitsUsed
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Generation 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the vehicle
units used by the card holder (Annex IC requirements 304 and 352).
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vehicleUnitPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated
vehicle unit record.
Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the
vehicle unit record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of the
vehicle unit records in the structure.
cardVehicleUnitRecords is the set of records containing information on
vehicle units used.
2.41. Certificate
The certificate of a public key issued by a Certification Authority.
Generation 1:
Value assignment: digital signature with partial recovery of a Certifi­
cateContent according to Appendix 11 common security mechanisms:
Signature (128 bytes) || Public Key remainder (58 bytes) || Certification
Authority Reference (8 bytes).
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Generation 2:
Value assignment: See Appendix 11
2.42. CertificateContent
Generation 1:
The (clear) content of the certificate of a public key according to
Appendix 11 common security mechanisms.
certificateProfileIdentifier is the version of the corresponding
certificate.
Value assignment: ‘01h’ for this version.
certificationAuthorityReference identifies the Certification Authority
issuing the certificate. It also references the Public Key of this Certifi­
cation Authority.
certificateHolderAuthorisation identifies the rights of the certificate
holder.
certificateEndOfValidity is the date when the certificate expires
administratively.
certificateHolderReference identifies the certificate holder. It also
references his Public Key.
publicKey is the public key that is certified by this certificate.
2.43. CertificateHolderAuthorisation
Identification of the rights of a certificate holder.
Generation 1:
tachographApplicationID is the application identifier for the
tachograph application.
Value assignment: ‘FFh’ ‘54h’ ‘41h’ ‘43h’ ‘48h’ ‘4Fh’. This AID is a
proprietary non registered application identifier in accordance with
ISO/IEC 7816-5.
equipmentType is the identification of the type of equipment to which
the certificate is intended.
Value assignment: in accordance with EquipmentType data type. 0 if
certificate is the one of a Member State.
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Generation 2:
tachographApplicationID denotes the 6 most significant bytes of the
generation 2 tachograph card application identifier (AID). The AID for
the tachograph card application is specified in chapter 6.2.
Value assignment: ‘FF 53 4D 52 44 54’.
equipmentType is the identification of the type of equipment as
specified for generation 2 to which the certificate is intended.
Value assignment: in accordance with EquipmentType data type.
2.44. CertificateRequestID
Unique identification of a certificate request. It can also be used as a
Vehicle Unit Public Key Identifier if the serial number of the vehicle
Unit to which the key is intended is not known at certificate generation
time.
requestSerialNumber is a serial number for the certificate request,
unique for the manufacturer and the month below.
requestMonthYear is the identification of the month and the year of the
certificate request.
Value assignment: BCD coding of Month (two digits) and Year (two
last digits).
crIdentifier: is an identifier to distinguish a certificate request from an
extended serial number.
Value assignment: ‘FFh’.
manufacturerCode: is the numerical code of the manufacturer
requesting the certificate.
2.45. CertificationAuthorityKID
Identifier of the Public Key of a Certification Authority (a Member State
or the European Certification Authority).
nationNumeric is the numerical nation code of the Certification
Authority.
nationAlpha is the alphanumerical nation code of the Certification
Authority.
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keySerialNumber is a serial number to distinguish the different keys of
the Certification Authority in the case keys are changed.
additionalInfo is a two byte field for additional coding (Certification
Authority specific).
caIdentifier is an identifier to distinguish a Certification Authority Key
Identifier from other Key Identifiers.
Value assignment: ‘01h’.
2.46. CompanyActivityData
Information, stored in a company card, related to activities performed
with the card (Annex 1C requirement 373 and 379).
companyPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated compa­
nyActivityRecord.
Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the
company activity record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of
the company activity record in the structure.
companyActivityRecords is the set of all company activity records.
companyActivityRecord is the sequence of information related to one
company activity.
companyActivityType is the type of the company activity.
companyActivityTime is the date and time of the company activity.
cardNumberInformation is the card number and the card issuing
Member State of the card downloaded, if any.
vehicleRegistrationInformation is the VRN and registering Member
State of the vehicle downloaded or locked in or out.
downloadPeriodBegin and downloadPeriodEnd is the period down­
loaded from the VU, if any.
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2.47. CompanyActivityType
Code indicating an activity carried out by a company using its company
card.
2.48. CompanyCardApplicationIdentification
Information, stored in a company card related to the identification of the
application of the card (Annex 1C requirement 369 and 375).
typeOfTachographCardId is specifying the implemented type of card.
cardStructureVersion is specifying the the version of the structure that
is implemented in the card.
noOfCompanyActivityRecords is the number of company activity
records the card can store.
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2.48a. CompanyCardApplicationIdentificationV2
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a company card related to the identification of the
application of the card (Annex IC requirement 375a).
lengthOfFollowingData is the number of bytes following in the record.
vuConfigurationLengthRange is the number of bytes in a tachograph
card, available to store VU configurations.
▼B
2.49. CompanyCardHolderIdentification
Information, stored in a company card, related to the cardholder identi­
fication (Annex 1C requirement 372 and 378).
companyName is the name of the holder company.
▼B
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companyAddress is the address of the holder company.
cardHolderPreferredLanguage is the preferred language of the card
holder.
2.50. ControlCardApplicationIdentification
Information, stored in a control card related to the identification of the
application of the card (Annex 1C requirement 357 and 363).
typeOfTachographCardId is specifying the implemented type of card.
cardStructureVersion is specifying the version of the structure that is
implemented in the card.
noOfControlActivityRecords is the number of control activity records
the card can store.
▼M3
2.50a. ControlCardApplicationIdentificationV2
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a control card related to the identification of the
application of the card (Annex IC requirement 363a).
lengthOfFollowingData is the number of bytes following in the record.
vuConfigurationLengthRange is the number of bytes in a tachograph
card, available to store VU configurations.
▼B
2.51. ControlCardControlActivityData
Information, stored in a control card, related to control activity
performed with the card (Annex 1C requirement 361 and 367).
controlPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated control
activity record.
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Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the
control activity record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of
the control activity record in the structure.
controlActivityRecords is the set of all control activity records.
controlActivityRecord is the sequence of information related to one
control.
controlType is the type of the control.
controlTime is the date and time of the control.
controlledCardNumber is the card number and the card issuing
Member State of the card controlled.
controlledVehicleRegistration is the VRN and registering Member
State of the vehicle in which the control happened.
controlDownloadPeriodBegin and controlDownloadPeriodEnd is the
period eventually downloaded.
2.52. ControlCardHolderIdentification
Information, stored in a control card, related to the identification of the
cardholder (Annex 1C requirement 360 and 366).
controlBodyName is the name of the control body of the card holder.
controlBodyAddress is the address of the control body of the card
holder.
cardHolderName is the name and first name(s) of the holder of the
Control Card.
cardHolderPreferredLanguage is the preferred language of the card
holder.
2.53. ControlType
Code indicating the activities carried out during a control. This data type
is related to Annex 1C requirements 126, 274, 299, 327, and 350.
Generation 1:
Value assignment — Octet aligned: ‘cvpdxxxx’B (8 bits)
‘c’B card downloading:
‘0’B: card not downloaded during this control activity,
‘1’B: card downloaded during this control activity
▼B
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‘v’B VU downloading:
‘0’B: VU not downloaded during this control activity,
‘1’B: VU downloaded during this control activity
‘p’B printing:
‘0’B: no printing done during this control activity,
‘1’B: printing done during this control activity
‘d’B display:
‘0’B: no display used during this control activity,
‘1’B: display used during this control activity
‘xxxx’B Not used.
Generation 2:
Value assignment — Octet aligned: ‘cvpdexxx’B (8 bits)
‘c’B card downloading:
‘0’B: card not downloaded during this control activity,
‘1’B: card downloaded during this control activity
‘v’B VU downloading:
‘0’B: VU not downloaded during this control activity,
‘1’B: VU downloaded during this control activity
‘p’B printing:
‘0’B: no printing done during this control activity,
‘1’B: printing done during this control activity
‘d’B display:
‘0’B: no display used during this control activity,
‘1’B: display used during this control activity
‘e’B roadside calibration checking:
‘0’B: calibration parameters not checked during this
control activity,
‘1’B: calibration parameters checked during this control
activity
‘xxx’B RFU.
▼B
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2.54. CurrentDateTime
The current date and time of the recording equipment.
Value assignment: not further specified.
2.55. CurrentDateTimeRecordArray
Generation 2:
The current date and time plus metadata as used in the download
protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (CurrentDateTime). Value
Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the CurrentDateTime in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of current date and time records.
2.56. DailyPresenceCounter
Counter, stored in a driver or workshop card, increased by one for each
calendar day the card has been inserted in a VU. This data type is
related to Annex 1C requirements 266, 299, 320, and 343.
Value assignment: Consecutive Number with maximum value = 9 999,
starting again with 0. At the time of first issuing of the card the number
is set to 0.
2.57. Datef
Date expressed in a readily printable numeric format.
Value assignment:
yyyy Year
mm Month
dd Day
‘00000000’H denotes explicitly no date.
▼B
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2.58. DateOfDayDownloaded
Generation 2:
The date and time of the download.
Value assignment: not further specified.
2.59. DateOfDayDownloadedRecordArray
Generation 2:
The date and time of the download plus metadata as used in the
download protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (DateOfDayDownloaded).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the CurrentDateTime in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of date and time of the download records.
2.60. Distance
A distance travelled (result of the calculation of the difference between
two vehicle's odometer values in kilometers).
Value assignment: Unsigned binary. Value in km in the operational
range 0 to 9 999 km.
▼M3
2.60a. DownloadInterfaceVersion
Generation 2, version 2:
Code indicating the version of the download interface of a vehicle unit.
Value assignment: ‘aabb’H:
‘aa’H ‘00’H: not used,
‘01’H: Generation 2 vehicle unit,
‘bb’H ‘00’H: not used,
‘01’H: version 2 of Generation 2 vehicle unit.
▼B
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2.61. DriverCardApplicationIdentification
Information, stored in a driver card related to the identification of the
application of the card (Annex 1C requirement 253 and 278).
Generation 1:
typeOfTachographCardId is specifying the implemented type of card.
cardStructureVersion is specifying the the version of the structure that
is implemented in the card.
noOfEventsPerType is the number of events per type of event the card
can record.
noOfFaultsPerType is the number of faults per type of fault the card
can record.
activityStructureLength indicates the number of bytes available for
storing activity records.
noOfCardVehicleRecords is the number of vehicle records the card can
contain.
noOfCardPlaceRecords is the number of places the card can record.
Generation 2:
▼M1
In addition to generation 1 the following data elements are used:
noOfGNSSADRecords is the number of GNSS accumulated driving
records the card can store.
noOfSpecificConditionRecords is the number of specific condition
records the card can store.
noOfCardVehicleUnitRecords is the number of vehicle units used
records the card can store.
▼B
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2.61a. DriverCardApplicationIdentificationV2
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a driver card related to the identification of the
application of the card (Annex IC requirement 278a).
lengthOfFollowingData is the number of bytes following in the record.
noOfBorderCrossingRecords is the number of border crossing records
the driver card can store.
noOfLoadUnloadRecords is the number of load/unload records the
driver card can store.
noOfLoadTypeEntryRecords is the number of load type entry records
the driver card can store.
vuConfigurationLengthRange is the number of bytes in a tachograph
card, available to store VU configurations.
▼B
2.62. DriverCardHolderIdentification
Information, stored in a driver card, related to the identification of the
cardholder (Annex 1C requirement 256 and 281).
cardHolderName is the name and first name(s) of the holder of the
Driver Card.
cardHolderBirthDate is the date of birth of the holder of the Driver
Card.
cardHolderPreferredLanguage is the preferred language of the card
holder.
▼M3
2.63. DSRCSecurityData
Generation 2:
For the definition of this data type, see Appendix 11.
▼M3
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2.64. EGFCertificate
Generation 2:
Certificate of the external GNSS facility public key for mutual auth­
entication with a VU. The structure of this certificate is specified in
Appendix 11.
2.65. EmbedderIcAssemblerId
Provides information about the IC embedder.
countryCode is the 2 letter country code of the module embedder
according to ISO 3166.
moduleEmbedder identifies the module embedder.
manufacturerInformation for manufacturer internal usage.
2.66. EntryTypeDailyWorkPeriod
Code to distinguish between begin and end for an entry of a daily work
period place and condition of the entry.
Generation 1
Value assignment: according to ISO/IEC8824-1.
▼M3
Generation 2
Value assignment: according to ISO/IEC8824-1.
▼B
2.67. EquipmentType
Code to distinguish different types of equipment for the tachograph
application.
▼B
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Generation 1:
Value assignment: According to ISO/IEC8824-1.
Value 0 is reserved for the purpose of designating a Member State or
Europe in the CHA field of certificates.
Generation 2:
▼M1
The same values as in generation 1 are used with the following
additions:
Note 1: The generation 2 values for the Plaque, Adapter and the
External GNSS connection as well as the generation 1 values for the
Vehicle Unit and Motion Sensor may be used in SealRecord, i.e. if
applicable.
Note 2: In the CardHolderAuthorisation (CHA) field of a generation 2
certificate, the values (1), (2), and (6) are to be interpreted as indicating
a certificate for Mutual Authentication for the respective equipment type.
For indicating the respective certificate for creating a digital signature,
the values (17), (18) or (19) must be used.
▼B
2.68. EuropeanPublicKey
Generation 1:
The European public key.
2.69. EventFaultRecordPurpose
Code explaining why an event or a fault has been recorded.
Value assignment:
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one of the 10 most recent (or last) events or faults
the longest event for one of the last 10 days of occurrence
one of the 5 longest events over the last 365 days
the last event for one of the last 10 days of occurrence
the most serious event for one of the last 10 days of occurrence
one of the 5 most serious events over the last 365 days
the first event or fault having occurred after the last calibration
an active/on-going event or fault
RFU
manufacturer specific
2.70. EventFaultType
Code qualifying an event or a fault.
Value assignment:
Generation 1:
General events,
No further details,
Insertion of a non valid card,
Card conflict,
Time overlap,
Driving without an appropriate card,
Card insertion while driving,
Last card session not correctly closed,
Over speeding,
Power supply interruption,
Motion data error,
Vehicle Motion Conflict,
RFU,
Vehicle unit related security breach attempt events,
No further details,
Motion sensor authentication failure,
Tachograph card authentication failure,
Unauthorised change of motion sensor,
Card data input integrity error
Stored user data integrity error,
Internal data transfer error,
Unauthorised case opening,
Hardware sabotage,
RFU,
Sensor related security breach attempt events,
No further details,
Authentication failure,
Stored data integrity error,
Internal data transfer error,
Unauthorised case opening,
Hardware sabotage,
RFU,
Recording equipment faults,
No further details,
VU internal fault,
Printer fault,
Display fault,
Downloading fault,
Sensor fault,
RFU,
▼B
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Card faults,
No further details,
RFU,
RFU,
Manufacturer specific.
▼M3
Generation 2, version 1:
▼M1
General events,
No further details,
Insertion of a non valid card,
Card conflict,
Time overlap,
Driving without an appropriate card,
Card insertion while driving,
Last card session not correctly closed,
Over speeding,
Power supply interruption,
Motion data error,
Vehicle Motion Conflict,
Time conflict (GNSS versus VU internal clock),
Communication error with the remote communication facility,
Absence of position information from GNSS receiver,
Communication error with the external GNSS facility,
RFU,
Vehicle unit related security breach attempt events,
No further details,
Motion sensor authentication failure,
Tachograph card authentication failure,
Unauthorised change of motion sensor,
Card data input integrity error
Stored user data integrity error,
Internal data transfer error,
Unauthorised case opening,
Hardware sabotage,
Tamper detection of GNSS,
External GNSS facility authentication failure,
External GNSS facility certificate expired,
RFU,
Sensor related security breach attempt events,
No further details,
Authentication failure,
Stored data integrity error,
Internal data transfer error,
Unauthorised case opening,
Hardware sabotage,
RFU,
▼B
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Recording equipment faults,
No further details,
VU internal fault,
Printer fault,
Display fault,
Downloading fault,
Sensor fault,
Internal GNSS receiver,
External GNSS facility,
Remote communication facility,
ITS interface,
RFU,
Card faults,
No further details,
RFU,
RFU,
Manufacturer specific.
▼M3
Generation 2, version 2:
‘0x’H General events,
‘00’H No further details,
‘01’H Insertion of a non valid card,
‘02’H Card conflict,
‘03’H Time overlap,
‘04’H Driving without an appropriate card,
‘05’H Card insertion while driving,
‘06’H Last card session not correctly closed,
‘07’H Over speeding,
‘08’H Power supply interruption,
‘09’H Motion data error,
‘0A’H Vehicle Motion Conflict,
‘0B’H Time conflict (GNSS versus VU internal clock),
‘0C’H Communication error with the remote communi­
cation facility,
‘0D’H Absence of position information from GNSS
receiver,
‘0E’H Communication error with the external GNSS
facility,
‘0F’H GNSS anomaly,
‘1x’H Vehicle unit related security breach attempt events,
‘10’H No further details,
▼M1
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‘11’H Motion sensor authentication failure,
‘12’H Tachograph card authentication failure,
‘13’H Unauthorised change of motion sensor,
‘14’H Card data input integrity error,
‘15’H Stored user data integrity error,
‘16’H Internal data transfer error,
‘17’H Unauthorised case opening,
‘18’H Hardware sabotage,
‘19’H Tamper detection of GNSS,
‘1A’H External GNSS facility authentication failure,
‘1B’H External GNSS facility certificate expired,
‘1C’H Inconsistency between motion data and stored
driver activity data,
‘1D’H to ‘1F’H RFU,
‘2x’H Sensor related security breach attempt events,
‘20’H No further details,
‘21’H Authentication failure,
‘22’H Stored data integrity error,
‘23’H Internal data transfer error,
‘24’H Unauthorised case opening,
‘25’H Hardware sabotage,
‘26’H to ‘2F’H RFU,
‘3x’H Recording equipment faults,
‘30’H No further details,
‘31’H VU internal fault,
‘32’H Printer fault,
‘33’H Display fault,
‘34’H Downloading fault,
‘35’H Sensor fault,
‘36’H Internal GNSS receiver,
‘37’H External GNSS facility,
‘38’H Remote communication facility,
‘39’H ITS interface,
‘3A’H Internal Sensor Fault,
‘3B’H to ‘3F’H RFU,
‘4x’H Card faults,
‘40’H No further details,
‘41’H to ‘4F’H RFU,
‘50’H to ‘7F’H RFU,
‘80’H to ‘FF’H Manufacturer specific.
▼M3
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2.71. ExtendedSealIdentifier
Generation 2:
The extended seal identifier uniquely identifies a seal (Annex IC
requirement 401).
manufacturerCode is a code of the manufacturer of the seal. Value
assignment: see database registration to be managed by the European
Commission (see https://dtc.jrc.ec.europa.eu).
sealIdentifier is an identifier for the seal which is unique for the manu­
facturer. Value assignment: alpha-numeric number, unique in the manu­
facturer domain according to [ISO8859-1].
▼B
2.72. ExtendedSerialNumber
Unique identification of an equipment. It can also be used as an
equipment Public Key Identifier.
Generation 1:
serialNumber is a serial number for the equipment, unique for the
manufacturer, the equipment's type and the month and year below.
monthYear is the identification of the month and the year of manu­
facturing (or of serial number assignment).
Value assignment: BCD coding of Month (two digits) and Year (two
last digits).
type is an identifier of the type of equipment.
Value assignment: manufacturer specific, with ‘FFh’ reserved value.
manufacturerCode: is the numerical code identifying a manufacturer of
type approved equipment.
Generation 2:
serialNumber see Generation 1
monthYear see Generation 1
type indicates the type of equipment
manufacturerCode: see Generation 1.
▼M3
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2.73. FullCardNumber
Code fully identifying a tachograph card.
cardType is the type of the tachograph card.
cardIssuingMemberState is the code of the Member State having
issued the card.
cardNumber is the card number.
2.74. FullCardNumberAndGeneration
Generation 2:
Code fully identifying a tachograph card and its generation.
fullcardNumber identifies the tachograph card.
generation indicates the generation of the tachograph card used.
2.75. Generation
Generation 2:
Indicates the generation of tachograph used.
Value assignment:
‘00’H RFU
‘01’H Generation 1
‘02’H Generation 2
‘03’H .. ‘FF’H RFU
2.76. GeoCoordinates
▼M3
Generation 2:
The geo-coordinates are encoded as integers. These integers are multiples
of the ±DDMM.M encoding for the latitude and ±DDDMM.M for the
longitude. Here ±DD respectively ±DDD denotes the degrees and
MM.M the minutes. Longitude and latitude of an unknown position
shall be represented as Hex ‘7FFFFF’ (Decimal 8388607).
▼B
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latitude is encoded as a multiple (factor 10) of the ±DDMM.M
representation.
longitude is encoded as a multiple (factor 10) of the ±DDDMM.M
representation.
2.77. GNSSAccuracy
Generation 2:
The accuracy of the GNSS position data (definition eee)). This accuracy
is encoded as integer and is a multiple (factor 10) of the X.Y value
provided by the GSA NMEA sentence.
▼M1
2.78. GNSSAccumulatedDriving
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the GNSS
position of the vehicle if the accumulated driving time reaches a multiple
of three hours (Annex IC requirement 306 and 354).
gnssADPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated GNSS
accumulated driving record.
Value assignment is the number corresponding to the numerator of the
GNSS accumulated driving record, beginning with '0' for the first
occurrence of the GNSS accumulated driving record in the structure.
gnssAccumulatedDrivingRecords is the set of records containing the
date and time the accumulated driving reaches a multiple of three hours
and information on the position of the vehicle.
2.79. GNSSAccumulatedDrivingRecord
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the GNSS
position of the vehicle if the accumulated driving time reaches a multiple
of three hours (Annex IC requirement 305 and 353)
timeStamp is the date and time when the accumulated driving time
reaches a multiple of three hours.
▼B
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gnssPlaceRecord contains information related to the position of the
vehicle.
vehicleOdometerValue is the odometer value when the accumulated
driving time reaches a multiple of three hours.
▼M3
2.79a. GNSSAuthAccumulatedDriving
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, providing the auth­
entication status of GNSS positions of the vehicle if the accumulated
driving time reaches a multiple of three hours (Annex IC requirements
306d and 356d).
gnssAuthADPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated
GNSS position authentication status record.
Value assignment is the number corresponding to the numerator of the
GNSS position authentication status record, beginning with '0' for the
first occurrence of the GNSS position authentication status record in the
structure.
gnssAuthStatusADRecords is the set of records containing the date and
time the accumulated driving reaches a multiple of three hours and the
authentication status of the GNSS position.
2.79b. GNSSAuthStatusADRecord
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, providing the auth­
entication status of a GNSS position of the vehicle if the accumulated
driving time reaches a multiple of three hours (Annex IC requirements
306c and 356c). Other information related to the GNSS position itself is
stored in another record (see 2.79 GNSSAccumulatedDrivingRecord).
timeStamp is the date and time when the accumulated driving time
reaches a multiple of three hours (which is the same date and time as
in the corresponding GNSSAccumulatedDrivingRecord).
authenticationStatus is the authentication status of the GNSS position
when the accumulated driving time reaches a multiple of three hours.
▼M1
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2.79c. GNSSPlaceAuthRecord
Generation 2, version 2:
Information related to the GNSS position of the vehicle (Annex IC
requirements 108, 109, 110, 296, 306a, 306c, 306e, 306g, 356a, 356c,
356e and 356g).
timeStamp is the date and time when the GNSS position of the vehicle
was determined.
gnssAccuracy is the accuracy of the GNSS position data.
geoCoordinates is the recorded location using GNSS.
authenticationStatus is the authentication status of the GNSS position
when it was determined.
▼B
2.80. GNSSPlaceRecord
Generation 2:
Information related to the GNSS position of the vehicle (Annex 1C
requirements 108, 109, 110, 296, 305, 347, and 353).
timeStamp is the date and time when the GNSS position of the vehicle
was determined.
gnssAccuracy is the accuracy of the GNSS position data.
geoCoordinates is the recorded location using GNSS.
2.81. HighResOdometer
Odometer value of the vehicle: Accumulated distance travelled by the
vehicle during its operation.
Value assignment: Unsigned binary. Value in 1/200 km in the operating
range 0 to 21 055 406 km.
2.82. HighResTripDistance
A distance travelled during all or part of a journey.
Value assignment: Unsigned binary. Value in 1/200 km in the operating
range 0 to 21 055 406 km.
▼M3
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2.83. HolderName
The surname and first name(s) of a card holder.
holderSurname is the surname (family name) of the holder. This
surname does not include titles.
Value assignment: When a card is not personal, holderSurname contains
the same information as companyName or workshopName or control­
BodyName.
holderFirstNames is the first name(s) and initials of the holder.
▼M3
2.84. Reserved for future use
▼B
Generation 2:
Information if the GNSS receiver is internal or external to the vehicle
unit. True means that the GNSS receiver is internal to the VU. False
means that the GNSS receiver is external.
2.85. K-ConstantOfRecordingEquipment
Constant of the recording equipment (definition m)).
Value assignment: Pulses per kilometer in the operating range 0 to
64 255 pulses/km.
▼M1
2.86. KeyIdentifier
A unique identifier of a Public Key used to reference and select the key.
It also identifies the holder of the key.
The first choice is suitable to reference the public key of a Vehicle Unit,
of a tachograph card or of an external GNSS facility.
The second choice is suitable to reference the public key of a Vehicle
Unit (in cases where the serial number of the Vehicle Unit cannot be
known at certificate generation time).
The third choice is suitable to reference the public key of a Member
State.
▼B
2.87. KMWCKey
Generation 2:
▼B
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AES key and its associated key version used for VU — Motion Sensor
pairing. For details see Appendix 11.
kMWCKey is the length of the AES key concatenated with the key
which is used for VU — Motion Sensor pairing.
keyVersion denotes the key version of the AES key.
2.88. Language
Code identifying a language.
Value assignment: Two-letter lower-case coding according to ISO 639.
2.89. LastCardDownload
Date and time, stored on a driver card, of last card download (for other
purposes than control) Annex 1C requirement 257 and 282. This date is
updateable by a VU or any card reader.
Value assignment: not further specified.
▼M3
2.89a. LengthOfFollowingData
Generation 2, version 2:
Length indicator for extensible records.
Value assignment: See Appendix 2.
▼B
2.90. LinkCertificate
Generation 2:
The link certificate between European Root CA key pairs.
▼M3
2.90a. LoadType
Generation 2, version 2:
Code identifying a load type entered.
▼B
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Value assignment:
‘00’H Undefined load type,
‘01’H Goods,
‘02’H Passengers,
‘03’H .. ‘FF’H RFU.
▼B
2.91. L-TyreCircumference
Effective circumference of the wheel tyres (definition u)).
Value assignment: Unsigned binary, value in 1/8 mm in the operating
range 0 to 8 031 mm.
▼M1
2.92. MAC
Generation 2:
A cryptographic check sum of 8, 12 or 16 bytes length corresponding to
the cipher suites specified in Appendix 11.
▼B
2.93. ManualInputFlag
Code identifying whether a cardholder has manually entered driver
activities at card insertion or not (Annex 1B requirement 081 and
Annex 1C requirement 102).
Value assignment: not further specified.
2.94. ManufacturerCode
Code identifying a manufacturer of type approved equipment.
The laboratory competent for interoperability tests maintains and
publishes the list of manufacturer codes on its web site (Annex 1C
requirement 454).
ManufacturerCodes are provisionally assigned to developers of
tachograph equipment on application to the laboratory competent for
interoperability tests.
▼M3
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2.95. ManufacturerSpecificEventFaultData
Generation 2:
Manufacturer specific error codes simplify the error analysis and main­
tenance of vehicle units.
manufacturerCode identifies the manufacturer of the Vehicle Unit.
manufacturerSpecificErrorCode is an error code specific to the
manufacturer.
2.96. MemberStateCertificate
The certificate of the public key of a member state issued by the
European certification authority.
2.97. MemberStateCertificateRecordArray
Generation 2:
The member state certificate plus metadata as used in the download
protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (MemberStateCertificate).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the MemberStateCertificate in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records. The value shall
be set to 1 as the certficates may have different lengths.
records is the set of member state certificates.
2.98. MemberStatePublicKey
Generation 1:
The public key of a Member State.
▼B
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2.99. Name
A name.
codePage specifies a character set defined in Chapter 4,
name is a name encoded using the specified character set.
2.100. NationAlpha
Alphabetic reference to a country shall be in accordance with the distin­
guishing signs used on vehicles in international traffic (United Nations
Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, 1968).
The Nation Alpha and Numeric codes shall be held on a list maintained
on the website of the laboratory appointed to carry out interoperability
testing, as set out in Annex 1C requirement 440.
2.101. NationNumeric
Numerical reference to a country.
Value assignment: see data type 2.100 (NationAlpha).
Any amendment or updating of the Nation Alpha or Numeric specifi­
cation described in the above paragraph shall only be made out after the
appointed laboratory has obtained the views of type approved digital and
smart tachograph vehicle unit manufacturers.
▼M3
2.101a. NoOfBorderCrossingRecords
Generation 2, version 2:
Number of border crossing records a driver or workshop card can store.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
▼B
2.102. NoOfCalibrationRecords
Number of calibration records, a workshop card can store.
Generation 1:
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
▼B
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Generation 2:
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
2.103. NoOfCalibrationsSinceDownload
Counter indicating the number of calibrations performed with a
workshop card since its last download (Annex 1C requirement 317
and 340).
Value assignment: Not specified further.
2.104. NoOfCardPlaceRecords
Number of place records a driver or workshop card can store.
Generation 1:
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
Generation 2:
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
2.105. NoOfCardVehicleRecords
Number of vehicles used records a driver or workshop card can store.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
2.106. NoOfCardVehicleUnitRecords
Generation 2:
Number of vehicle units used records a driver or workshop card can
store.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
2.107. NoOfCompanyActivityRecords
Number of company activity records, a company card can store.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
▼B
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2.108. NoOfControlActivityRecords
Number of control activity records, a control card can store.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
2.109. NoOfEventsPerType
Number of events per type of event a card can store.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
2.110. NoOfFaultsPerType
Number of faults per type of fault a card can store.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
▼M1
2.111. NoOfGNSSADRecords
Generation 2:
Number of GNSS accumulated driving records a card can store.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
▼M3
2.111a. NoOfLoadUnloadRecords
Generation 2, version 2:
Number of load/unload records a card can store.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
▼B
2.112. NoOfSpecificConditionRecords
Generation 2:
Number of specific condition records a card can store.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
▼B
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2.112a. NoOfLoadTypeEntryRecords
Generation 2, version 2:
Number of load type entry records a driver or workshop card can store.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
▼B
2.113. OdometerShort
Odometer value of the vehicle in a short form.
Value assignment: Unsigned binary. Value in km in the operating range
0 to 9 999 999 km.
2.114. OdometerValueMidnight
The vehicle's odometer value at midnight on a given day (Annex 1B
requirement 090 and Annex 1C requirement 113).
Value assignment: not further specified.
▼M3
2.114a. OperationType
Generation 2, version 2:
Code identifying a type of operation entered.
Value assignment:
‘00’H RFU,
‘01’H Load operation,
‘02’H Unload operation,
‘03’H Simultaneous load/unload operation,
‘04’H .. ‘FF’H RFU.
▼B
2.115. OdometerValueMidnightRecordArray
Generation 2:
The OdometerValueMidnight plus metadata used in the download
protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (OdometerValueMidnight).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
▼M3
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recordSize is the size of the OdometerValueMidnight in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of OdometerValueMidnight records.
2.116. OverspeedNumber
Number of over speeding events since the last over speeding control.
Value assignment: 0 means that no over speeding event has occurred
since the last over speeding control, 1 means that one over speeding
event has occurred since the last over speeding control …255 means
that 255 or more over speeding events have occurred since the last
over speeding control.
▼M3
2.116a. PlaceAuthRecord
Information related to a place where a daily work period begins or ends
(Annex IC requirements 108, 271, 296, 324 and 347).
Generation 2, version 2:
entryTime is a date and time related to the entry.
entryTypeDailyWorkPeriod is the type of entry.
dailyWorkPeriodCountry is the country entered.
dailyWorkPeriodRegion is the region entered.
vehicleOdometerValue is the odometer value at the time of place entry.
entryGNSSPlaceAuthRecord is the recorded location, GNSS authenti­
cation status and time.
2.116b. PlaceAuthStatusRecord
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, providing the auth­
entication status of a place where a daily work period begins or ends
(Annex IC requirements 306a and 356a). Other information related to the
place itself is stored in another record (see 2.117 PlaceRecord).
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 172
entryTime is a date and time related to the entry (which is the same date
and time as in the corresponding PlaceRecord).
authenticationStatus is the authentication status of the recorded GNSS
position.
▼B
2.117. PlaceRecord
Information related to a place where a daily work period begins or ends
(Annex 1C requirements 108, 271, 296, 324, and 347).
Generation 1:
entryTime is a date and time related to the entry.
entryTypeDailyWorkPeriod is the type of entry.
dailyWorkPeriodCountry is the country entered.
dailyWorkPeriodRegion is the region entered.
vehicleOdometerValue is the odometer value at the time of place entry.
Generation 2:
In addition to Generation 1 the following component is used:
entryGNSSPlaceRecord is the recorded location and time.
▼M3
2.117a. PositionAuthenticationStatus
Generation 2, version 2:
▼M3
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Value assignment (see Appendix 12):
‘00’H Not Authenticated (see Appendix 12, requirement
GNS_39),
‘01’H Authenticated (see Appendix 12, requirement
GNS_39),
‘02’H .. ‘FF’H RFU.
▼B
2.118. PreviousVehicleInfo
Information related to the vehicle previously used by a driver when
inserting his card in a vehicle unit (Annex 1B requirement 081 and
Annex 1C requirement 102).
Generation 1:
vehicleRegistrationIdentification is the VRN and the registering
Member State of the vehicle.
cardWithdrawalTime is the card withdrawal date and time.
Generation 2:
In addition to generation 1 the following data element is used:
vuGeneration identifies the generation of the vehicle unit.
2.119. PublicKey
Generation 1:
A public RSA key.
rsaKeyModulus is the Modulus of the key pair.
rsaKeyPublicExponent is the public exponent of the key pair.
2.120. RecordType
Generation 2:
Reference to a record type. This data type is used in RecordArrays.
▼M3
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Value assignment:
► (1) M1
► (2) M3
ActivityChangeInfo,
CardSlotsStatus,
CurrentDateTime,
MemberStateCertificate,
OdometerValueMidnight,
DateOfDayDownloaded,
SensorPaired,
Signature,
SpecificConditionRecord,
VehicleIdentificationNumber,
VehicleRegistrationNumber,
VuCalibrationRecord,
VuCardIWRecord,
VuCardRecord,
VuCertificate,
VuCompanyLocksRecord,
VuControlActivityRecord,
VuDetailedSpeedBlock,
VuDownloadablePeriod,
VuDownloadActivityData,
VuEventRecord,
►M1 VuGNSSADRecord, ◄
VuITSConsentRecord,
VuFaultRecord,
VuIdentification,
VuOverSpeedingControlData,
VuOverSpeedingEventRecord,
VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecord,
VuTimeAdjustmentGNSSRecord,
VuTimeAdjustmentRecord,
VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecord,
SensorPairedRecord,
SensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecord,
►M3 VuBorderCrossingRecord,
VuLoadUnloadRecord,
VehicleRegistrationIdentification,
RFU, ◄
Manufacturer specific.
2.121. RegionAlpha
Alphabetic reference to a region within a specified country.
Generation 1:
Value assignment:
▼B
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Generation 2:
The RegionAlpha codes shall be held on a list maintained on the website
of the laboratory appointed to carry out interoperability testing.
2.122. RegionNumeric
Numerical reference to a region within a specified country.
Generation 1:
Value assignment:
Generation 2:
The RegionNumeric codes shall be held on a list maintained on the
website of the laboratory appointed to carry out interoperability testing.
2.123. RemoteCommunicationModuleSerialNumber
Generation 2:
Serial number of the Remote Communication Module.
2.124. RSAKeyModulus
Generation 1:
The modulus of a RSA key pair.
Value assignment: Unspecified.
2.125. RSAKeyPrivateExponent
Generation 1:
The private exponent of a RSA key pair.
Value assignment: Unspecified.
▼B
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2.126. RSAKeyPublicExponent
Generation1:
The public exponent of a RSA key pair.
Value assignment: Unspecified.
2.127. RtmData
Generation2:
For the definition of this data type see Appendix 14.
2.128. SealDataCard
Generation 2:
This data type stores information about the seals that are attached to the
different components of a vehicle and is intended for storage on a card.
This data type is related to Annex 1C requirement 337.
noOfSealRecords is the number of records in sealRecords.
sealRecords is a set of seal records.
2.129. SealDataVu
Generation 2:
This data type stores information about the seals that are attached to the
different components of a vehicle and is intended for storage in a
Vehicle Unit.
sealRecords is a set of seal records. If there are less than 5 seals
available the value of the EquipmentType in all unused sealRecords
shall be set to 16, i.e. unused.
2.130. SealRecord
Generation 2:
This data type stores information about a seal that is attached to a
component. This data type is related to Annex 1C requirement 337.
equipmentType identifies the type of equipment the seal is attached to.
extendedSealIdentifier is the identifier of the seal attached to the
equipment.
▼B
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2.131. SensorApprovalNumber
Type approval number of the sensor.
Generation 1:
Value assignment: Unspecified.
Generation 2:
Value assignment:
The approval number shall be provided as published on the corre­
sponding European Commission web site, i.e. for example including
hyphens if any. The approval number shall be left-aligned.
2.132. SensorExternalGNSSApprovalNumber
Generation 2:
Type approval number of the external GNSS facility.
Value assignment:
The approval number shall be provided as published on the corre­
sponding European Commission web site, i.e. for example including
hyphens if any. The approval number shall be left-aligned.
2.133. SensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecord
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the identification of the
external GNSS facility coupled with the vehicle unit (Annex 1C
requirement 100).
sensorSerialNumber is the serial number of the external GNSS facility
coupled with the vehicle unit.
sensorApprovalNumber is the approval number of this external GNSS
facility.
sensorCouplingDate is a date of coupling of this external GNSS facility
with the vehicle unit.
2.134. SensorExternalGNSSIdentification
Generation 2:
Information related to the identification of the external GNSS facility
(Annex 1C requirement 98).
▼B
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sensorSerialNumber is the extended serial number of the external
GNSS facility.
sensorApprovalNumber is the approval number of the external GNSS
facility.
sensorSCIdentifier is the identifier of the security component of the
external GNSS facility.
sensorOSIdentifier is the identifier of the operating system of the
external GNSS facility.
2.135. SensorExternalGNSSInstallation
Generation 2:
Information, stored in an external GNSS facility, related to the instal­
lation of the external GNSS sensor (Annex 1C requirement 123).
sensorCouplingDateFirst is the date of the first coupling of external
GNSS facility with a vehicle unit.
firstVuApprovalNumber is the approval number of the first vehicle unit
coupled with the external GNSS facility.
firstVuSerialNumber is the serial number of the first vehicle unit paired
with the external GNSS facility.
sensorCouplingDateCurrent is the date of the current coupling of
external GNSS facility with a vehicle unit.
currentVuApprovalNumber is the approval number of the vehicle unit
currently coupled with the external GNSS facility.
currentVUSerialNumber is the serial number of the vehicle unit
currently coupled with the external GNSS facility.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 179
2.136. SensorExternalGNSSOSIdentifier
Generation 2:
Identifier of the operating system of the external GNSS facility.
Value assignment: manufacturer specific.
2.137. SensorExternalGNSSSCIdentifier
Generation 2:
This type is used e.g. to identify the cryptographic module of the
external GNSS facility.
Identifier of the security component of the external GNSS facility.
Value assignment: component manufacturer specific.
2.138. SensorGNSSCouplingDate
Generation 2:
Date of a coupling of the external GNSS facility with a vehicle unit.
Value assignment: Unspecified.
2.139. SensorGNSSSerialNumber
Generation 2:
This type is used to store the serial number of the GNSS receiver both
when it is inside the VU and when it is outside the VU.
Serial number of the GNSS receiver.
2.140. SensorIdentification
Information, stored in a motion sensor, related to the identification of
the motion sensor (Annex 1B requirement 077 and Annex 1C
requirement 95).
sensorSerialNumber is the extended serial number of the motion sensor
(includes part number and manufacturer code).
sensorApprovalNumber is the approval number of the motion sensor.
sensorSCIdentifier is the identifier of the security component of the
motion sensor.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 180
sensorOSIdentifier is the identifier of the operating system of the
motion sensor.
2.141. SensorInstallation
Information, stored in a motion sensor, related to the installation of
the motion sensor (Annex 1B requirement 099 and Annex 1C
requirement 122).
sensorPairingDateFirst is the date of the first pairing of the motion
sensor with a vehicle unit.
firstVuApprovalNumber is the approval number of the first vehicle unit
paired with the motion sensor.
firstVuSerialNumber is the serial number of the first vehicle unit paired
with the motion sensor.
sensorPairingDateCurrent is the date of the current pairing of the
motion sensor with the vehicle unit.
currentVuApprovalNumber is the approval number of the vehicle unit
currently paired with the motion sensor.
currentVUSerialNumber is the serial number of the vehicle unit
currently paired with the motion sensor.
2.142. SensorInstallationSecData
Information, stored in a workshop card, related to the security data
needed for pairing motion sensors to vehicle units (Annex 1C
requirement 308 and 331).
Generation 1:
Value assignment: in accordance with ISO 16844-3.
Generation 2:
As described in Appendix 11 a workshop card shall store up to three
keys for VU Motion Sensor pairing. These keys have different key
versions.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 181
2.143. SensorOSIdentifier
Identifier of the operating system of the motion sensor.
Value assignment: manufacturer specific.
2.144. SensorPaired
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the identification of the
motion sensor paired with the vehicle unit (Annex 1B requirement 079).
sensorSerialNumber is the serial number of the motion sensor currently
paired with the vehicle unit.
sensorApprovalNumber is the approval number of the motion sensor
currently paired with the vehicle unit.
sensorPairingDateFirst is the date of the first pairing with a vehicle unit
of the motion sensor currently paired with the vehicle unit.
2.145. SensorPairedRecord
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the identification of a
motion sensor paired with the vehicle unit (Annex 1C requirement 97).
sensorSerialNumber is the serial number of a motion sensor paired with
the vehicle unit.
sensorApprovalNumber is the approval number of this motion sensor.
sensorPairingDate is a date of pairing of this motion sensor with the
vehicle unit.
2.146. SensorPairingDate
Date of a pairing of the motion sensor with a vehicle unit.
Value assignment: Unspecified.
▼B
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2.147. SensorSCIdentifier
Identifier of the security component of the motion sensor.
Value assignment: component manufacturer specific.
2.148. SensorSerialNumber
Serial number of the motion sensor.
2.149. Signature
A digital signature.
Generation 1:
Value assignment: in accordance with Appendix 11 Common security
mechanisms.
Generation 2:
Value assignment: in accordance with Appendix 11 Common security
mechanisms.
2.150. SignatureRecordArray
Generation 2:
A set of signatures plus metadata used in the download protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (Signature). Value
Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the Signature in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records. The value shall
be set to 1 as the signatures may have different lengths.
records is the set of signatures.
2.151. SimilarEventsNumber
The number of similar events for one given day (Annex 1B requirement
094 and Annex 1C requirement 117).
Value assignment: 0 is not used, 1 means that only one event of that
type has occurred and has been stored on that day, 2 means that 2 events
of that type has occurred on that day (one only has been stored), …255
means that 255 or more events of that type have occurred on that day.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 183
2.152. SpecificConditionRecord
Information, stored in a driver card, a workshop card or a vehicle unit,
related to a specific condition (requirements Annex 1C 130, 276, 301,
328, and 355).
entryTime is the date and time of the entry.
specificConditionType is the code identifying the specific condition.
2.153. SpecificConditions
Information, stored in a driver card, a workshop card or a vehicle unit,
related to a specific condition (Annex 1C requirement 131, 277, 302,
329, and 356).
Generation 2:
conditionPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated specific
condition record.
Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the
specific condition record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of
the specific condition record in the structure.
specificConditionRecords is the set of records containing information
on the specific conditions recorded.
2.154. SpecificConditionType
Code identifying a specific condition (Annex 1B requirements 050b,
105a, 212a and 230a and Annex 1C requirements 62).
Generation 1:
Value assignment:
‘00’H RFU
‘01’H Out of scope — Begin
‘02’H Out of scope — End
‘03’H Ferry / Train crossing
‘04’H .. ‘FF’H RFU
Generation 2:
Value assignment:
‘00’H RFU
‘01’H Out of scope — Begin
‘02’H Out of scope — End
‘03’H Ferry / Train crossing — Begin
‘04’H Ferry / Train crossing — End
‘05’H .. ‘FF’H RFU
▼B
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2.155. Speed
Speed of the vehicle (km/h).
Value assignment: kilometers per hour in the operational range 0 to
220 km/h.
2.156. SpeedAuthorised
Maximum authorised Speed of the vehicle (definition hh)).
2.157. SpeedAverage
Average speed in a previously defined duration (km/h).
2.158. SpeedMax
Maximum speed measured in a previously defined duration.
▼M3
2.158a. TachographCardsGen1Suppression
Generation 2, version 2:
Ability of a second generation VU to use first generation of driver,
control and company cards (see Appendix 15, MIG_002).
Value assignment:
‘0000’H The VU is able to use the generation 1 of
tachograph cards (default value),
‘A5E3’H The VU is not able to use the tachograph cards
generation 1,
All other values Not used.
▼B
2.159. TachographPayload
Generation 2:
For the definition of this data type see Appendix 14.
▼M1
2.160. Reserved for future use
▼B
2.161. TDesSessionKey
Generation 1:
▼B
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A triple DES session key.
Value assignment: not further specified.
▼M1
2.162. TimeReal
Code for a combined date and time field, where the date and time are
expressed as seconds past 00h.00m.00s. on 1 January 1970 UTC.
Value assignment – Octet aligned: Number of seconds since midnight
1 January 1970 UTC.
The max. possible date/time is in the year 2106.
▼B
2.163. TyreSize
Designation of tyre dimensions.
Value assignment: in accordance with Directive 92/23 (EEC) 31/03/92
O.J. L129 p.95.
2.164. VehicleIdentificationNumber
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) referring to the vehicle as a whole,
normally chassis serial number or frame number.
Value assignment: As defined in ISO 3779.
2.165. VehicleIdentificationNumberRecordArray
Generation 2:
The Vehicle Idenification Number plus metadata as used in the
download protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (VehicleIdentification­
Number). Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VehicleIdentificationNumber in bytes.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 186
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of vehicle identification numbers.
2.166. VehicleRegistrationIdentification
Identification of a vehicle, unique for Europe (VRN and Member State).
vehicleRegistrationNation is the nation where the vehicle is registered.
vehicleRegistrationNumber is the registration number of the
vehicle (VRN).
▼M3
2.166a. VehicleRegistrationIdentificationRecordArray
Generation 2, version 2:
The Vehicle Registration Identification plus metadata as used in the
download protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (VehicleRegistrationIdentifi­
cation). Value assignment: see RecordType.
recordSize is the size of the VehicleRegistrationIdentification in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of vehicle registration identification.
▼B
2.167. VehicleRegistrationNumber
Registration number of the vehicle (VRN). The registration number is
assigned by the vehicle licensing authority.
codePage specifies a character set defined in Chapter 4,
▼B
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vehicleRegNumber is a VRN encoded using the specified character set.
Value assignment: Country specific.
2.168. VehicleRegistrationNumberRecordArray
▼M3
Generation 2, version 1:
▼B
The Vehicle Registration Number plus metadata as used in the download
protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (VehicleRegistration­
Number). Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VehicleRegistrationNumber in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of vehicle registration numbers.
2.169. VuAbility
Generation 2:
Information stored in a VU on the ability of the VU to use generation 1
tachograph cards or not (Annex 1C requirement 121).
Value assignment — Octet Aligned: ‘xxxxxxxa’B (8 bits)
For the ability to support of generation 1:
‘a’B Ability to support generation 1 tachograph cards:
‘0’ B Generation 1 is supported,
‘1’B Generation1 is not supported,
‘xxxxxxx’B RFU
2.170. VuActivityDailyData
Generation 1:
▼B
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Information, stored in a VU, related to changes of activity and/or
changes of driving status and/or changes of card status for a given
calendar day (Annex 1B requirement 084 and Annex 1C requirement
105, 106, 107) and to slots status at 00:00 that day.
noOfActivityChanges is the number of ActivityChangeInfo words in
the activityChangeInfos set.
activityChangeInfos is the set of ActivityChangeInfo words stored in
the VU for the day. It always includes two ActivityChangeInfo words
giving the status of the two slots at 00:00 that day.
2.171. VuActivityDailyRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a VU, related to changes of activity and/or
changes of driving status and/or changes of card status for a given
calendar day (Annex 1C requirement 105, 106, 107) and to slots
status at 00:00 that day.
recordType denotes the type of the record (ActivityChangeInfo). Value
Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the ActivityChangeInfo in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of ActivityChangeInfo words stored in the VU for the
day. It always includes two ActivityChangeInfo words giving the status
of the two slots at 00:00 that day.
2.172. VuApprovalNumber
Type approval number of the vehicle unit.
Generation 1:
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 189
Value assignment: Unspecified.
Generation 2:
Value assignment:
The approval number shall be provided as published on the corre­
sponding European Commission web site, i.e. for example including
hyphens if any. The approval number shall be left-aligned.
2.173. VuCalibrationData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the calibrations of the
recording equipment (Annex 1B requirement 098).
noOfVuCalibrationRecords is the number of records contained in the
vuCalibrationRecords set.
vuCalibrationRecords is the set of calibration records.
2.174. VuCalibrationRecord
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related a calibration of the
recording equipment (Annex 1B requirement 098 and Annex 1C
requirement 119 and 120).
Generation 1:
calibrationPurpose is the purpose of the calibration.
workshopName, workshopAddress are the workshop name and
address.
workshopCardNumber identifies the workshop card used during the
calibration.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 190
workshopCardExpiryDate is the card expiry date.
vehicleIdentificationNumber is the VIN.
vehicleRegistrationIdentification contains the VRN and registering
Member State.
wVehicleCharacteristicConstant is the characteristic coefficient of the
vehicle.
kConstantOfRecordingEquipment is the constant of the recording
equipment.
lTyreCircumference is the effective circumference of the wheel tyres.
tyreSize is the designation of the dimension of the tyres mounted on the
vehicle
authorisedSpeed is the authorised speed of the vehicle.
oldOdometerValue, newOdometerValue are the old and new values of
the odometer.
oldTimeValue, newTimeValue are the old and new values of date and
time.
nextCalibrationDate is the date of the next calibration of the type
specified in CalibrationPurpose to be carried out by the authorised
inspection authority.
▼M3
Generation 2, version 1:
▼B
In addition to generation 1 the following data element is used:
sealDataVu gives information about the seals that are attached to
different components of the vehicle.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 191
Generation 2, version 2:
In addition to generation 1 the following data element is used:
sensorSerialNumber is the serial number of the motion sensor paired
with the vehicle unit at the end of the calibration,
sensorGNSSSerialNumber is the serial number of the external GNSS
facility coupled with the vehicle unit at the end of the calibration (if
any),
rcmSerialNumber is the serial number of the remote communication
facility coupled with the vehicle unit at the end of the calibration (if
any),
sealDataVu gives information about the seals that are attached to
different components of the vehicle.
byDefaultLoadType is the by-default load type of the vehicle (only
present in version 2).
calibrationCountry is the country in which the calibration has been
performed.
calibrationCountryTimestamp is the date and time when the position
used to determine the country in which the calibration has been
performed was provided by the GNSS receiver.
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 192
2.175. VuCalibrationRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the calibrations of the
recording equipment (Annex 1C requirement 119 and 120).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuCalibrationRecord).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuCalibrationRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of calibration records.
2.176. VuCardIWData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to insertion and withdrawal
cycles of driver cards or of workshop cards in the vehicle unit (Annex
1B requirement 081 and Annex 1C requirement 103).
noOfIWRecords is the number of records in the set vuCardIWRecords.
vuCardIWRecords is a set of records related to card insertion with­
drawal cycles.
2.177. VuCardIWRecord
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to an insertion and with­
drawal cycle of a driver card or of a workshop card in the vehicle unit
(Annex 1B requirement 081 and Annex 1C requirement 102).
Generation 1:
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cardHolderName is the driver or workshop card holder's surname and
first names as stored in the card.
fullCardNumber is the type of card, its issuing Member State and its
card number as stored in the card.
cardExpiryDate is the card's expiry date as stored in the card.
cardInsertionTime is the insertion date and time.
vehicleOdometerValueAtInsertion is the vehicle odometer value at
card insertion.
cardSlotNumber is the slot in which the card is inserted.
cardWithdrawalTime is the withdrawal date and time.
vehicleOdometerValueAtWithdrawal is the vehicle odometer value at
card withdrawal.
previousVehicleInfo contains information about the previous vehicle
used by the driver, as stored in the card.
manualInputFlag is a flag identifying if the cardholder has manually
entered driver activities at card insertion.
Generation 2:
Instead of fullCardNumber the generation 2 data structure makes use of
the following data element.
fullCardNumberAndGeneration is the type of card, its issuing
Member State, its card number and generation as stored in the card.
2.178. VuCardIWRecordArray
Generation 2:
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Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to insertion and withdrawal
cycles of driver cards or of workshop cards in the vehicle unit (Annex
1C requirement 103).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuCardIWRecord). Value
Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuCardIWRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of records related to card insertion withdrawal cycles.
▼M1
2.179. VuCardRecord
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, about a tachograph card used
(Annex IC requirement 132).
cardNumberAndGenerationInformation is the full card number and
generation of the card used (data type 2.74).
cardExtendedSerialNumber as read from the file EF_ICC under the
MF of the card.
cardStructureVersion as read from the file EF_Application_Identifi­
cation under the DF_Tachograph_G2.
cardNumber as read from the file EF_Identification under the
DF_Tachograph_G2.
▼B
2.180. VuCardRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information stored in a vehicle unit about the tachograph cards used
with this VU. This information is intended for the analysis of VU —
card problems (Annex 1C requirement 132).
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recordType denotes the type of the record (VuCardRecord). Value
Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuCardRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of records related to the tachograph cards used with the
VU.
2.181. VuCertificate
Certificate of the public key of a vehicle unit.
2.182. VuCertificateRecordArray
Generation 2:
The VU certificate plus metadata as used in the download protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuCertificate). Value
Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuCertificate in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records. The value
shall be set to 1 as the certificates may have different lengths.
records is a set of VU certificates.
2.183. VuCompanyLocksData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to company locks (Annex
1B requirement 104).
noOfLocks is the number of locks listed in vuCompanyLocksRecords.
vuCompanyLocksRecords is the set of company locks records.
▼B
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2.184. VuCompanyLocksRecord
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to one company lock
(Annex 1B requirement 104 and Annex 1C requirement 128).
Generation 1:
lockInTime, lockOutTime are the date and time of lock-in and
lock-out.
companyName, companyAddress are the company name and address
related with the lock-in.
companyCardNumber identifies the card used at lock-in.
Generation 2:
Instead of companyCardNumber the generation 2 data structure makes
use of the following data element.
companyCardNumberAndGeneration identifies the card including its
generation used at lock-in.
2.185. VuCompanyLocksRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to company locks (Annex
1C requirement 128).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuCompanyLocksRecord).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuCompanyLocksRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records. Value 0..255.
records is the set of company locks records.
▼B
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2.185a. VuConfigurationLengthRange
Generation 2, version 2:
Number of bytes in a tachograph card, available to store VU
configurations.
Value assignment: see Appendix 2.
▼B
2.186. VuControlActivityData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to controls performed using
this VU (Annex 1B requirement 102).
noOfControls is the number of controls listed in vuControlActiv­
ityRecords.
vuControlActivityRecords is the set of control activity records.
2.187. VuControlActivityRecord
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a control performed using
this VU (Annex 1B requirement 102 and Annex 1C requirement 126).
Generation 1:
controlType is the type of the control.
controlTime is the date and time of the control.
controlCardNumber identifies the control card used for the control.
downloadPeriodBeginTime is the begin time of the downloaded period,
in case of downloading.
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downloadPeriodEndTime is the end time of the downloaded period, in
case of downloading.
Generation 2:
Instead of controlCardNumber the generation 2 data structure makes use
of the following data element.
controlCardNumberAndGeneration identifies the control card
including its generation used for the control.
2.188. VuControlActivityRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to controls performed using
this VU (Annex 1C requirement 126).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuControlActivityRecord).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuControlActivityRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of VU control activity records.
2.189. VuDataBlockCounter
Counter, stored in a card, identifying sequentially the insertion with­
drawal cycles of the card in vehicle units.
Value assignment: Consecutive Number with max, value 9 999, starting
again with 0.
2.190. VuDetailedSpeedBlock
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the vehicle's detailed
speed for a minute during which the vehicle has been moving
(Annnex 1B requirement 093 and Annex 1C requirement 116).
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speedBlockBeginDate is the date and time of the first speed value
within the block.
speedsPerSecond is the chronological sequence of measured speeds
every seconds for the minute starting at speedBlockBeginDate
(included).
2.191. VuDetailedSpeedBlockRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the detailed speed of the
vehicle.
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuDetailedSpeedBlock).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuDetailedSpeedBlock in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of detailed speed blocks.
2.192. VuDetailedSpeedData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the detailed speed of the
vehicle.
noOfSpeedBlocks is the number of speed blocks in the vuDetailed­
SpeedBlocks set.
vuDetailedSpeedBlocks is the set of detailed speed blocks.
▼M3
2.192a. VuDigitalMapVersion
Generation 2, version 2:
Version of the digital map stored in the vehicle unit (Annex IC
requirement 133j).
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Value assignment: as specified on the dedicated secured website made
available by the European Commission (Annex IC requirement 133k).
▼B
2.193. VuDownloadablePeriod
Oldest and latest dates for which a vehicle unit holds data related to
drivers activities (Annex 1B requirements 081, 084 or 087 and
Annex 1C requirements 102, 105, 108).
minDownloadableTime is the oldest card insertion or activity change or
place entry date and time stored in the VU.
maxDownloadableTime is the latest card withdrawal or activity change
or place entry date and time stored in the VU.
2.194. VuDownloadablePeriodRecordArray
Generation 2:
The VUDownloadablePeriod plus metadata used in the download
protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuDownloadablePeriod).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuDownloadablePeriod in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of VuDownloadablePeriod records.
2.195. VuDownloadActivityData
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to its last download (Annex
1B requirement 105 and Annex 1C requirement 129).
Generation 1:
downloadingTime is the date and time of downloading.
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fullCardNumber identifies the card used to authorise the download.
companyOrWorkshopName is the company or workshop name.
Generation 2:
Instead of fullCardNumber the generation 2 data structure makes use of
the following data element.
fullCardNumberAndGeneration identifies the card including its
generation used to authorise the download.
2.196. VuDownloadActivityDataRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information related to the last VU download (Annex 1C requirement
129).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuDownloadActivityData).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuDownloadActivityData in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of download activity data records.
2.197. VuEventData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to events (Annex 1B
requirement 094 except over speeding event).
noOfVuEvents is the number of events listed in the vuEventRecords
set.
vuEventRecords is a set of events records.
▼B
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2.198. VuEventRecord
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to an event (Annex 1B
requirement 094 and Annex 1C requirement 117 except over speeding
event).
Generation 1:
eventType is the type of the event.
eventRecordPurpose is the purpose for which this event has been
recorded.
eventBeginTime is the date and time of beginning of event.
eventEndTime is the date and time of end of event.
cardNumberDriverSlotBegin identifies the card inserted in the driver
slot at the beginning of the event.
cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin identifies the card inserted in the
co-driver slot at the beginning of the event.
cardNumberDriverSlotEnd identifies the card inserted in the driver
slot at the end of the event.
cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd identifies the card inserted in the
co-driver slot at the end of the event.
similarEventsNumber is the number of similar events that day.
This sequence can be used for all events other than over speeding
events.
Generation 2:
In addition to generation 1 the following data elements are used:
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manufacturerSpecificEventFaultData contains additional, manu­
facturer specific information about the event.
Instead of cardNumberDriverSlotBegin, cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin,
cardNumberDriverSlotEnd, and cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd the
generation 2 data structure makes use of the following data elements:
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotBegin identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the driver slot at the beginning of the
event.
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotBegin identifies the card including
its generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot at the beginning
of the event.
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotEnd identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the driver slot at the end of the event.
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotEnd identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot at the end of the event.
If the event is a time conflict the eventBeginTime and eventEndTime are
to be interpreted as follows:
eventBeginTime is the recording equipment date and time.
eventEndTime is the GNSS date and time.
2.199. VuEventRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to events (Annex 1C
requirement 117 except over speeding event).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuEventRecord). Value
Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuEventRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of events records.
▼B
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2.200. VuFaultData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to faults (Annex 1B
requirement 096).
noOfVuFaults is the number of faults listed in the vuFaultRecords set.
vuFaultRecords is a set of faults records.
2.201. VuFaultRecord
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a fault (Annex 1B
requirement 096 and Annex 1C requirement 118).
Generation 1:
faultType is the type of recording equipment fault.
faultRecordPurpose is the purpose for which this fault has been
recorded.
faultBeginTime is the date and time of beginning of fault.
faultEndTime is the date and time of end of fault.
cardNumberDriverSlotBegin identifies the card inserted in the driver
slot at the beginning of the fault.
cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin identifies the card inserted in the
co-driver slot at the beginning of the fault.
cardNumberDriverSlotEnd identifies the card inserted in the driver
slot at the end of the fault.
cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd identifies the card inserted in the
co-driver slot at the end of the fault.
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Generation 2:
In addition to generation 1 the following data element is used:
manufacturerSpecificEventFaultData contains additional, manu­
facturer specific information about the fault.
Instead of cardNumberDriverSlotBegin, cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin,
cardNumberDriverSlotEnd, and cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd the
generation 2 data structure makes use of the following data elements:
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotBegin identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the driver slot at the beginning of the
fault.
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotBegin identifies the card including
its generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot at the beginning
of the fault.
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotEnd identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the driver slot at the end of the fault.
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotEnd identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot at the end of the fault.
2.202. VuFaultRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to faults (Annex 1C
requirement 118).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuFaultRecord). Value
Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuFaultRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of faults records.
▼B
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2.203. VuGNSSADRecord
▼M3
Generation 2, version 1:
▼M1
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the GNSS position of the
vehicle if the accumulated driving time reaches a multiple of three hours
(Annex IC requirement 108, 110).
timeStamp is the date and time when the accumulated driving time
reaches a multiple of three hours.
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlot identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the driver slot.
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlot identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot.
gnssPlaceRecord contains information related to the position of the
vehicle.
vehicleOdometerValue is the odometer value when the accumulated
driving time reaches a multiple of three hours.
▼M3
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the GNSS position of the
vehicle if the accumulated driving time reaches a multiple of three hours
(Annex IC requirement 108, 110).
In Generation 2 version 2, instead of gnssPlaceRecord, the gnssPla­
ceAuthRecord is used, which contains the GNSS authentication status in
addition.
2.203a. VuBorderCrossingRecord
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to border crossings of the
vehicle when the latter has crossed the border of a country (Annex IC
requirement 133a and 133b).
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cardNumberAndGenDriverSlot identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the driver slot.
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlot identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot.
countryLeft is the country which was left by the vehicle, based on the
last available position before the border crossing has been detected.
‘Rest of the World’ (NationNumeric code ‘FF’H) shall be used when
the vehicle unit is not able to determine the country where the vehicle is
located (e.g. the current country is not part of the stored digital maps).
countryEntered is the country into which the vehicle has entered. ‘Rest
of the World’ (NationNumeric code ‘FF’H) shall be used when the
vehicle unit is not able to determine the country where the vehicle is
located (e.g. the current country is not part of the stored digital maps).
gnssPlaceAuthRecord contains information related to the position of
the vehicle when the border crossing was detected, and its authentication
status.
vehicleOdometerValue is the odometer value when the vehicle unit has
detected that the vehicle has crossed the border of a country.
2.203b. VuBorderCrossingRecordArray
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to border crossings of the
vehicle (Annex IC requirement 133c).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuBorderCrossingRecord).
Value assignment: see RecordType.
recordSize is the size of the VuBorderCrossingRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of border crossing records.
▼M1
2.204. VuGNSSADRecordArray
Generation 2:
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Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the GNSS position of the
vehicle if the accumulated driving time reaches a multiple of three hours
(Annex IC requirement 108 and 110).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuGNSSADRecord).
Value Assignment: See RecordType.
recordSize is the size of the VuGNSSADRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of GNSS accumulated driving records.
▼M3
2.204a. VuGnssMaximalTimeDifference
Generation 2, version 2:
The maximal difference between true time and the VU Real Time Clock
time, based on the maximal time drift specified in Annex IC requirement
041, transmitted by the vehicle unit to an external GNSS Facility, see
Appendix 12 requirement GNS_3g.
▼B
2.205. VuIdentification
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the identification of the
vehicle unit (Annex 1B requirement 075 and Annex 1C requirement 93
and 121).
Generation 1:
vuManufacturerName is the name of the manufacturer of the vehicle
unit.
vuManufacturerAddress is the address of the manufacturer of the
vehicle unit.
vuPartNumber is the part number of the vehicle unit.
vuSerialNumber is the serial number of the vehicle unit.
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vuSoftwareIdentification identifies the software implemented in the
vehicle unit.
vuManufacturingDate is the manufacturing date of the vehicle unit.
vuApprovalNumber is the type approval number of the vehicle unit.
▼M3
Generation 2:
In addition to generation 1 the following data elements are used:
vuGeneration identifies the generation of the vehicle unit.
vuAbility provides information whether the VU supports generation 1
tachograph cards or not.
vuDigitalMapVersion is the version of the digital map stored in the
vehicle unit (only present in version 2).
▼B
2.206. VuIdentificationRecordArray
Generation 2:
The VuIdentification plus metadata used in the download protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuIdentification). Value
Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuIdentification in bytes.
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noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of VuIdentification records.
2.207. VuITSConsentRecord
Generation 2:
Information stored in a vehicle unit, related to the consent of a driver to
use Intelligent Transport Systems.
cardNumberAndGen identifies the card including its generation. This
must be a driver card or a workshop card.
consent is a flag which indicates whether the driver has given his
consent on the usage of Intelligent Transport Systems with this
vehicle / vehicle unit.
Value assignment:
TRUE indicates the driver's consent to use Intelligent
Transport Systems
FALSE indicates the driver's denial to use Intelligent
Transport Systems
2.208. VuITSConsentRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to drivers' consent on the
usage of Intelligent Transport Systems (Annex 1C requirement 200).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuITSConsentRecord).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuITSConsentRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is the set of ITS consent records.
▼M3
2.208a. VuLoadUnloadRecord
Generation 2, version 2:
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Information, stored in the vehicle unit, related to a load/unload operation
entered (Annex IC requirements 133e, 133f and 133g).
timeStamp is the date and time when the load/unload operation was
entered.
operationType is the type of the operation entered (load, unload, or
simultaneous load/unload).
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlot identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the driver slot.
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlot identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the co-driver slot.
gnssPlaceAuthRecord contains information related to the position of
the vehicle, and its authentication status.
vehicleOdometerValue is the odometer value related to the load/unload
operation.
2.208b. VuLoadUnloadRecordArray
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a load/unload operation
vehicle entered (Annex IC requirement 133h).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuLoadUnloa­
dRecord).Value Assignment: See RecordType.
recordSize is the size of the VuLoadUnloadRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of load/unload operation records.
▼M3
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2.209. VuManufacturerAddress
Address of the manufacturer of the vehicle unit.
Value assignment: Unspecified.
2.210. VuManufacturerName
Name of the manufacturer of the vehicle unit.
Value assignment: Unspecified.
2.211. VuManufacturingDate
Date of manufacture of the vehicle unit.
Value assignment: Unspecified.
2.212. VuOverSpeedingControlData
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events
since the last over speeding control (Annex 1B requirement 095 and
Annex 1C requirement 117).
lastOverspeedControlTime is the date and time of the last over
speeding control.
firstOverspeedSince is the date and time of the first over speeding
following this over speeding control.
numberOfOverspeedSince is the number of over speeding events since
the last over speeding control.
2.213. VuOverSpeedingControlDataRecordArray
Generation 2:
The VuOverSpeedingControlData plus metadata used in the download
protocol.
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recordType denotes the type of the record (VuOverSpeedingCon­
trolData). Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuOverSpeedingControlData in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of over speeding control data records.
2.214. VuOverSpeedingEventData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events
(Annex 1B requirement 094).
noOfVuOverSpeedingEvents is the number of events listed in the
vuOverSpeedingEventRecords set.
vuOverSpeedingEventRecords is a set of over speeding events records.
2.215. VuOverSpeedingEventRecord
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events
(Annex 1B requirement 094 and Annex 1C requirement 117).
eventType is the type of the event.
eventRecordPurpose is the purpose for which this event has been
recorded.
eventBeginTime is the date and time of beginning of event.
eventEndTime is the date and time of end of event.
maxSpeedValue is the maximum speed measured during the event.
averageSpeedValue is the arithmetic average speed measured during the
event.
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cardNumberDriverSlotBegin identifies the card inserted in the driver
slot at the beginning of the event.
similarEventsNumber is the number of similar events that day.
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events
(Annex 1B requirement 094 and Annex 1C requirement 117).
Instead of cardNumberDriverSlotBegin, the generation 2 data structure
makes use of the following data element:
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotBegin identifies the card including its
generation which is inserted in the driver slot at the beginning of the
event.
2.216. VuOverSpeedingEventRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events
(Annex 1C requirement 117).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuOverSpeeding­
EventRecord). Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuOverSpeedingEventRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of over speeding events records.
2.217. VuPartNumber
Part number of the vehicle unit.
Value assignment: VU manufacturer specific.
▼B
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2.218. VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to places where drivers
begin or end a daily work period (Annex 1B requirement 087 and
Annex 1C requirement 108 and 110).
noOfPlaceRecords is the number of records listed in the vuPlaceDaily­
WorkPeriodRecords set.
vuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecords is a set of place related records.
2.219. VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecord
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a place where a driver
begins or ends a daily work period (Annex 1B requirement 087 and
Annex 1C requirement 108 and 110).
fullCardNumber is the driver's card type, card issuing Member State
and card number.
placeRecord contains the information related to the place entered.
▼M3
Generation 2, version 1:
▼B
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a place where a driver
begins or ends a daily work period (Annex 1B requirement 087 and
Annex 1C requirement 108 and 110).
Instead of fullCardNumber, the generation 2 data structure makes use of
the following data element:
fullCardNumberAndGeneration is the type of card, its issuing
Member State, its card number and generation as stored in the card.
▼M3
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a place where a driver
begins or ends a daily work period (Annex 1B requirement 087 and
Annex 1C requirement 108 and 110).
▼B
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Instead of placeRecord, the generation 2 version 2 data structure makes
use of the following data element:
placeAuthRecord contains the information related to the place entered,
the recorded position, GNSS authentication status and position deter­
mination time.
▼B
2.220. VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to places where drivers
begin or end a daily work period (Annex 1C requirement 108 and 110).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriod­
Record). Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of place related records.
2.221. VuPrivateKey
Generation 1:
The private key of a vehicle unit.
2.222. VuPublicKey
Generation 1:
The public key of a vehicle unit.
▼M3
2.222a. VuRtcTime
Generation 2, version 2:
The time of the VU RTC clock, transmitted by the VU to an External
GNSS Facility, see Appendix 12 requirement GNS_3f.
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2.223. VuSerialNumber
Serial number of the vehicle unit (Annex 1B requirement 075 and
Annex 1C requirement 93).
2.224. VuSoftInstallationDate
Date of installation of the vehicle unit software version.
Value assignment: Unspecified.
2.225. VuSoftwareIdentification
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the software installed.
vuSoftwareVersion is the software version number of the Vehicle Unit.
vuSoftInstallationDate is the software version installation date.
2.226. VuSoftwareVersion
Software version number of the vehicle unit.
Value assignment: Unspecified.
2.227. VuSpecificConditionData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to specific conditions.
noOfSpecificConditionRecords is the number of records listed in the
specificConditionRecords set.
specificConditionRecords is a set of specific conditions related records.
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2.228. VuSpecificConditionRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to specific conditions
(Annex 1C requirement 130).
recordType denotes the type of the record (SpecificConditionRecord).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the SpecificConditionRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of specific conditions related records.
2.229. VuTimeAdjustmentData
Generation 1:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to time adjustments
performed outside the frame of a regular calibration (Annex 1B
requirement 101).
noOfVuTimeAdjRecords is the number of records in vuTimeAdjust­
mentRecords.
vuTimeAdjustmentRecords is a set of time adjustment records.
▼M1
2.230. Reserved for future use
2.231. Reserved for future use
▼B
2.232. VuTimeAdjustmentRecord
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related a time adjustment
performed outside the frame of a regular calibration (Annex 1B
requirement 101 and Annex 1C requirement 124 and 125).
Generation 1:
▼B
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oldTimeValue, newTimeValue are the old and new values of date and
time.
workshopName, workshopAddress are the workshop name and
address.
workshopCardNumber identifies the workshop card used to perform
the time adjustment.
Generation 2:
Instead of workshopCardNumber the generation 2 data structure makes
use of the following data element.
workshopCardNumberAndGeneration identifies the workshop card
including its generation used to perform the time adjustment.
2.233. VuTimeAdjustmentRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to time adjustments
performed outside the frame of a regular calibration (Annex 1C
requirement 124 and 125).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuTimeAdjustmentRecord).
Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuTimeAdjustmentRecord in bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of time adjustment records.
2.234. WorkshopCardApplicationIdentification
Information, stored in a workshop card related to the identification of the
application of the card (Annex 1C requirement 307 and 330).
Generation 1:
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typeOfTachographCardId is specifying the implemented type of card.
cardStructureVersion is specifying the the version of the structure that
is implemented in the card.
noOfEventsPerType is the number of events per type of event the card
can record.
noOfFaultsPerType is the number of faults per type of fault the card
can record.
activityStructureLength indicates the number of bytes available for
storing activity records.
noOfCardVehicleRecords is the number of vehicle records the card can
contain.
noOfCardPlaceRecords is the number of places the card can record.
noOfCalibrationRecords is the number of calibration records the card
can store.
Generation 2:
▼M1
In addition to generation 1 the following data elements are used:
noOfGNSSADRecords is the number of GNSS accumulated driving
records the card can store.
noOfSpecificConditionRecords is the number of specific condition
records the card can store.
noOfCardVehicleUnitRecords is the number of vehicle units used
records the card can store.
▼M3
2.234a. WorkshopCardApplicationIdentificationV2
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a workshop card related to the identification of the
application of the card (Annex IC requirement 330a).
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lengthOfFollowingData is the number of bytes following in the record.
noOfBorderCrossingRecords is the number of border crossing records
the workshop card can store.
noOfLoadUnloadRecords is the number of load/unload records the
workshop card can store.
noOfLoadTypeEntryRecords is the number of load type entry records
the workshop card can store.
vuConfigurationLengthRange is the number of bytes in a tachograph
card, available to store VU configurations.
2.234b. WorkshopCardCalibrationAddData
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a workshop card, related to the additional data
(i.e. by-default load type) entered during a calibration (Annex IC
requirement 356l).
calibrationPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated cali­
bration additional data record.
Value assignment is the number corresponding to the numerator of the
calibration additional data record, beginning with '0' for the first
occurrence of the calibration additional data record in the structure.
workshopCardCalibrationAddDataRecords is the set of records
containing the old date and time value, the vehicle identification value
and the by-default load type of the vehicle.
2.234c. WorkshopCardCalibrationAddDataRecord
Generation 2, version 2:
Information, stored in a workshop card, related to the by-default load
type entered during a calibration (Annex IC requirement 356k).
▼M3
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oldTimeValue is the old value of date and time contained in the corre­
sponding WorkshopCardCalibrationRecord,
vehicleIdentificationNumber is the vehicle identification number of the
vehicle, also contained in the corresponding WorkshopCardCalibration­
Record,
byDefaultLoadType is the by-default load type of the vehicle (only
present in version 2).
calibrationCountry is the country in which the calibration has been
performed,
calibrationCountryTimestamp is the date time when the position used
to determine this country was provided by the GNSS receiver.
▼B
2.235. WorkshopCardCalibrationData
Information, stored in a workshop card, related to workshop activity
performed with the card (Annex 1C requirements 314, 316, 337, and
339).
calibrationTotalNumber is the total number of calibrations performed
with the card.
calibrationPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated cali­
bration record.
Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the cali­
bration record, beginning with ‘0’ for the first occurrence of the cali­
bration records in the structure.
calibrationRecords is the set of records containing calibration and/or
time adjustment information.
2.236. WorkshopCardCalibrationRecord
Information, stored in a workshop card, related to a calibration
performed with the card (Annex 1C requirement 314 and 337).
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Generation 1:
calibrationPurpose is the purpose of the calibration.
vehicleIdentificationNumber is the VIN.
vehicleRegistration contains the VRN and registering Member State.
wVehicleCharacteristicConstant is the characteristic coefficient of the
vehicle.
kConstantOfRecordingEquipment is the constant of the recording
equipment.
lTyreCircumference is the effective circumference of the wheel tyres.
tyreSize is the designation of the dimensions of the tyres mounted on
the vehicle.
authorisedSpeed is the maximum authorised speed of the vehicle.
oldOdometerValue, newOdometerValue are the old and new values of
the odometer.
oldTimeValue, newTimeValue are the old and new values of date and
time.
nextCalibrationDate is the date of the next calibration of the type
specified in CalibrationPurpose to be carried out by the authorised
inspection authority.
vuPartNumber, vuSerialNumber and sensorSerialNumber are the
data elements for recording equipment identification.
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Generation 2:
In addition to generation 1 the following data elements are used:
sensorGNSSSerialNumber which identifies an external GNSS facility.
rcmSerialNumber which identifies a Remote Communication Module.
sealDataCard gives information about the seals that are attached to
different components of the vehicle.
2.237. WorkshopCardHolderIdentification
Information, stored in a workshop card, related to the identification of
the cardholder (Annex 1C requirement 311 and 334).
workshopName is name of the workshop of the card holder.
workshopAddress is the address of the workshop of the card holder.
cardHolderName is the name and first name(s) of the holder (e.g. the
name of the mechanic).
cardHolderPreferredLanguage is the preferred language of the card
holder.
2.238. WorkshopCardPIN
Personal identification number of the Workshop Card (Annex 1C
requirement 309 and 332).
Value assignment: The PIN known to the cardholder, right padded with
‘FF’ bytes up to 8 bytes.
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2.239. W-VehicleCharacteristicConstant
Characteristic coefficient of the vehicle (definition k)).
Value assignment: Impulses per kilometer in the operating range 0 to
64 255 pulses/km.
2.240. VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecord
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to Power Supply Inter­
ruption events (Annex 1C requirement 117).
eventType is the type of the event.
eventRecordPurpose is the purpose for which this event has been
recorded.
eventBeginTime is the date and time of beginning of event.
eventEndTime is the date and time of end of event.
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotBegin identifies the card including its
generation inserted in the driver slot at the beginning of the event.
cardNumberAndGenDriverSlotEnd identifies the card including its
generation inserted in the driver slot at the end of the event.
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotBegin identifies the card including
its generation inserted in the co-driver slot at the beginning of the event.
cardNumberAndGenCodriverSlotEnd identifies the card including its
generation inserted in the co-driver slot at the end of the event.
similarEventsNumber is the number of similar events that day.
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2.241. VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecordArray
Generation 2:
Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to Power Supply Inter­
ruption events (Annex 1C requirement 117).
recordType denotes the type of the record (VuPowerSupplyInterrupt­
ionRecord). Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecord in
bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of power supply interruption events records.
2.242. VuSensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecordArray
Generation 2:
A set of SensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecord plus metadata used in the
download protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (SensorExternalGNSSCouple­
dRecord). Value Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the SensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecord in
bytes.
noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of Sensor External GNSS Coupled records.
2.243. VuSensorPairedRecordArray
Generation 2:
A set of SensorPairedRecord plus metadata used in the download
protocol.
recordType denotes the type of the record (SensorPairedRecord). Value
Assignment: See RecordType
recordSize is the size of the SensorPairedRecord in bytes.
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noOfRecords is the number of records in the set records.
records is a set of sensor paired records.
3. VALUE AND SIZE RANGE DEFINITIONS
Definition of variable values used for definitions in paragraph 2.
4. CHARACTER SETS
IA5Strings use the ASCII characters as defined by ISO/IEC 8824-1. For
readability and for easy referencing the value assignment is given below.
The ISO/IEC 8824-1 supersedes this informative note in case of
discrepancy.
Other character strings (Address, Name, VehicleRegistrationNumber)
use, in addition, characters from the decimal character code range 161
— 255 of the following 8-bit, standard character sets, specified by the
Code Page number:
Standard Character Set
Code Page
(Decimal)
ISO/IEC 8859-1 Latin-1 Western European 1
ISO/IEC 8859-2 Latin-2 Central European 2
ISO/IEC 8859-3 Latin-3 South European 3
ISO/IEC 8859-5 Latin / Cyrillic 5
ISO/IEC 8859-7 Latin / Greek 7
ISO/IEC 8859-9 Latin-5 Turkish 9
ISO/IEC 8859-13 Latin-7 Baltic Rim 13
ISO/IEC 8859-15 Latin-9 15
ISO/IEC 8859-16 Latin-10 South Eastern European 16
KOI8-R Latin / Cyrillic 80
KOI8-U Latin / Cyrillic 85
5. ENCODING
When encoded with ASN.1 encoding rules, all data types defined shall
be encoded according to ISO/IEC 8825-2, aligned variant.
6. OBJECT IDENTIFIERS UND APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS
6.1. Object Identifiers
The Object Identifiers (OIDs) listed in this chapter are only relevant for
generation 2. These OIDs are specified in TR-03110-3 and repeated here
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for the sake of completeness. These OIDs are contained in the subtree of
bsi-de:
VU Authentication protocol identifiers
Example: Suppose VU Authentication is to be done with
SHA-384, then the object identifier to use is (in ASN.1 notation)
. The value of
this object identifier in dot notation is .
Dot notation Byte notation
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 02 02 03’
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 02 02 04’
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 02 02 05’
Chip Authentication protocol identifiers
Example: Suppose Chip Authentication is to be done by using
the ECDH algorithm, resulting in an AES session key length of
128 bits. This session key will subsequently be used in the
CBC mode of operation to ensure data confidentiality and
with the CMAC algorithm to ensure data authenticity. Therefore,
the object identifier to use is (in ASN.1 notation)
. The value of
this object identifier in dot notation is .
Dot notation Byte notation
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 03 02 02’
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 03 02 03’
‘04 00 7F 00 07 02 02 03 02 04’
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6.2. Application Identifiers
Generation 2:
The Application Identifier (AID) for the External GNSS Facility
(Generation 2) is given by ‘FF 44 54 45 47 4D’. This is a proprietary
AID according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.
Note: The last 5 bytes encode DTEGM for smart Tachograph External
GNSS Facility.
The Application Identifier for the generation 2 tachograph card appli­
cation is given by ‘FF 53 4D 52 44 54’. This is a proprietary AID
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.
▼B
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Appendix 2
TACHOGRAPH CARDS SPECIFICATION
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Abbreviations
1.2. References
2. ELECTRICAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
2.1. Supply Voltage and Current Consumption
2.2. Programming Voltage V pp
2.3. Clock generation and Frequency
2.4. I/O Contact
2.5. States of the Card
3. HARDWARE AND COMMUNICATION
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Transmission Protocol
3.2.1 Protocols
3.2.2 ATR
3.2.3 PTS
3.3. Access Rules
3.4. Commands and error codes overview
3.5. Command descriptions
3.5.1 SELECT
3.5.2 READ BINARY
3.5.3 UPDATE BINARY
3.5.4 GET CHALLENGE
3.5.5 VERIFY
3.5.6 GET RESPONSE
3.5.7 PSO: VERIFY CERTIFICATE
3.5.8 INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
3.5.9 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
3.5.10 GENERAL AUTHENTICATE
3.5.11 MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
3.5.12 PSO: HASH
3.5.13 PERFORM HASH OF FILE
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3.5.14 PSO: COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE
3.5.15 PSO: VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE
3.5.16 PROCESS DSRC MESSAGE
4. TACHOGRAPH CARDS STRUCTURE
4.1. Master File MF
4.2. Driver card applications
4.2.1 Driver card application generation 1
4.2.2 Driver card application generation 2
4.3. Workshop card applications
4.3.1 Workshop card application generation 1
4.3.2 Workshop card application generation 2
4.4. Control card applications
4.4.1 Control Card application generation 1
4.4.2 Control card application generation 2
4.5. Company card applications
4.5.1 Company card application generation 1
4.5.2 Company card application generation 2
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Abbreviations
For the purpose of this appendix, the following abbreviations apply.
AC Access conditions
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AID Application Identifier
ALW Always
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit (structure of a command)
ATR Answer To Reset
AUT Authenticated.
C6, C7 Contacts No 6 and 7 of the card as described in ISO/IEC
7816-2
cc clock cycles
▼M1
CHA Certificate Holder Authorisation
▼B
CHV Card holder Verification Information
CLA Class byte of an APDU command
▼M1
DO Data Object
▼B
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communication
DF Dedicated File. A DF can contain other files (EF or DF)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EF Elementary File
etu elementary time unit
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G1 Generation 1
G2 Generation 2
IC Integrated Circuit
ICC Integrated Circuit Card
ID Identifier
IFD Interface Device
IFS Information Field Size
IFSC Information Field Size for the card
IFSD Information Field Size Device (for the Terminal)
INS Instruction byte of an APDU command
Lc Length of the input data for a APDU command
Le Length of the expected data (output data for a command)
MF Master File (root DF)
NAD Node Address used in T=1 protocol
NEV Never
P1-P2 Parameter bytes
PIN Personal Identification Number
PRO SM Protected with secure messaging
PTS Protocol Transmission Selection
RFU Reserved for Future Use
RST Reset (of the card)
SFID Short EF Identifier
SM Secure Messaging
SW1-SW2 Status bytes
TS Initial ATR character
VPP Programming Voltage
VU Vehicle Unit
XXh Value XX in hexadecimal notation
‘XXh’ Value XX in hexadecimal notation
|| Concatenation symbol 03||04=0304
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1.2. References
The following references are used in this Appendix:
ISO/IEC 7816-2 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards —
Part 2: Dimensions and location of the contacts.
ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007.
ISO/IEC 7816-3 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards —
Part 3: Electrical interface and transmission
protocols. ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006.
ISO/IEC 7816-4 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards —
Part 4: Organization, security and commands for
interchange. ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 + Cor 1: 2014.
ISO/IEC 7816-6 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards —
Part 6: Interindustry data elements for interchange.
ISO/IEC 7816-6:2004 + Cor 1: 2006.
ISO/IEC 7816-8 Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards —
Part 8: Commands for security operations. ISO/IEC
7816-8:2004.
ISO/IEC 9797-2 Information technology — Security techniques —
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 2:
Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function.
ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011
2. ELECTRICAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
TCS_01 All electronic signals shall be in accordance with ISO/IEC
7816-3 unless specified otherwise.
TCS_02 The location and dimensions of the card contacts shall
comply with the ISO/IEC 7816-2.
2.1. Supply Voltage and Current Consumption
TCS_03 The card shall work according to specifications within the
consumption limits specified in ISO/IEC 7816-3.
TCS_04 The card shall work with Vcc = 3V (± 0,3V) or with Vcc =
5V (± 0,5V).
Voltage selection shall be performed according to ISO/IEC
7816-3.
2.2. Programming Voltage V pp
TCS_05 The card shall not require a programming voltage at pin
C6. It is expected that pin C6 is not connected in an IFD.
Contact C6 may be connected to V cc in the card but shall
not be connected to ground. This voltage should not be
interpreted in any case.
2.3. Clock generation and Frequency
TCS_06 The card shall operate within a frequency range of 1 to
5 MHz and may support higher frequencies. Within one
card session the clock frequency may vary ± 2 %. The
clock frequency is generated by the Vehicle Unit and not
the card itself. The duty cycle may vary between 40 and
60 %.
TCS_07 Under conditions contained into the card file EF ICC, the
external clock can be stopped. The first byte of the EF ICC
file body codes the Clockstop mode conditions:
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Low High
Bit 3 Bit 2 Bit 1
0 0 1 Clockstop allowed, no preferred level
0 1 1 Clockstop allowed, high level preferred
1 0 1 Clockstop allowed, low level preferred
0 0 0 Clockstop not allowed
0 1 0 Clockstop only allowed on high level
1 0 0 Clockstop only allowed on low level
Bits 4 to 8 are not used.
2.4. I/O Contact
TCS_08 The I/O contact C7 is used to receive data from and to
transmit data to the IFD. During operation only either the
card or the IFD shall be in transmit mode. Should both
units be in transmit mode no damage shall occur to the
card. Unless transmitting, the card shall enter the
reception mode.
2.5. States of the Card
TCS_09 The card works in two states while the supply voltage is
applied:
▼M3
Operation state while executing commands or interfacing
with Vehicle Unit,
▼B
Idle state at all other times; in this state all data shall be
retained by the card.
3. HARDWARE AND COMMUNICATION
3.1. Introduction
This paragraph describes the minimum functionality required by
Tachograph cards and VUs to ensure correct operation and
interoperability.
Tachograph cards are as compliant as possible with the available
ISO/IEC applicable norms (especially ISO/IEC 7816). However,
commands and protocols are fully described in order to specify
some restricted usage or some differences if they exist. The
commands specified are fully compliant with the referred norms
except where indicated.
3.2. Transmission Protocol
TCS_10 The Transmission protocol shall be compliant with
ISO/IEC 7816-3 for T = 0 and T = 1. In particular, the
VU shall recognise waiting time extensions sent by the
card.
3.2.1 Protocols
TCS_11 The card shall provide both protocol T=0 and protocol
T=1. In addition the card may support further contact-
oriented protocols.
TCS_12 T=0 is the default protocol, a PTS command is therefore
necessary to change the protocol to T=1.
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TCS_13 Devices shall support direct convention in both protocols:
the direct convention is hence mandatory for the card.
TCS_14 The Information Field Size Card byte shall be presented
at the ATR in character TA3. This value shall be at least
‘F0h’ (=240 bytes).
The following restrictions apply to the protocols:
TCS_15 T=0
— The interface device shall support an answer on I/O
after the rising edge of the signal on RST from 400 cc.
— The interface device shall be able to read characters
separated with 12 etu.
— The interface device shall read an erroneous character
and its repetition if separated with 13 etu. If an
erroneous character is detected, the Error signal on
I/O can occur between 1 etu and 2 etu. The device
shall support a 1 etu delay.
— The interface device shall accept a 33 bytes ATR
(TS+32)
— If TC1 is present in the ATR, the Extra Guard Time
shall be present for characters sent by the interface
device although characters sent by the card can still
be separated with 12 etu. This is also true for the
ACK character sent by the card after a P3 character
emitted by the interface device.
— The interface device shall take into account a NUL
character emitted by the card.
— The interface device shall accept the complementary
mode for ACK.
— The get-response command cannot be used in chaining
mode to get a data which length could exceed 255
bytes.
TCS_16 T=1
— NAD byte: not used (NAD shall be set to ‘00’).
— S-block ABORT: not used.
— S-block VPP state error: not used.
▼M3
__________
▼B
— The Information Field Size Device (IFSD) shall be
indicated by the IFD immediately after the ATR: the
IFD shall transmit the S-Block IFS request after the
ATR and the card shall send back S-Block IFS. The
recommended value for IFSD is 254 bytes.
— The card will not ask for an IFS readjustment.
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3.2.2 ATR
TCS_17 The device checks ATR bytes, according to ISO/IEC 7816-
3. No verification shall be done on ATR Historical
Characters.
Example of Basic Biprotocol ATR according to ISO/IEC
7816-3
Character Value Remarks
TS ‘3Bh’ Indicates direct convention.
T0 ‘85h’ TD1 present; 5 historical bytes are presents.
TD1 ‘80h’ TD2 present; T=0 to be used
TD2 ‘11h’ TA3 present; T=1 to be used
TA3 ‘XXh’ (at least
‘F0h’)
Information Field Size Card ( IFSC)
TH1 to TH5 ‘XXh’ Historical characters
TCK ‘XXh’ Check Character (exclusive OR)
TCS_18 After the Answer To Reset (ATR), the Master File (MF) is
implicitly selected and becomes the Current Directory.
3.2.3 PTS
TCS_19 The default Protocol is T=0. To set the T=1 protocol, a
PTS (also known as PPS) must be sent to the card by the
device.
TCS_20 As both T=0 and T=1 protocols are mandatory for the card,
the basic PTS for protocol switching is mandatory for the
card.
The PTS can be used, as indicated in ISO/IEC 7816-3, to
switch to higher baud rates than the default one proposed
by the card in the ATR if any (TA(1) byte).
Higher baud rates are optional for the card.
TCS_21 If no other baud rate than the default one are supported (or
if the selected baud rate is not supported), the card shall
respond to the PTS correctly according to ISO/IEC 7816-3
by omitting the PPS1 byte.
Examples of basic PTS for protocol selection are the
following:
Character Value Remarks
PPSS ‘FFh’ The Initiate Character.
PPS0 ‘00h’ or ‘01h’ PPS1 to PPS3 are not present; ‘00h’ to select T0, ‘01h’ to
select T1.
PK ‘XXh’ Check Character: ‘XXh’ = ‘FFh’ if PPS0 = ‘00h’,
‘XXh’ = ‘FEh’ if PPS0 = ‘01h’.
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3.3. Access Rules
TCS_22 An access rule specifies for an access mode, i.e. command,
the corresponding security conditions. If these security
conditions are fulfilled the corresponding command is
processed.
TCS_23 The following security conditions are used for the
tachograph card:
Abbreviation Meaning
ALW The action is always possible and can be executed without any restriction.
Command and response APDU are sent in plain text, i.e. without secure
messaging.
NEV The action is never possible.
PLAIN-C The command APDU is sent in plain, i.e. without secure messaging.
PWD The action may only be executed if the workshop card PIN has been
successfully verified, i.e. if the card internal security status ‘PIN_Verified’
is set. The command must be sent without secure messaging.
EXT-AUT-G1 The action may only be executed if the External Authenticate command for
the generation 1 authentication (see also Appendix 11 Part A) has been
successfully performed.
SM-MAC-G1 The APDU (command and response) must be applied with generation 1
secure messaging in authentication-only mode (see Appendix 11 Part A).
SM-C-MAC-G1 The command APDU must be applied with generation 1 secure messaging in
authentication only mode (see Appendix 11 Part A).
SM-R-ENC-G1 The response APDU must be applied with generation 1 secure messaging in
encryption mode (see Appendix 11 Part A), i.e. no message authentication
code is returned.
SM-R-ENC-
MAC-G1
The response APDU must be applied with generation 1 secure messaging in
encrypt-then-authenticate mode (see Appendix 11 Part A).
SM-MAC-G2 The APDU (command and response) must be applied with generation 2
secure messaging in authentication-only mode (see Appendix 11 Part B).
SM-C-MAC-G2 The command APDU must be applied with generation 2 secure messaging in
authentication only mode (see Appendix 11 Part B).
SM-R-ENC-
MAC-G2
The response APDU must be applied with generation 2 secure messaging in
encrypt-then-authenticate mode (see Appendix 11 Part B).
▼M1
TCS_24 These security conditions can be linked in the following
ways:
AND: All security conditions must be fulfilled
OR: At least one security condition must be fulfilled
The access rules for the file system, i.e. the SELECT,
READ BINARY and UPDATE BINARY command, are
specified in chapter 4. The access rules for the remaining
commands are specified in the following tables. The term
‘not applicable’ is used if there is no requirement to support
the command. In this case the command may or may not be
supported, but the access condition is out of scope.
▼B
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TCS_25 In the DF Tachograph G1 application the following access
rules are used:
▼M1
Command Driver Card Workshop Card Control Card Company Card
External Authenticate
— For generation 1 authenti­
cation
ALW ALW ALW ALW
— For generation 2 authenti­
cation
ALW PWD ALW ALW
Internal Authenticate ALW PWD ALW ALW
General Authenticate ALW ALW ALW ALW
Get Challenge ALW ALW ALW ALW
MSE:SET AT ALW ALW ALW ALW
MSE:SET DST ALW ALW ALW ALW
Process DSRC Message Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not applicable
PSO: Compute Digital Signature ALW OR
SM-MAC-
G2
ALW OR
SM-MAC-
G2
Not
applicable
Not applicable
PSO: Hash Not
applicable
Not
applicable
ALW Not applicable
PERFORM HASH of FILE ALW OR
SM-MAC-
G2
ALW OR
SM-MAC-
G2
Not
applicable
Not applicable
PSO: Verify Certificate ALW ALW ALW ALW
PSO: Verify Digital Signature Not
applicable
Not
applicable
ALW Not applicable
Verify Not
applicable
ALW Not
applicable
Not applicable
▼B
TCS_26 In the DF Tachograph_G2 application the following access
rules are used:
▼M1
Command Driver Card Workshop Card Control Card Company Card
External Authenticate
— For generation 1 authenti­
cation
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not applicable
— For generation 2 authenti­
cation
ALW PWD ALW ALW
▼B
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Command Driver Card Workshop Card Control Card Company Card
Internal Authenticate Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not applicable
General Authenticate ALW ALW ALW ALW
Get Challenge ALW ALW ALW ALW
MSE:SET AT ALW ALW ALW ALW
MSE:SET DST ALW ALW ALW ALW
Process DSRC Message Not
applicable
ALW ALW Not applicable
PSO: Compute Digital Signature ALW OR
SM-MAC-
G2
ALW OR
SM-MAC-
G2
Not
applicable
Not applicable
PSO: Hash Not
applicable
Not
applicable
ALW Not applicable
PERFORM HASH of FILE ALW OR
SM-MAC-
G2
ALW OR
SM-MAC-
G2
Not
applicable
Not applicable
PSO: Verify Certificate ALW ALW ALW ALW
PSO: Verify Digital Signature Not
applicable
Not
applicable
ALW Not applicable
Verify Not
applicable
ALW Not
applicable
Not applicable
▼B
TCS_27 In the MF the following access rules are used:
▼M1
Command Driver Card Workshop Card Control Card Company Card
External Authenticate
— For generation 1 authenti­
cation
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not applicable
— For generation 2 authenti­
cation
ALW PWD ALW ALW
Internal Authenticate Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not applicable
General Authenticate ALW ALW ALW ALW
Get Challenge ALW ALW ALW ALW
MSE:SET AT ALW ALW ALW ALW
MSE:SET DST ALW ALW ALW ALW
▼M1
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Command Driver Card Workshop Card Control Card Company Card
Process DSRC Message Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not applicable
PSO: Compute Digital Signature Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not applicable
PSO: Hash Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not applicable
PERFORM HASH of FILE Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not applicable
PSO: Verify Certificate ALW ALW ALW ALW
PSO: Verify Digital Signature Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not applicable
Verify Not
applicable
ALW Not
applicable
Not applicable
▼B
TCS_28 A tachograph card may or may not accept a command with
a higher level of security than the one specified in the
security conditions. I.e. if the security condition is ALW
(or PLAIN-C) the card may accept a command with secure
messaging (encryption and / or authentication mode). If the
security condition requires secure messaging with authenti­
cation mode, the tachograph card may accept a command
with secure messaging of the same generation in authenti­
cation and encryption mode.
Note: The command descriptions provide more information
on the support of the commands for the different
tachograph card types and the different DFs.
3.4. Commands and error codes overview
Commands and file organisation are deduced from and complies with
ISO/IEC 7816-4.
This section describes the following APDU command-response pairs.
The command variants which are supported by a generation 1 and 2
application are specified in the corresponding command descriptions.
Command INS
SELECT ‘A4h’
READ BINARY ‘B0h’, ‘B1h’
UPDATE BINARY ‘D6h’, ‘D7h’
GET CHALLENGE ‘84h’
VERIFY ‘20h’
GET RESPONSE ‘C0h’
▼M1
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Command INS
PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION ‘2Ah’
— VERIFY CERTIFICATE
— COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNA­
TURE
— VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNA­
TURE
— HASH
— PERFORM HASH OF FILE
— PROCESS DSRC MESSAGE
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE ‘88h’
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE ‘82h’
MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRON­
MENT
‘22h’
— SET DIGITAL SIGNATURE
TEMPLATE
— SET AUTHENTICATION
TEMPLATE
GENERAL AUTHENTICATE ‘86h’
▼M1
TCS_29 The status words SW1 SW2 are returned in any response
message and denote the processing state of the command.
SW1 SW2 Meaning
90 00 Normal processing.
61 XX Normal processing. XX = number of response bytes available.
62 81 Warning processing. Part of returned data may be corrupted
63 00 Authentication failed (Warning)
63 CX Wrong CHV (PIN). Remaining attempts counter provided by ‘X’.
64 00 Execution error - State of non-volatile memory unchanged.
Integrity error.
65 00 Execution error - State of non-volatile memory changed
65 81 Execution error - State of non-volatile memory changed –
Memory failure
66 88 Security error: wrong cryptographic checksum (during Secure
Messaging) or
wrong certificate (during certificate verification)
or
wrong cryptogram (during external authenti­
cation) or
wrong signature (during signature verification)
▼B
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SW1 SW2 Meaning
67 00 Wrong length (wrong Lc or Le)
68 83 Last command of the chain expected
69 00 Forbidden command (no response available in T=0)
69 82 Security status not satisfied.
69 83 Authentication method blocked.
69 85 Conditions of use not satisfied.
69 86 Command not allowed (no current EF).
69 87 Expected Secure Messaging Data Objects missing
69 88 Incorrect Secure Messaging Data Objects
6A 80 Incorrect parameters in data field
6A 82 File not found.
6A 86 Wrong parameters P1-P2.
6A 88 Referenced data not found.
6B 00 Wrong parameters (offset outside the EF).
6C XX Wrong length, SW2 indicates the exact length. No data field is
returned.
6D 00 Instruction code not supported or invalid.
6E 00 Class not supported.
6F 00 — Other checking errors
Additional status words as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 can
be returned, if their behaviour is not explicitly mentioned in
this appendix.
For example the following status words can be optionally
returned:
6881: Logical channel not supported
6882: Secure messaging not supported
▼B
TCS_30 If more than one error condition is fulfilled in one
command APDU the card may return any of the appro­
priate status words.
3.5. Command descriptions
The mandatory commands for the Tachograph cards are described in
this chapter.
Additional relevant details, related to cryptographic operations
involved, are given in Appendix 11 Common security mechanisms
for Tachograph Generation 1 and Generation 2.
All commands are described independently of the used protocol (T=0
or T=1). The APDU bytes CLA, INS, P1, P2, Lc and Le are always
indicated. If Lc or Le is not needed for the described command, the
associated length, value and description are empty.
▼M1
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TCS_31 If both length bytes (Lc and Le) are requested, the
described command has to be split in two parts if the
IFD is using protocol T=0: the IFD sends the command
as described with P3=Lc + data and then sends a GET
RESPONSE (see § 3.5.6) command with P3=Le.
TCS_32 If both length bytes are requested, and Le=0 (secure
messaging):
— When using protocol T=1, the card shall answer to
Le=0 by sending all available output data.
— When using protocol T=0, the IFD shall send the first
command with P3=Lc + data, the card shall answer (to
this implicit Le=0) by the Status bytes ‘61La’, where
La is the number of response bytes available. The IFD
shall then generate a GET RESPONSE command with
P3 = La to read the data.
TCS_33 A tachograph card may support extended length fields
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 as an optional feature. A
tachograph card that supports extended length fields shall
— Indicate the extended length field support in the ATR
— Provide the supported buffer sizes by means of the
extended length information in the EF ATR/INFO see
TCS_146.
— Indicate whether it supports extended length fields for T
= 1 and / or T = 0 in the EF Extended Length, see
TCS_147.
— Support extended length fields for the tachograph appli­
cation generation 1 and 2.
Notes:
All commands are specified for short length fields. The
usage of extended length APDUs is clear from ISO/IEC
7816-4.
In general the commands are specified for the plain mode,
i.e. without secure messaging, as the secure messaging
layer is specified in Appendix 11. It is clear from the
access rules for a command whether the command shall
support secure messaging or not and whether the
command shall support generation 1 and / or generation
2 secure messaging. Some command variants are
described with secure messaging to illustrate the usage of
secure messaging.
TCS_34 The VU shall perform the complete generation 2 VU —
card mutual authentication protocol for a session including
the certificate verification (if required) either in the DF
Tachograph, the DF Tachograph_G2 or the MF.
3.5.1 SELECT
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.
▼B
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The SELECT command is used:
— to select an application DF (selection by name must be used)
— to select an elementary file corresponding to the submitted file ID
3.5.1.1 S e l e c t i o n b y n a m e ( A I D )
This command allows selecting an application DF in the card.
TCS_35 This command can be performed from anywhere in the file
structure (after the ATR or at any time).
TCS_36 The selection of an application resets the current security
environment. After performing the application selection, no
current public key is selected anymore. The EXT-AUT-G1
access condition is also lost. If the command was
performed without secure messaging, the former secure
messaging session keys are no longer available.
TCS_37 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘A4h’
P1 1 ‘04h’ Selection by name (AID)
P2 1 ‘0Ch’ No response expected
Lc 1 ‘NNh’ Number of bytes sent to the card (length of the AID):
‘06h’ for the Tachograph application
#6-#(5+NN) NN ‘XX..XXh’ AID: ‘FF 54 41 43 48 4F’ for the Generation 1
tachograph application
AID: ‘FF 53 4D 52 44 54’ for the Generation 2
tachograph application
No response to the SELECT command is needed (Le
absent in T=1, or no response asked in T=0).
TCS_38 Response Message (no response asked)
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If the application corresponding with the AID is not
found, the processing state returned is ‘6A82’.
— In T=1, if the byte Le is present, the state returned is
‘6700’.
— In T=0, if a response is asked after the SELECT
command, the state returned is ‘6900’.
▼M1
— If the selected application is considered to be corrupted
(integrity error is detected within the file attributes), the
processing state returned is ‘6400’ or ‘6500’.
▼B
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3.5.1.2 S e l e c t i o n o f a n E l e m e n t a r y F i l e u s i n g i t s F i l e
I d e n t i f i e r
TCS_39 Command Message
TCS_40 A tachograph card shall support the generation 2 secure
messaging as specified in Appendix 11 Part B for this
command variant.
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘A4h’
P1 1 ‘02h’ Selection of an EF under the current DF
P2 1 ‘0Ch’ No response expected
Lc 1 ‘02h’ Number of bytes sent to the card
#6-#7 2 ‘XXXXh’ File Identifier
No response to the SELECT command is needed (Le
absent in T=1, or no response asked in T=0).
TCS_41 Response Message (no response asked)
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If the file corresponding with the file identifier is not
found, the processing state returned is ‘6A82’.
— In T=1, if the byte Le is present, the state returned is
‘6700’.
— In T=0, if a response is asked after the SELECT
command, the state returned is ‘6900’.
▼M1
— If the selected file is considered to be corrupted
(integrity error is detected within the file attributes),
the processing state returned is ‘6400’ or ‘6500’.
▼B
3.5.2 READ BINARY
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.
The READ BINARY command is used to read data from a trans­
parent file.
The response of the card consists of returning the data read, optionally
encapsulated in a secure messaging structure.
3.5.2.1 C o m m a n d w i t h o f f s e t i n P 1 - P 2
This command enables the IFD to read data from the EF currently
selected, without secure messaging.
Note: This command without secure messaging can only be used to
read a file that supports the ALW security condition for the Read
access mode.
▼B
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TCS_42 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘B0h’ Read Binary
P1 1 ‘XXh’ Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Most
Significant Byte
P2 1 ‘XXh’ Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Least
Significant Byte
Le 1 ‘XXh’ Length of data expected. Number of Bytes to be read.
Note: bit 8 of P1 must be set to 0.
TCS_43 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
#1-#X X ‘XX..XXh’ Data read
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If no EF is selected, the processing state returned is
‘6986’.
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘6982’.
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is
‘6B00’.
— If the size of the data to be read is not compatible with
the size of the EF (Offset + Le > EF size) the
processing state returned is ‘6700’ or ‘6Cxx’ where
‘xx’ indicates the exact length.
▼M1
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes,
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and unre­
coverable, the processing state returned is ‘6400’ or
‘6500’.
▼B
— If an integrity error is detected within the stored data,
the card shall return the demanded data, and the
processing state returned is ‘6281’.
3.5.2.1.1 C o m m a n d w i t h s e c u r e m e s s a g i n g ( e x a m p l e s )
This command enables the IFD to read data from the EF currently
selected with secure messaging, in order to verify the integrity of the
data received and to protect the confidentiality of the data if the
security condition SM-R-ENC-MAC-G1 (generation 1) or SM-R-
ENC-MAC-G2 (generation 2) is applied.
TCS_44 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘0Ch’ Secure Messaging asked
INS 1 ‘B0h’ Read Binary
▼B
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Byte Length Value Description
P1 1 ‘XXh’ P1 ( offset in bytes from the beginning of the file): Most
Significant Byte
P2 1 ‘XXh’ P2 ( offset in bytes from the beginning of the file): Least
Significant Byte
Lc 1 ‘XXh’ Length of input data for secure messaging
#6 1 ‘97h’ T LE : Tag for expected length specification.
#7 1 ‘01h’ L LE : Length of expected length
#8 1 ‘NNh’ Expected length specification (original Le): Number of
Bytes to be read
#9 1 ‘8Eh’ T CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum
#10 1 ‘XXh’ L CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum
‘04h’ for Generation 1 secure messaging (see Appendix
11 Part A)
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)
#11-#(10+L) L ‘XX..XXh’ Cryptographic checksum
Le 1 ‘00h’ As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4
TCS_45 Response Message if SM-R-ENC-MAC-G1 (generation
1) / SM-R-ENC-MAC-G2 (generation 2) is not required
and if Secure Messaging input format is correct:
▼M1
Byte Length Value Description
#1 1 ‘81h’ T PV : Tag for plain value data
#2 L ‘NNh’ or
‘81 NNh’
L PV : length of returned data (=original Le).
L is 2 bytes if L PV >127 bytes.
#(2+L) - #(1+L+NN) NN ‘XX..XXh’ Plain Data value
#(2+L+NN) 1 ‘99h’ Tag for Processing Status (SW1-SW2) –
optional for generation 1 secure messaging
#(3+L+NN) 1 ‘02h’ Length of Processing Status – optional for
generation 1 secure messaging
#(4+L+NN) - #(5+L+NN) 2 ‘XX XXh’ Processing Status of the unprotected
response APDU – optional for generation 1
secure messaging
#(6+L+NN) 1 ‘8Eh’ TCC: Tag for cryptographic checksum
#(7+L+NN) 1 ‘XXh’ LCC: Length of following cryptographic
checksum
‘04h’ for Generation 1 secure messaging
(see Appendix 11 Part A)
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES
key length for Generation 2 secure
messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)
▼B
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Byte Length Value Description
#(8+L+NN)-#(7+M+L+NN) M ‘XX..XXh’ Cryptographic checksum
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
▼B
TCS_46 Response Message if SM-R-ENC-MAC-G1 (generation
1) / SM-R-ENC-MAC-G2 (generation 2) is required and
if Secure Messaging input format is correct:
▼M1
Byte Length Value Description
#1 1 ‘87h’ T PI CG : Tag for encrypted data (cryptogram)
#2 L ‘MMh’ or
‘81 MMh’
L PI CG : length of returned encrypted data
(different of original Le of the command
due to padding).
L is 2 bytes if LPI CG > 127 bytes.
#(2+L)-#(1+L+MM) MM ‘01XX..XXh’ Encrypted Data: Padding Indicator and
cryptogram
#(2+L+MM) 1 ‘99h’ Tag for Processing Status (SW1-SW2) –
optional for generation 1 secure messaging
#(3+L+MM) 1 ‘02h’ Length of Processing Status – optional for
generation 1 secure messaging
#(4+L+MM) - #(5+L+MM) 2 ‘XX XXh’ Processing Status of the unprotected
response APDU – optional for generation 1
secure messaging
#(6+L+MM) 1 ‘8Eh’ TCC: Tag for cryptographic checksum
#(7+L+MM) 1 ‘XXh’ LCC: Length of following cryptographic
checksum
‘04h’ for Generation 1 secure messaging
(see Appendix 11 Part A)
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES
key length for Generation 2 secure
messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)
#(8+L+MM)-
#(7+N+L+MM)
N ‘XX..XXh’ Cryptographic checksum
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
▼B
The READ BINARY command may return regular
processing states listed in TCS_43 under Tag ‘99h’ as
described in TCS_59 using the secure messaging
response structure.
Additionally, some errors specifically related to secure
messaging can happen. In that case, the processing state
is simply returned, with no secure messaging structure
involved:
▼M1
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TCS_47 Response Message if incorrect Secure Messaging input
format
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If no current session key is available, the processing
state ‘6A88’ is returned. It happens either if the
session key has not already been generated or if the
session key validity has expired (in this case the IFD
must re-run a mutual authentication process to set a
new session key).
— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are
missing in the secure messaging format, the processing
state ‘6987’ is returned: this error happens if an
expected tag is missing or if the command body is
not properly constructed.
— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state
returned is ‘6988’: this error happens if all the required
tags are present but some lengths are different from the
ones expected.
— If the verification of the cryptographic checksum fails,
the processing state returned is ‘6688’.
3.5.2.2 C o m m a n d w i t h s h o r t E F ( E l e m e n t a r y F i l e )
i d e n t i f i e r
This command variant enables the IFD to select an EF by means of a
short EF identifier and read data from this EF.
TCS_48 A tachograph card shall support this command variant for
all Elementary Files with a specified short EF identifier.
These short EF identifiers are specified in chapter 4.
TCS_49 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘B0h’ Read Binary
P1 1 ‘XXh’ Bit 8 is set to 1
Bit 7 and 6 are set to 00
Bit 5 — 1 encode the short EF identifier of the corre­
sponding EF
P2 1 ‘XXh’ Encodes an offset from 0 to 255 bytes in the EF
referenced by P1
Le 1 ‘XXh’ Length of data expected. Number of Bytes to be read.
Note: The short EF identifiers used for the Generation 2
tachograph application are specified in chapter 4.
If P1 encodes a short EF identifier and the command is
successful, the identified EF becomes the currently selected
EF (current EF).
▼B
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TCS_50 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
#1-#L L ‘XX..XXh’ Data read
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If the file corresponding with the short EF identifier is
not found, the processing state returned is ‘6A82’.
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘6982’.
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is
‘6B00’.
— If the size of the data to be read is not compatible with
the size of the EF (Offset + Le > EF size) the
processing state returned is ‘6700’ or ‘6Cxx’ where
‘xx’ indicates the exact length.
▼M1
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes,
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and unre­
coverable, the processing state returned is ‘6400’ or
‘6500’.
▼B
— If an integrity error is detected within the stored data,
the card shall return the demanded data, and the
processing state returned is ‘6281’.
3.5.2.3 C o m m a n d w i t h o d d i n s t r u c t i o n b y t e
This command variant enables the IFD to read data from an EF with
32 768 bytes or more.
TCS_51 A tachograph card which supports EFs with 32 768 bytes
or more shall support this command variant for these EFs.
A tachograph card may or may not support this command
variant for other EFs with the exception of the EF
Sensor_Installation_Data see TCS_156 and TCS_160.
TCS_52 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘B1h’ Read Binary
P1 1 ‘00h’ Current EF
P2 1 ‘00h’
Lc 1 ‘NNh’ Lc Length of offset data object.
#6-#(5+NN) NN ‘XX..XXh’ Offset data object:
Tag ‘54h’
Length ‘01h’ or ‘02h’
Value offset
▼M1
Le 1 'XXh' As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4
▼B
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The IFD shall encode the offset data object's length with a
minimum possible number of octets, i.e. using the length
byte ‘01h’ the IFD shall encode an offset from 0 to 255
and using the length byte ‘02h’ an offset from ‘256’ up to
‘65 535’ bytes.
▼M1
In case of T = 0 the card assumes the value Le = ‘00h’ if
no secure messaging is applied.
In case of T = 1 the processing state returned is ‘6700’ if
Le=‘01h’.
▼B
TCS_53 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
#1-#L L ‘XX..XXh’ Data read encapsulated in a discretionary data object
with tag ‘53h’.
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If no EF is selected, the processing state returned is
‘6986’.
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘6982’.
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is
‘6B00’.
— If the size of the data to be read is not compatible with
the size of the EF (Offset + Le > EF size) the
processing state returned is ‘6700’ or ‘6Cxx’ where
‘xx’ indicates the exact length.
▼M1
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes,
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and unre­
coverable, the processing state returned is ‘6400’ or
‘6500’.
▼B
— If an integrity error is detected within the stored data,
the card shall return the demanded data, and the
processing state returned is ‘6281’.
3.5.2.3.1 C o m m a n d w i t h s e c u r e m e s s a g i n g ( e x a m p l e )
The following example illustrates the usage of secure messaging if the
security condition SM-MAC-G2 applies.
TCS_54 Command message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘0Ch’ Secure Messaging asked
INS 1 ‘B1h’ Read Binary
P1 1 ‘00h’ Current EF
P2 1 ‘00h’
Lc 1 ‘XXh’ Length of the secured data field
▼B
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Byte Length Value Description
#6 1 ‘B3h’ Tag for plain value data encoded in BER-TLV
#7 1 ‘NNh’ L PV : length of transmitted data
#(8)-#(7+NN) NN ‘XX..XXh’ Plain Data encoded in BER-TLV, i.e. the offset data
object with tag ‘54’
#(8+NN) 1 ‘97h’ T LE : Tag for expected length specification.
#(9+NN) 1 ‘01h’ L LE : Length of expected length
#(10+NN) 1 ‘XXh’ Expected length specification (original Le): Number of
bytes to be read
#(11+NN) 1 ‘8Eh’ T CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum
#(12+NN) 1 ‘XXh’ L CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)
#(13+NN)-
#(12+M+NN)
M ‘XX..XXh’ Cryptographic checksum
Le 1 ‘00h’ As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4
TCS_55 Response message if the command is successful
Byte Length Value Description
#1 1 ‘B3h’ Plain Data encoded in BER-TLV
#2 L ‘NNh’ or
‘81 NNh’
L PV : length of returned data (=original Le).
L is 2 bytes if L PV >127 bytes.
#(2+L)-
#(1+L+NN)
NN ‘XX..XXh’ Plain Data value encoded in BER-TLV, i.e. data read
encapsulated in a discretionary data object with tag
‘53h’.
#(2+L+NN) 1 ‘99h’ Processing Status of the unprotected response APDU
#(3+L+NN) 1 ‘02h’ Length of Processing Status
#(4+L+NN) —
#(5+L+NN)
2 ‘XX XXh’ Processing Status of the unprotected response APDU
#(6+L+NN) 1 ‘8Eh’ T CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum
#(7+L+NN) 1 ‘XXh’ L CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)
#(8+L+NN)-
#(7+M+L+
NN)
M ‘XX..XXh’ Cryptographic checksum
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
3.5.3 UPDATE BINARY
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.
The UPDATE BINARY command message initiates the update (erase
+ write) of the bits already present in an EF binary with the bits given
in the command APDU.
▼B
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3.5.3.1 C o m m a n d w i t h o f f s e t i n P 1 - P 2
This command enables the IFD to write data into the EF currently
selected, without the card verifying the integrity of data received.
Note: This command without secure messaging can only be used to
update a file that supports the ALW security condition for the Update
access mode.
TCS_56 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘D6h’ Update Binary
P1 1 ‘XXh’ Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Most
Significant Byte
P2 1 ‘XXh’ Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Least
Significant Byte
Lc 1 ‘NNh’ Lc Length of data to Update. Number of bytes to be
written.
#6-#(5+NN) NN ‘XX..XXh’ Data to be written
Note: bit 8 of P1 must be set to 0.
TCS_57 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If no EF is selected, the processing state returned is
‘6986’.
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘6982’.
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is
‘6B00’.
— If the size of the data to be written is not compatible
with the size of the EF (Offset + Lc > EF size) the
processing state returned is ‘6700’.
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes,
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and unre­
coverable, the processing state returned is ‘6400’ or
‘6500’.
— If writing is unsuccessful, the processing state returned
is ‘6581’.
3.5.3.1.1 C o m m a n d w i t h s e c u r e m e s s a g i n g ( e x a m p l e s )
This command enables the IFD to write data into the EF currently
selected, with the card verifying the integrity of data received. As no
confidentiality is required, the data are not encrypted.
▼B
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TCS_58 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘0Ch’ Secure Messaging asked
INS 1 ‘D6h’ Update Binary
P1 1 ‘XXh’ Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file:
Most Significant Byte
P2 1 ‘XXh’ Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file:
Least Significant Byte
Lc 1 ‘XXh’ Length of the secured data field
#6 1 ‘81h’ T PV : Tag for plain value data
#7 L ‘NNh’ or
‘81 NNh’
L PV : length of transmitted data.
L is 2 bytes if L PV > 127 bytes.
#(7+L)-
#(6+L+NN)
NN ‘XX..XXh’ Plain Data value (Data to be written)
#(7+L+NN) 1 ‘8Eh’ T CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum
#(8+L+NN) 1 ‘XXh’ L CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum‘04h’
for Generation 1 secure messaging (see Appendix 11
Part A)
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)
#(9+L+NN)-
#(8+M+L+
NN)
M ‘XX..XXh’ Cryptographic checksum
Le 1 ‘00h’ As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4
TCS_59 Response message if correct Secure Messaging input
format
Byte Length Value Description
#1 1 ‘99h’ T SW : Tag for Status Words (to be protected by CC)
#2 1 ‘02h’ L SW : length of returned Status Words
#3-#4 2 ‘XXXXh’ Processing Status of the unprotected response APDU
#5 1 ‘8Eh’ T CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum
#6 1 ‘XXh’ L CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum
‘04h’ for Generation 1 secure messaging (see Appendix
11 Part A)
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)
#7-#(6+L) L ‘XX..XXh’ Cryptographic checksum
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
The ‘regular’ processing states, described for the UPDATE
BINARY command with no secure messaging (see
§3.5.3.1), can be returned using the response message
structure described above.
▼B
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Additionally, some errors specifically related to secure
messaging can happen. In that case, the processing state
is simply returned, with no secure messaging structure
involved:
TCS_60 Response Message if error in secure messaging
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If no current session key is available, the processing
state ‘6A88’ is returned.
— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are
missing in the secure messaging format, the processing
state ‘6987’ is returned: this error happens if an
expected tag is missing or if the command body is
not properly constructed.
— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state
returned is ‘6988’: this error happens if all the required
tags are present but some lengths are different from the
ones expected.
— If the verification of the cryptographic checksum fails,
the processing state returned is ‘6688’.
3.5.3.2 C o m m a n d w i t h s h o r t E F i d e n t i f i e r
This command variant enables the IFD to select an EF by means of a
short EF identifier and write data from this EF.
TCS_61 A tachograph card shall support this command variant for
all Elementary Files with a specified short EF identifier.
These short EF identifiers are specified in chapter 4.
TCS_62 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘D6h’ Update Binary
P1 1 ‘XXh’ Bit 8 is set to 1
Bit 7 and 6 are set to 00
Bit 5 — 1 encode the short EF identifier of the corre­
sponding EF
P2 1 ‘XXh’ Encodes an offset from 0 to 255 bytes in the EF
referenced by P1
Lc 1 ‘NNh’ Lc Length of data to Update. Number of bytes to be
written.
#6-#(5+NN) NN ‘XX..XXh’ Data to be written
TCS_63 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
Note: The short EF identifiers used for the generation 2
tachograph application are specified in chapter 4.
If P1 encodes a short EF identifier and the command is
successful, the identified EF becomes the currently selected
EF (current EF).
▼B
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— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If the file corresponding with the short EF identifier is
not found, the processing state returned is ‘6A82’.
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘6982’.
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is
‘6B00’.
— If the size of the data to be written is not compatible
with the size of the EF (Offset + Lc > EF size) the
processing state returned is ‘6700’.
▼M1
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes,
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and unre­
coverable, the processing state returned is ‘6400’ or
‘6500’.
▼B
— If writing is unsuccessful, the processing state returned
is ‘6581’.
3.5.3.3 C o m m a n d w i t h o d d i n s t r u c t i o n b y t e
This command variant enables the IFD to write data to an EF with
32 768 bytes or more.
TCS_64 A tachograph card which supports EFs with 32 768 bytes
or more shall support this command variant for these EFs.
A tachograph card may or may not support this command
variant for other EFs.
TCS_65 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘D7h’ Update Binary
P1 1 ‘00h’ Current EF
P2 1 ‘00h’
Lc 1 ‘NNh’ Lc Length of data in the command data field
#6-#(5+NN) NN ‘XX..XXh’ Offset data object with tag ‘54h’ || Discretionary data
object with tag ‘53h’ that encapsulates the data to be
written
The IFD shall encode the offset data object's and the
discretionary data object's length with the minimum
possible number of octets, i.e. using the length byte ‘01h’
the IFD shall encode an offset / length from 0 to 255 and
using the length byte ‘02h’ an offset / length from ‘256’ up
to ‘65 535’ bytes.
TCS_66 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
▼B
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— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If no EF is selected, the processing state returned is
‘6986’.
— If the security conditions of the selected file are not
satisfied, the command is interrupted with ‘6982’.
— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF
(Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is
‘6B00’.
— If the size of the data to be written is not compatible
with the size of the EF (Offset + Lc > EF size) the
processing state returned is ‘6700’.
— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes,
the card shall consider the file as corrupted and unre­
coverable, the processing state returned is ‘6400’ or
‘6500’.
— If writing is unsuccessful, the processing state returned
is ‘6581’.
3.5.3.3.1 C o m m a n d w i t h s e c u r e m e s s a g i n g ( e x a m p l e )
The following example illustrates the usage of secure messaging if the
security condition SM-MAC-G2 applies.
TCS_67 Command message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘0Ch’ Secure Messaging asked
INS 1 ‘D7h’ Update Binary
P1 1 ‘00h’ Current EF
P2 1 ‘00h’
Lc 1 ‘XXh’ Length of the secured data field
#6 1 ‘B3h’ Tag for plain value data encoded in BER-TLV
#7 L ‘NNh’ or
‘81 NNh’
L PV : length of transmitted data.
L is 2 bytes if L PV > 127 bytes.
#(7+L)-
#(6+L+NN)
NN ‘XX..XXh’ Plain Data encoded in BER-TLV, i.e. offset data object
with tag ‘54h’ || Discretionary data object with tag ‘53h’
that encapsulates the data to be written
#(7+L+NN) 1 ‘8Eh’ T CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum
#(8+L+NN) 1 ‘XXh’ L CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)
#(9+L+NN)-
#(8+M+L+
NN)
M ‘XX..XXh’ Cryptographic checksum
Le 1 ‘00h’ As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4
▼B
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TCS_68 Response message if the command is successful
Byte Length Value Description
#1 1 ‘99h’ T SW : Tag for Status Words (to be protected by CC)
#2 1 ‘02h’ L SW : length of returned Status Words
#3-#4 2 ‘XXXXh’ Processing Status of the unprotected response APDU
#5 1 ‘8Eh’ T CC : Tag for cryptographic checksum
#6 1 ‘XXh’ L CC : Length of following cryptographic checksum
‘08h’, ‘0Ch’ or ‘10h’ depending on AES key length for
Generation 2 secure messaging (see Appendix 11 Part B)
#7-#(6+L) L ‘XX..XXh’ Cryptographic checksum
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
3.5.4 GET CHALLENGE
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.
The GET CHALLENGE command asks the card to issue a challenge
in order to use it in a security related procedure in which a
cryptogram or some ciphered data are sent to the card.
TCS_69 The Challenge issued by the card is only valid for the next
command, which uses a challenge, sent to the card.
TCS_70 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘84h’ INS
P1 1 ‘00h’ P1
P2 1 ‘00h’ P2
Le 1 ‘08h’ Le (Length of Challenge expected).
TCS_71 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
#1-#8 8 ‘XX..XXh’ Challenge
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If Le is different from ‘08h’, the processing state is
‘6700’.
— If parameters P1-P2 are incorrect, the processing state is
‘6A86’.
▼B
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3.5.5 VERIFY
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.
Only the workshop card is required to support this command.
Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this
command, but for these cards no reference CHV is personalized.
Therefore these cards cannot perform this commend successfully.
For other types of tachograph cards than workshop cards the
behavior, i.e. the error code returned, is out of the scope of this
specification, if this command is sent.
The Verify command initiates the comparison in the card of the
CHV (PIN) data sent from the command with the reference CHV
stored in the card.
▼M1
TCS_72 The PIN entered by the user must be ASCII encoded and
right padded with ‘FFh’ bytes up to a length of 8 bytes by
the IFD, see also the data type WorkshopCardPIN in
Appendix 1.
▼B
TCS_73 The tachograph applications generation 1 and 2 shall use
the same reference CHV.
TCS_74 The tachograph card shall check whether the command is
encoded correctly. If the command is not encoded correctly
the card shall not compare the CHV values, not decrement
the remaining CHV attempt counter and not reset the
security status ‘PIN_Verified’, but abort the command. A
command is encoded correctly, if the CLA, INS, P1, P2, Lc
bytes have the specified values, Le is absent, and the
command data field has the correct length.
TCS_75 If the command is successful, the remaining CHV attempt
counter is reinitialised. The initial value of the remaining
CHV attempt counter is 5. If the command is successful the
card shall set the internal security status ‘PIN_Verified’.
The card shall reset this security status, if the card is
reset or if the CHV code transmitted in the command
does not match the stored reference CHV.
Note: Using the same reference CHV and a global security
status prevents that a workshop employee must re-enter the
PIN after a selection of another tachograph application DF.
TCS_76 An unsuccessful comparison is recorded in the card, i.e. the
remaining CHV attempts counter shall be decremented by
one, in order to limit the number of further attempts of the
use of the reference CHV.
TCS_77 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘20h’ INS
P1 1 ‘00h’ P1
▼B
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Byte Length Value Description
P2 1 ‘00h’ P2 (the verified CHV is implicitly known)
Lc 1 ‘08h’ Length of CHV code transmitted
#6-#13 8 ‘XX..XXh’ CHV
TCS_78 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If the reference CHV is not found, the processing state
returned is ‘6A88’.
— If the CHV is blocked, (the remaining attempt counter
of the CHV is null), the processing state returned is
‘6983’. Once in that state, the CHV can never be
successfully presented anymore.
— If the comparison is unsuccessful, the remaining
attempt Counter is decreased and the status ‘63CX’ is
returned (X>0 and X equals the remaining CHV
attempts counter.
— If the reference CHV is considered corrupted, the
processing state returned is ‘6400’ or ‘6581’.
— If Lc is different from ‘08h’, the processing state is
‘6700’.
3.5.6 GET RESPONSE
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.
This command (only necessary and available for T=0 Protocol) is
used to transmit prepared data from the card to the interface device
(case where a command had included both Lc and Le).
The GET RESPONSE command has to be issued immediately after
the command preparing the data, otherwise, the data are lost. After the
execution of the GET RESPONSE command (except if the error
‘61xx’ or ‘6Cxx’ occur, see below), the previously prepared data
are no longer available.
TCS_79 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘C0h’
P1 1 ‘00h’
P2 1 ‘00h’
Le 1 ‘XXh’ Number of bytes expected
▼B
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TCS_80 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
#1-#X X ‘XX..XXh’ Data
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If no data have been prepared by the card, the
processing state returned is ‘6900’ or ‘6F00’.
— If Le exceeds the number of available bytes or if Le is
null, the processing state returned is ‘6Cxx’, where xx
denotes the exact number of available bytes. In that
case, the prepared data are still available for a
subsequent GET RESPONSE command.
— If Le is not null and is smaller than the number of
available bytes, the required data are sent normally by
the card, and the processing state returned is ‘61xx’,
where ‘xx’ indicates a number of extra bytes still
available by a subsequent GET RESPONSE command.
— If the command is not supported (protocol T=1), the
card returns ‘6D00’.
3.5.7 PSO: VERIFY CERTIFICATE
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8, but has a restricted
usage compared to the command defined in the norm.
The VERIFY CERTIFICATE command is used by the card to obtain
a Public Key from the outside and to check its validity.
3.5.7.1 G e n e r a t i o n 1 C o m m a n d — R e s p o n s e p a i r
TCS_81 This command variant is only supported by a generation 1
tachograph application.
TCS_82 When a VERIFY CERTIFICATE command is successful,
the Public Key is stored for a future use in the Security
environment. This key shall be explicitly set for the use
in security related commands (INTERNAL AUTH­
ENTICATE, EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE or VERIFY
CERTIFICATE) by the MSE command (see § 3.5.11)
using its key identifier.
TCS_83 In any case, the VERIFY CERTIFICATE command uses
the public key previously selected by the MSE command to
open the certificate. This public key must be the one of a
Member State or of Europe.
TCS_84 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘2Ah’ Perform Security Operation
P1 1 ‘00h’ P1
▼B
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Byte Length Value Description
P2 1 ‘AEh’ P2: non BER-TLV coded data (concatenation of data
elements)
Lc 1 ‘C2h’ Lc: Length of the certificate, 194 bytes
#6-#199 194 ‘XX..XXh’ Certificate: concatenation of data elements (as described
in Appendix 11)
TCS_85 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If the certificate verification fails, the processing state
returned is ‘6688’. The verification and unwrapping
process of the certificate is described in Appendix 11
for G1 and G2.
— If no Public Key is present in the Security
Environment, ‘6A88’ is returned.
— If the selected public key (used to unwrap the
certificate) is considered corrupted, the processing
state returned is ‘6400’ or ‘6581’.
— Generation 1 only: If the selected public key (used to
unwrap the certificate) has a CHA.LSB
( )
different from ‘00’ (i.e. is not the one of a Member
State or of Europe), the processing state returned is
‘6985’.
3.5.7.2 G e n e r a t i o n 2 C o m m a n d — R e s p o n s e p a i r
Depending on the curve size ECC certificates may be so long that
they cannot be transmitted in a single APDU. In this case command
chaining according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 must be applied and the cer­
tificate transmitted in two consecutive PSO: Verify Certificate
APDUs.
The certificate structure and the domain parameters are defined in
Appendix 11.
▼M3
TCS_86 The command can be performed in the MF, DF
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_34.
▼B
TCS_87 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘X0h’ CLA byte indicating command chaining:
‘00h’ the only or last command of the chain
‘10h’ not the last command of a chain
INS 1 ‘2Ah’ Perform Security Operation
P1 1 ‘00h’
P2 1 ‘BEh’ Verify self-descriptive certificate
▼B
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Byte Length Value Description
Lc 1 ‘XXh’ Length of the command data field, see TCS_88 and
TCS_89.
#6-#5+L L ‘XX..XXh’ DER-TLV encoded data: ECC Certificate Body data
object as first data object concatenated with the ECC
Certificate Signature data object as second data object
or a part of this concatenation. The tag ‘7F21’ and the
corresponding length shall not be transmitted.
The order of these data objects is fixed.
▼M3
TCS_88 For short length APDUs the following provisions apply:
the IFD shall use the minimum number of APDUs
required to transmit the command payload and transmit
the maximum number of bytes in the first command
APDU. However any value of ‘Lc’ up to 255 bytes must
be supported by the card.
TCS_89 For extended length APDUs the following provisions
apply: if the certificate does not fit into a single APDU,
the card shall support command chaining. The IFD shall
use the minimum number of APDUs required to transmit
the command payload and transmit the maximum number
of bytes in the first command APDU. If chaining is needed,
any value of ‘Lc’ up to the maximum extended length size
indicated must be supported by the card.
Note: According to Appendix 11 the card stores the certifi­
cate or the relevant contents of the certificate and updates
its currentAuthenticatedTime.
The response message structure and status words are as
defined in TCS_85.
▼B
TCS_90 In addition to the error codes listed in TCS_85, the card
may return the following error codes:
— If the selected public key (used to unwrap the
certificate) has a CHA.LSB (CertificateHolderAuthori­
sation.equipmentType) that is not suitable for the cer­
tificate verification according to Appendix 11, the
processing state returned is ‘6985’.
— If the currentAuthenticatedTime of the card is later than
the Certificate Expiration Date, the processing state
returned is ‘6985’.
— If the last command of the chain is expected, the card
returns ‘6883’.
— If incorrect parameters are sent in the command data
field, the card returns ‘6A80’ (also used in case the data
objects are not sent in the specified order).
▼B
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3.5.8 INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.
TCS_91 All tachograph cards shall support this command in the DF
Tachograph generation 1. The command may or may not
be accessible in the MF and / or the DF Tachograph_G2. If
so, the command shall terminate with a suitable error code
as the private key of the card (Card.SK) for the generation
1 authentication protocol is only accessible in the
DF_Tachograph generation 1.
Using the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, the
IFD can authenticate the card. The authentication process
is described in Appendix 11. It includes the following
statements:
TCS_92 The INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command uses the
card Private Key (implicitly selected) to sign authentication
data including K1 (first element for session key agreement)
and RND1, and uses the Public Key currently selected
(through the last MSE command) to encrypt the signature
and form the authentication token (more details in
Appendix 11).
TCS_93 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’ CLA
INS 1 ‘88h’ INS
P1 1 ‘00h’ P1
P2 1 ‘00h’ P2
Lc 1 ‘10h’ Length of data sent to the card
#6 — #13 8 ‘XX..XXh’ Challenge used to authenticate the card
#14 -#21 8 ‘XX..XXh’ VU.CHR (see Appendix 11)
Le 1 ‘80h’ Length of the data expected from the card
TCS_94 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
#1-#128 128 ‘XX..XXh’ Card authentication token (see Appendix 11)
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If no Public Key is present in the Security
Environment, the processing state returned is ‘6A88’.
— If no Private Key is present in the Security
Environment, the processing state returned is ‘6A88’.
— If VU.CHR does not match the current public key
identifier, the processing state returned is ‘6A88’.
▼B
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— If the selected private key is considered corrupted, the
processing state returned is ‘6400’ or ‘6581’.
▼M1
TCS_95 If the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is successful,
the current generation 1 session key, if existing, is erased and
no longer available. In order to have a new generation 1
session key available, the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
command for the generation 1 authentication mechanism
must be successfully performed.
Note: For generation 2 session keys see Appendix 11
CSM_193 and CSM_195. If generation 2 session keys are
established and the tachograph card receives the plain
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command APDU, it
aborts the generation 2 secure messaging session and
destroys the generation 2 session keys.
▼B
3.5.9 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.
Using the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, the card can
authenticate the IFD. The authentication process is described in
Appendix 11 for Tachograph G1 and G2 (VU authentication).
TCS_96 The command variant for the generation 1 mutual authenti­
cation mechanism is only supported by a generation 1
tachograph application.
▼M1
TCS_97 The command variant for the second generation VU-card
mutual authentication can be performed in the MF, DF
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_34. If
this generation 2 EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
command is successful, the current generation 1 session
key, if existing, is erased and no longer available.
Note: For generation 2 session keys see Appendix 11
CSM_193 and CSM_195. If generation 2 session keys are
established and the tachograph card receives the plain
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command APDU, it
aborts the generation 2 secure messaging session and
destroys the generation 2 session keys.
▼B
TCS_98 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’ CLA
INS 1 ‘82h’ INS
P1 1 ‘00h’ Keys and algorithms implicitly known
P2 1 ‘00h’
Lc 1 ‘XXh’ Lc (Length of the data sent to the card )
#6-#(5+L) L ‘XX..XXh’ Generation 1 authentication: Cryptogram (see Appendix
11 Part A)
Generation 2 authentication: Signature generated by the
IFD (see Appendix 11 Part B)
▼B
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TCS_99 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If the CHA of the currently set public key is not the
concatenation of the Tachograph application AID and
of a VU equipment Type, the processing state returned
is ‘6F00’.
— If the command is not immediately preceded with a
GET CHALLENGE command, the processing state
returned is ‘6985’.
The Generation 1 Tachograph application may return the
following additional error codes:
— If no Public Key is present in the Security
Environment, ‘6A88’ is returned.
— If no Private Key is present in the Security
Environment, the processing state returned is ‘6A88’.
— If the verification of the cryptogram is wrong, the
processing state returned is ‘6688’.
— If the selected private key is considered corrupted, the
processing state returned is ‘6400’ or ‘6581’.
The command variant for the Generation 2 authentication
may return the following additional error code:
— If signature verification failed, the card returns ‘6300’.
3.5.10 GENERAL AUTHENTICATE
This command is used for the generation 2 chip authentication
protocol specified in Appendix 11 Part B and is compliant with
ISO/IEC 7816-4.
TCS_100 The command can be performed in the MF, DF
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_34.
TCS_101 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘86h’
P1 1 ‘00h’ Keys and protocol implicitly known
P2 1 ‘00h’
Lc 1 ‘NNh’ Lc: length of subsequent data field
#6-#(5+L) L ‘7Ch’ + L 7C +
‘80h’ + L 80 +
‘XX..XXh’
DER-TLV encoded ephemeral public key value (see
Appendix 11)
The VU shall send the data objects in this order.
▼M3
Le 1 ‘00h’ As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4
▼B
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TCS_102 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
#1-#L L ‘7Ch’ + L 7C + ‘81h’
+ ‘08h’ + ‘XX..XXh’
+ ‘82h’ + L 82 +
‘XX..XXh’
DER-TLV encoded Dynamic Authentication
Data: nonce and authentication token (see
Appendix 11)
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— The card returns ‘6A80’ to indicate incorrect parameters
in data field.
— The card returns ‘6982’ if the External Authenticate
command has not been performed successfully
The response Dynamic Authentication Data object ‘7Ch’
— must be present if the operation is successful, i.e. the
Status Words are ‘9000’,
— must be absent in case of an execution error or
checking error, i.e. if the Status Words are in the
range ‘6400’ — ‘6FFF’, and
— may be absent in case of a warning, i.e. if the Status
Words are in the range ‘6200’ — ‘63FF’.
3.5.11 MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
This command is used to set a public key for authentication purpose.
3.5.11.1 G e n e r a t i o n 1 C o m m a n d — R e s p o n s e p a i r
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4. The use of this
command is restricted regarding the related standard.
TCS_103 This command is only supported by a generation 1
tachograph application.
TCS_104 The key referenced in the MSE data field remains the
current public key until the next correct MSE command,
a DF is selected or the card is reset.
TCS_105 If the key referenced is not (already) present into the card,
the security environment remains unchanged.
TCS_106 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’ CLA
INS 1 ‘22h’ INS
P1 1 ‘C1h’ P1: referenced key valid for all cryptographic operations
P2 1 ‘B6h’ P2 (referenced data concerning Digital Signature)
Lc 1 ‘0Ah’ Lc: length of subsequent data field
#6 1 ‘83h’ Tag for referencing a public key in asymmetric cases
▼B
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Byte Length Value Description
#7 1 ‘08h’ Length of the key reference (key identifier)
#8-#15 8 ‘XX..XXh’ Key identifier as specified in Appendix 11
TCS_107 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If the referenced key is not present into the card, the
processing state returned is ‘6A88’.
— If some expected data objects are missing in the secure
messaging format, the processing state ‘6987’ is
returned. This can happen if the tag ‘83h’ is missing.
— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state
returned is ‘6988’. This can happen if the length of the
key identifier is not ‘08h’.
— If the selected key is considered corrupted, the
processing state returned is ‘6400’ or ‘6581’.
3.5.11.2 G e n e r a t i o n 2 C o m m a n d — R e s p o n s e p a i r s
For the Generation 2 authentication the tachograph card supports the
following MSE: Set command versions which are compliant with
ISO/IEC 7816-4. These command versions are not supported for the
Generation 1 authentication.
3.5.11.2.1 M S E : S E T A T f o r C h i p A u t h e n t i c a t i o n
The following MSE:SET AT command is used to select the
parameters for the Chip Authentication that is performed by a
subsequent General Authenticate command.
TCS_108 The command can be performed in the MF, DF
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_34.
TCS_109 MSE:SET AT Command Message for Chip Authenti­
cation
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘22h’
P1 1 ‘41h’ Set for internal authentication
P2 1 ‘A4h’ Authentication
Lc 1 ‘NNh’ Lc: length of subsequent data field
#6-#(5+L) L ‘80h’ + ‘0Ah’
+ ‘XX..XXh’
DER-TLV encoded cryptographic mechanism reference:
Object Identifier of Chip Authentication (value only, Tag
‘06h’ is omitted).
See Appendix 1 for the values of object identifiers; the
byte notation shall be used. See Appendix 11 for
guidance on how to select one of these object identifiers.
▼B
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3.5.11.2.2 M S E : S E T A T f o r V U A u t h e n t i c a t i o n
The following MSE:SET AT command is used to select the
parameters and keys for the VU Authentication that is performed by
a subsequent External Authenticate command.
TCS_110 The command can be performed in the MF, DF
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_34.
TCS_111 MSE:SET AT Command Message for VU Authenti­
cation
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘22h’
P1 1 ‘81h’ Set for external authentication
P2 1 ‘A4h’ Authentication
Lc 1 ‘NNh’ Lc: length of subsequent data field
#6-#(5+L) L ‘80h’ + ‘0Ah’
+ ‘XX..XXh’
DER-TLV encoded cryptographic mechanism reference:
Object Identifier of VU Authentication (value only, Tag
‘06h’ is omitted).
See Appendix 1 for the values of object identifiers; the
byte notation shall be used. See Appendix 11 for
guidance on how to select one of these object identifiers.
‘83h’ + ‘08h’
+ ‘XX..XXh’
DER-TLV encoded reference of the VU public key by
the Certificate Holder Reference mentioned in its
certificate.
‘91h’ + L 91 +
‘XX..XXh’
DER-TLV encoded compressed representation of the
ephemeral public key of the VU that will be used
during Chip Authentication (see Appendix 11)
3.5.11.2.3 M S E : S E T D S T
The following MSE:SET DST command is used to set a public key
either
— for the verification of a signature that is provided in a subsequent
PSO: Verify Digital Signature command or
— for the signature verification of a certificate that is provided in a
subsequent PSO: Verify Certificate command
TCS_112 The command can be performed in the MF, DF
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2, see also TCS_33.
TCS_113 MSE:SET DST Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’
INS 1 ‘22h’
P1 1 ‘81h’ Set for verification
P2 1 ‘B6h’ Digital Signature
▼B
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Byte Length Value Description
Lc 1 ‘NNh’ Lc: length of subsequent data field
#6-#(5+L) L ‘83h’ + ‘08h’
+ ‘XX...XXh’
DER-TLV encoded reference of a public key, i.e. the
Certificate Holder Reference in the certificate of the
public key (see Appendix 11)
For all command versions the response message structure and status
words are given by:
TCS_114 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
The protocol has been selected and initialised.
— ‘6A80’ indicates incorrect parameters in the command
data field.
— ‘6A88’ indicates that referenced data (i.e. a referenced
key) is not available.
▼M1
— If the currentAuthenticatedTime of the card is later than
the Expiration Date of the selected public key, the
processing state returned is ‘6A88’.
Note: In the case of a MSE: SET AT for VU Authenti­
cation command, the referenced key is a VU_MA public
key. The card shall set the VU_MA public key for use, if
available in its memory, which matches the Certificate
Holder Reference (CHR) given in the command data field
(the card can identify VU_MA public keys by means of the
certificate's CHA field). A card shall return ‘6A 88’ to this
command in case only the VU_Sign public key or no
public key of the Vehicle Unit is available. See the defi­
nition of the CHA field in Appendix 11 and of data type
equipmentType in Appendix 1.
Similarly, in case an MSE: SET DST command referencing
an EQT (i.e. a VU or a card) is sent to a control card,
according to CSM_234 the referenced key is always an
EQT_Sign key that has to be used for the verification of
a digital signature. According to Figure 13 in Appendix 11,
the control card will always have stored the relevant
EQT_Sign public key. In some cases, the control card
may have stored the corresponding EQT_MA public key.
The control card shall always set the EQT_Sign public key
for use when it receives an MSE: SET DST command.
▼B
3.5.12 PSO: HASH
This command is used to transfer to the card the result of a hash
calculation on some data. This command is used for the verification of
digital signatures. The hash value is stored temporarily for the
subsequent command PSO: Verify Digital Signature
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this
command is restricted regarding the related standard.
▼B
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Only the control card is required to support this command in the DF
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2.
Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this
command. The command may or may not be accessible in the MF.
The control card application generation 1 supports only SHA-1.
TCS_115 The temporarily stored hash value shall be deleted if a new
hash value is computed by means of the PSO: HASH
command, if a DF is selected, and if the tachograph card
is reset.
TCS_116 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’ CLA
INS 1 ‘2Ah’ Perform Security Operation
P1 1 ‘90h’ Return Hash code
P2 1 ‘A0h’ Tag: data field contains DOs relevant for hashing
Lc 1 ‘XXh’ Length Lc of the subsequent data field
#6 1 ‘90h’ Tag for the hash code
#7 1 ‘XXh’ Length L of the hash code:
‘14h’ in Generation 1 application (see Appendix 11
Part A)
‘20h’, ‘30h’ or ‘40h’ in Generation 2 application (see
Appendix 11 Part B)
#8-#(7+L) L ‘XX..XXh’ Hash code
TCS_117 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are
missing, the processing state ‘6987’ is returned. This
can happen if one of the tag ‘90h’ is missing.
— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state
returned is ‘6988’. This error happens if the required
tag is present but with a length different from ‘14h’ for
SHA-1, ‘20h’ for SHA-256, ‘30h’ for SHA-384, ‘40h’
for SHA-512 (Generation 2 application).
3.5.13 PERFORM HASH of FILE
This command is not compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. Thus the CLA
byte of this command indicates that there is a proprietary use of the
PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION / HASH.
Only the driver card and the workshop card are required to support
this command in the DF Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2.
▼B
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Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this
command. If a company or control card implements this command,
the command shall be implemented as specified in this chapter.
The command may or may not be accessible in the MF. If so, the
command shall be implemented as specified in this chapter, i.e. shall
not allow the calculation of a hash value, but terminate with a suitable
error code.
TCS_118 The PERFORM HASH of FILE command is used to hash
the data area of the currently selected transparent EF.
TCS_119 A tachograph card shall support this command only for the
EFs that are listed in chapter 4 under the DF_Tachograph
and DF_Tachograph_G2 with the following exception. A
tachograph card shall not support the command for the EF
Sensor_Installation_Data of DF Tachograph_G2..
TCS_120 The result of the hash operation is stored temporarily in the
card. It can then be used to get a digital signature of the
file, using the PSO: COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE
command.
▼M1
TCS_121 The temporarily stored hash of file value shall be deleted if
a new hash of file value is computed by means of the
PERFORM HASH of FILE command, if a DF is
selected, and if the tachograph card is reset.
▼B
TCS_122 The Tachograph Generation 1 application shall support
SHA-1.
▼M1
TCS_123 The Tachograph Generation 2 application shall support the
SHA-2 algorithm (SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512),
specified by the cipher suite in Appendix 11 Part B for
the card signature key Card_Sign.
▼B
TCS_124 Command Message
▼M1
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘80h’ CLA
INS 1 ‘2Ah’ Perform Security Operation
P1 1 ‘90h’ Tag: Hash
P2 1 ‘00h’ Algorithm implicitly known
For the Tachograph Generation 1 application: SHA-1
For the Tachograph Generation 2 application: SHA-2
algorithm (SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512) defined
by the cipher suite in Appendix 11 Part B for the card
signature key Card_Sign
▼B
TCS_125 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If the current EF does not allow this command (EF
Sensor_Installation_Data in DF Tachograph_G2), the
processing state ‘6985’ is returned.
▼B
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— If the selected EF is considered corrupted (file attributes
or stored data integrity errors), the processing state
returned is ‘6400’ or ‘6581’.
— If the selected file is not a transparent file or if there is
no current EF, the processing state returned is ‘6986’.
3.5.14 PSO: COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE
▼M1
This command is used to compute the digital signature of previously
computed hash code (see PERFORM HASH of FILE, §3.5.13).
Only the driver card and the workshop card are required to support
this command in the DF Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2.
Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this
command. In case of the Generation 2 tachograph application, only
the driver card and the workshop card have a generation 2 signature
key, other cards are not able to successfully perform the command
and terminate with a suitable error code.
The command may or may not be accessible in the MF. If the
command is not accessible in the MF, it shall terminate with a
suitable error code.
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this
command is restricted regarding the related standard.
▼B
TCS_126 This command shall not compute a digital signature of
previously computed hash code with the PSO: HASH
command.
TCS_127 The card private key is used to compute the digital
signature and is implicitly known by the card.
TCS_128 The Generation 1 tachograph application performs a digital
signature using a padding method compliant with PKCS1
(see Appendix 11 for details).
TCS_129 The Generation 2 tachograph application computes an
elliptic curve based digital signature (see Appendix 11 for
details).
TCS_130 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’ CLA
INS 1 ‘2Ah’ Perform Security Operation
P1 1 ‘9Eh’ Digital signature to be returned
P2 1 ‘9Ah’ Tag: data field contains data to be signed. As no data
field is included, the data are supposed to be already
present in the card (hash of file)
Le 1 ‘NNh’ Length of the expected signature
▼B
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TCS_131 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
#1-#L L ‘XX..XXh’ Signature of the previously computed hash
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If the implicitly selected private key is considered as
corrupted, the processing state returned is ‘6400’ or
‘6581’.
— If the hash which was computed in a previous Perform
Hash of File command is not available, the processing
state returned is ‘6985’.
3.5.15 PSO: VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE
This command is used to verify the digital signature, provided as an
input, whose hash is known to the card. The signature algorithm is
implicitly known by the card.
This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this
command is restricted regarding the related standard.
Only the control card is required to support this command in the DF
Tachograph and DF Tachograph_G2.
Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this
command. The command may or may not be accessible in the MF.
TCS_132 The VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE command always
uses the public key selected by the previous Manage
Security Environment MSE: Set DST command and the
previous hash code entered by a PSO: HASH command.
TCS_133 Command Message
▼M1
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘00h’ CLA
INS 1 ‘2Ah’ Perform Security Operation
P1 1 ‘00h’
P2 1 ‘A8h’ Tag: data field contains DOs relevant for verification
Lc 1 ‘XXh’ Length Lc of the subsequent data field
#6 1 ‘9Eh’ Tag for Digital Signature
#7 or
#7-#8
L ‘NNh’ or
‘81 NNh’
Length of digital signature (L is 2 bytes if the digital
signature is longer than 127 bytes):
128 bytes coded in accordance with Appendix 11 Part A
for Tachograph Generation 1 application.
Depending on the selected curve for Tachograph
Generation 2 application (see Appendix 11 Part B).
#(7+L)-
#(6+L+NN)
NN ‘XX..XXh’ Digital signature content
▼B
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TCS_134 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— If the verification of the signature fails, the processing
state returned is ‘6688’. The verification process is
described in Appendix 11.
— If no public key is selected, the processing state
returned is ‘6A88’.
— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are
missing, the processing state ‘6987’ is returned. This
can happen if one of the required tag is missing.
— If no hash code is available to process the command (as
a result of a previous PSO: Hash command), the
processing state returned is ‘6985’.
— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state
returned is ‘6988’. This can happen if one of the
required data objects length is incorrect.
— If the selected public key is considered corrupted, the
processing state returned is ‘6400’ or ‘6581’.
▼M1
— If the selected public key (used to verify the digital
signature) has a CHA.LSB (CertificateHolderAuthori­
sation.equipmentType) that is not suitable for the
digital signature verification according to Appendix
11, the processing state returned is ‘6985’.
▼B
3.5.16 PROCESS DSRC MESSAGE
This command is used to verify the integrity and authenticity of the
DSRC message and to decipher the data communicated from a VU to
a control authority or a workshop over the DSRC link. The card
derives the encryption key and the MAC key used to secure the
DSRC message as described in Appendix 11 Part B chapter 13.
Only the control card and the workshop card are required to support
this command in the DF Tachograph_G2.
Other types of tachograph cards may or may not implement this
command, but shall not have a DSRC master key. Therefore these
cards cannot perform the command successfully, but terminate with a
suitable error code.
The command may or may not be accessible in the MF and / or the
DF Tachograph. If so, the command shall terminate with a suitable
error code.
TCS_135 The DSRC master key is accessible only in the DF
Tachograph_G2, i.e. the control and workshop card shall
support a successful execution of the command only in the
DF Tachograph_G2.
▼B
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TCS_136 The command shall only decrypt the DSRC data and verify
the cryptographic checksum, but not interpret the input
data.
TCS_137 The order of the data objects in the command data field is
fixed by this specification.
TCS_138 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘80h’ Proprietary CLA
INS 1 ‘2Ah’ Perform Security Operation
P1 1 ‘80h’ Response data: plain value
P2 1 ‘B0h’ Command data: plain value encoded in BER-TLV and
including SM DOs
Lc 1 ‘NNh’ Length Lc of the subsequent data field
#6-#(5+L) L ‘87h’ + L 87 +
‘XX..XXh’
DER-TLV encoded padding-content indicator byte
followed by encrypted tachograph payload. For the
padding-content indicator byte the value ‘00h’ (‘no
further indication’ according to ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013
Table 52) shall be used. For the encryption mechanism
see Appendix 11, Part B chapter 13.
Allowed values for the length L 87 are the multiples of
the AES block length plus 1 for the padding-content
indicator byte, i.e. from 17 bytes up to and including
193 bytes.
Note: See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 Table 49 for the SM
data object with tag ‘87h’.
‘81h’ + ‘10h’ DER-TLV encoded Control Reference Template for
Confidentiality nesting the concatenation of the
following data elements (see Appendix 1 DSRCSecur­
ityData and Appendix 11 Part B chapter 13):
— 4 byte time stamp
— 3 byte counter
— 8 byte VU serial number
— 1 byte DSRC master key version
Note: See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 Table 49 for the SM
data object with tag ‘81h’.
‘8Eh’ + L 8E +
‘XX..XXh’
DER-TLV encoded MAC over the DSRC message. For
the MAC algorithm and calculation see Appendix 11,
Part B chapter 13.
Note: See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 Table 49 for the SM
data object with tag ‘8Eh’.
▼M3
Le 1 ‘00h’ As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4
▼B
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TCS_139 Response Message
Byte Length Value Description
#1-#L L ‘XX..XXh’ Absent (in case of an error) or deciphered data (padding
removed)
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the card returns ‘9000’.
— ‘6A80’ indicates incorrect parameters in the command
data field (also used in case the data objects are not sent
in the specified order).
— ‘6A88’ indicates that referenced data is not available,
i.e. the referenced DSRC master key is not available.
— ‘6900’ indicates that the verification of the crypto­
graphic checksum or the decryption of the data failed.
▼M1
— ‘6985’ indicates that the 4-byte time stamp provided in
the command data field is earlier than cardValid­
ityBegin or later than cardExpiryDate.
▼B
4. TACHOGRAPH CARDS STRUCTURE
This paragraph specifies the file structures of the Tachograph cards for
storage of accessible data.
It does not specify card manufacturer dependent internal structures,
such as e.g. file headers, nor storage and handling of data elements
needed for internal use only such as ,
, or .
TCS_140 A generation 2 tachograph card shall host the Master File
MF and a generation 1 and a generation 2 tachograph
application of the same type (e.g. driver card applications).
TCS_141 A tachograph card shall support at least the minimum
number of records specified for the corresponding appli­
cations and shall not support more records than the
maximum number of records specified for the corre­
sponding applications.
▼M3
The maximum and minimum numbers of records are
specified in this chapter for the different applications. In
version 2 of generation 2 driver and workshop cards, the
generation 1 application shall support the maximum
number of records specified in TCS_150 and TCS_158.
▼B
For the security conditions used in the access rules
throughout this chapter please refer to chapter 3.3. In
general the access mode ‘read’ denotes the READ
BINARY command with even and if supported odd INS
byte with the exception of the EF Sensor_Installation_Data
on the workshop card, see TCS_156 and TCS_160. The
access mode ‘update’ denotes the Update Binary command
with even and if supported odd INS byte and the access
mode ‘select’ the SELECT command.
▼B
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4.1. Master File MF
TCS_142 After its personalisation, the master file MF shall have the
following permanent file structure and file access rules:
Note: The short EF identifier SFID is given as decimal
number, e.g. the value 30 corresponds to 11110 in binary.
The following abbreviation for the security condition is
used in this table:
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2
TCS_143 All EF structures shall be transparent.
TCS_144 The Master File MF shall have the following data structure:
TCS_145 The elementary file EF DIR shall contain the following
application related data objects: ‘61 08 4F 06 FF 54 41
43 48 4F 61 08 4F 06 FF 53 4D 52 44 54’
TCS_146 The elementary file EF ATR/INFO shall be present if the
tachograph card indicates in its ATR that it supports
extended length fields. In this case the EF ATR/INFO
shall contain the extended length information data object
(DO‘7F66’) as specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 clause
12.7.1.
TCS_147 The elementary file EF Extended_Length shall be present if
the tachograph card indicates in its ATR that it supports
extended length fields. In this case the EF shall contain the
following data object: ‘02 01 xx’ where the value ‘xx’
indicates whether extended length fields are supported for
the T = 1 and / or T = 0 protocol.
The value ‘01’ indicates extended length field support for
the T = 1 protocol.
▼B
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The value ‘10’ indicates extended length field support for
the T = 0 protocol.
The value ‘11’ indicates extended length field support for
the T = 1 and the T = 0 protocol.
4.2. Driver card applications
4.2.1 Driver card application generation 1
TCS_148 After its personalisation, the driver card application
generation 1 shall have the following permanent file
structure and file access rules:
The following abbreviations for the security conditions are
used in this table:
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2
SC2 ALW OR SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2
SC3 SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2
TCS_149 All EF structures shall be transparent.
TCS_150 The driver card application generation 1 shall have the
following data structure:
▼B
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► (1) (2) M3
▼B
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▼B
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TCS_151 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table
above, are the minimum and maximum record number
values the driver card data structure must use for a
generation 1 application:
4.2.2 Driver card application generation 2
▼M3
TCS_152 After its personalisation, the driver card application
generation 2 shall have the following permanent file
structure and file access rules:
Notes:
— The short EF identifier SFID is given as decimal
number, e.g. the value 30 corresponds to 11110 in
binary.
— EF Application_Identification_V2, EF Places_Authenti­
cation, EF GNSS_Places_Authentication, EF
Border_Crossings, EF Load_Unload_Operations, EF
VU_Configuration and EF Load_Type_Entries are
only present in version 2 of the generation 2 driver
card.
— cardStructureVersion in EF Application_Identification
is equal to {01 01} for version 2 of the generation 2
driver card, while it was equal to {01 00} for version 1
of the generation 2 driver card.
▼B
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The following abbreviations for the security condition are
used in this table:
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2
SC5 For the Read Binary command with even INS byte:
SM-C-MAC-G2 AND SM-R-ENC-MAC-G2
For the Read Binary command with odd INS byte (if
supported): NEV
▼B
TCS_153 All EF structures shall be transparent.
▼M3
TCS_154 The driver card application generation 2 shall have the
following data structure:
▼M3
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▼M3
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▼M3
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TCS_155 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table
above, are the minimum and maximum record number
values the driver card data structure must use for a
generation 2 application:
▼M3
Min Max
n 1 NoOfEventsPerType 12 12
n 2 NoOfFaultsPerType 24 24
n 3 NoOfCardVehicleRecords 200 200
n 4 NoOfCardPlaceRecords 112 112
n 6 CardActivityLengthRange 13776 Bytes
(56 days * 117 activity
changes)
13776 Bytes
(56 days * 117 activity
changes)
n 7 NoOfCardVehicleUnitRecords 200 200
n 8 NoOfGNSSADRecords 336 336
n 9 NoOfSpecificConditionRecords 112 112
n 10 NoOfBorderCrossingRecords 1120 1120
n 11 NoOfLoadUnloadRecords 1624 1624
n 12 NoOfLoadTypeEntryRecords 336 336
n 13 VuConfigurationLengthRange 3072 Bytes 3072 Bytes
▼B
4.3. Workshop card applications
4.3.1 Workshop card application generation 1
TCS_156 After its personalisation, the workshop card application
generation 1 shall have the following permanent file
structure and file access rules:
▼B
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The following abbreviations for the security conditions are
used in this table:
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2
SC2 ALW OR SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2
SC3 SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2
▼M1
SC4 For the READ BINARY command with even INS
byte:
(SM-C-MAC-G1 AND SM-R-ENC-MAC-G1) OR
(SM-C-MAC-G2 AND SM-R-ENC-MAC-G2)
For the READ BINARY command with odd INS
byte (if supported): NEV
▼B
TCS_157 All EF structures shall be transparent.
TCS_158 The workshop card application generation 1 shall have the
following data structure:
▼B
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▼B
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▼B
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TCS_159 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table
above, are the minimum and maximum record number
values the workshop card data structure must use for a
generation 1 application:
4.3.2 Workshop card application generation 2
▼M3
TCS_160 After its personalisation, the workshop card application
generation 2 shall have the following permanent file
structure and file access rules.
Notes:
— The short EF identifier SFID is given as decimal
number, e.g. the value 30 corresponds to 11110 in
binary.
— EF Application_Identification_V2, EF Places_Authenti­
cation, EF GNSS_Places_Authentication, EF
Border_Crossings, EF Load_Unload_Operations, EF
Load_Type_Entries, EF VU_Configuration and EF
Calibration_Add_Data are only present in version 2 of
the generation 2 workshop card.
— cardStructureVersion in EF Application_Identification
is equal to {01 01} for version 2 of the generation 2
workshop card, while it was equal to {01 00} for
version 1 of the generation 2 workshop card.
▼B
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The following abbreviations for the security conditions are
used in this table:
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2
SC5 For the Read Binary command with even INS byte:
SM-C-MAC-G2 AND SM-R-ENC-MAC-G2
For the Read Binary command with odd INS byte (if
supported): NEV
▼B
TCS_161 All EFs structures shall be transparent.
TCS_162 The workshop card application generation 2 shall have the
following data structure:
▼M3
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▼M3
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▼M3
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▼M3
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▼M3
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TCS_163 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table
above, are the minimum and maximum record number
values the workshop card data structure must use for a
generation 2 application:
▼M3
Min Max
n 1 NoOfEventsPerType 3 3
n 2 NoOfFaultsPerType 6 6
n 3 NoOfCardVehicleRecords 8 8
n 4 NoOfCardPlaceRecords 8 8
n 5 NoOfCalibrationRecords 255 255
n 6 CardActivityLengthRange 492 bytes (1 day * 240
activity changes)
492 bytes (1 day *
240 activity changes)
n 7 NoOfCardVehicleUnitRecords 8 8
n 8 NoOfGNSSADRecords 24 24
n 9 NoOfSpecificConditionRecords 4 4
n 10 NoOfBorderCrossingRecords 4 4
n 11 NoOfLoadUnloadRecords 8 8
n 12 NoOfLoadTypeEntryRecords 4 4
n 13 VuConfigurationLengthRange 3072 Bytes 3072 Bytes
▼B
4.4. Control card applications
4.4.1 Control Card application generation 1
TCS_164 After its personalisation, the control card application
generation 1 shall have the following permanent file
structure and file access rules:
The following abbreviations for the security conditions are
used in this table:
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2
SC2 ALW OR SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2
SC3 SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2
SC6 EXT-AUT-G1 OR SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2
TCS_165 All EF structures shall be transparent.
TCS_166 The control card application generation 1 shall have the
following data structure:
▼B
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TCS_167 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table
above, are the minimum and maximum record number
values the control card data structure must use for a
generation 1 application:
4.4.2 Control card application generation 2
▼M3
TCS_168 After its personalisation, the control card application
generation 2 shall have the following permanent file
structure and file access rules.
▼B
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Notes:
— the short EF identifier SFID is given as decimal
number, e.g. the value 30 corresponds to 11110 in
binary,
— EF Application_Identification_V2, and EF
VU_Configuration are only present in version 2 of
the generation 2 control card,
— cardStructureVersion in EF Application_Identification
is equal to {01 01} for version 2 of the generation 2
control card, while it was equal to {01 00} for version
1 of the generation 2 control card.
The following abbreviations for the security condition are
used in this table:
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2
SC5 For the Read Binary command with even INS
byte: SM-C-MAC-G2 AND SM-R-ENC-
MAC-G2
For the Read Binary command with odd INS
byte (if supported): NEV
▼B
TCS_169 All EF structures shall be transparent.
TCS_170 The control card application generation2 shall have the
following data structure:
▼M3
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▼B
TCS_171 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table
above, are the minimum and maximum record number
values the control card data structure must use for a
generation 2 application:
▼M3
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Min Max
n 7 NoOfControlActivityRecords 230 520
n 13 VuConfigurationLengthRange 3072 Bytes 3072 Bytes
▼B
4.5. Company card applications
4.5.1 Company card application generation 1
TCS_172 After its personalisation, the company card application
generation 1 shall have the following permanent file
structure and file access rules:
The following abbreviations for the security
conditions are used in this table:
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2
SC2 ALW OR SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2
SC3 SM-MAC-G1 OR SM-MAC-G2
SC6 EXT-AUT-G1 OR SM-MAC-G1 OR
SM-MAC-G2
TCS_173 All EF structures shall be transparent.
TCS_174 The company card application generation 1 shall have the
following data structure:
▼M3
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TCS_175 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table
above, are the minimum and maximum record number
values the company card data structure must use for a
generation 1 application:
4.5.2 Company card application generation 2
▼M3
TCS_176 After its personalisation, the company card application
generation 2 shall have the following permanent file
structure and file access rules.
Notes:
— the short EF identifier SFID is given as decimal
number, e.g. the value 30 corresponds to 11110 in
binary,
— EF Application_Identification_V2, and EF
VU_Configuration are only present in version 2 of
the generation 2 company card,
— cardStructureVersion in EF Application_Identification
is equal to {01 01} for version 2 of the generation 2
company card, while it was equal to {01 00} for
version 1 of the generation 2 company card.
The following abbreviations for the security condition are
used in this table:
SC1 ALW OR SM-MAC-G2
SC5 For the Read Binary command with even INS
byte: SM-C-MAC-G2 AND SM-R-ENC-
MAC-G2
For the Read Binary command with odd INS
byte (if supported):NEV
▼B
TCS_177 All EF structures shall be transparent.
TCS_178 The company card application generation 2 shall have the
following data structure:
▼B
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▼B
TCS_179 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table
above, are the minimum and maximum record number
values the company card data structure must use for a
generation 2 application:
▼M3
Min Max
n 8 NoOfCompanyActivityRecords 230 520
n 13 VuConfigurationLengthRange 3072 Bytes 3072 Bytes
▼M3
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Appendix 3
PICTOGRAMS
PIC_001 The tachograph may optionally use the following pictograms and
pictogram combinations (or pictograms and combination similar
enough to be unambiguously identifiable with these):
1. BASIC PICTOGRAMS
People Actions Modes of operation
Company Company mode
Controller Control Control mode
Driver Driving Operational mode
Workshop/test station Inspection/calibration Calibration mode
Manufacturer
Activities Duration
Available Current availability period
Driving Continuous driving time
Rest Current rest period
Other Work Current work period
Break Cumulative break time
Unknown
Equipment Functions
Driver slot
Co-driver slot
Card
Clock
Display Displaying
External storage Downloading
Power supply
Printer/printout Printing
Sensor
Tyre size
Vehicle/vehicle unit
GNSS facility
Remote Detection facility
ITS interface
▼B
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Specific conditions, manual entries
Out of scope
Ferry/train crossing
Load operation
Unload operation
Simultaneous load/unload operation
Load type: passengers
Load type: goods
Load type: undefined load type
▼B
Miscellaneous
Events Faults
Start of daily work period End of daily work period
Location
Manual entry of driver activities
▼M3
Security/authenticated data/seals
▼B
Speed
Time
Total/summary
▼M3
Digital map/border crossing
▼B
Qualifiers
24h Daily
Weekly
Two weeks
From or to
2. PICTOGRAM COMBINATIONS
Miscellaneous
Control place
Location start of daily work period Location end of daily work
period
▼M1
Position after 3 hours accumulated
driving time
▼B
From time To time
From vehicle
Out of scope begin Out of scope end
▼M3
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Position where the vehicle has crossed
the border between two countries
Position where a load operation has
occurred
Position where an unload operation
has occurred
Position where a simultaneous load/
unload operation has occurred
▼B
Cards
Driver card
Company card
Control card
Workshop card
No card
Driving
Crew driving
Driving time for one week
Driving time for two weeks
Printouts
Driver activities from card daily printout
Driver activities from VU daily printout
Events and faults from card printout
Events and faults from VU printout
Technical data printout
Over speeding printout
▼M3
Historic of inserted cards printout
▼B
Events
Insertion of a non valid card
Card conflict
Time overlap
Driving without an appropriate card
Card insertion while driving
Last card session not correctly closed
Over speeding
Power supply interruption
Motion data error
Vehicle motion conflict
Security breach
▼M3
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Time conflict or time adjustment (by workshop)
▼B
Over speeding control
▼M1
Absence of position information from GNSS receiver or Communication
error with the external GNSS facility
Communication error with the remote communication facility
▼M3
GNSS anomaly
▼B
Faults
Card fault (driver slot)
Card fault (co-driver slot)
Display fault
Downloading fault
Printer fault
Sensor fault
VU internal fault
GNSS fault
Remote Detection fault
Manual entries procedure
Still same daily work period ?
End of previous work period ?
Confirm or enter location of end of work period
Enter start time
Enter location of start of work period.
Note: Additional pictogram combinations to form printout blocks or
record identifiers are defined in Appendix 4.
▼M1
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Appendix 4
PRINTOUTS
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. GENERALITIES
2. DATA BLOCKS SPECIFICATION
3. PRINTOUT SPECIFICATIONS
3.1. Driver Activities from Card Daily Printout
3.2. Driver Activities from VU Daily Printout
3.3. Events and Faults from Card Printout
3.4. Events and Faults from VU Printout
3.5. Technical data Printout
3.6. Over speeding Printout
3.7 History of inserted cards
1. GENERALITIES
Each printout is built up by chaining various data blocks, possibly
identified with a block identifier.
A data block contains one or more records, possibly identified with a
record identifier.
PRT_001 When a block identifier immediately precedes a record
identifier, the record identifier is not printed.
PRT_002 In the case where a data item is unknown, or must not be
printed for data access rights reasons, spaces are printed
instead.
PRT_003 If the content of a complete line is unknown, or need not to
be printed, then the complete line is omitted.
PRT_004 Numerical data fields are printed right aligned, with a space
separator for thousands and millions, and without leading
zeros.
▼M3
PRT_005 String data fields are printed left aligned and filled up with
spaces to data item length, or truncated to data item length
when needed. Names and addresses may be printed in two
lines.
▼B
PRT_006 In case of a line-break due to a long text a special character
(dot at middle line-height, ‘•’) should be printed as first
character in the new line.
2. DATA BLOCKS SPECIFICATION
In this chapter the following format notation conventions have been
used:
— Characters printed in bold denote plain text to be printed (printing
remains in normal characters),
▼B
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— Normal characters denote variables (pictograms or data) to be
replaced by their values for printing,
— Variable names have been padded with underscores to show the data
item length available for the variable,
— Dates are specified with a ‘dd/mm/yyyy’ (day, month, year) format.
A ‘dd.mm.yyyy’ format may also be used,
— The term ‘card identification’ denotes the composition of: the type
of card through a card pictograms combination, the card issuing
Member State code, a forward slash character and the card
number with the replacement index and the renewal index
separated with a space:
P x x x / x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
C
ar
d
P
ic
to
gr
am

co
m
bi
na
ti
on

Is
su
in
g
M
em
be
r
S
ta
te
c
od
e
First 14 characters of card number
(possibly including a consecutive index)
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
in
de
x
R
en
ew
al
i
nd
ex

▼M3
— In a data block, the text after ‘pi=’ refers to the corresponding
pictogram or pictogram combination defined in Appendix 3,
— When printed after the longitude and the latitude of a recorded
position, or after the timestamp when the position was determined,
the pictogram indicates that this position has been computed from
authenticated navigation messages,
— * data only available in GEN2 tachographs (all versions),
— ** data only available in GEN2 version 2.
▼B
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PRT_007 Printouts shall use the following data blocks and/or data records, in
accordance with the following meanings and formats:
► (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) M3
▼B
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► (1) (2) (3) M3
▼B
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► (1) (2) M3
▼B
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▼B
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► (1) (2) (3) (4) M3
▼B
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▼B
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► (1) M3
3. PRINTOUT SPECIFICATIONS
In this chapter the following notation conventions have been used:
N Print block or record number N
N
Print block or record number N repeated as many times as necessary
X/Y
Print blocks or records X and/or Y as needed, and repeating as many
times as necessary.
▼B
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3.1. Driver Activities from Card Daily Printout
▼M3
PRT_008 The driver activities from card daily printout shall be in
accordance with the following format:
▼B
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3.2. Driver Activities from VU Daily Printout
▼M3
PRT_009 The driver activities from VU daily printout shall be in
accordance with the following format:
▼B
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3.3. Events and Faults from Card Printout
PRT_010 The events and faults from card printout shall be in
accordance with the following format:
1 Date and time at which the document is printed
2 Type of printout
3 Controller identification (if a control card is inserted in the VU +
GEN)
3 Driver identification (from card subject of the printout)
4 Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)
12.2 Events delimiter
12.4 Event records (all events stored on the card)
12.3 Faults delimiter
12.4
Fault records (all faults stored on the card)
22.1 Control place
22.2 Controller's signature
22.5 Driver's signature
3.4. Events and Faults from VU Printout
PRT_011 The events and faults from VU printout shall be in
accordance with the following format:
1 Date and time at which the document is printed
2 Type of printout
3
Card holder identification (for all cards inserted in VU + GEN)
4 Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)
13.2 Events delimiter
13.4
Event records (All Events stored or on-going in the VU)
13.3 Faults delimiter
13.4
Fault records (All Faults stored or on-going in the VU)
22.1 Control place
22.2 Controller's signature
22.5 Driver's signature
▼B
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3.5. Technical data Printout
▼M3
PRT_012 The technical data printout shall be in accordance with the
following format:
▼B
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3.6. Over speeding Printout
PRT_013 The over speeding printout shall be in accordance with the
following format:
1 Date and time at which the document is printed
2 Type of printout
3
Card holder identification (for all cards inserted in VU + GEN)
4 Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)
20 Over speeding control information
21.1 Over speeding data identifier
21.4/21.5 First over speeding after the last calibration
21.2 Over speeding data identifier
21.4/21.5
The 5 most serious over speeding events over the last 365 days
21.3 Over speeding data identifier
21.4/21.5 The most serious over speeding for each of the last 10 days of
occurrence
22.1 Control place
22.2 Controller's signature
22.5 Driver's signature
3.7. Historic of inserted cards
▼M3
PRT_014 The historic of inserted cards printout shall be in accordance
with the following format:
▼B
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Appendix 5
DISPLAY
In this appendix the following format notation conventions have been used:
— characters printed in bold denote plain text to be displayed (display remains
in normal character),
— normal characters denote variables (pictograms or data) to be replaced by
their values for displaying:
— dd mm yyyy: day, month, year,
— hh: hours,
— mm: minutes,
— D: duration pictogram,
— EF: event or fault pictograms combination,
— O: mode of operation pictogram.
DIS_001 The tachograph shall display data using the following formats:
Data Format
Default display
Local time
Mode of operation
Information related to the driver
Information related to the co-driver
Out of scope condition opened
Warning display
Exceeding continuous driving time
Event or fault
Other displays
UTC date
time
Driver's continuous driving time and cumulative break time
Co-driver's continuous driving time and cumulative break
time
Driver's cumulated driving time for the previous and the
current week
Co-driver's cumulated driving time for the previous and the
current week
▼B
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Appendix 6
FRONT CONNECTOR FOR CALIBRATION AND DOWNLOAD
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. HARDWARE
1.1. Connector
1.2. Contact allocation
1.3. Block diagram
2. DOWNLOADING INTERFACE
3. CALIBRATION INTERFACE
1. HARDWARE
1.1. Connector
INT_001 The downloading/calibration connector shall be a 6 pin
connector, accessible on the front panel without the need to
disconnect any part of the tachograph, and shall comply with
the following drawing (all dimensions in millimetres):
▼B
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The following diagram shows a typical 6 pin mating plug:
1.2. Contact allocation
INT_002 Contacts shall be allocated in accordance with the following
table:
Pin Description Remark
1 Battery minus Connected to the battery minus of the vehicle
2 Data communication K-line (ISO 14230-1)
3 RxD — Downloading Data input to tachograph
4 Input/output signal Calibration
▼B
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Pin Description Remark
5 Permanent power output The voltage range is specified to be that of the vehicle
power minus 3V to allow for the voltage drop across the
protective circuitry
Output 40 mA
6 TxD — Downloading Data output from tachograph
1.3. Block diagram
INT_003 The block diagram shall comply with the following:
2. DOWNLOADING INTERFACE
INT_004 The downloading interface shall comply to RS232 specifications.
INT_005 The downloading interface shall use one start bit, 8 data bits
LSB first, one even parity bit and 1 stop bit.
Data byte organisation
Start bit: one bit with logic level 0;
Data bits: transmitted with LSB first;
Parity bit: even parity
Stop bit: one bit with logic level 1
When numerical data composed by more than one byte are transmitted, the
most significant byte is transmitted first and the least significant byte last.
INT_006 Transmission baud rates shall be adjustable from 9 600 bps to
115 200 bps. Transmission shall be achieved at the highest
possible transmission speed, the initial baud rate after a start
of communication being set at 9 600 bps.
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3. CALIBRATION INTERFACE
INT_007 The data communication shall comply to ISO 14230-1 Road
vehicles — Diagnostic systems — Keyword protocol 2000 —
Part 1: Physical layer, First edition: 1999.
INT_008 The input/output signal shall comply with the following elec­
trical specification:
Parameter Minimum Typical Maximum Remark
U low (in) 1,0 V I = 750 μA
U high (in) 4 V I = 200 μA
Frequency 4 kHz
U low (out) 1,0 V I = 1 mA
U high (out) 4 V I = 1 mA
INT_009 The input/output signal shall comply with the following timing
diagrams:
▼B
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Appendix 7
DATA DOWNLOADING PROTOCOLS
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Scope
1.2. Acronyms and notations
2. V.U. DATA DOWNLOADING
2.1. Download procedure
2.2. Data download protocol
2.2.1 Message structure
2.2.2 Message types
2.2.2.1 Start Communication Request (SID 81)
2.2.2.2 Positive Response Start Communication (SID C1)
2.2.2.3 Start Diagnostic Session Request (SID 10)
2.2.2.4 Positive Response Start Diagnostic (SID 50)
2.2.2.5 Link Control Service (SID 87)
2.2.2.6 Link Control Positive Response (SID C7)
2.2.2.7 Request Upload (SID 35)
2.2.2.8 Positive Response Request Upload (SID 75)
2.2.2.9 Transfer Data Request (SID 36)
2.2.2.10 Positive Response Transfer Data (SID 76)
2.2.2.11 Request Transfer Exit (SID 37)
2.2.2.12 Positive Response Request Transfer Exit (SID 77)
2.2.2.13 Stop Communication Request (SID 82)
2.2.2.14 Positive Response Stop Communication (SID C2)
2.2.2.15 Acknowledge Sub Message (SID 83)
2.2.2.16 Negative Response (SID 7F)
2.2.3 Message flow
2.2.4 Timing
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2.2.5 Error handling
2.2.5.1 Start Communication phase
2.2.5.2 Communication phase
2.2.6 Response Message content
▼M3
2.2.6.1 Positive Response Transfer Data Download Interface Version
2.2.6.2 Positive Response Transfer Data Overview
2.2.6.3 Positive Response Transfer Data Activities
2.2.6.4 Positive Response Transfer Data Events and Faults
2.2.6.5 Positive Response Transfer Data Detailed Speed
2.2.6.6 Positive Response Transfer Data Technical Data
▼B
2.3. ESM File storage
3. TACHOGRAPH CARDS DOWNLOADING PROTOCOL
3.1. Scope
3.2. Definitions
3.3. Card Downloading
3.3.1 Initialisation sequence
3.3.2 Sequence for un-signed data files
3.3.3 Sequence for Signed data files
3.3.4 Sequence for resetting the calibration counter.
3.4. Data storage format
3.4.1 Introduction
3.4.2 File format
4. DOWNLOADING A TACHOGRAPH CARD VIA A VEHICLE
UNIT.
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix specifies the procedures to follow in order to perform
the different types of data download to an External Storage Medium,
together with the protocols that must be implemented to assure the
correct data transfer and the full compatibility of the downloaded
data format to allow any controller to inspect these data and be able
to control their authenticity and their integrity before analysing them.
▼M1
1.1. Scope
Data may be downloaded to an ESM:
— from a Vehicle Unit by an Intelligent Dedicated Equipment (IDE)
connected to the VU,
— from a tachograph card by an IDE fitted with a card interface
device (IFD),
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— from a tachograph card via a vehicle unit by an IDE connected to
the VU.
To give the possibility to verify the authenticity and integrity of down­
loaded data stored on an ESM, data is downloaded with a signature
appended in accordance with Appendix 11 Common Security
Mechanisms. The source equipment (VU or card) identification and
its security certificates (Member state and equipment) are also down­
loaded. The verifier of the data must possess independently a trusted
European public key.
Data downloaded from a VU are signed using Appendix 11 Common
Security Mechanisms Part B (Second-generation tachograph system),
except when drivers' control is performed by a non EU control
authority, using a first generation control card, in which case data
are signed using Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms Part A
(First-generation tachograph system), as requested by Appendix 15
Migration, requirement MIG_015.
This Appendix specifies therefore two types of data downloads from
the VU:
— Generation 2 type of VU data download, providing the generation 2
data structure, signed using Appendix 11 Common Security
Mechanisms Part B,
— Generation 1 type of VU data download, providing the generation 1
data structure, signed using Appendix 11 Common Security
Mechanisms Part A.
Similarly, there are two types of data downloads from second
generation driver cards inserted in a VU, as specified in paragraphs
3 and 4 of this Appendix.
▼B
1.2. Acronyms and notations
The following acronyms are used in this appendix:
AID Application Identifier
ATR Answer To Reset
CS Checksum byte
DF Dedicated File
DS_ Diagnostic Session
EF Elementary File
ESM External Storage Medium
FID File Identifier (File ID)
FMT Format Byte (first byte of message header)
ICC Integrated Circuit Card
IDE Intelligent Dedicated Equipment: The equipment used to
perform data downloading to the ESM (e.g. Personal
Computer)
IFD Interface Device
KWP Keyword Protocol 2000
LEN Length Byte (last byte of message header)
PPS Protocol Parameter Selection
PSO Perform Security Operation
SID Service Identifier
SRC Source byte
TGT Target Byte
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TLV Tag Length Value
TREP Transfer Response Parameter
TRTP Transfer Request Parameter
VU Vehicle Unit
2. V.U. DATA DOWNLOADING
2.1. Download procedure
In order to carry on a VU data download, the operator must perform
the following operations:
— Insert his tachograph card inside a card slot of the VU (*);
— Connect the IDE to the VU download connector;
— Establish the connection between the IDE and the VU;
— Select on the IDE the data to download and send the request to the
VU;
— Close the download session.
2.2. Data download protocol
The protocol is structured on a master-slave basis, with the IDE playing
the master role and the VU playing the slave role.
The message structure, types and flow are principally based on the
Keyword Protocol 2000 (KWP) (ISO 14230-2 Road vehicles — Diag­
nostic systems — Keyword protocol 2000 — Part2: Data link layer).
The application layer is principally based on the current draft to date of
ISO 14229-1 (Road vehicles — Diagnostic systems — Part 1: Diag­
nostic services, version 6 of 22 February 2001).
2.2.1 Message structure
DDP_002 All the messages exchanged between the IDE and the VU
are formatted with a structure consisting of three parts:
— Header composed by a Format byte (FMT), a Target
byte (TGT), a Source byte (SRC) and possibly a
Length byte (LEN),
— Data field composed by a Service Identifier byte (SID)
and a variable number of data bytes, which can include
an optional diagnostic session byte (DS_) or an optional
transfer parameter byte (TRTP or TREP).
— Checksum composed by a Checksum byte (CS).
Header Data field Checksum
FMT TGT SRC LEN SID DATA … … … CS
4 bytes Max 255 bytes 1 byte
The TGT and SRC byte represent the physical address of
the recipient and originator of the message. Values are F0
Hex for the IDE and EE Hex for the VU.
The LEN byte is the length of the Data field part.
▼B
(*) The card inserted will trigger the appropriate access rights to the downloading function
and to the data. It shall, however, be possible to download data from a driver card
inserted into one of the VU slots when no other card type is inserted in the other slot.
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The Checksum byte is the 8 bit sum series modulo 256 of
all the bytes of the message excluding the CS itself.
FMT, SID, DS_, TRTP and TREP bytes are defined later in
this document.
DDP_003 In the case where the data to be carried by the message is
longer than the space available in the data field part, the
message is actually sent in several sub messages. Each sub
message bears a header, the same SID, TREP and a 2-byte
sub message counter indicating the sub message number
within the total message. To enable error checking and
abort the IDE acknowledges every sub message. The IDE
can accept the sub message, ask for it to be re-transmitted,
request the VU to start again or abort the transmission.
DDP_004 If the last sub message contains exactly 255 bytes in the
data field, a final sub message with an empty (except SID
TREP and sub message counter) data field must be
appended to show the end of the message.
Example:
Header SID TREP Message CS
4 Bytes Longer than 255 Bytes
Will be transmitted as:
Header SID TREP 00 01 Sub message 1 CS
4 Bytes 255 Bytes
Header SID TREP 00 02 Sub message 2 CS
4 Bytes 255 Bytes
…
Header SID TREP xx yy Sub message n CS
4 Bytes Less than 255 Bytes
or as:
Header SID TREP 00 01 Sub message 1 CS
4 Bytes 255 Bytes
Header SID TREP 00 02 Sub message 2 CS
4 Bytes 255 Bytes
…
Header SID TREP xx yy Sub message n CS
4 Bytes 255 Bytes
Header SID TREP xx yy + 1 CS
4 Bytes 4 bytes
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2.2.2 Message types
The communication protocol for data download between the VU and
the IDE requires the exchange of 8 different message types.
The following table summarises these messages.
▼M3
Message Structure Max 4 Bytes Max 255 Bytes 1 Byte
Header Data CheckSum
IDE ->
Start Communication Request 81 EE F0 81 E0
Positive Response Start Communi­
cation
80 F0 EE 03 C1 EA, 8F 9B
Start Diagnostic Session Request 80 EE F0 02 10 81 F1
Positive Response Start Diagnostic 80 F0 EE 02 50 81 31
Link Control Service
Verify Baud Rate (stage 1)
9 600 Bd 80 EE F0 04 87 01 01,01 EC
19 200 Bd 80 EE F0 04 87 01 01,02 ED
38 400 Bd 80 EE F0 04 87 01 01,03 EE
57 600 Bd 80 EE F0 04 87 01 01,04 EF
115 200 Bd 80 EE F0 04 87 01 01,05 F0
Positive Response Verify Baud Rate 80 F0 EE 02 C7 01 28
Transition Baud Rate (stage 2) 80 EE F0 03 87 02 03 ED
Request Upload 80 EE F0 0A 35 00,00,00,00,
00,FF,FF,
FF,FF
99
Positive Response Request Upload 80 F0 EE 03 75 00,FF D5
Transfer Data Request
Download interface version 80 EE F0 02 36 00 96
Overview 80 EE F0 02 36 01, 21 or 31 CS
Activities 80 EE F0 06 36 02, 22 or 32 Date CS
Events & Faults 80 EE F0 02 36 03, 23 or 33 Date CS
Detailed Speed 80 EE F0 02 36 04 or 24 Date CS
Technical Data 80 EE F0 02 36 05, 25 or 35 Date CS
Card download 80 EE F0 02 or 03 36 06 Slot CS
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Message Structure Max 4 Bytes Max 255 Bytes 1 Byte
Header Data CheckSum
IDE ->
Positive Response Transfer Data 80 F0 EE Len 76 TREP Data CS
Request Transfer Exit 80 EE F0 01 37 96
Positive Response Request Transfer
Exit
80 F0 EE 01 77 D6
Stop Communication Request 80 EE F0 01 82 E1
Positive Response Stop Communi­
cation
80 F0 EE 01 C2 21
Acknowledge sub message 80 EE F0 Len 83 Data CS
Negative responses
General reject 80 F0 EE 03 7F Sid Req 10 CS
Service not supported 80 F0 EE 03 7F Sid Req 11 CS
Sub function not supported 80 F0 EE 03 7F Sid Req 12 CS
Incorrect Message Length 80 F0 EE 03 7F Sid Req 13 CS
Conditions not correct or Request
sequence error
80 F0 EE 03 7F Sid Req 22 CS
Request out of range 80 F0 EE 03 7F Sid Req 31 CS
Upload not accepted 80 F0 EE 03 7F Sid Req 50 CS
Response pending 80 F0 EE 03 7F Sid Req 78 CS
Data not available 80 F0 EE 03 7F Sid Req FA CS
Notes:
— Sid Req = the Sid of the corresponding request.
— TREP = the TRTP of the corresponding request.
— Dark cells denote that nothing is transmitted.
— The term upload (as seen from the IDE) is used for compatibility
with ISO 14229. It means the same as download (as seen from the
VU).
— Potential 2-byte sub message counters are not shown in this table.
— Slot is the slot number, either ‘1’ (card on driver slot) or ‘2’ (card
on co-driver slot).
— In case the slot is not specified, the VU shall select slot 1 if a card
is inserted in this slot and it shall select slot 2 only in case it is
specifically selected by the user.
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— TRTP 24 is used for Generation 2, for version 1 and version 2 type
of VU data download requests.
— TRTP 00, 31, 32, 33 and 35 are used for Generation 2 version 2
type of VU data download requests.
— TRTP 21, 22, 23, and 25 are used for Generation 2 version 1 type
of VU data download requests.
— TRTP 01 to 05 are used for Generation 1 type of VU data
download requests. They can optionally be accepted by Generation
2 type of VU, but only in the frame of drivers' control performed
by a non-EU control authority, using a first generation control card.
— TRTP 11 to 1F are reserved for manufacturer specific download
requests.
▼B
2.2.2.1 S t a r t C o m m u n i c a t i o n R e q u e s t ( S I D 8 1 )
DDP_005 This message is issued by the IDE to establish the
communication link with the VU. Initial communications
are always performed at 9 600 baud (until baud rate is
eventually changed using the appropriate Link control
services).
2.2.2.2 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e S t a r t C o m m u n i c a t i o n ( S I D C 1 )
DDP_006 This message is issued by the VU to answer positively to a
start communication request. It includes the 2 key bytes
‘EA’ ‘8F’ indicating that the unit supports protocol with
header including target source and length information.
2.2.2.3 S t a r t D i a g n o s t i c S e s s i o n R e q u e s t ( S I D 1 0 )
DDP_007 The Start Diagnostic Session request message is issued by
the IDE in order to request a new diagnostic session with
the VU. The sub function ‘default session’ (81 Hex)
indicates a standard diagnostic session is to be opened.
2.2.2.4 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e S t a r t D i a g n o s t i c ( S I D 5 0 )
DDP_008 The Positive Response Start Diagnostic message is sent by
the VU to answer positively to Diagnostic Session Request.
2.2.2.5 L i n k C o n t r o l S e r v i c e ( S I D 8 7 )
DDP_052 The Link Control Service is used by the IDE to initiate a
change in baud rate. This takes place in two steps. In step
one the IDE proposes the baud rate change, indicating the
new rate. On receipt of a positive message from the VU the
IDE sends out confirmation of the baud rate change to the
VU (step two). The IDE then changes to the new baud rate.
After receipt of the confirmation the VU changes to the new
baud rate
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2.2.2.6 L i n k C o n t r o l P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e ( S I D C 7 )
DDP_053 The Link Control Positive Response is issued by the VU to
answer positively to Link Control Service request (step one).
Note that no response is given to the confirmation request
(step two).
2.2.2.7 R e q u e s t U p l o a d ( S I D 3 5 )
DDP_009 The Request Upload message is issued by the IDE to
specify to the VU that a download operation is requested.
To meet the requirements of ISO14229 data is included
covering address, the size and format details for the data
requested. As these are not known to the IDE prior to a
download, the memory address is set to 0, format is unen­
crypted and uncompressed and the memory size is set to the
maximum.
2.2.2.8 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e R e q u e s t U p l o a d ( S I D 7 5 )
DDP_010 The Positive Response Request Upload message is sent by
the VU to indicate to the IDE that the VU is ready to
download data. To meet the requirements of ISO 14229
data is included in this positive response message, indicating
to the IDE that further Positive Response Transfer Data
messages will include 00FF hex bytes maximum.
2.2.2.9 T r a n s f e r D a t a R e q u e s t ( S I D 3 6 )
▼M1
DDP_011 The Transfer Data Request is sent by the IDE to specify to
the VU the type of data that are to be downloaded. A one
byte Transfer Request Parameter (TRTP) indicates the type
of transfer.
▼M3
There are seven types of data transfer. For VU data
download, two different TRTP values can be used for
each transfer type:
Data transfer type
TRTP value for generation 1
type of
VU data download
TRTP value for generation 2,
version 1 type of
VU data download
TRTP value for generation 2,
version 2 type of
VU data download
Download interface version Not used Not used 00
Overview 01 21 31
Activities of a specified date 02 22 32
Events and faults 03 23 33
Detailed speed 04 24 24
Technical data 05 25 35
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Data transfer
type
TRTP value
Card download 06
▼M3
DDP_054 It is mandatory for the IDE to request the overview data
transfer (TRTP 01, 21 or 31) during a download session as
this only will ensure that the VU certificates are recorded
within the downloaded file (and allow for verification of
digital signature).
In the third case (TRTP 02, 22 or 32) the Transfer Data Request
message includes the indication of the calendar day (TimeReal
format) to be downloaded.
▼B
2.2.2.10 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a ( S I D 7 6 )
DDP_012 The Positive Response Transfer Data is sent by the VU in
response to the Transfer Data Request. The message
contains the requested data, with a Transfer Response
Parameter (TREP) corresponding to the TRTP of the
request.
▼M3
DDP_055 In the first case (TREP 01, 21 or 31), the VU will send data
helping the IDE operator to choose the data he wants to
download further. The information contained within this
message is:
▼M1
— Security certificates,
— Vehicle identification,
— VU current date and time,
— Min and Max downloadable date (VU data),
— Indication of cards presence in the VU,
— Previous download to a company,
— Company locks,
— Previous controls.
▼B
2.2.2.11 R e q u e s t T r a n s f e r E x i t ( S I D 3 7 )
DDP_013 The Request Transfer Exit message is sent by the IDE to
inform the VU that the download session is terminated.
2.2.2.12 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e R e q u e s t T r a n s f e r E x i t ( S I D 7 7 )
DDP_014 The Positive Response Request Transfer Exit message is
sent by the VU to acknowledge the Request Transfer Exit.
▼M1
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2.2.2.13 S t o p C o m m u n i c a t i o n R e q u e s t ( S I D 8 2 )
DDP_015 The Stop Communication Request message is sent by the
IDE to disconnect the communication link with the VU.
2.2.2.14 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e S t o p C o m m u n i c a t i o n ( S I D C 2 )
DDP_016 The Positive Response Stop Communication message is sent
by the VU to acknowledge the Stop Communication
Request.
2.2.2.15 A c k n o w l e d g e S u b M e s s a g e ( S I D 8 3 )
DDP_017 The Acknowledge Sub Message is sent by the IDE to
confirm receipt of each part of a message that is being
transmitted as several sub messages. The data field
contains the SID received from the VU and a 2-byte code
as follows:
— MsgC+1 Acknowledges correct receipt of sub message
number MsgC.
Request from the IDE to the VU to send next sub
message
— MsgC indicates a problem with the receipt of sub
message number MsgC.
Request from the IDE to the VU to send the sub
message again.
— FFFF requests termination of the message.
This can be used by the IDE to end the transmission of
the VU message for any reason.
The last sub message of a message (LEN byte
be acknowledged using any of these codes or not
acknowledged.
The VU responses that will consist of several sub messages
are:
— Positive Response Transfer Data (SID 76)
2.2.2.16 N e g a t i v e R e s p o n s e ( S I D 7 F )
DDP_018 The Negative Response message is sent by the VU in
response to the above request messages when the VU
cannot satisfy the request. The data fields of the message
contains the SID of the response (7F), the SID of the
request, and a code specifying the reason of the negative
response. The following codes are available:
— 10 general reject
The action cannot be performed for a reason not covered
below.
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— 11 service not supported
The SID of the request is not understood.
— 12 sub function not supported
The DS_ or TRTP of the request is not understood, or
there are no further sub messages to be transmitted.
— 13 incorrect message length
The length of the received message is wrong.
— 22 conditions not correct or request sequence error
The required service is not active or the sequence of
request messages is not correct.
— 31 Request out of range
The request parameter record (data field) is not valid.
— 50 upload not accepted
The request cannot be performed (VU in a non appro­
priate mode of operation or internal fault of the VU).
— 78 response pending
The action requested cannot be completed in time and
the VU is not ready to accept another request.
▼M1
— FA data not available
The data object of a data transfer request are not
available in the VU (e.g. no card is inserted, generation
1 type of VU data download requested outside the frame
of a driver’s control by a non EU control authority…).
▼B
2.2.3 Message flow
A typical message flow during a normal data download procedure is
the following:
IDE VU
Start Communication Request ⇨
⇦ Positive Response
Start Diagnostic Service Request ⇨
⇦ Positive Response
Request Upload ⇨
⇦ Positive Response
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IDE VU
Transfer Data Request Overview ⇨
⇦ Positive Response
Transfer Data Request #2 ⇨
⇦ Positive Response #1
Acknowledge Sub Message #1 ⇨
⇦ Positive Response #2
Acknowledge Sub Message #2 ⇨
⇦ Positive Response #m
Acknowledge Sub Message #m ⇨
⇦ Positive Response (Data Field
Acknowledge Sub Message (optional) ⇨
…
Transfer Data Request #n ⇨
⇦ Positive Response
Request Transfer Exit ⇨
⇦ Positive Response
Stop Communication Request ⇨
⇦ Positive Response
2.2.4 Timing
DDP_019 During normal operation the timing parameters shown in the
following figure are relevant:
Figure 1
Message flow, timing
Where:
P1 = Inter byte time for VU response.
P2 = Time between end of IDE request and start of VU
response, or between end of IDE acknowledge and
start of next VU response.
P3 = Time between end of VU response and start of new
IDE request, or between end of VU response and start
of IDE acknowledge, or between end of IDE request
and start of new IDE request if VU fails to respond.
P4 = Inter byte time for IDE request.
P5 = Extended value of P3 for card downloading.
▼B
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The allowed values for the timing parameters are showed in
the following table (KWP extended timing parameters set,
used in case of physical addressing for faster communi­
cation).
Timing Parameter
Lower limit
Value (ms)
Upper limit
Value (ms)
P1 0 20
P2 20 1 000 (*)
P3 10 5 000
P4 5 20
P5 10 20 minutes
(*) If the VU responds with a Negative Response containing a code meaning ‘request correctly received,
response pending’, this value is extended to the same upper limit value of P3.
2.2.5 Error handling
If an error occurs during the message exchange, the message flow
scheme is modified depending on which equipment has detected the
error and on the message generating the error.
In figure 2 and figure 3 the error handling procedures for the VU and
the IDE are respectively shown.
2.2.5.1 S t a r t C o m m u n i c a t i o n p h a s e
DDP_020 If the IDE detects an error during the Start Communication
phase, either by timing or by the bit stream, then it will wait
for a period P3 min before issuing again the request.
DDP_021 If the VU detects an error in the sequence coming from the
IDE, it shall send no response and wait for another Start
Communication Request message within a period P3 max.
2.2.5.2 C o m m u n i c a t i o n p h a s e
Two different error handling areas can be defined:
1. The VU detects an IDE transmission error.
DDP_022 For every received message the VU shall detect timing
errors, byte format errors (e.g. start and stop bit
violations) and frame errors (wrong number of bytes
received, wrong checksum byte).
DDP_023 If the VU detects one of the above errors, then it sends
no response and ignores the message received.
DDP_024 The VU may detect other errors in the format or content
of the received message (e.g. message not supported)
even if the message satisfies the length and checksum
requirements; in such a case, the VU shall respond to
the IDE with a Negative Response message specifying
the nature of the error.
▼B
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Figure 2
VU error handling
▼B
2. The IDE detects a VU transmission error.
DDP_025 For every received message the IDE shall detect timing
errors, byte format errors (e.g. start and stop bit
violations) and frame errors (wrong number of bytes
received, wrong checksum byte).
DDP_026 The IDE shall detect sequence errors, e.g. incorrect sub
message counter increments in successive received
messages.
DDP_027 If the IDE detects an error or there was no response from
the VU within a P2 max period, the request message will
be sent again for a maximum of three transmissions in
total. For the purposes of this error detection a sub
message acknowledge will be considered as a request to
the VU.
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DDP_028 The IDE shall wait at least for a period of P3 min before
beginning each transmission; the wait period shall be
measured from the last calculated occurrence of a stop
bit after the error was detected.
Figure 3
IDE error handling
2.2.6 Response Message content
This paragraph specifies the content of the data fields of the various
positive response messages.
Data elements are defined in Appendix 1 data dictionary.
Remark: For generation 2 downloads, each top-level data element is
represented by a record array, even if it contains only one record. A
record array starts with a header; this header contains the record type,
the record size and the number of records. Record arrays are named by
‘…RecordArray’ (with header) in the following tables.
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2.2.6.1 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a D o w n l o a d I n t e r f a c e
V e r s i o n
DDP_028a The data field of the ‘Positive Response Transfer Data
Download Interface Version’ message shall provide the
following data in the following order under the SID 76
Hex, the TREP 00 Hex:
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Data structure generation 2, version 2 (TREP 00 Hex)
Data element Comment
DownloadInterfaceVersion Generation and version of the VU: 02,02 Hex for
Generation 2, version 2.
Not supported by Generation 1 and Generation 2,
version 1 VU, which shall respond negatively
(Sub function not supported, see DDP_018)
2.2.6.2 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a O v e r v i e w
DDP_029 The data field of the ‘Positive Response Transfer Data
Overview’ message shall provide the following data in
the following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 01,
21 or 31 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and
counting:
Data structure generation 1 (TREP 01 Hex)
Data element Comment
MemberStateCertificate VU Security certificates
VUCertificate
VehicleIdentificationNumber Vehicle identification
VehicleRegistrationIdentification
CurrentDateTime VU current date and time
VuDownloadablePeriod Downloadable period
CardSlotsStatus Type of cards inserted in the VU
VuDownloadActivityData Previous VU download
VuCompanyLocksData All company locks stored. If the section is empty,
only noOfLocks = 0 is sent.
VuControlActivityData All control records stored in the VU. If the
section is empty, only noOfControls = 0 is sent
Signature RSA signature of all data (except certificates)
starting from VehicleIdentificationNumber down
to last byte of last VuControlActivityData.
Data structure generation 2, version 1 (TREP 21 Hex)
Data element Comment
MemberStateCertificateRecordArray Member state certificate
VUCertificateRecordArray VU certificate
VehicleIdentificationNumberRecordArray Vehicle identification
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Data element Comment
VehicleRegistrationIdentificationRecordArray Vehicle registration number
CurrentDateTimeRecordArray VU current date and time
VuDownloadablePeriodRecordArray Downloadable period
CardSlotsStatusRecordArray Type of cards inserted in the VU
VuDownloadActivityDataRecordArray Previous VU download
VuCompanyLocksRecordArray All company locks stored. If the section is empty,
an array header with noOfRecords = 0 is sent
VuControlActivityRecordArray All control records stored in the VU. If the
section is empty, an array header with noOf­
Records = 0 is sent
SignatureRecordArray ECC signature of all preceding data except the
certificates.
Data structure generation 2, version 2 (TREP 31 Hex)
Data element Comment
MemberStateCertificateRecordArray Member state certificate
VUCertificateRecordArray VU certificate
VehicleIdentificationNumberRecordArray Vehicle identification
VehicleRegistrationNumberRecordArray Vehicle registration number
CurrentDateTimeRecordArray VU current date and time
VuDownloadablePeriodRecordArray Downloadable period
CardSlotsStatusRecordArray Type of cards inserted in the VU
VuDownloadActivityDataRecordArray Previous VU download
VuCompanyLocksRecordArray All company locks stored. If the section is empty,
an array header with noOfRecords = 0 is sent
VuControlActivityRecordArray All control records stored in the VU. If the
section is empty, an array header with noOf­
Records = 0 is sent
SignatureRecordArray ECC signature of all preceding data except the
certificates.
2.2.6.3 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a A c t i v i t i e s
DDP_030 The data field of the ‘Positive Response Transfer Data
Activities’ message shall provide the following data in
the following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 02,
22 or 32 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and
counting:
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Data structure generation 1 (TREP 02 Hex)
Data element Comment
TimeReal Date of day downloaded
OdometerValueMidnight Odometer at end of downloaded day
VuCardIWData Cards insertion withdrawal cycles data.
— If this section contains no available data, only
noOfVuCardIWRecords = 0 is sent.
— When a VuCardIWRecord lies across 00:00 (card
insertion on previous day) or across 24:00 (card
withdrawal the following day) it shall appear in
full within the two days involved.
VuActivityDailyData Slots status at 00:00 and activity changes recorded for
the day downloaded.
VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodData Places related data recorded for the day downloaded. If
the section is empty, only noOfPlaceRecords = 0 is
sent.
VuSpecificConditionData Specific conditions data recorded for the day down­
loaded. If the section is empty, only noOfSpecificCon­
ditionRecords=0 is sent
Signature RSA signature of all data starting from TimeReal down
to last byte of last specific condition record.
Data structure generation 2, version 1 (TREP 22 Hex)
Data element Comment
DateOfDayDownloadedRecordArray Date of day downloaded
OdometerValueMidnightRecordArray Odometer at end of downloaded day
VuCardIWRecordArray Cards insertion withdrawal cycles data.
— If this section contains no available data, an array
header with noOfRecords = 0 is sent.
— When a VuCardIWRecord lies across 00:00 (card
insertion on previous day) or across 24:00 (card
withdrawal the following day) it shall appear in
full within the two days involved.
VuActivityDailyRecordArray Slots status at 00:00 and activity changes recorded for
the day downloaded.
VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecordArray Places related data recorded for the day downloaded. If
the section is empty, an array header with noOfRecords
= 0 is sent.
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Data element Comment
VuGNSSADRecordArray GNSS positions of the vehicle if the accumulated
driving time of the vehicle reaches a multiple of three
hours. If the section is empty, an array header with
noOfRecords = 0 is sent.
VuSpecificConditionRecordArray Specific conditions data recorded for the day down­
loaded. If the section is empty, an array header with
noOfRecords =0 is sent
SignatureRecordArray ECC signature of all preceding data.
Data structure generation 2, version 2 (TREP 32 Hex)
Data element Comment
DateOfDayDownloadedRecordArray Date of day downloaded
OdometerValueMidnightRecordArray Odometer at end of downloaded day
VuCardIWRecordArray Cards insertion withdrawal cycles data.
— If this section contains no available data, an array
header with noOfRecords = 0 is sent.
— When a VuCardIWRecord lies across 00:00 (card
insertion on previous day) or across 24:00 (card
withdrawal the following day) it shall appear in
full within the two days involved.
VuActivityDailyRecordArray Slots status at 00:00 and activity changes recorded for
the day downloaded.
VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecordArray Places related data recorded for the day downloaded. If
the section is empty, an array header with noOfRecords
= 0 is sent.
VuGNSSADRecordArray GNSS positions of the vehicle if the accumulated
driving time of the vehicle reaches a multiple of three
hours. If the section is empty, an array header with
noOfRecords = 0 is sent.
VuSpecificConditionRecordArray Specific conditions data recorded for the day down­
loaded. If the section is empty, an array header with
noOfRecords =0 is sent
VuBorderCrossingRecordArray Border crossings for the day downloaded. If the
section is empty, an array header with noOfRecords =
0 is sent.
VuLoadUnloadRecordArray Load/unload operations for the day downloaded. If the
section is empty, an array header with noOfRecords = 0
is sent.
SignatureRecordArray ECC signature of all preceding data.
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2.2.6.4 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a E v e n t s a n d F a u l t s
DDP_031 The data field of the ‘Positive Response Transfer Data
Events and Faults’ message shall provide the following
data in the following order under the SID 76 Hex, the
TREP 03, 23 or 33 Hex and appropriate sub message
splitting and counting:
Data structure generation 1, (TREP 03 Hex)
Data element Comment
VuFaultData All faults stored or on-going in the VU.
If the section is empty, only noOfVuFaults = 0 is sent.
VuEventData All events (except over speeding) stored or on-going in
the VU.
If the section is empty, only noOfVuEvents = 0 is sent.
VuOverSpeedingControlData Data related to last over speeding control (default value
if no data).
VuOverSpeedingEventData All over speeding events stored in the VU.
If the section is empty, only noOfVuOverSpeed­
ingEvents = 0 is sent.
VuTimeAdjustmentData All time adjustment events stored in the VU (outside the
frame of a full calibration).
If the section is empty, only noOfVuTimeAdjRecords =
0 is sent.
Signature RSA signature of all data starting from noOfVuFaults
down to last byte of last time adjustment record
Data structure generation 2, version 1 (TREP 23 Hex)
Data element Comment
VuFaultRecordArray All faults stored or on-going in the VU.
If the section is empty, an array header with noOf­
Records = 0 is sent.
VuEventRecordArray All events (except over speeding) stored or on-going in
the VU.
If the section is empty, an array header with noOf­
Records = 0 is sent.
VuOverSpeedingControlDataRecordArray Data related to last over speeding control (default value
if no data).
VuOverSpeedingEventRecordArray All over speeding events stored in the VU.
If the section is empty, an array header with noOf­
Records = 0 is sent.
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Data element Comment
VuTimeAdjustmentRecordArray All time adjustment events stored in the VU (outside the
frame of a full calibration).
If the section is empty, an array header with noOf­
Records = 0 is sent.
SignatureRecordArray ECC signature of all preceding data.
Data structure generation 2, version 2 (TREP 33 Hex)
Data element Comment
VuFaultRecordArray All faults stored or on-going in the VU.
If the section is empty, an array header with noOf­
Records = 0 is sent.
VuEventRecordArray All events (except over speeding) stored or on-going in
the VU.
If the section is empty, an array header with noOf­
Records = 0 is sent.
VuOverSpeedingControlDataRecordArray Data related to last over speeding control (default value
if no data).
VuOverSpeedingEventRecordArray All over speeding events stored in the VU.
If the section is empty, an array header with noOf­
Records = 0 is sent.
VuTimeAdjustmentRecordArray All time adjustment events stored in the VU (outside the
frame of a full calibration).
If the section is empty, an array header with noOf­
Records = 0 is sent.
SignatureRecordArray ECC signature of all preceding data.
2.2.6.5 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a D e t a i l e d S p e e d
DDP_032 The data field of the ‘Positive Response Transfer Data
Detailed Speed’ message shall provide the following data
in the following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 04
or 24 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and
counting:
Data structure generation 1 (TREP 04 Hex)
Data element Comment
VuDetailedSpeedData All detailed speed stored in the VU (one speed block
per minute during which the vehicle has been moving)
60 speed values per minute (one per second).
Signature RSA signature of all data starting from noOf­
SpeedBlocks down to last byte of last speed block.
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Data structure generation 2 (TREP 24 Hex)
Data element Comment
VuDetailedSpeedBlockRecordArray All detailed speed stored in the VU (one speed block
per minute during which the vehicle has been moving)
60 speed values per minute (one per second).
SignatureRecordArray ECC signature of all preceding data.
2.2.6.6 P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e T r a n s f e r D a t a T e c h n i c a l D a t a
DDP_033 The data field of the ‘Positive Response Transfer Data
Technical Data’ message shall provide the following data
in the following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 05,
25 or 35 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and
counting:
Data structure generation 1 (TREP 05 Hex)
Data element Comment
VuIdentification
SensorPaired
VuCalibrationData All calibration records stored in the VU.
Signature RSA signature of all data starting from vuManufac­
turerName down to last byte of last VuCalibration­
Record.
Data structure generation 2, version 1 (TREP 25 Hex)
Data element Comment
VuIdentificationRecordArray
VuSensorPairedRecordArray All MS pairings stored in the VU
VuSensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecor­
dArray
All external GNSS facility couplings stored in the VU
VuCalibrationRecordArray All calibration records stored in the VU.
VuCardRecordArray All card insertion data stored in the VU.
VuITSConsentRecordArray
VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecordArray
SignatureRecordArray ECC signature of all preceding data.
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Data structure generation 2, version 2 (TREP 35 Hex)
Data element Comment
VuIdentificationRecordArray
VuSensorPairedRecordArray All MS pairings stored in the VU
VuSensorExternalGNSSCoupledRecor­
dArray
All external GNSS facility couplings stored in the VU
VuCalibrationRecordArray All calibration records stored in the VU.
VuCardRecordArray All card insertion data stored in the VU.
VuITSConsentRecordArray
VuPowerSupplyInterruptionRecordArray
SignatureRecordArray ECC signature of all preceding data.
▼B
2.3. ESM File storage
DDP_034 When a download session has included a VU data transfer,
the IDE shall store within one single physical file all data
received from the VU during the download session within
Positive Response Transfer Data messages. Data stored
excludes message headers, sub-message counters, empty
sub-messages and checksums but include the SID and
TREP (of the first sub-message only if several sub-
messages).
3. TACHOGRAPH CARDS DOWNLOADING PROTOCOL
3.1. Scope
This paragraph describes the direct card data downloading of a
tachograph card to an IDE. The IDE is not part of the secure
environment; therefore no authentication between the card and the
IDE is performed.
3.2. Definitions
Download session: Each time a download of the ICC data is
performed. The session covers the complete
procedure from the reset of the ICC by an
IFD until the deactivation of the ICC
(withdraw of the card or next reset).
Signed Data File: A file from the ICC. The file is transferred to
the IFD in plain text. On the ICC the file is
hashed and signed and the signature is trans­
ferred to the IFD.
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3.3. Card Downloading
▼M3
DDP_035 The download of a tachograph card includes the following
steps:
— Download the common information of the card in the
EFs ICC and IC. This information is optional and is not
secured with a digital signature.
— For first and second generation tachograph cards
— Download EFs within Tachograph DF:
— Download the EFs Card_Certificate and
CA_Certificate. This information is not secured
with a digital signature.
It is mandatory to download these files for each
download session.
— Download the other application data EFs (within
Tachograph DF) except EF Card_Download.
This information is secured with a digital
signature, using Appendix 11 Common Security
Mechanisms Part A.
— It is mandatory to download at least the EFs
Application_Identification and Identification for
each download session.
— When downloading a driver card it is also
mandatory to download the following EFs:
Events_Data,
Faults_Data,
Driver_Activity_Data,
Vehicles_Used,
Places,
Control_Activity_Data,
Specific_Conditions.
— For second generation tachograph cards only:
— Except when a download of a driver card inserted in
a VU is performed during drivers' control by a non
EU control authority, using a first generation control
card, download EFs within Tachograph_G2 DF:
— Download the EFs CardSignCertificate, CA_Certificate
and Link_Certificate. This information is not secured
with a digital signature.
— It is mandatory to download these files for each
download session.
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— Download the other application data EFs (within
Tachograph_G2 DF) except EF Card_Download.
This information is secured with a digital
signature, using Appendix 11 Common Security
Mechanisms Part B.
— It is mandatory to download at least the EFs
Application_Identification, Application_Identifi­
cation_V2 (if present) and Identification for
each download session.
— When downloading a driver card it is also
mandatory to download the following EFs:
Events_Data,
Faults_Data,
Driver_Activity_Data,
Vehicles_Used,
Places,
Control_Activity_Data,
Specific_Conditions,
VehicleUnits_Used,
GNSS_Places,
Places_Authentication, if present,
GNSS_Places_Authentication, if present,
Border_Crossings, if present,
Load_Unload_Operations, if present,
Load_Type_Entries, if present.
— When downloading a driver card, update the Last­
CardDownload date in EF Card_Download, in the
Tachograph and, if applicable, Tachograph_G2
DFs.
— When downloading a workshop card, reset the cali­
bration counter in EF Card_Download in the
Tachograph and, if applicable, Tachograph_G2
DFs.
— When downloading a workshop card the EF
Sensor_Installation_Data in the Tachograph
and, if applicable, Tachograph_G2 DFs shall
not be downloaded.
▼B
3.3.1 Initialisation sequence
DDP_036 The IDE shall initiate the sequence as follows:
Card Direction IDE/IFD Meaning/Remarks
⇦ Hardware reset
ATR ⇨
It is optional to use PPS to switch to a higher baud rate as
long as the ICC supports it.
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3.3.2 Sequence for un-signed data files
DDP_037 ►M1 The sequence to download EFs ICC, IC, Card_Certificate
(or CardSignCertificate for DF Tachograph_G2), CA_Certificate
and Link_Certificate (for DF Tachograph_G2 only) is as
follows: ◄
Card Direction IDE/IFD Meaning/Remarks
⇦ Select File Select by File identifiers
OK ⇨
⇦ Read Binary If the file contains more data
than the buffer size of the
reader or the card the
command has to be repeated
until the complete file is read.
File Data
OK
⇨ Store data to ESM according to 3.4 Data storage
format
Note 1: Before selecting the Card_Certificate (or CardSign­
Certificate) EF, the Tachograph Application must be
selected (selection by AID).
Note 2: Selecting and reading a file may also be performed
in one step using a Read Binary command with a short EF
identifier.
3.3.3 Sequence for Signed data files
DDP_038 The following sequence shall be used for each of the
following files that has to be downloaded with their
signature:
▼M1
Card Dir IDE / IFD Meaning / Remarks
Select File
OK
Perform Hash of File — Calculates the hash value
over the data content of
the selected file using the
prescribed hash algo-
rithm in accordance with
Appendix 11, part A or
B. This command is not
an ISO-Command.
Calculate Hash of File
and store Hash value
temporarily
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Card Dir IDE / IFD Meaning / Remarks
OK
Read Binary If the file contains more data
than the buffer of the reader
or the card can hold, the
command has to be repeated
until the complete file is read.
File Data
OK
Store received data to ESM according to 3.4 Data storage
format
PSO: Compute Digital
Signature
Perform Security
Operation ‘Compute
Digital Signature’
using the temporarily
stored Hash value
Signature
OK
Append data to the previous
stored data on the ESM
according to 3.4 Data storage
format
▼B
Note: Selecting and reading a file may also be performed in
one step using a Read Binary command with a short EF
identifier. In this case the EF may be selected and read
before the command Perform Hash of File is applied.
3.3.4 Sequence for resetting the calibration counter.
DDP_039 The sequence to reset the
counter in the
EF in a workshop card is the following:
Card Dir IDE/IFD Meaning/Remarks
⇦ Select File EF
Card_Download
Select by File identifiers
OK ⇨
⇦ Update Binary
NoOfCalibrationsSince­
Download = ‘00 00’
resets card download
number
OK ⇨
Note: Selecting and updating a file may also be performed
in one step using an Update Binary command with a short
EF identifier.
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3.4. Data storage format
3.4.1 Introduction
DDP_040 The downloaded data has to be stored according to the
following conditions:
— The data shall be stored transparent. This means that the
order of the bytes as well as the order of the bits inside
the byte that are transferred from the card has to be
preserved during storage.
— All files of the card downloaded within a download
session are stored in one file on the ESM.
3.4.2 File format
DDP_041 The file format is a concatenation of several TLV objects.
DDP_042 The tag for an EF shall be the FID plus the appendix ‘00’.
DDP_043 The tag of an EF's signature shall be the FID of the file plus
the appendix ‘01’.
DDP_044 The length is a two byte value. The value defines the
number of bytes in the value field. The value ‘FF FF’ in
the length field is reserved for future use.
DDP_045 When a file is not downloaded nothing related to the file
shall be stored (no tag and no zero length).
▼M1
DDP_046 A signature shall be stored as the next TLV object directly
after the TLV object that contains the data of the file.
Definition Meaning Length
FID (2 Bytes) || ‘00’ Tag for EF (FID) in the
or for
common information of the
card
3 Bytes
FID (2 Bytes) || ‘01’ Tag for Signature of EF (FID)
in the DF
3 Bytes
FID (2 Bytes) || ‘02’ Tag for EF (FID) in the
DF
3 Bytes
FID (2 Bytes) || ‘03’ Tag for Signature of EF (FID)
in the
DF
3 Bytes
xx xx Length of Value field 2 Bytes
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Example of data in a download file on an ESM:
Tag Length Value
— Data of EF ICC
— Data of EF Card_Certificate
— …
Data of EF (in the
DF)
Signature of EF
(in the DF)
Data of EF in the
DF
Signature of EF in
the DF
▼B
4. DOWNLOADING A TACHOGRAPH CARD VIA A VEHICLE
UNIT.
DDP_047 The VU must allow for downloading the content of a driver
card inserted to a connected IDE.
DDP_048 The IDE shall send a ‘Transfer Data Request Card
Download’ message to the VU to initiate this mode (see
2.2.2.9).
▼M1
DDP_049 First generation driver cards: Data shall be downloaded
using the first generation data download protocol, and
downloaded data shall have the same format as data down­
loaded from a first generation vehicle unit.
Second generation driver cards: the VU shall then download
the whole card, file by file, in accordance with the card
downloading protocol defined in paragraph 3, and forward
all data received from the card to the IDE within the appro­
priate TLV file format (see 3.4.2) and encapsulated within a
‘Positive Response Transfer Data’ message.
▼B
DDP_050 The IDE shall retrieve card data from the ‘Positive
Response Transfer Data’ message (stripping all headers,
SIDs, TREPs, sub message counters, and checksums) and
store them within one single physical file as described in
paragraph 2.3.
DDP_051 The VU shall then, as applicable, update the
or the file of
the driver card.
▼M1
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Appendix 8
CALIBRATION PROTOCOL
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. INTRODUCTION
2. TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND REFERENCES
3. OVERVIEW OF SERVICES
3.1. Services available
3.2. Response codes
4. COMMUNICATION SERVICES
4.1. StartCommunication Service
4.2. StopCommunication Service
4.2.1 Message description
4.2.2 Message format
4.2.3 Parameter Definition
4.3. TesterPresent Service
4.3.1 Message description
4.3.2 Message format
5. MANAGEMENT SERVICES
5.1. StartDiagnosticSession service
5.1.1 Message description
5.1.2 Message format
5.1.3 Parameter definition
5.2. SecurityAccess service
5.2.1 Message Description
5.2.2 Message format — SecurityAccess — requestSeed
5.2.3 Message format — SecurityAccess — sendKey
6. DATA TRANSMISSION SERVICES
6.1. ReadDataByIdentifier service
6.1.1 Message description
6.1.2 Message format
6.1.3 Parameter Definition
6.2. WriteDataByIdentifier service
6.2.1 Message description
6.2.2 Message format
6.2.3 Parameter definition
▼B
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7. CONTROL OF TEST PULSES — INPUT/OUTPUT CONTROL
FUNCTIONAL UNIT
7.1. InputOutputControlByIdentifier service
7.1.1 Message description
7.1.2 Message format
7.1.3 Parameter definition
▼M3
8. ROUTINECONTROL SERVICE (TIME ADJUSTMENT)
8.1. Message description
8.2. Message format
9. DATARECORDS FORMATS
9.1. Transmitted parameter ranges
9.2. dataRecords formats
▼B
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix describes how data is exchanged between a vehicle unit
and a tester via the K-line which forms part of the calibration interface
described in Appendix 6. It also describes control of the input/output
signal line on the calibration connector.
Establishing K-line communications is described in Section 4
‘Communication Services’.
This appendix uses the idea of diagnostic ‘sessions’ to determine the
scope of K-line control under different conditions. The default session
is the ‘StandardDiagnosticSession’ where all data can be read from a
vehicle unit but no data can be written to a vehicle unit.
Selection of the diagnostic session is described in Section 5
‘Management Services’.
This appendix has to be considered as relevant for both generations of
VUs and of workshop cards, in compliance with the interoperability
requirements laid down in this Regulation.
CPR_001 The ‘ECUProgrammingSession’ allows data entry into the
vehicle unit. In the case of entry of calibration data, the
vehicle unit must, in addition be in the CALIBRATION
mode of operation.
Data transfer via K-line is described in Section 6 ‘Data
Transmission Services’. Formats of data transferred are
detailed in Section 8 ‘dataRecords formats’.
CPR_002 The ‘ECUAdjustmentSession’ allows the selection of the
I/O mode of the calibration I/O signal line via the K-line
interface. Control of the calibration I/O signal line is
described in section 7 ‘Control of Test Pulses — Input/
Output Control functional unit’.
CPR_003 Throughout this document the address of the tester is
referred to as ‘tt’. Although there may be preferred
addresses for testers, the VU shall respond correctly to
any tester address. The physical address of the VU is 0xEE.
▼B
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2. TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND REFERENCES
The protocols, messages and error codes are principally based on a
draft of ISO 14229-1 (Road vehicles — Diagnostic systems — Part
1: Diagnostic services, version 6 of 22 February 2001).
Byte encoding and hexadecimal values are used for the service
identifiers, the service requests and responses, and the standard
parameters.
The term ‘tester’ refers to the equipment used to enter programming/
calibration data into the VU.
The terms ‘client’ and ‘server’ refer to the tester and the VU
respectively.
The term ECU means ‘Electronic Control Unit’ and refers to the VU.
References:
▼M1
ISO 14230-2: Road Vehicles -Diagnostic Systems — Keyword
Protocol 2000- Part 2: Data Link Layer.
First edition: 1999.
▼B
3. OVERVIEW OF SERVICES
3.1. Services available
The following table provides an overview of the services that will be
available in the tachograph and are defined in this document.
CPR_004 The table indicates the services that are available in an
enabled diagnostic session.
— The 1st column lists the services that are available.
— The 2nd column includes the section number in this
appendix where of service is further defined.
— The 3rd column assigns the service identifier values for
request messages.
— The 4th column specifies the services of the
‘StandardDiagnosticSession’ (SD) which must be im­
plemented in each VU.
— The 5th column specifies the services of the
‘ECUAdjustmentSession’ (ECUAS) which must be im­
plemented to allow control of the I/O signal line in the
front panel calibration connector of the VU.
— The 6th column specifies the services of the
‘ECUProgrammingSession’ (ECUPS) which must be
implemented to allow for programming of parameters
in the VU.
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Table 1
Service Identifier value summary table
Diagnostic Sessions
Diagnostic Service Name
Section
No.
SId Req.Value SD ECUAS ECUPS
StartCommunication 4.1 81 ■ ■ ■
StopCommunication 4.2 82 ■
TesterPresent 4.3 3E ■ ■ ■
StartDiagnosticSession 5.1 10 ■ ■ ■
SecurityAccess 5.2 27 ■ ■ ■
ReadDataByIdentifier 6.1 22 ■ ■ ■
WriteDataByIdentifier 6.2 2E ■
InputOutputControlByIdentifier 7.1 2F ■
▼M3
RoutineControl 8 31
▼B
■ This symbol indicates that the service is mandatory in this diagnostic session.
No symbol indicates that this service is not allowed in this diagnostic session.
3.2. Response codes
Response codes are defined for each service.
4. COMMUNICATION SERVICES
Some services are necessary to establish and maintain communication.
They do not appear on the application layer. The services available are
detailed in the following table:
Table 2
Communication Services
Service name Description
StartCommunication The client requests to start a communi­
cation session with a server(s).
StopCommunication The client requests to stop the current
communication session.
TesterPresent The client indicates to the server that it
is still present.
CPR_005 The StartCommunication Service is used for starting a
communication. In order to perform any service, communi­
cation must be initialised and the communication parameters
need to be appropriate for the desired mode.
4.1. StartCommunication Service
CPR_006 Upon receiving a StartCommunication indication primitive,
the VU shall check if the requested communication link can
be initialised under the present conditions. Valid conditions
for the initialisation of a communication link are described
in document ISO 14230-2.
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CPR_007 Then the VU shall perform all actions necessary to initialise
the communication link and send a StartCommunication
response primitive with the Positive Response parameters
selected.
CPR_008 If a VU that is already initialised (and has entered any
diagnostic session) receives a new StartCommunication
Request (e.g. due to error recovery in the tester) the
request shall be accepted and the VU shall be reinitialised.
CPR_009 If the communication link cannot be initialised for any
reason, the VU shall continue operating as it was immedi­
ately prior to the attempt to initialise the communication
link..
CPR_010 The StartCommunication Request message must be
physically addressed.
CPR_011 Initialising the VU for services is performed through a ‘fast
initialisation’ method,
— There is a bus-idle time prior to any activity.
— The tester then sends an initialisation pattern.
— All information which is necessary to establish
communication is contained in the response of the VU.
CPR_012 After completion of the initialisation,
— All communication parameters are set to values defined
in Table 4 according to the key bytes.
— The VU is waiting for the first request of the tester.
— The VU is in the default diagnostic mode, i.e. Standard­
DiagnosticSession.
— The calibration I/O signal line is in the default state, i.e.
disabled state.
CPR_014 The data rate on the K-line shall be 10 400 Baud.
CPR_016 The fast initialisation is started by the tester transmitting a
Wake up pattern (Wup) on the K-line. The pattern begins
after the idle time on K-line with a low time of Tinil. The
tester transmits the first bit of the StartCommunication
Service after a time of Twup following the first falling edge.
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CPR_017 The timing values for the fast initialisation and communi­
cations in general are detailed in the tables below. There are
different possibilities for the idle time:
— First transmission after power on, Tidle = 300 ms.
— After completion of a StopCommunication Service,
Tidle = P3 min.
— After stopping communication by time-out P3 max,
Tidle = 0.
Table 3
Timing values for fast initialisation
Parameter min value max value
Tinil 25 ± 1 ms 24 ms 26 ms
Twup 50 ± 1 ms 49 ms 51 ms
Table 4
Communication timing values
Timing
Parameter
Parameter Description
lower limit
values [ms]
upper limit
values [ms]
min. max.
P1 Inter byte time for VU
response
0 20
P2 Time between tester request
and VU response or two VU
responses
25 250
P3 Time between end of VU
responses and start of new
tester request
55 5 000
P4 Inter byte time for tester
request
5 20
CPR_018 The message format for fast initialisation is detailed in the
following tables. (NOTE: Hex means hexadecimal)
Table 5
StartCommunication Request Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
81 FMT
#2 Target address byte EE TGT
#3 Source address byte tt SRC
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Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#4 StartCommunication Request
Service Id
81 SCR
#5 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 6
StartCommunication Positive Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
#5 StartCommunication Positive
Response Service Id
C1 SCRPR
#6 Key byte 1 EA KB1
#7 Key byte 2 8F KB2
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
CPR_019 There is no negative response to the StartCommunication
Request message, if there is no positive response message
to be transmitted then the VU is not initialised, nothing is
transmitted and it remains in its normal operation.
4.2. StopCommunication Service
4.2.1 Message description
The purpose of this communication layer service is to terminate a
communication session.
CPR_020 Upon receiving a StopCommunication indication primitive,
the VU shall check if the current conditions allow to
terminate this communication. In this case the VU shall
perform all actions necessary to terminate this communi­
cation.
CPR_021 If it is possible to terminate the communication, the VU
shall issue a StopCommunication response primitive with
the Positive Response parameters selected, before the
communication is terminated.
CPR_022 If the communication cannot be terminated by any reason,
the VU shall issue a StopCommunication response primitive
with the Negative Response parameter selected.
CPR_023 If time-out of P3 max is detected by the VU, the communi­
cation shall be terminated without any response primitive
being issued.
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4.2.2 Message format
CPR_024 The message formats for the StopCommunication primitives
are detailed in the following tables.
Table 7
StopCommunication Request Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte EE TGT
#3 Source address byte tt SRC
#4 Additional length byte 01 LEN
#5 StopCommunication Request
Service Id
82 SPR
#6 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 8
StopCommunication Positive Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 01 LEN
#5 StopCommunication Positive
Response Service Id
C2 SPRPR
#6 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 9
StopCommunication Negative Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
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Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#5 negative Response Service Id 7F NR
#6 StopCommunication Request
Service Identification
82 SPR
#7 responseCode = generalReject 10 RC_GR
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
4.2.3 Parameter Definition
This service does not require any parameter definition.
4.3. TesterPresent Service
4.3.1 Message description
The TesterPresent service is used by the tester to indicate to the server
that it is still present, in order to prevent the server from automatically
returning to normal operation and possibly stopping the communi­
cation. This service, sent periodically, keeps the diagnostic session/
communication active by resetting the P3 timer each time a request
for this service is received.
4.3.2 Message format
CPR_079 The message formats for the TesterPresent primitives are
detailed in the following tables.
Table 10
TesterPresent Request Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte EE TGT
#3 Source address byte tt SRC
#4 Additional length byte 02 LEN
#5 TesterPresent Request
Service Id
3E TP
#6 Sub Function =
responseRequired-
=
[ yes 01 RESPREQ_Y
no ] 02 RESPREQ_NO
#7 Checksum 00-FF CS
CPR_080 If the responseRequired parameter is set to ‘yes’, then the
server shall respond with the following positive response
message. If set to ‘no’, then no response is sent by the
server.
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Table 11
TesterPresent Positive Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 01 LEN
#5 TesterPresent Positive
Response Service Id
7E TPPR
#6 Checksum 00-FF CS
CPR_081 The service shall support the following negative responses
codes:
Table 12
TesterPresent Negative Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name
Hex
Value
Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
#5 negative Response Service Id 7F NR
#6 TesterPresent Request Service Identi­
fication
3E TP
#7 respon­
seCode =
[SubFunctionNotSup­
ported-InvalidFormat
12 RC_SFNS_IF
incorrectMessage­
Length]
13 RC_IML
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
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5. MANAGEMENT SERVICES
The services available are detailed in the following table:
Table 13
Management Services
Service name Description
StartDiagnosticSession The client requests to start a diagnostic
session with a VU.
SecurityAccess The client requests access to functions
restricted to authorised users.
5.1. StartDiagnosticSession service
5.1.1 Message description
CPR_025 The service StartDiagnosticSession is used to enable
different diagnostic sessions in the server. A diagnostic
session enables a specific set of services according to
Table 17. A session can enable vehicle manufacturer
specific services which are not part of this document. Im­
plementation rules shall conform to the following
requirements:
— There shall be always exactly one diagnostic session
active in the VU,
— The VU shall always start the StandardDiagnostic­
Session when powered up. If no other diagnostic
session is started, then the StandardDiagnosticSession
shall be running as long as the VU is powered,
— If a diagnostic session which is already running has been
requested by the tester, then the VU shall send a positive
response message,
— Whenever the tester requests a new diagnostic session,
the VU shall first send a StartDiagnosticSession positive
response message before the new session becomes active
in the VU. If the VU is not able to start the requested
new diagnostic session, then it shall respond with a
StartDiagnosticSession negative response message, and
the current session shall continue.
CPR_026 A diagnostic session shall only be started if communication
has been established between the client and the VU.
CPR_027 The timing parameters defined in Table 4 shall be active
after a successful StartDiagnosticSession with the diagnos­
ticSession parameter set to ‘StandardDiagnosticSession’ in
the request message if another diagnostic session was
previously active.
5.1.2 Message format
CPR_028 The message formats for the StartDiagnosticSession
primitives are detailed in the following tables.
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Table 14
StartDiagnosticSession Request Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte EE TGT
#3 Source address byte tt SRC
#4 Additional length byte 02 LEN
#5 StartDiagnosticSession
Request Service Id
10 STDS
#6 diagnosticSession = [one value
from Table 17]
xx DS_…
#7 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 15
StartDiagnosticSession Positive Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 02 LEN
#5 StartDiagnosticSession
Positive Response Service Id
50 STDSPR
#6 diagnosticSession = [same
value as in byte #6 Table 14]
xx DS_…
#7 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 16
StartDiagnosticSession Negative Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name
Hex
Value
Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
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Byte # Parameter Name
Hex
Value
Mnemonic
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
#5 Negative Response Service Id 7F NR
#6 StartDiagnosticSession Request
Service Id
10 STDS
#7 Respon­
seCode = [subFunctionNotSup­
ported ( α )
12 RC_SFNS
incorrectMessage­
Length ( β )
13 RC_IML
conditionsNot­
Correct ( γ )
22 RC_CNC
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
( α ) – the value inserted in byte #6 of the request message is not supported, i.e. not in
Table 17,
( β ) – the length of the message is wrong,
( γ ) – the criteria for the request StartDiagnosticSession are not met.
5.1.3 Parameter definition
CPR_029 The parameter diagnosticSession (DS_) is used by the Start­
DiagnosticSession service to select the specific behaviour of
the server(s). The following diagnostic sessions are specified
in this document:
Table 17
Definition of diagnosticSession Values
Hex Description Mnemonic
81 StandardDiagnosticSession
This diagnostic session enables all services
specified in Table 1 column 4 ‘SD’. These
s erv ices allo w read in g o f d ata fro m a
server (VU). This diagnostic Session is active
after the initialisation has been successfully
c o m p l e t e d b e t w e e n c l i e n t ( t e s t e r ) a n d
server (VU). This diagnostic session may be
overwritten by other diagnostic sessions speci-
fied in this section.
SD
85 ECUProgrammingSession
This diagnostic session enables all services
specified in Table 1 column 6 ‘ECUPS’. These
services support the memory programming of a
server (VU) This diagnostic session may be
overwritten by other diagnostic sessions speci-
fied in this section..
ECUPS
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Hex Description Mnemonic
87 ECUAdjustmentSession
This diagnostic session enables all services
specified in Table 1 column 5 ‘ECUAS’. These
services support the input/output control of a
server (VU). This diagnostic session may be
overwritten by other diagnostic sessions speci-
fied in this section.
ECUAS
5.2. SecurityAccess service
Writing of calibration data is not possible unless the VU is in CALI­
BRATION mode. In addition to insertion of a valid workshop card into
the VU, it is necessary to enter the appropriate PIN into the VU before
access to the CALIBRATION mode is granted.
When the VU is in CALIBRATION or CONTROL mode, access to the
calibration input/output line is also possible.
The SecurityAccess service provides a means to enter the PIN and to
indicate to the tester whether or not the VU is in CALIBRATION
mode.
It is acceptable that the PIN may be entered through alternative
methods.
5.2.1 Message Description
The SecurityAccess service consists of a SecurityAccess ‘requestSeed’
message, eventually followed by a SecurityAccess ‘sendKey’ message.
The SecurityAccess service must be carried out after the StartDiagnos­
ticSession service.
CPR_033 The tester shall use the SecurityAccess ‘requestSeed’
message to check if the vehicle unit is ready to accept a
PIN.
CPR_034 If the vehicle unit is already in CALIBRATION mode, it
shall answer the request by sending a ‘seed’ of 0x0000
using the service SecurityAccess Positive Response.
CPR_035 If the vehicle unit is ready to accept a PIN for verification
by a workshop card, it shall answer the request by sending a
‘seed’ greater than 0x0000 using the service SecurityAccess
Positive Response.
CPR_036 If the vehicle unit is not ready to accept a PIN from the
tester, either because the workshop card inserted is not
valid, or because no workshop card has been inserted, or
because the vehicle unit expects the PIN from another
method, it shall answer the request with a Negative
Response with a response code set to conditionsNotCorrec­
tOrRequestSequenceError.
CPR_037 The tester shall then, eventually, use the SecurityAccess
‘sendKey’ message to forward a PIN to the Vehicle Unit.
To allow time for the card authentication process to take
place, the VU shall use the negative response code
requestCorrectlyReceived-ResponsePending to extend the
time to respond. However, the maximum time to respond
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shall not exceed 5 minutes. As soon as the requested service
has been completed, the VU shall send a positive response
message or negative response message with a response code
different from this one. The negative response code
requestCorrectlyReceived-ResponsePending may be
repeated by the VU until the requested service is
completed and the final response message is sent.
CPR_038 The vehicle unit shall answer to this request using the
service SecurityAccess Positive Response only when in
CALIBRATION mode.
CPR_039 In the following cases, the vehicle unit shall answer to this
request with a Negative Response with a response code set
to:
— subFunctionNot supported: Invalid format for the
subfunction parameter (accessType),
— conditionsNotCorrectOrRequestSequenceError: Vehicle
unit not ready to accept a PIN entry,
— invalidKey: PIN not valid and number of PIN checks
attempts not exceeded,
— exceededNumberOfAttempts: PIN not valid and number
of PIN checks attempts exceeded,
— generalReject: Correct PIN but mutual authentication
with workshop card failed.
5.2.2 Message format — SecurityAccess — requestSeed
CPR_040 The message formats for the SecurityAccess ‘requestSeed’
primitives are detailed in the following tables.
Table 18
SecurityAccess Request- requestSeed Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte EE TGT
#3 Source address byte tt SRC
#4 Additional length byte 02 LEN
#5 SecurityAccess Request
Service Id
27 SA
#6 accessType — requestSeed 7D AT_RSD
#7 Checksum 00-FF CS
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Table 19
SecurityAccess — requestSeed Positive Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 04 LEN
#5 SecurityAccess Positive
Response Service Id
67 SAPR
#6 accessType — requestSeed 7D AT_RSD
#7 Seed High 00-FF SEEDH
#8 Seed Low 00-FF SEEDL
#9 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 20
SecurityAccess Negative Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name
Hex
Value
Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
#5 negativeResponse Service Id 7F NR
#6 SecurityAccess Request Service Id 27 SA
#7 respon­
seCode =
[conditionsNotCorrec­
tOrRequestSequen­
ceError
22 RC_CNC
incorrectMessage­
Length]
13 RC_IML
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
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5.2.3 Message format — SecurityAccess — sendKey
CPR_041 The message formats for the SecurityAccess ‘sendKey’
primitives are detailed in the following tables.
Table 21
SecurityAccess Request — sendKey Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte EE TGT
#3 Source address byte tt SRC
#4 Additional length byte m+2 LEN
#5 SecurityAccess Request
Service Id
27 SA
#6 accessType — sendKey 7E AT_SK
#7 to
#m + 6
Key #1 (High) xx KEY
… …
Key #m (low, m must be a
minimum of 4, and a
maximum of 8)
xx
#m + 7 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 22
SecurityAccess — sendKey Positive Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 02 LEN
#5 SecurityAccess Positive
Response Service Id
67 SAPR
#6 accessType — sendKey 7E AT_SK
#7 Checksum 00-FF CS
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Table 23
SecurityAccess Negative Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name
Hex
Value
Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
#5 NegativeResponse Service Id 7F NR
#6 SecurityAccess Request Service Id 27 SA
#7 Respon­
seCode =
[generalReject 10 RC_GR
subFunctionNotSup­
ported
12 RC_SFNS
incorrectMessage­
Length
13 RC_IML
conditionsNotCorrec­
tOrRequestSequen­
ceError
22 RC_CNC
invalidKey 35 RC_IK
exceededNumberOf­
Attempts
36 RC_ENA
requestCorrectlyRe­
ceived-Response­
Pending]
78 RC_RCR_RP
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
6. DATA TRANSMISSION SERVICES
The services available are detailed in the following table:
Table 24
Data Transmission Services
Service name Description
ReadDataByIdentifier The client requests the transmission of the
current value of a record with access by
recordDataIdentifier.
WriteDataByIdentifier The client requests to write a record
accessed by recordDataIdentifier.
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6.1. ReadDataByIdentifier service
6.1.1 Message description
CPR_050 The ReadDataByIdentifier service is used by the client to
request data record values from a server. The data are
identified by a recordDataIdentifier. It is the VU manu­
facturer's responsibility that the server conditions are met
when performing this service.
6.1.2 Message format
CPR_051 The message formats for the ReadDataByIdentifier
primitives are detailed in the following tables.
Table 25
ReadDataByIdentifier Request Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte EE TGT
#3 Source address byte tt SRC
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
#5 ReadDataByIdentifier
Request Service Id
22 RDBI
#6 to #7 recordDataIdentifier = [a value
fromTable 28]
xxxx RDI_…
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 26
ReadDataByIdentifier Positive Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name
Hex
Value
Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte m+3 LEN
#5 ReadDataByIdentifier Positive
Response Service Id
62 RDBIPR
#6 and #7 recordDataIdentifier = [the same
value as bytes #6 and #7 Table 25]
xxxx RDI_...
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Byte # Parameter Name
Hex
Value
Mnemonic
#8 to
#m + 7
dataRecord[] = [data#1 xx DREC_DAT­
A1
: : :
data#m] xx DREC_DAT­
Am
#m + 8 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 27
ReadDataByIdentifier Negative Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name
Hex
Value
Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
#5 NegativeResponse Service Id 7F NR
#6 ReadDataByIdentifier Request
Service Id
22 RDBI
#7 Respon­
seCode=
[requestOutO­
fRange
31 RC_ROOR
incorrectMessage­
Length
13 RC_IML
conditionsNot­
Correct]
22 RC_CNC
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
6.1.3 Parameter Definition
CPR_052 The parameter recordDataIdentifier (RDI_) in the ReadDa­
taByIdentifier request message identifies a data record.
▼M3
CPR_053 recordDataIdentifier values defined by this document are
shown in the table below.
The recordDataIdentifier table consists of five columns and
multiple lines.
— The 1 st column (Hex) includes the ‘Hex Value’
assigned to the recordDataIdentifier specified in the 3 rd
column.
— The 2 nd column (Data element) specifies the data
element of Appendix 1 on which the recordDataI­
dentifier is based (transcoding is sometimes necessary).
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— The 3 rd column (Description) specifies the corre­
sponding recordDataIdentifier name.
— The 4 th column (Access rights) specifies the access
rights to this recordDataIdentifier.
— The 5 th column (Mnemonic) specifies the mnemonic of
this recordDataIdentifier.
Table 28
Definition of recordDataIdentifier values
Hex Data element
recordDataIdentifier Name
(see format in Section 8.2)
Access
rights
(Read/
Write)
Mnemonic
F90B CurrentDateTime TimeDate R/W RDI_TD
F912 HighResOdometer HighResolutionTotalVehicleD­
istance
R/W RDI_HRTVD
F918 K-ConstantOfRecordingEquipment Kfactor R/W RDI_KF
F91C L-TyreCircumference LfactorTyreCircumference R/W RDI_LF
F91D W-VehicleCharacteristicConstant WvehicleCharacteristicFactor R/W RDI_WVCF
F921 TyreSize TyreSize R/W RDI_TS
F922 nextCalibrationDate NextCalibrationDate R/W RDI_NCD
F92C SpeedAuthorised SpeedAuthorised R/W RDI_SA
F97D vehicleRegistrationNation RegisteringMemberState R/W RDI_RMS
F97E VehicleRegistrationNumber VehicleRegistrationNumber R/W RDI_ VRN
F190 VehicleIdentificationNumber VIN R/W RDI_ VIN
F9D0 SensorSerialNumber MotionSensorSerialNumber R RDI_SSN
F9D1 RemoteCommunicationModuleSerial­
Number
RemoteCommunicationFacility­
SerialNumber
R RDI_RCSN
F9D2 SensorGNSSSerialNumber ExternalGNSSFacilitySerial­
Number
R RDI_GSSN
F9D3 SealDataVu SmartTachographSealsSerial­
Number
R/W RDI_SDV
F9D4 VuSerialNumber VuSerialNumber R RDI_VSN
F9D5 ByDefaultLoadType ByDefaultLoadType R/W RDI_BDLT
F9D6 TachographCardsGen1Suppression Tachograph­
CardsGen1Suppression
R/W RDI_TCG1S
F9D7 VehiclePosition VehiclePosition R RDI_VP
F9D8 LastCalibrationCountry CalibrationCountry R RDI_CC
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CPR_054 The parameter dataRecord (DREC_) is used by the Read­
DataByIdentifier positive response message to provide the
data record value identified by the recordDataIdentifier to
the client (tester). Data formats are specified in section 8.
Additional user optional dataRecords including VU specific
input, internal and output data may be implemented, but are
not defined in this document.
6.2. WriteDataByIdentifier service
6.2.1 Message description
CPR_056 The WriteDataByIdentifier service is used by the client to
write data record values to a server. The data are identified
by a recordDataIdentifier. It is the VU manufacturer's
responsibility that the server conditions are met when
performing this service. To update the parameters listed in
Table 28 the VU must be in CALIBRATION mode.
6.2.2 Message format
CPR_057 The message formats for the WriteDataByIdentifier
primitives are detailed in the following tables.
Table 29
WriteDataByIdentifier Request Message
Byte # Parameter Name
Hex
Value
Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte EE TGT
#3 Source address byte tt SRC
#4 Additional length byte m + 3 LEN
#5 WriteDataByIdentifier Request
Service Id
2E WDBI
#6 to #7 recordDataIdentifier = [a value from
Table 28]
xxxx RDI_…
#8 to
m + 7
dataRecord[] = [data#1 xx DREC_DAT­
A1
: : :
data#m] xx DREC_DAT­
Am
#m + 8 Checksum 00-FF CS
▼B
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Table 30
WriteDataByIdentifier Positive Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
#5 WriteDataByIdentifier
Positive Response Service Id
6E WDBIPR
#6 to #7 recordDataIdentifier = [the
same value as bytes #6 and
#7 Table 29]
xxxx RDI_…
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 31
WriteDataByIdentifier Negative Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name
Hex
Value
Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
#5 NegativeResponse Service Id 7F NR
#6 WriteDataByIdentifier Request
Service Id
2E WDBI
#7 Respon­
seCode=
[requestOutO­
fRange
31 RC_ROOR
incorrectMessage­
Length
13 RC_IML
conditionsNot­
Correct]
22 RC_CNC
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
▼B
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6.2.3 Parameter definition
The parameter recordDataIdentifier (RDI_) is defined in Table 28.
The parameter dataRecord (DREC_) is used by the WriteDataByI­
dentifier request message to provide the data record values identified
by the recordDataIdentifier to the server (VU). Data formats are
specified in section 8.
7. CONTROL OF TEST PULSES — INPUT/OUTPUT CONTROL
FUNCTIONAL UNIT
The services available are detailed in the following table:
Table 32
Input/Output Control functional unit
Service name Description
InputOutputControl­
ByIdentifier
The client requests the control of an input/
output specific to the server.
7.1. InputOutputControlByIdentifier service
7.1.1 Message description
There is a connection via the front connector which allows test pulses
to be controlled or monitored using a suitable tester.
CPR_058 This calibration I/O signal line can be configured by K-line
command using the InputOutputControlByIdentifier service
to select the required input or output function for the line.
The available states of the line are:
— disabled,
— speedSignalInput, where the calibration I/O signal line is
used to input a speed signal (test signal) replacing the
motion sensor speed signal, this function is not available
in CONTROL mode,
— realTimeSpeedSignalOutputSensor, where the calibration
I/O signal line is used to output the speed signal of the
motion sensor,
— RTCOutput, where the calibration I/O signal line is used
to output the UTC clock signal, this function is not
available in CONTROL mode.
CPR_059 The vehicle unit must have entered an adjustment session
and must be in CALIBRATION or CONTROL mode to
configure the state of the line. When the VU is in CALI­
BRATION mode, the four states of the line can be selected
(disabled, speedSignalInput, realTimeSpeedSignalOutput­
Sensor, RTCOutput). When the VU is in CONTROL
mode, only two states of the lines can be selected (disabled,
realTimeSpeedOutputSensor). On exit of the adjustment
session or of the CALIBRATION or CONTROL mode
the vehicle unit must ensure the calibration I/O signal line
is returned to the ‘disabled’ (default) state.
▼B
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CPR_060 If speed pulses are received at the real time speed signal
input line of the VU while the calibration I/O signal line is
set to input then the calibration I/O signal line shall be set to
output or returned to the disabled state.
CPR_061 The sequence shall be:
— Establish communications by StartCommunication
Service
— Enter an adjustment session by StartDiagnosticSession
Service and be in CALIBRATION or CONTROL
mode of operation (the order of these two operation is
not important).
— Change the state of the output by InputOutputControl­
ByIdentifier Service.
7.1.2 Message format
CPR_062 The message formats for the InputOutputControlByIdentifier
primitives are detailed in the following tables.
Table 33
InputOutputControlByIdentifier Request Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte EE TGT
#3 Source address byte tt SRC
#4 Additional length byte xx LEN
#5 InputOutputControlByI­
dentifier Request Sid
2F IOCBI
#6 and #7 InputOutputIdentifier = [Cali­
brationInputOutput]
F960 IOI_CIO
#8 or
#8 to #9
ControlOptionRecord = [ COR_…
inputOutputControlParameter
— one value from Table 36
xx IOCP_…
controlState — one value from
Table 37 (see note below)]
xx CS_…
#9 or #10 Checksum 00-FF CS
Note: The controlState parameter is present only in some
cases (see 7.1.3).
▼B
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Table 34
InputOutputControlByIdentifier Positive Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte xx LEN
#5 inputOutputControlByI­
dentifier Positive Response
SId
6F IOCBIPR
#6 and #7 inputOutputIdentifier = [Cali­
brationInputOutput]
F960 IOI_CIO
#8 or
#8 to #9
controlStatusRecord = [ CSR_
inputOutputControlParameter
(same value as byte #8 Table
33)
xx IOCP_…
controlState (same value as
byte #9 Table 33)] (if
applicable)
xx CS_…
#9 or #10 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 35
InputOutputControlByIdentifier Negative Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte — physical
addressing
80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
#5 negativeResponse Service Id 7F NR
#6 inputOutputControlByIdentifier
Request SId
2F IOCBI
▼B
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Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#7 responseCode=[
incorrectMessageLength 13 RC_IML
conditionsNotCorrect 22 RC_CNC
requestOutOfRange 31 RC_ROOR
deviceControlLimitsExceeded] 7A RC_DCLE
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
7.1.3 Parameter definition
CPR_064 The parameter inputOutputControlParameter (IOCP_) is
defined in the following table.
Table 36
Definition of inputOutputControlParameter values
Hex Description Mnemonic
00 ReturnControlToECU
This value shall indicate to the server (VU) that
the tester does no longer have control about the
calibration I/O signal line.
RCTECU
01 ResetToDefault
This value shall indicate to the server (VU) that it
is requested to reset the calibration I/O signal line
to its default state.
RTD
03 ShortTermAdjustment
This value shall indicate to the server (VU) that it
is requested to adjust the calibration I/O signal
line to the value included in the controlState
parameter.
STA
CPR_065 The parameter controlState is present only when the input­
OutputControlParameter is set to ShortTermAdjustment and
is defined in the following table:
Table 37
Definition of controlState values
Mode Hex Value Description
Disable 00 I/O line is disabled (default state)
▼B
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Mode Hex Value Description
Enable 01 Enable calibration I/O line as speedSigna­
lInput
Enable 02 Enable calibration I/O line as realTime­
SpeedSignalOutputSensor
Enable 03 Enable calibration I/O line as RTCOutput
▼M3
8. ROUTINECONTROL SERVICE (TIME ADJUSTMENT)
8.1. Message description
CPR_065a The service RoutineControl (TimeAdjustment) provides the
ability to trigger an alignment of the VU clock to the time
provided by the GNSS receiver.
For the service RoutineControl (TimeAdjustment)
execution the VU must be in CALIBRATION mode.
Precondition: it is ensured that the VU is able to receive
authenticated position messages from the GNSS receiver.
As long the time adjustment is ongoing, the VU shall
respond to the request RoutineControl, subfunction reques­
tRoutineResults, with routineInfo = 0x78.
Note: the time adjustment may take some time. The diag­
nostic tester shall request the time adjustment status by
using the sub-function requestRoutineResults.
8.2. Message format
CPR_065b The message formats for the service RoutineControl
(TimeAdjustment) and its primitives are detailed in the
following tables.
Table 37a
RoutineControl, routine (TimeAdjustment) Request Message, subfunction startRoutine
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte - physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte EE TGT
#3 Source address byte tt SRC
#4 Additional length byte xx LEN
#5 RoutineControl Request Sid 31 RC
#6 routineControlType = [startRoutine] 01 RCTP_STR
#7 and #8 routineIdentifier = [TimeAdjustment] 0100 RI_TA
#9 Checksum 00-FF CS
▼B
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Table 37b
RoutineControl, routine (TimeAdjustment), subfunction startRoutine, Positive Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte – physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte xx LEN
#5 RoutineControl Positive Response Sid 71 RCPR
#6 routineControlType = [startRoutine] 01 RCTP_STR
#7 and #8 routineIdentifier= [TimeAdjustment] 0100 RI_TA
#9 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 37c
RoutineControl, routine (TimeAdjustment) Request Message, subfunction requestRoutineResults
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte - physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte EE TGT
#3 Source address byte tt SRC
#4 Additional length byte xx LEN
#5 RoutineControl Request Sid 31 RC
#6 routineControlType = [requestRoutineResults] 03 RCTP_RRR
#7 and #8 routineIdentifier= [TimeAdjustment] 0100 RI_TA
#9 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 37d
RoutineControl, routine (TimeAdjustment), subfunction requestRoutineResults, Positive Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte – physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte xx LEN
#5 RoutineControl Positive Response Sid 71 RCPR
#6 routineControlType = [requestRoutineResults] 03 RCTP_RRR
#7 and #8 routineIdentifier= [TimeAdjustment] 0100 RI_TA
#9 routineInfo (see Table 37f) XX RINF_TA
#10 routineStatusRecord[] = routineStatus#1 (see Table 37g) XX RS_TA
#11 Checksum 00-FF CS
▼M3
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Table 37e
RoutineControl, routine (TimeAdjustment) Negative Response Message
Byte # Parameter Name Hex Value Mnemonic
#1 Format byte – physical addressing 80 FMT
#2 Target address byte tt TGT
#3 Source address byte EE SRC
#4 Additional length byte 03 LEN
#5 negativeResponse Service Id 7F NR
#6 inputOutputControlByIdentifier Request SId 31 RC
#7 responseCode=[
sub-functionNotSupported
incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
conditionsNotCorrect
requestOutOfRange
]
12
13
22
31
SFNS
IMLOIF
CNC
ROOR
#8 Checksum 00-FF CS
Table 37f
RoutineControl, routine (TimeAdjustment), routineInfo
routineInfo Hex Value Description
NormalExitWithResultAvailable 61 The routine was executed completely; additional routine
results available.
RoutineExecutionOngoing 78 The requested routine is still executed.
Table 37g
RoutineControl, routine (TimeAdjustment), routineStatus
Hex Value Test result Description
01 positive The time adjustment successfully finished.
02..0F RFU
10 negative No GNSS signal reception.
11..7F RFU
80..FF Manufacturer specific
9. DATARECORDS FORMATS
This section details:
— general rules that shall be applied to ranges of parameters trans­
mitted by the vehicle unit to the tester,
— formats that shall be used for data transferred via the Data Trans­
mission Services described in section 6.
▼M3
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CPR_067 All parameters identified shall be supported by the VU.
CPR_068 Data transmitted by the VU to the tester in response to a
request message shall be of the measured type (i.e. current
value of the requested parameter as measured or observed
by the VU).
9.1. Transmitted parameter ranges
CPR_069 Table 38 defines the ranges used to determine the validity
of a transmitted parameter.
CPR_070 The values in the range ‘error indicator’ provide a means
for the vehicle unit to immediately indicate that valid para­
metric data is not currently available due to some type of
error in the tachograph.
CPR_071 The values in the range ‘not available’ provide a means for
the vehicle unit to transmit a message which contains a
parameter that is not available or not supported in that
module. The values in the range ‘not requested’ provide a
means for a device to transmit a command message and
identify those parameters where no response is expected
from the receiving device.
CPR_072 If a component failure prevents the transmission of valid
data for a parameter, the error indicator as described in
Table 38 should be used in place of that parameter’s
data. However, if the measured or calculated data has
yielded a value that is valid yet exceeds the defined
parameter range, the error indicator should not be used.
The data should be transmitted using the appropriate
minimum or maximum parameter value.
Table 38
dataRecords ranges
Range Name
1 byte
(Hex value)
2 bytes
(Hex value)
4 bytes
(Hex Value)
ASCII
Valid signal 00 to FA 0000 to FAFF 00000000 to FAFFFFFF 1 to 254
Parameter specific indicator FB FB00 to FBFF FB000000 to FBFFFFFF none
Reserved range for future indicator
bits
FC to FD FC00 to FDFF FC000000 to FDFFFFFF none
Error indicator FE FE00 to FEFF FE000000 to FEFFFFFF 0
Not available or not requested FF FF00 to FFFF FF000000 to FFFFFFFF FF
CPR_073 For parameters coded in ASCII, the ASCII character ‘*’ is
reserved as a delimiter.
9.2. dataRecords formats
Table 39 to Table 42 below detail the formats that shall be used via the
ReadDataByIdentifier and WriteDataByIdentifier Services.
▼M3
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CPR_074 Table 39 provides the length, resolution and operating range
for each parameter identified by its recordDataIdentifier:
Table 39
Format of dataRecords
Parameter Name
Data length
(bytes)
Resolution Operating range
TimeDate 8 See details in Table 40
HighResolutionTotalVehicleD­
istance
4 5 m/bit gain, 0 m offset 0 to +21 055 406 km
Kfactor 2 0.001 pulse/m /bit gain, 0
offset
0 to 64.255 pulse/m
LfactorTyreCircumference 2 0.125 10 -3 m /bit gain, 0 offset 0 to 8.031 m
WvehicleCharacteristicFactor 2 0.001 pulse/m /bit gain, 0
offset
0 to 64.255 pulse/m
TyreSize 15 ASCII ASCII
NextCalibrationDate 3 See details in Table 41
SpeedAuthorised 2 1/256 km/h/bit gain, 0 offset 0 to 250.996 km/h
RegisteringMemberState 3 ASCII ASCII
VehicleRegistrationNumber 14 See details in Table 42
VIN 17 ASCII ASCII
SealDataVu 55 See details in Table 43
ByDefaultLoadType 1 See details in Table 44
VuSerialNumber 8 See details in Table 45
SensorSerialNumber 8 See details in Table 45
SensorGNSSSerialNumber 8 See details in Table 45
RemoteCommunicationModuleSer­
ialNumber
8 See details in Table 45
TachographCardsGen1Suppression 2 See details in Table 46
VehiclePosition 14 See details in Table 47
CalibrationCountry 3 ASCII NationAlpha as defined in
Appendix 1
▼M3
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CPR_075 Table 40 details the formats of the different bytes of the
TimeDate parameter:
Table 40
Detailed format of TimeDate (recordDataIdentifier value # F90B)
Byte Parameter definition Resolution Operating range
1 Seconds 0.25 s/bit gain, 0 s offset 0 to 59.75s
2 Minutes 1 min/bit gain, 0 min offset 0 to 59 min
3 Hours 1 h/bit gain, 0 h offset 0 to 23 h
4 Month 1 month/bit gain, 0 month offset 1 to 12 month
5 Day 0.25 day/bit gain, 0 day offset (see NOTE
below Table 41)
0.25 to 31.75 day
6 Year 1 year/bit gain, +1985 year offset
(see NOTE below Table 41)
1985 to 2235 year
7 Local Minute Offset 1 min/bit gain, -125 min offset -59 to +59 min
8 Local Hour Offset 1 h/bit gain, -125 h offset - 23 to +23 h
CPR_076 Table 41 details the formats of the different bytes of the
NextCalibrationDate parameter:
Table 41
Detailed format of NextCalibrationDate (recordDataIdentifier value # F922)
Byte Parameter definition Resolution Operating range
1 Month 1 month/bit gain, 0 month offset 1 to 12 month
2 Day 0.25 day/bit gain, 0 day offset (see NOTE
below)
0.25 to 31.75 day
3 Year 1 year/bit gain, +1985 year offset
(see NOTE below)
1985 to 2235 year
NOTE concerning the use of the ‘Day’ parameter:
1) A value of 0 for the date is null. The values 1, 2, 3,
and 4 are used to identify the first day of the month; 5,
6, 7, and 8 identify the second day of the month; etc.
2) This parameter does not influence or change the hours
parameter above.
NOTE concerning the use of the ‘Year’ parameter:
A value of 0 for the year identifies the year 1985; a value
of 1 identifies 1986; etc.
▼M3
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CPR_078 Table 42 details the formats of the different bytes of the
VehicleRegistrationNumber parameter:
Table 42
Detailed format of VehicleRegistrationNumber (recordDataIdentifier value # F97E)
Byte Parameter definition Resolution Operating range
1 Code Page (as defined in Appendix 1) not applicable VehicleRegistrationNumber
2 – 14 Vehicle Registration Number (as defined in
Appendix 1)
not applicable VehicleRegistrationNumber
CPR_090 Table 43 details the formats of the different bytes of the
SealDataVu parameter:
Table 43
Detailed format of SealDataVu (recordDataIdentifier value # F9D3)
Byte Parameter definition Resolution Operating range
1 – 11 sealRecord1. Format SealRecord as defined
in Appendix 1.
not applicable SealRecord
12 - 22 sealRecord2. Format SealRecord as defined
in Appendix 1.
not applicable SealRecord
23 – 33 sealRecord3. Format SealRecord as defined
in Appendix 1.
not applicable SealRecord
34 – 44 sealRecord4. Format SealRecord as defined
in Appendix 1.
not applicable SealRecord
45 – 55 sealRecord5. Format SealRecord as defined
in Appendix 1.
not applicable SealRecord
NOTE: If there are less than 5 seals available the value of
the EquipmentType in all unused sealRecords shall be set to
15, i.e. unused.
CPR_091 Table 44 details the formats of the different bytes of the
ByDefaultLoadType parameter:
Table 44
Detailed format of ByDefaultLoadType (recordDataIdentifier value # F9D5)
Byte Parameter definition Resolution Operating range
1 loadType
'00'H: Undefined load type
'01'H: Goods
'02'H: Passengers
not applicable '00'H to '02'H
CPR_092 Table 45 details the formats of the different bytes of the
VuSerialNumber, SensorSerialNumber, SensorGNSSSerial­
Number and RemoteCommunicationModuleSerialNumber
parameters:
▼M3
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Table 45
Detailed format of VuSerialNumber, SensorSerialNumber, SensorGNSSSerialNumber and
RemoteCommunicationModuleSerialNumber (recordDataIdentifier values # F9D4, F9D0, F9D2, F9D1)
Byte Parameter definition Resolution Operating range
1 VuSerialNumber, SensorSerialNumber,
SensorGNSSSerialNumber and RemoteCom­
municationModuleSerialNumber:
format ExtendedSerialNumber as defined in
Appendix 1.
not applicable ExtendedSerialNumber
CPR_093 Table 46 details the formats of the different bytes of the
TachographCardsGen1Suppression parameter:
Table 46
Detailed format of TachographCardsGen1Suppression (recordDataIdentifier value # F9D6)
Byte Parameter definition Resolution Operating range
1-2 TachographCardsGen1Suppression. Format
TachographCardsGen1Suppression as
defined in Appendix 1.
not applicable '0000'H, 'A5E3'H
CPR_094 Table 47 details the formats of the different bytes of the
VehiclePosition parameter.
Table 47
Detailed format of VehiclePosition (recordDataIdentifier value # F9D7)
Byte Parameter definition Resolution Operating range
1 - 4 Time stamp of the vehicle position was
determined.
Not applicable TimeReal
5 GNSS accuracy Not applicable GNSSAccuracy
6 - 11 Vehicle position Not applicable GeoCoordinates
12 Authentication status Not applicable PositionAuthenticationStatus
13 Current country Not applicable NationNumeric
14 Current region Not applicable RegionNumeric
Note: after vehicle position update, the update of current
country and region may be delayed.
▼M3
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Appendix 9
TYPE APPROVAL LIST OF MINIMUM REQUIRED TESTS
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. INTRODUCTION
2. VEHICLE UNIT FUNCTIONAL TESTS
3. MOTION SENSOR FUNCTIONAL TESTS
4. TACHOGRAPH CARDS FUNCTIONAL TESTS
5. EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY TESTS
▼M1
6. EXTERNAL REMOTE COMMUNICATION FACILITY TESTS
▼B
7. PAPER FUNCTIONAL TESTS
8. INTEROPERABILITY TESTS
▼M3
9. OSNMA TESTS
▼B
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Type approval
The EC type approval for a recording equipment (or component) or a
tachograph card is based on:
▼M1
— a security certification, based on Common Criteria specifications,
against a security target fully compliant with Appendix 10 to this
Annex,
▼B
— a functional certification performed by a Member State authority
certifying that the item tested fulfils the requirements of this
Annex in terms of functions performed, measurement accuracy and
environmental characteristics,
— an interoperability certification performed by the competent body
certifying that the recording equipment (or tachograph card) is fully
interoperable with the necessary tachograph card (or recording
equipment) models (see Chapter 8 of this Annex).
This Appendix specifies which tests, as a minimum, must be performed by
a Member State authority during the functional tests, and which tests, as a
minimum, must be performed by the competent body during the inter­
operability tests. Procedures to follow to carry out the tests or the type of
tests are not specified further.
The security certification aspects are not covered by this Appendix. If
some tests requested for type approval are performed during the security
evaluation and certification process, then these tests do not need to be
performed again. In this case, only the results of these security tests may
be inspected. For information, the requirements expected to be tested (or
closely related to tests expected to be performed) during the security
certification, are marked with a ‘*’ in this Appendix.
The numbered requirements refer to the Annex corpus, while the other
requirements refer to the other appendixes (e.g. PIC_001 refers to
requirement PIC_001 of Appendix 3 Pictograms).
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 392
This Appendix considers separately the type approval of the motion
sensor, of the vehicle unit, and of the external GNSS facility as
components of the recording equipment. Each component will get its
own type approval certificate in which the other compatible components
will be indicated. The functional test of the motion sensor (or external
GNSS facility) is done together with the vehicle unit and vice versa.
Interoperability between every model of motion sensor (resp. external
GNSS facility) and every model of vehicle unit is not required. In that
case the type approval for a motion sensor (resp. external GNSS facility)
can be granted only in combination with the type approval of the relevant
vehicle unit and vice versa.
▼M3
The Member States authority in charge of the functional tests of a vehicle
unit or an external GNSS facility must make sure that the embedded
GNSS receiver has successfully passed the OSNMA tests specified in
this Appendix. These tests are considered to be a part of the functional
tests of the vehicle unit or the external GNSS facility.
▼B
1.2. References
The following references are used in this Appendix:
IEC 60068-2-1: Environmental testing — Part 2-1: Tests — Test A: Cold
IEC 60068-2-2: Basic environmental testing procedures; part 2: tests; tests
B: dry heat (sinusoidal).
IEC 60068-2-6: Environmental testing — Part 2: Tests — Test Fc:
Vibration
IEC 60068-2-14: Environmental testing; Part 2-14: Tests; Test N: Change
of temperature
IEC 60068-2-27: Environmental testing. Part 2: Tests. Test Ea and
guidance: Shock
IEC 60068-2-30: Environmental testing — Part 2-30: Tests — Test Db:
Damp heat, cyclic (12 h + 12 h cycle)
IEC 60068-2-64: Environmental testing — Part 2-64: Tests — Test Fh:
Vibration, broadband random and guidance
IEC 60068-2-78 Environmental testing — Part 2-78: Tests — Test Cab:
Damp heat, steady state
ISO 16750-3 — Mechanical loads (2012-12)
ISO 16750-4 — Climatic loads(2010-04).
ISO 20653: Road vehicles — Degree of protection (IP code) — Protection
of electrical equipment against foreign objects, water and access
ISO 10605:2008 + Technical Corrigendum:2010 + AMD1:2014 Road
vehicles — Test methods for electrical disturbances from electrostatic
discharge
ISO 7637-1:2002 + AMD1: 2008 Road vehicles — Electrical disturbances
from conduction and coupling — Part 1: Definitions and general
considerations.
ISO 7637-2 Road vehicles — Electrical disturbances from conduction and
coupling — Part 2: Electrical transient conduction along supply lines only.
ISO 7637-3 Road vehicles — Electrical disturbances from conduction and
coupling — Part 3: Electrical transient transmission by capacitive and
inductive coupling via lines other than supply lines.
ISO/IEC 7816-1 Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with
contacts — Part 1: Physical characteristics..
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 393
ISO/IEC 7816-2 Information technology — Identification cards — Inte­
grated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 2: Dimensions and location of
the contacts.
ISO/IEC 7816-3 Information technology — Identification cards — Inte­
grated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 3: Electronic signals and
transmission protocol.
ISO/IEC 10373-1:2006 + AMD1:2012 Identification cards — Test
methods — Part 1: General characteristics
ISO/IEC 10373-3:2010 + Technical Corrigendum:2013 Identification
cards — Test methods — Part 3: Integrated circuit cards with contacts
and related interface devices
ISO 16844-3:2004, Cor 1:2006 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems —
Part 3: Motion sensor interface (with vehicle units).
ISO 16844-4 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 4: CAN
interface
ISO 16844-6 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 6: Diagnostics
ISO 16844-7 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 7: Parameters
ISO 534 Paper and board — Determination of thickness, density and
specific volume
▼M3
RGODP JRC Technical Report - Receiver guidelines for OSNMA data
processing
▼B
UN ECE R10 Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles
with regard to electromagnetic compatibility (United Nation Economic
Commission for Europe)
2. VEHICLE UNIT FUNCTIONAL TESTS
▼M1
No Test Description Related requirements
1. Administrative examination
1.1 Documentation Correctness of documentation
1.2 Manufacturer test resu-
lts
Results of manufacturer test performed during
integration.
Paper demonstrations.
88, 89,91
2. Visual inspection
2,1 Compliance with documentation
2.2 Identification / markings 224 to 226
2.3 Materials 219 to 223
2.4 Sealing 398, 401 to 405
2.5 External interfaces
3. Functional tests
▼B
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No Test Description Related requirements
▼M3
3.1 Functions provided 02, 03, 04, 05, 07, 382,
3.2 Modes of operation 09 to 11*, 134, 135
3.3 Functions and data access rights 12*, 13*, 382, 383, 386 to
389
3.4 Monitoring cards insertion and withdrawal 15, 16, 17, 18, 19*, 20*, 134
3.5 Speed, position and distance measurement 21 to 37
3.6 Time measurement (test performed at 20°C) 38 to 43
3.7 Monitoring driver activities 44 to 53, 134
3.8 Monitoring driving status 54, 55, 134
3.9 Driver’s entries 56 to 62c
3.10 Company locks management 63 to 68
3.11 Monitoring control activities 69, 70
3.12 Detection of events and/or faults 71 to 88a, 134
3.13 Equipment identification data 93*, 94*, 97, 100
3.14 Driver or workshop card insertion and withdrawal data 102* to 104*
3.15 Driver activity data 105* to 107*
3.16 Places and positions data 108* to 112*
3.17 Odometer data 113* to 115*
3.18 Detailed speed data 116*
3.19 Events data 117*
3.20 Faults data 118*
3.21 Calibration data 119* to 121*
3.22 Time adjustment data 124*, 125*
3.23 Control activity data 126*, 127*
3.24 Company locks data 128*
3.25 Download activity data 129*
3.26 Specific conditions data 130*, 131*
3.27 Tachograph cards data 132*, 133*
▼M1
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No Test Description Related requirements
3.28 Border crossings 133a* to 133d*
3.29 Load/unload operation 133e* to 133i*
3.30 Digital map 133j* to 133t*
3.31 Recording and storing on tachographs cards 136, 137, 138*, 139*, 141*,
142, 143
144, 145, 146*, 147*, 147a*,
147b*, 148*, 149, 150, 150a
3.32 Displaying 90, 134,
151 to 168,
PIC_001, DIS_001
3.33 Printing 90, 134,
169 to 181, PIC_001,
PRT_001 to PRT_014
3.34 Warning 134, 182 to 191,
PIC_001
3.35 Data downloading to external media 90, 134, 192 to 196
3.36 Remote communication for targeted roadside checks 197 to 199
3.37 Data exchanges with additional external devices 200, 201
3.38 Calibration 202 to 206*, 383, 384, 386 to
391
3.39 Roadside calibration checking 207 to 209
3.40 Time adjustment 210 to 212*
3.41 Monitoring border crossings 226a to 226c
3.42 Software update 226d to 226f
3.43 Non-interference of additional functions 06, 425
3.44 Motion sensor interface 02, 122
3.45 External GNSS facility 03, 123
3.46 Verify that the VU detects, records and stores the event(s) and/or
fault(s) defined by the VU manufacturer when a paired motion sensor
reacts to magnetic fields disturbing vehicle motion detection.
217
3.47 Cypher suite and standardized domain parameters CSM_48, CSM_50
▼M3
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No Test Description Related requirements
4. Environmental tests
4.1 Temperature Verify functionality through:
Test according to ISO 16750-4, Chapter
5.1.1.2: Low temperature operation test
(72 h @ – 20 °C)
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-1: Environ­
mental testing - Part 2-1: Tests - Test A:
Cold
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter
5.1.2.2: High temperature operation test
(72 h at 70 °C)
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-2: Basic en­
vironmental testing procedures; part 2: tests;
tests B: dry heat
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter
5.3.2: Rapid change of temperature with
specified transition duration (– 20 °C/
70 °C, 20 cycles, dwell time 2h at each
temperature)
A reduced set of tests (among those defined
in section 3 of this table) can be carried out
at the lower temperature, the higher
temperature and during the temperature
cycles
213
4.2 Humidity Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand a
cyclic damp (heat test) through IEC 60068-
2-30, test Db, six 24 hours cycles, each
temperature varying from +25 °C to + 55
°C and a relative humidity of 97 % at + 25
°C and equal to 93 % at +55 °C
214
4.3 Mechanical 1. Sinusoidal vibrations.
verify that the vehicle unit can withstand
sinusoidal vibrations with the following
characteristics:
constant displacement between 5 and
11 Hz: 10mm peak
constant acceleration between 11 and
300 Hz: 5g
This requirement is verified through IEC
60068-2-6, test Fc, with a minimum test
duration of 3 × 12 hours (12 hours per
axis)
ISO 16750-3 does not require a sinu­
soidal vibration test for devices located
in the decoupled vehicle cab.
2. Random vibrations:
Test according to ISO 16750-3: Chapter
4.1.2.8: Test VIII: Commercial vehicle,
decoupled vehicle cab
219
▼M1
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No Test Description Related requirements
Random vibration test, 10…2000 Hz, RMS
vertical 21,3 m/s 2 , RMS longitudinal
11,8 m/s 2 , RMS lateral 13,1 m/s 2 , 3 axes,
32 h per axis, including temperature cycle
– 20…70 °C.
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-64: Environ­
mental testing - Part 2-64: Tests - Test Fh:
Vibration, broadband random and guidance
3. Shocks:
mechanical shock with 3 g half sinus
according ISO 16750.
The tests described above are performed on
different samples of the equipment type
being tested.
4.4 Protection against
water and foreign
bodies
Test according to ISO 20653: Road vehicles
– Degree of protection (IP code) –
Protection of electrical equipment against
foreign objects, water and access
(No change in parameters); Minimum value
IP 40
220, 221
4.5 Over-voltage protection Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand a
power supply of:
24 V versions: 34V at + 40 °C 1 hour
12V versions: 17V at + 40 °C 1 hour
(ISO 16750-2)
216
4.6 Reverse polarity
protection
Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand an
inversion of its power supply
(ISO 16750-2)
216
4.7 Short-circuit protection Verify that input output signals are protected
against short circuits to power supply and
ground
(ISO 16750-2)
216
5. EMC tests
5.1 Radiated emissions and
susceptibility
Compliance with Regulation ECE R10 218
5.2 Electrostatic discharge Compliance with ISO 10605:2008 +
Technical Corrigendum:2010 +
AMD1:2014: +/– 4 kV for contact and +/–
8 kV for air discharge
218
▼M1
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 398
No Test Description Related requirements
5.3 Conducted transient
susceptibility on power
supply
For 24V versions: compliance with ISO
7637-2 + ECE Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3:
pulse 1a: Vs=450V Ri=50 ohms
pulse 2a: Vs=+37V Ri=2 ohms
pulse 2b: Vs=+20V Ri=0,05 ohms
pulse 3a: Vs=– 150V Ri=50 ohms
pulse 3b: Vs=+150V Ri=50 ohms
pulse 4: Vs=– 16V Va=– 12V t6=100ms
pulse 5: Vs=+120V Ri=2,2 ohms td=250ms
For 12V versions: compliance with ISO
7637– 1 + ECE Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3:
pulse 1: Vs=– 75V Ri=10 ohms
pulse 2a: Vs=+37V Ri=2 ohms
pulse 2b: Vs=+10V Ri=0,05 ohms
pulse 3a: Vs=– 112V Ri=50 ohms
pulse 3b: Vs=+75V Ri=50 ohms
pulse 4: Vs=– 6V Va=– 5V t6=15ms
pulse 5: Vs=+65V Ri=3ohms td=100ms
Pulse 5 shall be tested only for vehicle units
designed to be installed in vehicles for
which no external common protection
against load dump is implemented
For load dump proposal, refer to ISO 16750-
2, 4th edition, chapter 4.6.4.
218
▼B
3. MOTION SENSOR FUNCTIONAL TESTS
No Test Description Related requirements
1. Administrative examination
1.1 Documentation Correctness of documentation
2. Visual inspection
2.1. Compliance with documentation
2.2. Identification/markings 225, 226,
2.3 Materials 219 to 223
2.4. Sealing 398, 401 to 405
3. Functional tests
3.1 Sensor identification data 95 to 97*
▼M1
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No Test Description Related requirements
3.2 Motion sensor — vehicle unit pairing 122*, 204
3.3 Motion detection
Motion measurement accuracy
30 to 35
3.4 Vehicle unit interface 02
3.5 Check that the motion sensor is immune to constant magnetic field. Alter­
natively, verify that the motion sensor reacts to constant magnetic fields
disturbing vehicle motion detection so that a connected VU can detect, record
and store sensor faults
217
4. Environmental tests
4.1 Operating temperature Verify functionality (as defined in test No 3.3)
in temperature range [– 40°C; + 135°C]
through:
IEC 60068-2-1 test Ad, with a test duration of
96 hours at the lowest temperature To min ,
IEC 60068-2-2 test Bd, with a test duration of
96 hours at the highest temperature To max
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.1.1.2:
Low temperature operation test (24 h @ –
40 °C)
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-1: Environmen­
tal testing — Part 2-1: Tests — Test A: Cold
IEC 68-2-2 test Bd, with a test duration of
96 hours at the lowest temperature of – 40°C.
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.1.2.2:
High temperature operation test (96 h @
135 °C)
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-2: Basic envi­
ronmental testing procedures; part 2: tests; tests
B: dry heat
213
4.2 Temperature cycles Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.3.2:
Rapid change of temperature with specified
transition duration (– 40°C/135 °C, 20 cycles,
dwell time 30 min at each temperature)
IEC 60068-2-14: Environmental testing; Part 2-
14: Tests; Test N: Change of temperature
213
4.3 Humidity cycles Verify functionality (as defined in test No. 3.3)
through IEC 60068-2-30, test Db, six 24 hours
cycles, each temperature varying from + 25°C
to + 55°C and a relative humidity of 97 %
at + 25°C and equal to 93 % at + 55°C
214
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 400
No Test Description Related requirements
4.4 Vibration ISO 16750-3: Chapter 4.1.2.6: Test VI:
Commercial vehicle, engine, gearbox
Mixed mode vibration test including
a) Sinusoidal vibration test, 20…520 Hz, 11,4
… 120 m/s 2 ,
b) Random vibration test, 10…2 000 Hz, RMS
177 m/s 2
94 h per axis, including temperature cycle –
20…70°C)
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-80: Environ­
mental testing — Part 2-80: Tests — Test Fi:
Vibration — Mixed mode
219
4.5 Mechanical shock ISO 16750-3: Chapter 4.2.3: Test VI: Test for
devices in or on the gearbox
half-sinusoidal shock, acceleration to be agreed
in the range 3 000…15 000 m/s 2 , pulse duration
to be agreed, however
shocks: to be agreed
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-27: Environ­
mental testing. Part 2: Tests. Test Ea and
guidance: Shock
219
4.6 Protection against water and
foreign bodies
Test according to ISO 20653: Road vehicles —
Degree of protection (IP code) — Protection of
electrical equipment against foreign objects,
water and access
(Target value IP 64)
220, 221
4.7 Reverse polarity protection Verify that the motion sensor can withstand an
inversion of its power supply
216
4.8 Short circuit protection Verify that input output signals are protected
against short circuits to power supply and
ground
216
5. EMC
5.1 radiated emissions and
susceptibility
Verify compliance with Regulation ECE R10 218
5.2 Electrostatic discharge Compliance with ISO 10605:2008 + Technical
Corrigendum:2010 + AMD1:2014: +/– 4kV for
contact and +/– 8kV for air discharge
218
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 401
No Test Description Related requirements
5.3 Conducted transient suscepti­
bility on data lines)
For 24V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-
2 + ECE Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3:
pulse 1a: Vs = – 450 V Ri = 50 ohms
pulse 2a: Vs = + 37 V Ri = 2 ohms
pulse 2b: Vs = + 20 V Ri = 0,05 ohms
pulse 3a: Vs = – 150 V Ri = 50 ohms
pulse 3b: Vs = + 150 V Ri = 50 ohms
pulse 4: Vs= – 16 V Va = – 12 V t6 = 100ms
pulse 5: Vs = + 120 V Ri = 2,2 ohms td =
250ms
For 12V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-
1 + ECE Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3:
pulse 1: Vs = – 75 V Ri = 10 ohms
pulse 2a: Vs = + 37 V Ri = 2 ohms
pulse 2b: Vs = + 10 V Ri = 0,05 ohms
pulse 3a: Vs = – 112 V Ri = 50 ohms
pulse 3b: Vs = + 75 V Ri = 50 ohms
pulse 4: Vs= – 6 V Va=-5 V t6 = 15 ms
pulse 5: Vs = + 65 V Ri = 3 ohms td = 100 ms
Pulse 5 shall be tested only for vehicle units
designed to be installed in vehicles for which
no external common protection against load
dump is implemented
For load dump proposal, refer to ISO 16750-2,
4th edition, chapter 4.6.4
218
4. TACHOGRAPH CARDS FUNCTIONAL TESTS
Tests according to this Section 4,
no. 5 ‘Protocol tests’,
no. 6 ‘Card structure’ and
no. 7 ‘Functional tests’
can be performed by the evaluator or certifier during the Common
Criteria (CC) security certification process for the chip module.
Tests number 2.3 and 4.2 are the same. These are the mechanical tests of
the combination card body and chip module. If one of these components
(card body, chip module) is changed, then these tests are necessary.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 402
No Test Description Related requirements
1. Administrative examination
1.1 Documentation Correctness of documentation
2 Card Body
2.1 Printed Design Make sure that all features for protection and visible
data are correctly printed on the card and compliant.
[Designator]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 227)
The front page shall contain:
the words ‘Driver card’ or ‘Control card’ or
‘Workshop card’ or ‘Company card’ printed in
capital letters in the official language or languages
of the Member State issuing the card, according to
the type of the card.
[Member State name]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 228)
The front page shall contain:
the name of the Member State issuing the card
(optional).
[Sign]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 229)
The front page shall contain:
the distinguishing sign of the Member State issuing
the card, printed in negative in a blue rectangle and
encircled by 12 yellow stars.
[Enumeration]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 232)
The reverse page shall contain:
an explanation of the numbered items which appear
on the front page of the card.
[Colour]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 234)
Tachograph cards shall be printed with the following
background predominant colours:
— driver card: white,
— workshop card: red,
— control card: blue,
— company card: yellow.
227 to 229, 232, 234
to 236
▼B
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No Test Description Related requirements
[Security]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 235)
Tachograph cards shall bear at least the following
features for protection of the card body against
counterfeiting and tampering:
— a security design background with fine guilloche
patterns and rainbow printing,
— at least one two-coloured microprint line.
[Markings]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 236)
Member States may add colours or markings, such as
national symbols and security features.
[Approval mark]
Tachograph cards shall contain an approval mark.
The approval mark shall be made up of:
— a rectangle, within which shall be placed the letter
‘e’ followed by a distinguishing number or letter
for the country which has issued the approval,
— an approval number corresponding to the number
of the approval certificate for a tachograph card,
placed at any point within the immediate proxi-
mity of this rectangle.
2.2 Mechanical Tests
[Card size]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[5] Dimension of card,
[5.1] Card size,
[5.1.1] Card dimensions and tolererances,
card type ID-1 Unused card
[Card edges]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[5] Dimension of card,
[5.1] Card size,
[5.1.2] Card edges
240, 243
ISO/IEC 7810
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 404
No Test Description Related requirements
[Card construction]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[6] Card construction
[Card materials]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[7] Card materials
[Bending stiffness]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[8] Card characteristics,
[8.1] Bending stiffness
[Toxicity]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[8] Card characteristics,
[8.3] Toxicity
[Resistance to chemicals]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[8] Card characteristics,
[8.4] Resistance to chemicals
[Card stability]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[8] Card characteristics,
[8.5] Card dimensional stability and warpage with
temperature and humidity
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 405
No Test Description Related requirements
[Light]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[8] Card characteristics,
[8.6] Light
[Durability]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.4 ‘Environmental and electrical
specifications’, 241)
Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating
correctly for a five-year period if used within the
environmental and electrical specifications.
[Peel strength]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[8] Card characteristics,
[8.8] Peel strength
[Adhesion or blocking]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[8] Card characteristics,
[8.9] Adhesion or blocking
[Warpage]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[8] Card characteristics,
[8.11] Overall card warpage
[Resistance to heat]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[8] Card characteristics,
[8.12] Resistance to heat
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 406
No Test Description Related requirements
[Surface distortions]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[8] Card characteristics,
[8.13] Surface distortions
[Contamination]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards — Physical
characteristics,
[8] Card characteristics,
[8.14] Contamination and interaction of card
components
2.3 Mechanical tests with
chip module embedded [Bending]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification
cards — Physical characteristics, Amendment 1:
Criteria for cards containing integrated circuits
[9.2] Dynamic bending stress
Total number of bending cycles: 4 000.
[Torsion]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification cards
— Physical characteristics, Amendment 1: Criteria for
cards containing integrated circuits
[9.3] Dynamic torsional stress
Total number of torsion cycles: 4 000.
ISO/IEC 7810
3 Module
3.1 Module
Module is the chip encapsulation and the contact
plate.
[Surface profile]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7816-1:2011, Identification cards — Inte­
grated circuit cards — Part 1: Cards with contacts
— Physical characteristics
[4.2] Surface profile of contacts
ISO/IEC 7816
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 407
No Test Description Related requirements
[Mechanical strength]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7816-1:2011, Identification cards — Inte­
grated circuit cards — Part 1: Cards with contacts
— Physical characteristics
[4.3] Mechanical strength (of a card and contacts)
[Electrical resistance]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7816-1:2011, Identification cards — Inte-
grated circuit cards — Part 1: Cards with contacts —
Physical characteristics
[4.4] Electrical resistance (of contacts)
[Dimension]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007, Identification cards — Inte-
grated circuit cards — Part 2: Cards with contacts —
Dimension and location of the contacts
[3] Dimension of the contacts
[Location]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007, Identification cards — Inte-
grated circuit cards — Part 2: Cards with contacts —
Dimension and location of the contacts
[4] Number and location of the contacts
In case of modules with six contacts, contact ‘C4’ and
‘C8’ are not part of this test requirement.
4 Chip
4.1 Chip
[Operating temperature]
The Tachograph card chip shall operate in an
ambient temperature range between – 25 °C and +
85 °C.
241 to 244
ECE R10
ISO/IEC 7810
ISO/IEC 10373
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 408
No Test Description Related requirements
[Temperature and humidity]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.4 ‘Environmental and electrical
specifications’, 241)
Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating
correctly in all the climatic conditions normally
encountered in Community territory and at least in
the temperature range – 25°C to + 70°C with occa­
sional peaks of up to + 85°C, ‘occasional’ meaning
not more than 4 hours each time and not over 100
times during the life time of the card.
The Tachograph cards are exposed in consecutive
steps to the following temperatures and humidities
for the given time. After each step the Tachograph
cards are tested for electrical functionality.
1. Temperature of – 20 °C for 2 h.
2. Temperature of +/– 0 °C for 2 h.
3. Temperature of + 20 °C, 50 % RH, for 2 h.
4. Temperature of + 50 °C, 50 % RH, for 2 h.
5. Temperature of + 70 °C, 50 % RH, for 2 h.
The temperature is increased intermittently to +
85 °C, 50 % RH, for 60 min.
6. Temperature of + 70 °C, 85 % RH, for 2 h.
The temperature is increased intermittently to +
85 °C, 85 % RH, for 30 min.
[Humidity]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.4 ‘Environmental and electrical
specifications’, 242)
Tachograph cards shall be capable of operating
correctly in the humidity range 10 % to 90 %.
[Electromagnetic compatibility — EMC]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.4 ‘Environmental and electrical
specifications’ 244)
During operation, Tachograph cards shall conform to
ECE R10 related to electromagnetic compatibility.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 409
No Test Description Related requirements
[Static electricity]
Annex 1C, chapter 4.4 ‘Environmental and electrical
specifications’, 244)
During operation, Tachograph cards shall be protected
against electrostatic discharges.
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification cards
— Physical characteristics, Amendment 1: Criteria for
cards containing integrated circuits
[9.4] Static electricity
[9.4.1] Contact IC cards
Test voltage: 4 000 V.
[X-rays]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification cards
— Physical characteristics, Amendment 1: Criteria for
cards containing integrated circuits
[9.1] X-rays
[Ultraviolet light]
ISO/IEC 10373-1:2006, Identification cards — Test
methods — Part 1: General characteristics
[5.11] Ultraviolet light
[3-wheel]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 10373-1:2006/Amd. 1:2012, Identification
cards — Test methods — Part 1: General character-
istics, Amendment 1
[5.22] ICC — Mechanical strength: 3 wheel test for
ICCs with contacts
[Wrapping]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
MasterCard CQM V2.03:2013
[11.1.3] R-L3-14-8: Wrapping Test Robustness
[13.2.1.32] TM-422: Mechanical Reliability: Wrap-
ping Test
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 410
No Test Description Related requirements
4.2 Mechanical tests chip
module embedded in
the card body-> same
as 2.3
[Bending]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification
cards — Physical characteristics, Amendment 1:
Criteria for cards containing integrated circuits
[9.2] Dynamic bending stress
Total number of bending cycles: 4 000.
[Torsion]
Tachograph cards must conform to standard
ISO/IEC 7810:2003/Amd. 1:2009, Identification cards
— Physical characteristics, Amendment 1: Criteria for
cards containing integrated circuits
[9.3] Dynamic torsional stress
Total number of torsion cycles: 4 000.
ISO/IEC 7810
5 Protocol tests
5.1 ATR Check that the ATR is compliant ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS_14, TCS_17,
TCS_18
5.2 T=0 Check that T=0 protocol is compliant ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS_11, TCS_12,
TCS_13, TCS_15
5.3 PTS Check that the PTS command is compliant by setting
T=1 from T=0.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS_12, TCS_19,
TCS_20, TCS_21
5.4 T=1 Check that T=1 protocol is compliant ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS_11, TCS_13,
TCS_16
6 Card structure
6.1 Test that the file structure of the card is compliant by
checking the presence of the mandatory files in the
card and their access conditions
TCS_22 to TCS_28
TCS_140 to
TCS_179
7 Functional tests
7.1 Normal processing Test at least once each allowed usage of each
command (ex: test the UPDATE BINARY command
with CLA = ‘00’, CLA = ‘0C’ and with different
P1,P2 and Lc parameters)
Check that the operations have actually been
performed in the card (ex: by reading the file the
command has been performed on)
TCS_29 to TCS_139
▼B
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No Test Description Related requirements
7.2 Error messages Test at least once each error message (as specified in
Appendix 2) for each command
Test at least once every generic error (except ‘6400’
integrity errors checked during security certification)
7.3 Cypher suite and standardized domain parameters CSM_48, CSM_50
8 Personalisation
8.1 Optical personalisation
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 230)
The front page shall contain:
information specific to the card issued.
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 231)
The front page shall contain:
dates using a ‘dd/mm/yyyy’ or ‘dd.mm.yyyy’ format
(day, month, year).
Annex 1C, chapter 4.1 ‘Visible data’, 235)
Tachograph cards shall bear at least the following
features for protection of the card body against
counterfeiting and tampering:
— in the area of the photograph, the security design
background and the photograph shall overlap.
230, 231, 235
5. EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY TESTS
No Test Description Related requirements
1. Administrative examination
1.1 Documentation Correctness of documentation
2. Visual inspection for external GNSS facility
2.1. Compliance with documentation
2.2. Identification/markings 224 to 226
2.3 Materials 219 to 223
3. Functional tests
3.1 Sensor identification data 98,99
3.2 External GNSS module — vehicle unit coupling 123, 205
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No Test Description Related requirements
3.3 GNSS position 36, 37
3.4 Vehicle unit interface when the GNSS receiver is external to the Vehicle Unit 03
3.5 Cypher suite and standardized domain parameters CSM_48, CSM_50
4. Environmental tests
4.1 Temperature Verify functionality through:
Test according to ISO 16750-4, Chapter 5.1.1.2: Low
temperature operation test (72 h @ – 20 °C)
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-1: Environmental testing —
Part 2-1: Tests — Test A: Cold
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.1.2.2: High
temperature operation test (72 h @ 70 °C)
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-2: Basic environmental
testing procedures; part 2: tests; tests B: dry heat
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.3.2: Rapid change
of temperature with specified transition duration (– 20 °C/
70 °C, 20 cycles, dwell time 1 h at each temperature)
A reduced set of tests (among those defined in section 3 of
this table) can be carried out at the lower temperature, the
higher temperature and during the temperature cycles
213
4.2 Humidity Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand a cyclic damp (heat
test) through IEC 60068-2-30, test Db, six 24 hours cycles,
each temperature varying from + 25 °C to + 55 °C and a
relative humidity of 97 % at + 25 °C and equal to 93 %
at + 55 °C
214
4.3 Mechanical 1. Sinusoidal vibrations.
verify that the vehicle unit can withstand sinusoidal
vibrations with the following characteristics:
constant displacement between 5 and 11 Hz: 10 mm peak
constant acceleration between 11 and 300 Hz: 5g
This requirement is verified through IEC 60068-2-6, test
Fc, with a minimum test duration of 3 × 12 hours
(12 hours per axis)
ISO 16750-3 does not require a sinusoidal vibration test
for devices located in the decoupled vehicle cab.
219
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No Test Description Related requirements
2. Random vibrations:
Test according to ISO 16750-3: Chapter 4.1.2.8: Test VIII:
Commercial vehicle, decoupled vehicle cab
Random vibration test, 10…2 000 Hz, RMS vertical
21,3 m/s 2 , RMS longitudinal 11,8 m/s 2 , RMS lateral
13,1 m/s 2 , 3 axes, 32 h per axis, including temperature
c y c l e – 2 0 … 7 0 ° C .
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-64: Environmental testing
— Part 2-64: Tests — Test Fh: Vibration, broadband
random and guidance
3. Shocks:
mechanical shock with 3g half sinus according ISO 16750.
The tests described above are performed on different samples
of the equipment type being tested.
4.4 Protection
against water
and foreign
bodies
Test according to ISO 20653: Road vehicles — Degree of
protection (IP code) — Protection of electrical equipment
against foreign objects, water and access (No change in
parameters)
220, 221
4.5 Over-voltage
protection
Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand a power supply of: 216
24 V versions: 34 V at + 40 °C 1 hour
12V versions: 17 V at + 40 °C 1 hour
( ISO 16750-2, chapter 4.3)
4.6 Reverse
polarity
protection
Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand an inversion of its
power supply
(ISO 16750-2, chapter 4.7)
216
4.7 Short-circuit
protection
Verify that input output signals are protected against short
circuits to power supply and ground
(ISO 16750-2, chapter 4.10])
216
5 EMC tests
5.1 Radiated
emissions and
susceptibility
Compliance with Regulation ECE R10 218
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No Test Description Related requirements
5.2 Electrostatic
discharge
Compliance with ISO 10605:2008 + Technical Corrigendum:
2010 + AMD1:2014: +/– 4kV for contact and +/– 8kV for
air discharge
218
5.3 Conducted
transient
susceptibility
on power
supply
For 24V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-2 + ECE
Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3:
pulse 1a: Vs = – 450V Ri = 50 ohms
pulse 2a: Vs= + 37V Ri = 2 ohms
pulse 2b: Vs= + 20V Ri = 0,05 ohms
pulse 3a: Vs= – 150V Ri = 50 ohms
pulse 3b: Vs=+ 150V Ri = 50 ohms
pulse 4: Vs = – 16 V Va = – 12V t6 = 100 ms
pulse 5: Vs= + 120 V Ri = 2,2 ohms td = 250 ms
For 12V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-1 + ECE
Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3:
pulse 1: Vs= – 75V Ri=10 ohms
pulse 2a: Vs= + 37V Ri=2 ohms
pulse 2b: Vs= + 10V Ri=0,05 ohms
pulse 3a: Vs= – 112V Ri=50 ohms
pulse 3b: Vs= + 75V Ri=50 ohms
pulse 4: Vs= – 6V Va=-5V t6=15ms
pulse 5: Vs= + 65V Ri=3ohms td=100ms
Pulse 5 shall be tested only for vehicle units designed to be
installed in vehicles for which no external common
protection against load dump is implemented
For load dump proposal, refer to ISO 16750-2, 4th edition,
chapter 4.6.4.
218
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6. EXTERNAL REMOTE COMMUNICATION FACILITY TEST
No Test Description Related requirements
1. Administrative examination
1.1 Documentation Correctness of docu­
mentation
2. Visual inspection
2.1. Compliance with documentation
2.2. Identification / markings 225, 226
2.3 Materials 219 to 223
3. Functional tests
3.1 Remote communication for targeted roadside checks 4, 197 to 199
3.2 Recording and storing in data memory 91
3.3 Communication with Vehicle Unit Appendix 14
DSC_66 to DSC_70,
DSC_71 to DSC_76
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No Test Description Related requirements
4. Environmental tests
4.1 Temperature Verify functionality through:
Test according to ISO 16750-4, Chapter 5.1.1.2: Low
temperature operation test (72 h @ – 20 °C)
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-1: Environmental testing
- Part 2-1: Tests - Test A: Cold
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.1.2.2: High
temperature operation test (72 h @ 70 °C)
This test refers to IEC 60068-2-2: Basic environmental
testing procedures; part 2: tests; tests B: dry heat
Test according to ISO 16750-4: Chapter 5.3.2: Rapid
change of temperature with specified transition duration
(– 20 °C/70 °C, 20 cycles, dwell time 1 h at each
temperature)
A reduced set of tests (among those defined in section 3
of this table) can be carried out at the lower temperature,
the higher temperature and during the temperature cycles
213
4.2 Protection against
water and foreign
bodies
Test according to ISO 20653: Road vehicles – Degree of
protection (IP code) – Protection of electrical equipment
against foreign objects, water and access (targeted value
IP40)
220, 221
5 EMC tests
5.1 Radiated emissions
and susceptibility
Compliance with Regulation ECE R10 218
5.2 Electrostatic
discharge
Compliance with ISO 10605:2008 + Technical Corri­
gendum:2010 + AMD1:2014: +/– 4 kV for contact and
+/– 8 kV for air discharge
218
5.3 Conducted transient
susceptibility on
power supply
For 24V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-2 + ECE
Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3:
pulse 1a: Vs=– 450V Ri=50 ohms
pulse 2a: Vs=+37V Ri=2 ohms
pulse 2b: Vs=+20V Ri=0,05 ohms
pulse 3a: Vs=– 150V Ri=50 ohms
pulse 3b: Vs=+150V Ri=50 ohms
pulse 4: Vs=– 16V Va=-12V t6=100ms
pulse 5: Vs=+120V Ri=2,2 ohms td=250ms
For 12V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-1 + ECE
Regulation No. 10 Rev. 3:
pulse 1: Vs=-75V Ri=10 ohms
pulse 2a: Vs=+37V Ri=2 ohms
pulse 2b: Vs=+10V Ri=0,05 ohms
pulse 3a: Vs=– 112V Ri=50 ohms
218
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No Test Description Related requirements
pulse 3b: Vs=+75V Ri=50 ohms
pulse 4: Vs=– 6V Va=– 5V t6=15ms
pulse 5: Vs=+65V Ri=3ohms td=100ms
Pulse 5 shall be tested only for vehicle units designed to
be installed in vehicles for which no external common
protection against load dump is implemented
For load dump proposal, refer to ISO 16750-2, 4th
edition, chapter 4.6.4.
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7. PAPER FUNCTIONAL TESTS
No Test Description Related requirements
1. Administrative examination
1.1 Documentation Correctness of documentation
2 General Tests
2.1 Number of characters
per line
Visual inspection of printouts. 172
2.2 Minimum character
size
Visual inspection of printout and character inspection. 173
2.3 Supported character
sets
The printer shall support characters specified in Appendix
1 Chapter 4 ‘Character sets’.
174
2.4 Printouts definition Check of tachograph type approval and visual inspection
of printouts
174
2.5 Legibility and identi­
fication of printouts
Inspection of printouts
Demonstrated by test reports and test protocols by
manufacturer.
All homologation number(s) of tachographs with which
the printer paper may be used are imprinted on the
paper.
175, 177, 178
2.6 Addition of hand­
written notes
Visual inspection: Field for signature of the driver is
available.
Fields for additional other handwritten entries are
available.
180
2.7 Additional details on
paper faces.
Paper's face and reverse side may feature additional
details and information.
These additional details and information may not
interfere with the legibility of the printouts.
Visual inspection.
177, 178
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No Test Description Related requirements
3 Storage Tests
3.1 Dry Heat Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 %
± 3 % relative humidity
Test environment: 72 hours at + 70 °C ± 2 °C
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 %
relative humidity
176, 178
IEC 60068-2-2-Bb
2.2 Damp Heat Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 %
±3 % relative humidity
Test environment: 144 hours at + 55 °C ± 2 °C and
93 % ± 3 % r.h.
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 %
relative humidity
176, 178
IEC 60068-2-78-Cab
4 Paper In-Service Tests
4.1 Humidity resistance
background (unpri­
nted paper)
Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 %
±3 % relative humidity
Test environment: 144 hours at + 55 °C ± 2 °C and
93 % ± 3 % r.h.
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 %
relative humidity
176, 178
IEC 60068-2-78-Cab
4.2 Printability Preconditioning: 24 hours at + 40 °C ± 2 °C/93 %
± 3 % relative humidity
Test environment: printout produced at + 23 °C ± 2 °C
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 %
relative humidity
176, 178
4.3 Heat resistance Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 %
± 3 % relative humidity
Test environment: 2 hours at + 70 °C ± 2 °C, dry heat
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 %
relative humidity
176, 178
IEC 60068-2-2-Bb
4.4 Low temperature
resistance
Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 %
± 3 % relative humidity
Test environment: 24 hours – 20 °C ± 3 °C, dry cold
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 %
relative humidity
176, 178
ISO 60068-2-1-Ab
4.5 Light resistance Preconditioning: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 %
± 3 % relative humidity
Test environment: 100 hours under 5 000 Lux illumi­
nation at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 % relative humidity
Recovery: 16 hours at + 23 °C ± 2 °C/55 % ± 3 %
relative humidity
176, 178
Legibility criteria for tests 3.x and 4.x:
Printout legibility is assured if optical densities comply with the following
limits:
Printed characters: min. 1,0
Background (unprinted paper): max. 0,2
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Optical densities of the resulting printouts shall be measured according to
DIN EN ISO 534.
Printouts shall show no dimensional changes and remain clearly legible.
8. INTEROPERABILITY TESTS
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No Test Description
8.1 Interoperability tests between vehicle units and tachograph cards
1 Mutual authentication Check that the mutual authentication between the vehicle unit and
the tachograph card runs normally
2 Write/read tests Execute a typical activity scenario on the vehicle unit. The scenario
shall be adapted to the type of card being tested and involve
writings in as many EFs as possible in the card
Verify through a vehicle unit downloading that all corresponding
recordings have been properly made
Verify through a card downloading that all corresponding
recordings have been properly made
Verify through daily printouts that all corresponding recordings can
be properly read
8.2 Interoperability tests between vehicle units and motion sensors
1 Pairing Check that the pairing between the vehicle units and the motion
sensors runs normally
2 Activity tests Execute a typical activity scenario on the motion sensor. The
scenario shall involve a normal activity and creating as many
events or faults as possible.
Verify through a vehicle unit downloading that all corresponding
recordings have been properly made
Verify through a card downloading that all corresponding
recordings have been properly made
Verify through a daily printout that all corresponding recordings
can be properly read
8.3 Interoperability tests between vehicle units and external GNSS facilities (when applicable)
1 Mutual authentication Check that the mutual authentication (coupling) between the
vehicle unit and the external GNSS module runs normally.
2 Activity tests Execute a typical activity scenario on the external GNSS facility.
The scenario shall involve a normal activity and creating as many
events or faults as possible.
Verify through a vehicle unit downloading that all corresponding
recordings have been properly made
Verify through a card downloading that all corresponding
recordings have been properly made
Verify through a daily printout that all corresponding recordings
can be properly read
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9. OSNMA TESTS
9.1. Introduction
This chapter describes the tests to prove the correct implementation of
OSNMA in the GNSS receiver. Since satellite signal authentication is
carried out solely by the GNSS receiver with independence of any other
component of the tachograph, the tests set out in this chapter may be
performed on the GNSS receiver as a stand-alone element. In this case,
the tachograph manufacturer shall present a report to the type-approval
authorities providing details about the development and results of the tests
that are performed under the responsibility of the GNSS receiver
manufacturer.
9.2 Applicable conditions
— The pass/fail criteria defined in the OSNMA tests shall be considered
valid only for the identified testing conditions.
— The criteria might be revised at the moment of the Galileo OSNMA
service declaration and considering the associated service performance
commitments.
9.3. Definitions and acronyms
9.3.1 Definitions
GNSS cold/warm/hot start: refers to the start condition of a GNSS
receiver based on the availability of
time (T), current almanac (A) and
ephemeris (E), position (P):
— GNSS Cold Start: none
— GNSS Warm Start: T, A, P
— GNSS Hot Start: T, A, E, P
OSNMA cold/warm/hot start: refers to the start condition of the OSNMA
function based on the availability of the
Public Key (P) and DSM-KROOT (K)
information (as defined in the OSNMA
Receiver Guidelines referred to in
Appendix 12):
— OSNMA Cold Start: none
— OSNMA Warm Start: P
— OSNMA Hot Start: P, K
9.3.2 Acronyms
ADKD Authentication Data & Key Delay
DSM-KROOT Digital Signature Message KROOT
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
KROOT Root Key of the TESLA key chain
MAC Message Authentication Code
NMACK Number of MAC & key blocks (per 30 seconds)
OSNMA Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication
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SLMAC Slow MAC
TESLA Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication
(Protocol used in OSNMA)
9.4. Equipment for the generation of the GNSS signals
The generation of the GNSS signals can be carried out using a multi-
constellation GNSS simulator supporting OSNMA message transmission.
Alternatively, a radiofrequency signal re-player capable of playing back
GNSS signal samples from files can be used. Typical bit depth and
sampling rate are respectively 4 bits I/Q and 10MHz.
It is assumed that the GNSS receiver has interfaces to command the
clearing of the receiver memory (to independently erase the public key,
KROOT, clock information, position information, ephemeris and
almanac), to set the receiver local time realisation for the OSNMA
timing verification requirement, and to load the cryptographic information.
These commands may be limited to test purposes and therefore may not
be available for the receiver nominal operation.
9.5 Test conditions
9.5.1 GNSS conditions
The simulated or replayed GNSS signals will have the following features:
— Static user receiver scenario;
— At least GPS and Galileo constellations;
— E1/L1 frequency;
— At least 4 Galileo satellites with elevation angle greater than 5°;
— Duration as required for each test;
— Constant navigation ephemerides from the satellites during the test.
9.5.2 OSNMA conditions
The OSNMA message transmitted in the RF signal will have the
following features:
— An HKROOT message with OSNMA Status set to Operational or Test
and a fixed DSM-KROOT of 8 blocks for the chain in force;
— At least 4 Galileo satellites transmitting OSNMA;
— A MACK message with one MACK block (i.e. NMACK=1), and at
least one ADKD=0 and one ADKD=12 per satellite and MACK block;
— A tag size of 40 bits;
— The minimum equivalent tag length as required in the OSNMA
Receiver Guidelines (currently 80 bits).
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Except when noted, the internal receiver time realisation shall be known
with sufficient accuracy and properly aligned with the simulated time.
This guarantees that the OSNMA initial time synchronisation requirement
is fulfilled for each test condition, i.e., nominal synchronization for all but
the SLMAC test. See the OSNMA Receiver Guidelines for more details
on the time initialization.
Note that the identified pass/fail criteria are conservative and do not
represent the expected Galileo OSNMA performance.
9.6. Tests specification
No Test Description Related requirements
1. Administrative examination
1.1 Documentation Correctness of documentation
2 General Tests
2.1 OSNMA hot start Objective: verify that the GNSS receiver computes a
position with OSNMA after a hot start.
Procedure:
The GNSS receiver starts in GNSS and OSNMA hot
start conditions and acquires the signals of visible
Galileo satellites.
The receiver authenticates the Galileo navigation data
with OSNMA (ADKD = 0) and provides a position
with authenticated data.
Pass/fail criteria: the receiver computes an authenticated
position fix within 160 seconds.
Appendix 12,
GNS_3b
2.2 OSNMA warm start Objective: verify that the GNSS receiver computes a
position with OSNMA after a warm start.
Procedure:
Before starting the test, the ephemeris and KROOT
information shall be erased from the GNSS receiver
memory in order to force a warm GNSS and
OSNMA start.
The GNSS receiver starts and acquires the signals of
the visible Galileo satellites.
The DSM-KROOT is received and verified.
The receiver authenticates the Galileo navigation data
with OSNMA (ADKD=0) and provides a position with
authenticated data.
Pass/fail criteria: the receiver computes an authenticated
valid position fix within 430 seconds.
Appendix 12,
GNS_3b
2.3 OSNMA warm start
with SLMAC
Objective: verify that the GNSS receiver computes a
position with OSNMA after a warm start with a time
initialisation requiring SLMAC mode, as defined in the
OSNMA Receiver Guidelines.
Procedure:
The internal receiver time realisation shall be
configured in order to have an initial time uncertainty
of a value between 2 and 2.5 minutes so that, according
to OSNMA Receiver Guidelines, the Slow MAC mode
is activated.
Appendix 12,
GNS_3b
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No Test Description Related requirements
Before starting the tests, the ephemeris and KROOT
information shall be erased from the GNSS receiver
memory in order to force a warm GNSS and
OSNMA start.
The GNSS receiver starts and acquires the signals of
the visible Galileo satellites.
The DSM-KROOT is received and verified.
The receiver authenticates the Galileo navigation data
with only OSNMA Slow MAC (ADKD=12) and
provides a position with authenticated data.
Pass/fail criteria: the receiver computes an authenticated
valid position fix within 730 seconds.
2.4 OSNMA hot start with
replayed signal
Objective: verify that the GNSS receiver detects a
replayed signal.
Procedure:
The GNSS receiver starts in GNSS and OSNMA hot
start conditions and acquires the signals of visible
Galileo satellites.
The receiver authenticates the Galileo navigation data
with OSNMA (ADKD=0) and provides a position with
authenticated data.
Once the receiver provides PVT solution with auth­
enticated data, it is switched off.
A replayed signal with a delay of 40 seconds with
respect to the previous one is simulated, and the
receiver is switched on.
The receiver detects that the Galileo System Time from
the signal-in-space time and the local timing realisation
do not meet the synchronisation requirement and it
stops processing OSNMA data as defined in OSNMA
Receiver Guidelines.
Pass/fail criteria: the receiver detects the replay and
does not compute an authenticated valid position
since the start of the replay until the end of the test.
Appendix 12,
GNS_3b
2.5 OSNMA hot start with
false data
Objective: Verify that OSNMA detects false data.
Procedure:
The GNSS receiver starts in GNSS and OSNMA hot
start conditions.
The GNSS receiver shall be able to acquire the signal
of all the visible Galileo satellites and verify the auth­
enticity of their navigation messages by means of
OSNMA.
At least one bit of the ephemeris data provided by each
Galileo satellite does not correspond with the original
and authenticated data, but the Galileo I/NAV message
must be coherent, including CRC.
Pass/fail criteria: the receiver detects the false data
within 160 seconds and does not compute an auth­
enticated valid position until the end of the test.
Appendix 12,
GNS_3b
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Appendix 10
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
This appendix specifies the IT security requirements for the smart tachograph
system components (second-generation tachograph).
SEC_001 The following components of the smart tachograph system shall be
security certified according to the Common Criteria scheme:
— vehicle unit
— tachograph card,
— motion sensor,
— external GNSS facility.
SEC_002 The minimum IT security requirements to be met by each component
needing to be security certified shall be defined in a component
Protection Profile, according to the Common Criteria scheme.
SEC_003 The European Commission shall make sure that four Protection
Profiles compliant with this Annex are sponsored, developed,
approved by the governmental IT security certification bodies
organised within the Joint Interpretation Working Group (JIWG)
which is supporting the mutual recognition of certificates under the
umbrella of the European SOGIS-MRA (Agreement on Mutual Recog­
nition of Information Technology Security Evaluation Certificates) and
registered:
— Protection Profile for vehicle unit,
— Protection Profile for tachograph card,
— Protection Profile for motion sensor,
— Protection Profile for external GNSS facility.
The Protection Profile for vehicle unit shall address the cases when the VU is
designed to be used or not with an external GNSS facility. In the former case, the
security requirements of the external GNSS facility are provided in the dedicated
Protection Profile.
SEC_004 Component manufacturers shall refine and complete the appropriate
component Protection Profile as necessary, without amending or
deleting existing threats, objectives, procedural means and security
enforcing functions specifications, in order to build a Security
Target against which they shall seek the security certification of the
component.
SEC_005 Strict conformance of such specific Security Target with the corre­
sponding Protection Profile must be stated during the evaluation
process.
SEC_006 The assurance level for each Protection Profile shall be EAL4
augmented by the assurance components ATE_DPT.2 and
AVA_VAN.5.
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Appendix 11
COMMON SECURITY MECHANISMS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREAMBLE
PART A FIRST-GENERATION TACHOGRAPH SYSTEM
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. References
1.2. Notations and abbreviated terms
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND ALGORITHMS
2.1. Cryptographic systems
2.2. Cryptographic algorithms
2.2.1 RSA algorithm
2.2.2 Hash algorithm
2.2.3 Data Encryption Algorithm
3. KEYS AND CERTIFICATES
3.1. Keys generation and distribution
3.1.1 RSA Keys generation and distribution
3.1.2 RSA Test keys
3.1.3 Motion sensor keys
3.1.4 T-DES session keys generation and distribution
3.2. Keys
3.3. Certificates
3.3.1 Certificates content
3.3.2 Certificates issued
3.3.3 Certificate verification and unwrapping
4. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM
5. VU-CARDS DATA TRANSFER CONFIDENTIALITY,
INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS
5.1. Secure Messaging
5.2. Treatment of Secure Messaging errors
5.3. Algorithm to compute Cryptographic Checksums
5.4. Algorithm to compute cryptograms for confidentiality DOs
6. DATA DOWNLOAD DIGITAL SIGNATURE MECHANISMS
6.1. Signature generation
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6.2. Signature verification
PART B SECOND-GENERATION TACHOGRAPH SYSTEM
7. INTRODUCTION
7.1. References
7.2. Notations and Abbreviations
7.3. Definitions
8. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND ALGORITHMS
8.1. Cryptographic Systems
8.2. Cryptographic Algorithms
8.2.1 Symmetric Algorithms
8.2.2 Asymmetric Algorithms and Standardized Domain Parameters
8.2.3 Hashing algorithms
8.2.4 Cipher Suites
9. KEYS AND CERTIFICATES
9.1. Asymmetric Key Pairs and Public Key Certificates
9.1.1 General
9.1.2 European Level
9.1.3 Member State Level
9.1.4 Equipment Level: Vehicle Units
9.1.5 Equipment Level: Tachograph Cards
9.1.6 Equipment Level: External GNSS Facilities
9.1.7 Overview: Certificate Replacement
9.2. Symmetric Keys
9.2.1 Keys for Securing VU — Motion Sensor Communication
9.2.2 Keys for Securing DSRC Communication
9.3. Certificates
9.3.1 General
9.3.2 Certificate Content
9.3.3 Requesting Certificates
10. VU- CARD MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND SECURE
MESSAGING
10.1. General
10.2. Mutual Certificate Chain Verification
10.2.1 Card Certificate Chain Verification by VU
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10.2.2 VU Certificate Chain Verification by Card
10.3. VU Authentication
10.4. Chip Authentication and Session Key Agreement
10.5. Secure Messaging
10.5.1 General
10.5.2 Secure Message Structure
10.5.3 Secure Messaging Session Abortion
11. VU — EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY COUPLING, MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATION AND SECURE MESSAGING
11.1. General
11.2. VU and External GNSS Facility Coupling
11.3. Mutual Certificate Chain Verification
11.3.1 General
11.3.2 During VU — EGF Coupling
11.3.3 During Normal Operation
11.4. VU Authentication, Chip Authentication and Session Key
Agreement
11.5. Secure Messaging
12. VU — MOTION SENSOR PAIRING AND COMMUNICATION
12.1. General
12.2. VU — Motion Sensor Pairing Using Different Key Generations
12.3. VU — Motion Sensor Pairing and Communication using AES
12.4. VU — Motion Sensor Pairing For Different Equipment
Generations
13. SECURITY FOR REMOTE COMMUNICATION OVER DSRC
13.1. General
13.2. Tachograph Payload Encryption and MAC Generation
13.3. Verification and Decryption of Tachograph Payload
14. SIGNING DATA DOWNLOADS AND VERIFYING
SIGNATURES
14.1. General
14.2. Signature generation
14.3. Signature verification
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PREAMBLE
This Appendix specifies the security mechanisms ensuring
— mutual authentication between different components of the tachograph
system.
— confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and/or non-repudiation of data trans­
ferred between different components of the tachograph system or downloaded
to external storage media.
This Appendix consists of two parts. Part A defines the security mechanisms for
the first-generation tachograph system (digital tachograph). Part B defines the
security mechanisms for the second-generation tachograph system (smart
tachograph).
The mechanisms specified in Part A of this Appendix shall apply if at least one
of the components of the tachograph system involved in a mutual authentication
and/or data transfer process is of the first generation.
The mechanisms specified in Part B of this Appendix shall apply if both
components of the tachograph system involved in the mutual authentication
and/or data transfer process are of the second generation.
Appendix 15 provides more information regarding the use of first generation
components in combination with second-generation components.
PART A
FIRST-GENERATION TACHOGRAPH SYSTEM
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. References
The following references are used in this Appendix:
SHA-1 National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). FIPS Publication 180-1: Secure Hash
Standard. April 1995.
PKCS1 RSA Laboratories. PKCS # 1: RSA Encryption
Standard. Version 2.0. October 1998.
TDES National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). FIPS Publication 46-3: Data Encryption
Standard. Draft 1999.
TDES-OP ANSI X9.52, Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
Modes of Operation. 1998.
ISO/IEC 7816-4 Information Technology — Identification cards —
Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 4:
Interindustry commands for interexchange. First
edition: 1995 + Amendment 1: 1997.
ISO/IEC 7816-6 Information Technology — Identification cards —
Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 6:
Interindustry data elements. First edition: 1996 + Cor
1: 1998.
ISO/IEC 7816-8 Information Technology — Identification cards —
Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 8:
Security related interindustry commands. First edition
1999.
ISO/IEC 9796-2 Information Technology — Security techniques —
Digital signature schemes giving message recovery
— Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash function. First
edition: 1997.
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ISO/IEC 9798-3 Information Technology — Security techniques —
Entity authentication mechanisms — Part 3: Entity
authentication using a public key algorithm. Second
edition 1998.
ISO 16844-3 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 3:
Motion sensor interface.
1.2. Notations and abbreviated terms
The following notations and abbreviated terms are used in this Appendix:
(K a , K b , K c ) a key bundle for use by the Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm,
CA Certification Authority,
CAR Certification Authority Reference,
CC Cryptographic Checksum,
CG Cryptogram,
CH Command Header,
CHA Certificate Holder Authorisation,
CHR Certificate Holder Reference,
D() Decryption with DES,
DE Data Element,
DO Data Object,
d RSA private key, private exponent,
e RSA public key, public exponent,
E() Encryption with DES,
EQT Equipment,
Hash() hash value, an output of Hash,
Hash hash function,
KID Key Identifier,
Km TDES key. Master Key defined in ISO 16844-3.
Km VU TDES key inserted in vehicle units.
Km WC TDES key inserted in workshop cards.
m message representative, an integer between 0 and n-1,
n RSA keys, modulus,
PB Padding Bytes,
PI Padding Indicator byte (for use in Cryptogram for
confidentiality DO),
PV Plain Value,
s signature representative, an integer between 0 and n-1,
SSC Send Sequence Counter,
SM Secure Messaging,
TCBC TDEA Cipher Block Chaining Mode of Operation
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TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm,
TLV Tag Length Value,
VU Vehicle Unit,
X.C the certificate of user X issued by a certification
authority,
X.CA a certification authority of user X,
X.CA.PK o X.C the operation of unwrapping a certificate to extract a
public key. It is an infix operator, whose left operand
is the public key of a certification authority, and
whose right operand is the certificate issued by that
certification authority. The outcome is the public key
of the user X whose certificate is the right operand,
X.PK RSA public key of a user X,
X.PK[I] RSA encipherment of some information I, using the
public key of user X,
X.SK RSA private key of a user X,
X.SK[I] RSA encipherment of some information I, using the
private key of user X,
‘xx’ an Hexadecimal value,
|| concatenation operator.
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND ALGORITHMS
2.1. Cryptographic systems
CSM_001 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall use a classical RSA
public-key cryptographic system to provide the following
security mechanisms:
— authentication between vehicle units and cards,
— transport of Triple-DES session keys between vehicle
units and tachograph cards,
— digital signature of data downloaded from vehicle units or
tachograph cards to external media.
CSM_002 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall use a Triple DES
symmetric cryptographic system to provide a mechanism for
data integrity during user data exchange between vehicle units
and tachograph cards, and to provide, where applicable, confi­
dentiality of data exchange between vehicle units and
tachograph cards.
2.2. Cryptographic algorithms
2.2.1 RSA algorithm
CSM_003 The RSA algorithm is fully defined by the following
relations:
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X.SK[m] = s = m d mod n
X.PK[s] = m = s e mod n
A more comprehensive description of the RSA function can
be found in reference [PKCS1]. Public exponent, e, for RSA
calculations is an integer between 3 and n-1 satisfying gcd(e,
lcm(p-1, q-1))=1.
2.2.2 Hash algorithm
CSM_004 The digital signature mechanisms shall use the SHA-1 hash
algorithm as defined in reference [SHA-1].
2.2.3 Data Encryption Algorithm
CSM_005 DES based algorithms shall be used in Cipher Block
Chaining mode of operation.
3. KEYS AND CERTIFICATES
3.1. Keys generation and distribution
3.1.1 RSA Keys generation and distribution
CSM_006 RSA keys shall be generated through three functional hier­
archical levels:
— European level,
— Member State level,
— Equipment level.
CSM_007 At European level, a single European key pair
(EUR.SK and EUR.PK) shall be generated. The European
private key shall be used to certify the Member States
public keys. Records of all certified keys shall be kept.
These tasks shall be handled by a European Certification
Authority, under the authority and responsibility of the
European Commission.
CSM_008 At Member State level, a Member State key pair (MS.SK and
MS.PK) shall be generated. Member States public keys shall
be certified by the European Certification Authority. The
Member State private key shall be used to certify public
keys to be inserted in equipment (vehicle unit or tachograph
card). Records of all certified public keys shall be kept with
the identification of the equipment to which it is intended.
These tasks shall be handled by a Member State Certification
Authority. A Member State may regularly change its key pair.
CSM_009 At equipment level, one single key pair (EQT.SK and
EQT.PK) shall be generated and inserted in each equipment.
Equipment public keys shall be certified by a Member State
Certification Authority. These tasks may be handled by
equipment manufacturers, equipment personalisers or
Member State authorities. This key pair is used for authenti­
cation, digital signature and encipherement services
CSM_010 Private keys confidentiality shall be maintained during
generation, transport (if any) and storage.
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The following picture summarises the data flow of this
process:
3.1.2 RSA Test keys
CSM_011 For the purpose of equipment testing (including interoper­
ability tests) the European Certification Authority shall
generate a different single European test key pair and at
least two Member State test key pairs, the public keys of
which shall be certified with the European private test key.
Manufacturers shall insert, in equipment undergoing type
approval tests, test keys certified by one of these Member
State test keys.
3.1.3 Motion sensor keys
The confidentiality of the three Triple DES keys described below shall be
appropriately maintained during generation, transport (if any) and
storage.
In order to support tachograph components compliant with ISO 16844,
the European Certification Authority and the Member State Certification
Authorities shall, in addition, ensure the following:
CSM_036 The European Certification authority shall generate KmVU
and KmWC, two independent and unique Triple DES keys,
and generate Km as: Km = Km VU XOR Km WC . The
European Certification Authority shall forward these keys,
under appropriately secured procedures, to Member States
Certification Authorities at their request.
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CSM_037 Member States Certification Authorities shall:
— use Km to encrypt motion sensor data requested by
motion sensor manufacturers (data to be encrypted with
Km is defined in ISO 16844-3),
— forward Km VU to vehicle unit manufacturers, under
appropriately secured procedures, for insertion in vehicle
units,
— ensure that Km WC will be inserted in all workshop
cards ( in
elementary file)
during card personalisation.
3.1.4 T-DES session keys generation and distribution
CSM_012 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall, as a part of the
mutual authentication process, generate and exchange
necessary data to elaborate a common Triple DES session
key. This exchange of data shall be protected for confiden­
tiality through an RSA crypt-mechanism.
CSM_013 This key shall be used for all subsequent cryptographic
operations using secure messaging. Its validity shall expire
at the end of the session (withdrawal of the card or reset of
the card) and/or after 240 use (one use of the key = one
command using secure messaging sent to the card and asso­
ciated response).
3.2. Keys
CSM_014 RSA keys shall have (whatever the level) the following
lengths: modulus n 1 024 bits, public exponent e 64 bits
maximum, private exponent d 1 024 bits.
CSM_015 Triple DES keys shall have the form (K a , K b , K a ) where K a
and K b are independent 64 bits long keys. No parity error
detecting bits shall be set.
3.3. Certificates
CSM_016 RSA Public key certificates shall be ‘non self-descriptive’
‘Card Verifiable’ certificates (Ref.: ISO/IEC 7816-8)
3.3.1 Certificates content
CSM_017 RSA Public key certificates are built with the following data
in the following order:
Data Format Bytes Obs
CPI INTEGER 1 Certificate Profile Identifier
(‘01’ for this version)
CAR OCTET
STRING
8 Certification Authority
Reference
CHA OCTET
STRING
7 Certificate Holder Author­
isation
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Data Format Bytes Obs
EOV TimeReal 4 Certificate end of validity.
Optional, ‘FF’ padded if
not used.
CHR OCTET
STRING
8 Certificate Holder
Reference
n OCTET
STRING
128 Public key (modulus)
e OCTET
STRING
8 Public Key (public
exponent)
164
Notes:
1. The ‘Certificate Profile Identifier’ (CPI) delineates the exact structure
of an authentication certificate. It can be used as an equipment
internal identifier of a relevant headerlist which describes the concat­
enation of Data Elements within the certificate.
The headerlist associated with this certificate content is as follows:
‘4D’ ‘16’ ‘5F
29’
‘01’ ‘42’ ‘08’ ‘5F
4B’
‘07’ ‘5F
24’
‘04’ ‘5F
20’
‘08’ ‘7F
49’
‘05’ ‘81’ ‘81
80’
‘82’ ‘08’
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2. The ‘Certification Authority Reference’ (CAR) has the purpose of
identifying the certificate issuing CA, in such a way that the Data
Element can be used at the same time as an Authority Key Identifier
to reference the Public Key of the Certification Authority (for coding,
see Key Identifier below).
3. The ‘Certificate Holder Authorisation’ (CHA) is used to identify the
rights of the certificate holder. It consists of the Tachograph Appli­
cation ID and of the type of equipment to which the certificate is
intended (according to data element, ‘00’ for a
Member State).
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4. The ‘Certificate Holder Reference’ (CHR) has the purpose of iden­
tifying uniquely the certificate holder, in such a way that the Data
Element can be used at the same time as a Subject Key Identifier to
reference the Public Key of the certificate holder.
5. Key Identifiers uniquely identify certificate holder or certification
authorities. They are coded as follows:
5.1 Equipment (VU or Card):
Data Equipment
serial
number
Date Type Manufacturer
Length 4 Bytes 2 Bytes 1 Byte 1 Byte
Value Integer mm yy BCD
coding
Manufacturer
specific
Manufacturer
code
In the case of a VU, the manufacturer, when requesting
certificates, may or may not know the identification of the
equipment in which the keys will be inserted.
In the first case, the manufacturer will send the equipment identi­
fication with the public key to its Member State authority for
certification. The certificate will then contain the equipment
identification, and the manufacturer must ensure that keys and
certificate are inserted in the intended equipment. The Key
identifier has the form shown above.
In the later case, the manufacturer must uniquely identify each
certificate request and send this identification with the public key
to its Member State authority for certification. The certificate will
contain the request identification. The manufacturer must feed
back its Member State authority with the assignment of key to
equipment (i.e. certificate request identification, equipment identi­
fication) after key installation in the equipment. The key identifier
has the following form:
Data Certificate
request
serial
number
Date Type Manufacturer
Length 4 Bytes 2 Bytes 1 Byte 1 Byte
Value Integer mm yy BCD coding ‘FF’ Manufacturer
code
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5.2 Certification Authority:
Data Authority Identifi­
cation
Key serial
number
Additional
info
Identifier
Length 4 Bytes 1 Byte 2 Bytes 1 Byte
Value 1 Byte nation
numerical code
3 Bytes nation
alphanumerical
code
Integer additional
coding
(CA specific)
‘FF FF’ if not
used
‘01’
The key serial number is used to distinguish the different keys of
a Member State, in the case the key is changed.
6. Certificate verifiers shall implicitly know that the public key certified
is an RSA key relevant to authentication, digital signature verification
and encipherement for confidentiality services (the certificate contains
no Object Identifier to specify it).
3.3.2 Certificates issued
CSM_018 The certificate issued is a digital signature with partial
recovery of the certificate content in accordance with
ISO/IEC 9796-2 (except for its annex A4), with the ‘Certifi­
cation Authority Reference’ appended.
X.C = X.CA.SK[‘6A’ || C r || Hash (Cc) || ‘BC’] || C n || X.CAR
With certificate content = Cc = C r || C n
106 bytes 58 bytes
Notes:
1. This certificate is 194 bytes long.
2. CAR, being hidden by the signature, is also appended to the
signature, such that the Public Key of the Certification Authority
may be selected for the verification of the certificate.
3. The certificate verifier shall implicitly know the algorithm used by the
Certification Authority to sign the certificate.
4. The headerlist associated with this issued certificate is as follows:
‘7F 21’ ‘09’ ‘5F 37’ ‘81 80’ ‘5F 38’ ‘3A’ ‘42’ ‘08’
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3.3.3 Certificate verification and unwrapping
Certificate verification and unwrapping consists in verifying the signature
in accordance with ISO/IEC 9796-2, retrieving the certificate content and
the public key contained: X.PK = X.CA.PK o X.C, and verifying the
validity of the certificate.
CSM_019 It involves the following steps:
Verify signature and retrieve content:
— from X.C retrieve Sign, C n ' and
CAR':
X.C = Sign || C n ' || CAR'
128 Bytes 58 Bytes 8 Bytes
— from CAR' select appropriate Certification Authority
Public Key (if not done before through other means)
— open Sign with CA Public Key: Sr'= X.CA.PK [Sign],
— check Sr' starts with ‘6A’ and ends with ‘BC’
— compute C r ' and H' from: Sr' = ‘6A’ || C r ' || H' || ‘BC’
106 Bytes 20 Bytes
— Recover certificate content C' = C r ' || C n ',
— check Hash (C') = H'
If the checks are OK the certificate is a genuine one, its
content is C'.
Verify validity. From C':
— if applicable, check End of validity date,
Retrieve and store public key, Key Identifier, Certificate
Holder Authorisation and Certificate End of Validity from C':
— X.PK = n || e
— X.KID = CHR
— X.CHA = CHA
— X.EOV = EOV
4. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM
Mutual authentication between cards and VUs is based on the following
principle:
Each party shall demonstrate to the other that it owns a valid key pair,
the public key of which has been certified by a Member State certifi­
cation authority, itself being certified by the European certification
authority.
Demonstration is made by signing with the private key a random number
sent by the other party, who must recover the random number sent when
verifying this signature.
The mechanism is triggered at card insertion by the VU. It starts with the
exchange of certificates and unwrapping of public keys, and ends with
the setting of a session key.
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CSM_020 The following protocol shall be used (arrows indicate
commands and data exchanged (see Appendix 2)):
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5. VU-CARDS DATA TRANSFER CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY
AND AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS
5.1. Secure Messaging
CSM_021 VU-Cards data transfers integrity shall be protected through
Secure Messaging in accordance with references [ISO/IEC
7816-4] and [ISO/IEC 7816-8].
CSM_022 When data need to be protected during transfer, a Crypto­
graphic Checksum Data Object shall be appended to the
Data Objects sent within the command or the response. The
Cryptographic Checksum shall be verified by the receiver.
CSM_023 The cryptographic checksum of data sent within a command
shall integrate the command header, and all data objects sent
(=>CLA = ‘0C’, and all data objects shall be encapsulated
with tags in which b1=1).
CSM_024 The response status-information bytes shall be protected by a
cryptographic checksum when the response contains no data
field.
CSM_025 Cryptographic checksums shall be 4 Bytes long.
The structure of commands and responses when using secure
messaging is therefore the following:
The DOs used are a partial set of the Secure Messaging DOs
described in ISO/IEC 7816-4:
Tag Mnemonic Meaning
‘81’ T PV Plain Value not BER-TLV coded data (to be
protected by CC)
‘97’ T LE Value of Le in the unsecured command (to be
protected by CC)
‘99’ T SW Status-Info (to be protected by CC)
‘8E’ T CC Cryptographic Checksum
‘87’ T PI CG Padding Indicator Byte || Cryptogram (Plain Value
not coded in BER-TLV)
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Given an unsecured command response pair:
Command header Command body
CLA INS P1 P2 [L c field] [Data field] [L e field]
four bytes L bytes, denoted as B 1 to B L
Response body Response trailer
[Data field] SW1 SW2
L r data bytes two bytes
The corresponding secured command response pair is:
Secured command:
Command header (CH) Command body
CLA INS P1 P2 [New L c field] [New Data field] [New L e
field]
‘OC’ Length of New
Data field
T PV L PV PV T LE L LE L e T CC L CC CC ‘00’
‘81’ L c Data field ‘97’ ‘01’ L e ‘8E’ ‘04’ CC
Data to be integrated in checksum = CH || PB || T PV || L PV ||
PV || T LE || L LE || L e || PB
PB = Padding Bytes (80 .. 00) in accordance with ISO-IEC
7816-4 and ISO 9797 method 2.
DOs PV and LE are present only when there is some corre­
sponding data in the unsecured command.
Secured response:
1. Case where response data field is not empty and needs not
to be protected for confidentiality:
Response body Response trailer
[New Data field] new SW1 SW2
T PV L PV PV T CC L CC CC
‘81’ L r Data field ‘8E’ ‘04’ CC
Data to be integrated in checksum = T PV || L PV || PV || PB
2. Case where response data field is not empty and needs to
be protected for confidentiality:
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Response body Response trailer
[New Data field] new SW1 SW2
T PI CG L PI
CG
PI CG T CC L CC CC
‘87’ PI || CG ‘8E’ ‘04’ CC
Data to be carried by CG: non BER-TLV coded data and
padding bytes.
Data to be integrated in checksum = T PI CG || L PI CG || PI
CG || PB
3. Case where response data field is empty:
Response body Response trailer
[New Data field] new SW1 SW2
T SW L SW SW T CC L CC CC
‘99’ ‘02’ New SW1 SW2 ‘8E’ ‘04’ CC
Data to be integrated in checksum = T SW || L SW || SW ||
PB
5.2. Treatment of Secure Messaging errors
CSM_026 When the tachograph card recognises an SM error while
interpreting a command, then the status bytes must be
returned without SM. In accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-4,
the following status bytes are defined to indicate SM errors:
‘66 88’: Verification of Cryptographic Checksum failed,
‘69 87’: Expected SM Data Objects missing,
‘69 88’: SM Data Objects incorrect.
CSM_027 When the tachograph card returns status bytes without SM
DOs or with an erroneous SM DO, the session must be
aborted by the VU.
5.3. Algorithm to compute Cryptographic Checksums
CSM_028 Cryptographic checksums are built using a retail MACs in
accordance with ANSI X9.19 with DES:
— Initial stage: The initial check block y0 is E(Ka, SSC).
— Sequential stage: The check blocks y1, .., yn are
calculated using Ka.
— Final stage: The cryptographic checksum is calculated
from the last check block yn as follows: E(Ka, D(Kb,
yn)).
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where E() means encryption with DES, and D() means
decryption with DES.
The four most significant bytes of the cryptographic
checksum are transferred
CSM_029 The Send Sequence Counter (SSC) shall be initiated during
key agreement procedure to:
Initial SSC: Rnd3 (4 least significant bytes) || Rnd1 (4 least
significant bytes).
CSM_030 The Send Sequence Counter shall be increased by 1 each time
before a MAC is calculated (i.e. the SSC for the first
command is Initial SSC + 1, the SSC for the first response
is Initial SSC + 2).
The following figure shows the calculation of the retail MAC:
5.4. Algorithm to compute cryptograms for confidentiality DOs
CSM_031 Cryptograms are computed using TDEA in TCBC mode of
operation in accordance with references [TDES] and [TDES-
OP] and with the Null vector as Initial Value block.
The following figure shows the application of keys in TDES:
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6. DATA DOWNLOAD DIGITAL SIGNATURE MECHANISMS
CSM_032 The Intelligent Dedicated Equipment (IDE) stores data
received from an equipment (VU or card) during one
download session within one physical data file. This file
must contain the certificates MS i .C and EQT.C. The file
contains digital signatures of data blocks as specified in
Appendix 7 Data Downloading Protocols.
CSM_033 Digital signatures of downloaded data shall use a digital
signature scheme with appendix such, that downloaded data
may be read without any decipherment if desired.
6.1. Signature generation
CSM_034 Data signature generation by the equipment shall follow the
signature scheme with appendix defined in reference [PKCS1]
with the SHA-1 hash function:
Signature = EQT.SK[‘00’ || ‘01’ || PS || ‘00’ || DER(SHA-1
(Data))]
PS = Padding string of octets with value ‘FF’ such that length
is 128.
DER(SHA-1(M)) is the encoding of the algorithm ID for the
hash function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of type
DigestInfo (distinguished encoding rules):
‘30’||‘21’||‘30’||‘09’||‘06’||‘05’||‘2B’||‘0E’||‘03’||‘02’||‘1A’||
‘05’||‘00’||‘04’||‘14’||Hash Value.
6.2. Signature verification
CSM_035 Data signature verification on downloaded data shall follow
the signature scheme with appendix defined in reference
[PKCS1] with the SHA-1 hash function.
The European public key EUR.PK needs to be known inde­
pendently (and trusted) by the verifier.
The following table illustrates the protocol an IDE carrying a
Control card can follow to verify the integrity of data down­
loaded and stored on the ESM (External Storage media). The
control card is used to perform the decipherement of digital
signatures. This function may in this case not be implemented
in the IDE.
The equipment that has downloaded and signed the data to be
analysed is denoted EQT.
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PART B
SECOND-GENERATION TACHOGRAPH SYSTEM
7. INTRODUCTION
7.1. References
The following references are used in this part of this Appendix.
AES National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
FIPS PUB 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
November 26, 2001
DSS National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
FIPS PUB 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July
2013
ISO 7816-4 ISO/IEC 7816-4, Identification cards — Integrated circuit
cards — Part 4: Organization, security and commands for
interchange. Third edition 2013-04-15
ISO 7816-8 ISO/IEC 7816-8, Identification cards — Integrated circuit
cards — Part 8: Commands for security operations.
Second edition 2004-06-01
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ISO 8825-1 ISO/IEC 8825-1, Information technology — ASN.1
encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding
Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER). Fourth edition,
2008-12-15
ISO 9797-1 ISO/IEC 9797-1, Information technology — Security
techniques — Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
— Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher. Second
edition, 2011-03-01
ISO 10116 ISO/IEC 10116, Information technology — Security tech­
niques — Modes of operation of an n-bit block cipher.
Third edition, 2006-02-01
ISO 16844-3 ISO/IEC 16844-3, Road vehicles — Tachograph systems
— Part 3: Motion sensor interface. First edition 2004,
including Technical Corrigendum 1 2006
RFC 5480 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information, March 2009
RFC 5639 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) — Brainpool
Standard Curves and Curve Generation, 2010
RFC 5869 HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation
Function (HKDF), May 2010
SHS National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard, March 2012
SP 800-38B National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Special Publication 800-38B: Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Auth­
entication, 2005
TR-03111 BSI Technical Guideline TR-03111, Elliptic Curve
Cryptography, version 2.00, 2012-06-28
7.2. Notations and Abbreviations
The following notations and abbreviated terms are used in this Appendix:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CA Certificate Authority
CAR Certificate Authority Reference
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (mode of operation)
CH Command Header
CHA Certificate Holder Authorisation
CHR Certificate Holder Reference
CV Constant Vector
DER Distinguished Encoding Rules
DO Data Object
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communication
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (key agreement algorithm)
EGF External GNSS Facility
EQT Equipment
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IDE Intelligent Dedicated Equipment
K M Motion Sensor Master Key, allowing the pairing of a
Vehicle Unit to a Motion Sensor
K M-VU Key inserted in vehicle units, allowing a VU to derive the
Motion Sensor Master Key if a workshop card is inserted
into the VU
K M-WC Key inserted in workshop cards, allowing a VU to derive
the Motion Sensor Master Key if a workshop card is
inserted into the VU
MAC Message Authentication Code
MoS Motion Sensor
MSB Most Significant Bit
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RCF Remote Communication Facility
SSC Send Sequence Counter
SM Secure Messaging
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLV Tag Length Value
VU Vehicle Unit
X.C the public key certificate of user X
X.CA the certificate authority that issued the certificate of user X
X.CAR the certificate authority reference mentioned in the certifi­
cate of user X
X.CHR the certificate holder reference mentioned in the certificate
of user X
X.PK public key of user X
X.SK private key of user X
X.PK eph ephemeral public key of user X
X.SK eph ephemeral private key of user X
‘xx’ a hexadecimal value
|| concatenation operator
7.3. Definitions
The definitions of terms used in this Appendix are included in section I
of Annex 1C.
8. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND ALGORITHMS
8.1. Cryptographic Systems
CSM_38 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall use an elliptic
curve-based public-key cryptographic system to provide
the following security services:
— mutual authentication between a vehicle unit and a
card,
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— agreement of AES session keys between a vehicle unit
and a card,
— ensuring the authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation
of data downloaded from vehicle units or tachograph
cards to external media.
CSM_39 Vehicle units and external GNSS facilities shall use an
elliptic curve-based public-key cryptographic system to
provide the following security services:
— coupling of a vehicle unit and an external GNSS
facility,
— mutual authentication between a vehicle unit and an
external GNSS facility,
— agreement of an AES session key between a vehicle
unit and an external GNSS facility.
CSM_40 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall use an AES-based
symmetric cryptographic system to provide the following
security services:
— ensuring authenticity and integrity of data exchanged
between a vehicle unit and a tachograph card,
— where applicable, ensuring confidentiality of data
exchanged between a vehicle unit and a tachograph
card.
CSM_41 Vehicle units and external GNSS facilities shall use an
AES-based symmetric cryptographic system to provide
the following security services:
— ensuring authenticity and integrity of data exchanged
between a vehicle unit and an external GNSS facility.
CSM_42 Vehicle units and motion sensors shall use an AES-based
symmetric cryptographic system to provide the following
security services:
— pairing of a vehicle unit and a motion sensor,
— mutual authentication between a vehicle unit and a
motion sensor,
— ensuring confidentiality of data exchanged between a
vehicle unit and a motion sensor.
CSM_43 Vehicle units and control cards shall use an AES-based
symmetric cryptographic system to provide the following
security services on the remote communication interface:
— ensuring confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of
data transmitted from a vehicle unit to a control card.
Notes:
— Properly speaking, data is transmitted from a vehicle
unit to a remote interrogator under the control of a
control officer, using a remote communication facility
that may be internal or external to the VU, see
Appendix 14. However, the remote interrogator sends
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the received data to a control card for decryption and
validation of authenticity. From a security point of
view, the remote communication facility and the
remote interrogator are fully transparent.
— A workshop card offers the same security services for
the DSRC interface as a control card does. This allows
a workshop to validate the proper functioning of the
remote communication interface of a VU, including
security. Please refer to section 9.2.2 for more
information.
8.2. Cryptographic Algorithms
8.2.1 Symmetric Algorithms
CSM_44 Vehicle units, tachograph cards, motion sensors and
external GNSS facilities shall support the AES algorithm
as defined in [AES], with key lengths of 128, 192 and 256
bits.
8.2.2 Asymmetric Algorithms and Standardized Domain Parameters
CSM_45 Vehicle units, tachograph cards and external GNSS
facilities shall support elliptic curve cryptography with a
key size of 256, 384 and 512/521 bits.
CSM_46 Vehicle units, tachograph cards and external GNSS
facilities shall support the ECDSA signing algorithm, as
specified in [DSS].
CSM_47 Vehicle units, tachograph cards and external GNSS
facilities shall support the ECKA-EG key agreement
algorithm, as specified in [TR 03111].
CSM_48 Vehicle units, tachograph cards and external GNSS
facilities shall support all standardized domain parameters
specified in Table 1 below for elliptic curve cryptography.
Table 1
Standardized domain parameters
Name Size (bits) Reference Object identifier
NIST P-256 256 [DSS], [RFC 5480]
BrainpoolP256r1 256 [RFC 5639]
NIST P-384 384 [DSS], [RFC 5480]
BrainpoolP384r1 384 [RFC 5639]
BrainpoolP512r1 512 [RFC 5639]
NIST P-521 521 [DSS], [RFC 5480]
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Note: the object identifiers mentioned in the last column of
Table 1 are specified in [RFC 5639] for the Brainpool
curves and in [RFC 5480] for the NIST curves.
8.2.3 Hashing algorithms
▼M1
CSM_49 Vehicle units, tachograph cards and external GNSS
facilities shall support the SHA-256, SHA-384 and
SHA-512 algorithms specified in [SHS].
▼B
8.2.4 Cipher Suites
CSM_50 In case a symmetric algorithm, an asymmetric algorithm
and/or a hashing algorithm are used together to form a
security protocol, their respective key lengths and hash
sizes shall be of (roughly) equal strength. Table 2 shows
the allowed cipher suites:
Table 2
Allowed cipher suites
Cipher suite Id ECC key size (bits) AES key length (bits)
Hashing
algorithm
MAC length
(bytes)
CS#1 256 128 SHA-256 8
CS#2 384 192 SHA-384 12
CS#3 512/521 256 SHA-512 16
Note: ECC keys sizes of 512 bits and 521 bits are
considered to be equal in strength for all purposes within
this Appendix.
9. KEYS AND CERTIFICATES
9.1. Asymmetric Key Pairs and Public Key Certificates
9.1.1 General
Note: the keys described in this section are used for mutual authenti­
cation and secure messaging between vehicle units and tachograph cards
and between vehicle units and external GNSS facilities. These processes
are described in detail in chapters 10 and 11 of this Appendix.
CSM_51 Within the European Smart Tachograph system, ECC key
pairs and corresponding certificates shall be generated and
managed through three functional hierarchical levels:
— European level,
— Member State level,
— Equipment level.
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CSM_52 Within the entire European Smart Tachograph system,
public and private keys and certificates shall be generated,
managed and communicated using standardized and secure
methods.
9.1.2 European Level
CSM_53 At European level, a single unique ECC key pair
designated as EUR shall be generated. It shall consist of
a private key (EUR.SK) and a public key (EUR.PK). This
key pair shall form the root key pair of the entire European
Smart Tachograph PKI. This task shall be handled by a
European Root Certificate Authority (ERCA), under the
authority and responsibility of the European Commission.
CSM_54 The ERCA shall use the European private key to sign a
(self-signed) root certificate of the European public key,
and shall communicate this European root certificate to all
Member States.
CSM_55 The ERCA shall use the European private key to sign the
certificates of the Member States public keys upon request.
The ERCA shall keep records of all signed Member State
public key certificates.
CSM_56 As shown in Figure 1 in section 9.1.7, the ERCA shall
generate a new European root key pair every 17 years.
Whenever the ERCA generates a new European root key
pair, it shall create a new self-signed root certificate for the
new European public key. The validity period of a
European root certificate shall be 34 years plus 3 months.
Note: The introduction of a new root key pair also implies
that ERCA will generate a new motion sensor master key
and a new DSRC master key, see sections 9.2.1.2 and
9.2.2.2.
CSM_57 Before generating a new European root key pair, the
ERCA shall conduct an analysis of the cryptographic
strength that is needed for the new key pair, given it
should stay secure for the next 34 years. If found
necessary, the ERCA shall switch to a cipher suite that
is stronger than the current one, as specified in CSM_50.
▼M1
CSM_58 Whenever it generates a new European root key pair, the
ERCA shall create a link certificate for the new European
public key and sign it with the previous European private
key. The validity period of the link certificate shall be 17
years plus 3 months. This is shown in Figure 1 in
section 9.1.7 as well.
▼B
Note: Since a link certificate contains the ERCA
generation X public key and is signed with the ERCA
generation X-1 private key, a link certificate offers
equipment issued under generation X-1 a method to trust
equipment issued under generation X.
CSM_59 The ERCA shall not use the private key of a root key pair
for any purpose after the moment a new root key certifi­
cate becomes valid.
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CSM_60 At any moment in time, the ERCA shall dispose of the
following cryptographic keys and certificates:
— The current EUR key pair and corresponding certificate
— All previous EUR certificates to be used for the verifi­
cation of MSCA certificates that are still valid
— Link certificates for all generations of EUR certificates
except the first one
9.1.3 Member State Level
CSM_61 At Member State level, all Member States required to sign
tachograph card certificates shall generate one or more
unique ECC key pairs designated as MSCA_Card. All
Member States required to sign certificates for vehicle
units or external GNSS facilities shall additionally
generate one or more unique ECC key pairs designated
as MSCA_VU-EGF.
CSM_62 The task of generating Member State key pairs shall be
handled by a Member State Certificate Authority (MSCA).
Whenever a MSCA generates a Member State key pair, it
shall send the public key to the ERCA in order to obtain a
corresponding Member State certificate signed by the
ERCA.
CSM_63 An MSCA shall choose the strength of a Member State
key pair equal to the strength of the European root key
pair used to sign the corresponding Member State
certificate.
CSM_64 An MSCA_VU-EGF key pair, if present, shall consist of
private key MSCA_VU-EGF.SK and public key
MSCA_VU-EGF.PK. An MSCA shall use the
MSCA_VU-EGF.SK private key exclusively to sign the
public key certificates of vehicle units and external
GNSS facilities.
CSM_65 An MSCA_Card key pair shall consist of private key
MSCA_Card.SK and public key MSCA_Card.PK. An
MSCA shall use the MSCA_Card.SK private key
exclusively to sign the public key certificates of
tachograph cards.
CSM_66 An MSCA shall keep records of all signed VU certificates,
external GNSS facility certificates and card certificates,
together with the identification of the equipment for
which each certificate is intended.
CSM_67 The validity period of an MSCA_VU-EGF certificate shall
be 17 years plus 3 months. The validity period of an
MSCA_Card certificate shall be 7 years plus 1 month.
CSM_68 As shown in Figure 1 in section 9.1.7, the private key of a
MSCA_VU-EGF key pair and the private key of a
MSCA_Card key pair shall have a key usage period of
two years.
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CSM_69 An MSCA shall not use the private key of an MSCA_VU-
EGF key pair for any purpose after the moment its usage
period has ended. Neither shall an MSCA use the private
key of an MSCA_Card key pair for any purpose after the
moment its usage period has ended.
CSM_70 At any moment in time, an MSCA shall dispose of the
following cryptographic keys and certificates:
— The current MSCA_Card key pair and corresponding
certificate
— All previous MSCA_Card certificates to be used for
the verification of the certificates of tachograph cards
that are still valid
— The current EUR certificate necessary for the verifi­
cation of the current MSCA certificate
— All previous EUR certificates necessary for the verifi­
cation of all MSCA certificates that are still valid
CSM_71 If an MSCA is required to sign certificates for vehicle
units or external GNSS facilities, it shall additionally
dispose of the following keys and certificates:
— The current MSCA_VU-EGF key pair and corre­
sponding certificate
— All previous MSCA_VU-EGF public keys to be used
for the verification of the certificates of VUs or
external GNSS facilities that are still valid
9.1.4 Equipment Level: Vehicle Units
▼M1
CSM_72 Two unique ECC key pairs shall be generated for each
vehicle unit, designated as VU_MA and VU_Sign. This
task is handled by VU manufacturers. Whenever a VU key
pair is generated, the party generating the key shall send
the public key to its MSCA, in order to obtain a corre­
sponding VU certificate signed by the MSCA. The private
key shall be used only by the vehicle unit.
▼B
CSM_73 The VU_MA and VU_Sign certificates of a given vehicle
unit shall have the same Certificate Effective Date.
CSM_74 A VU manufacturer shall choose the strength of a VU key
pair equal to the strength of the MSCA key pair used to
sign the corresponding VU certificate.
CSM_75 A vehicle unit shall use its VU_MA key pair, consisting of
private key VU_MA.SK and public key VU_MA.PK,
exclusively to perform VU Authentication towards
tachograph cards and external GNSS facilities, as
specified in sections 10.3 and 11.4 of this Appendix.
CSM_76 A vehicle unit shall be capable of generating ephemeral
ECC key pairs and shall use an ephemeral key pair
exclusively to perform session key agreement with a
tachograph card or external GNSS facility, as specified
in sections 10.4 and 11.4 of this Appendix.
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CSM_77 A vehicle unit shall use the private key VU_Sign.SK of its
VU_Sign key pair exclusively to sign downloaded data
files, as specified in chapter 14 of this Appendix. The
corresponding public key VU_Sign.PK shall be used
exclusively to verify signatures created by the vehicle unit.
CSM_78 As shown in Figure 1 in section 9.1.7, the validity period
of a VU_MA certificate shall be 15 years and 3 months.
The validity period of a VU_Sign certificate shall also be
15 years and 3 months.
Notes:
— The extended validity period of a VU_Sign certificate
allows a Vehicle Unit to create valid signatures over
downloaded data during the first three months after it
has expired, as required in Regulation (EU)
No 581/2010.
— The extended validity period of a VU_MA certificate
is needed to allow the VU to authenticate to a control
card or a company card during the first three months
after it has expired, such that is it possible to perform a
data download.
CSM_79 A vehicle unit shall not use the private key of a VU key
pair for any purpose after the corresponding certificate has
expired.
CSM_80 The VU key pairs (except ephemeral keys pairs) and corre­
sponding certificates of a given vehicle unit shall not be
replaced or renewed in the field once the vehicle unit has
been put in operation.
Notes:
— Ephemeral key pairs are not included in this
requirement, as a new ephemeral key pair is
generated by a VU each time Chip Authentication
and session key agreement is performed, see
section 10.4. Note that ephemeral key pairs do not
have corresponding certificates.
— This requirement does not forbid the possibility of
replacing static VU key pairs during a refurbishment
or repair in a secure environment controlled by the VU
manufacturer.
CSM_81 When put in operation, vehicle units shall contain the
following cryptographic keys and certificates:
— The VU_MA private key and corresponding certificate
— The VU_Sign private key and corresponding certificate
— The MSCA_VU-EGF certificate containing the
MSCA_VU-EGF.PK public key to be used for verifi­
cation of the VU_MA certificate and VU_Sign certifi­
cate
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— The EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key
to be used for verification of the MSCA_VU-EGF
certificate
— The EUR certificate whose validity period directly
precedes the validity period of the EUR certificate to
be used to verify the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate, if
existing
— The link certificate linking these two EUR certificates,
if existing
CSM_82 In addition to the cryptographic keys and certificates listed
in CSM_81, vehicle units shall also contain the keys and
certificates specified in Part A of this Appendix, allowing
a vehicle unit to interact with first-generation tachograph
cards.
9.1.5 Equipment Level: Tachograph Cards
▼M1
CSM_83 One unique ECC key pair, designated as Card_MA, shall
be generated for each tachograph card. A second unique
ECC key pair, designated as Card_Sign, shall additionally
be generated for each driver card and each workshop card.
This task may be handled by card manufacturers or card
personalisers. Whenever a card key pair is generated, the
party generating the key shall send the public key to its
MSCA, in order to obtain a corresponding card certificate
signed by the MSCA. The private key shall be used only
by the tachograph card.
▼B
CSM_84 The Card_MA and Card_Sign certificates of a given driver
card or workshop card shall have the same Certificate
Effective Date.
CSM_85 A card manufacturer or card personaliser shall choose the
strength of a card key pair equal to the strength of the
MSCA key pair used to sign the corresponding card
certificate.
CSM_86 A tachograph card shall use its Card_MA key pair,
consisting of private key Card_MA.SK and public key
Card_MA.PK, exclusively to perform mutual authenti­
cation and session key agreement towards vehicle units,
as specified in sections 10.3 and 10.4 of this Appendix.
CSM_87 A driver card or workshop card shall use the private key
Card_Sign.SK of its Card_Sign key pair exclusively to
sign downloaded data files, as specified in chapter 14 of
this Appendix. The corresponding public key
Card_Sign.PK shall be used exclusively to verify
signatures created by the card.
▼M1
CSM_88 The validity period of a Card_MA certificate shall be as
follows:
— For driver cards: 5 years
— For company cards: 5 years
— For control cards: 2 years
— For workshop cards: 1 year
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CSM_89 The validity period of a Card_Sign certificate shall be as
follows:
— For driver cards: 5 years and 1 month
— For workshop cards: 1 year and 1 month
Note: the extended validity period of a Card_Sign certifi­
cate allows a driver card to create valid signatures over
downloaded data during the first month after it has
expired. This is necessary in view of Regulation (EU)
No 581/2010, which requires that a data download from
a driver card must be possible up to 28 days after the last
data has been recorded.
CSM_90 The key pairs and corresponding certificates of a given
tachograph card shall not be replaced or renewed once
the card has been issued.
CSM_91 When issued, tachograph cards shall contain the following
cryptographic keys and certificates:
— The Card_MA private key and corresponding certifi­
cate
— For driver cards and workshop cards additionally: the
Card_Sign private key and corresponding certificate
— The MSCA_Card certificate containing the
MSCA_Card.PK public key to be used for verification
of the Card_MA certificate and Card_Sign certificate
— The EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key
to be used for verification of the MSCA_Card
certificate.
— The EUR certificate whose validity period directly
precedes the validity period of the EUR certificate to
be used to verify the MSCA_Card certificate, if
existing.
— The link certificate linking these two EUR certificates,
if existing.
▼M1
— Additionally, for control cards, company cards and
workshop cards only, and only if such cards are
issued during the first three months of the validity
period of a new EUR certificate: the EUR certificate
that is two generations older, if existing.
Note to last bullet: For example, in the first three
months of the ERCA(3) certificate (see Figure 1), the
mentioned cards shall contain the ERCA(1) certificate.
This is needed to ensure that these cards can be used to
perform data downloads from ERCA(1) VUs whose
normal 15-year life period plus the 3-months data
downloading period expires during these months; see
the last bullet of requirement 13) in Annex IC.
▼B
CSM_92 In addition to the cryptographic keys and certificates listed
in CSM_91, tachograph cards shall also contain the keys
and certificates specified in Part A of this Appendix,
allowing these cards to interact with first-generation VUs.
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9.1.6 Equipment Level: External GNSS Facilities
▼M1
CSM_93 One unique ECC key pair shall be generated for each
external GNSS facility, designated as EGF_MA. This
task is handled by external GNSS facility manufacturers.
Whenever an EGF_MA key pair is generated, the party
generating th e key shall send the public key to its MSCA
in order to obtain a corresponding EGF_MA certificate
signed by the MSCA. The private key shall be used
only by the external GNSS facility.
▼B
CSM_94 An EGF manufacturer shall choose the strength of an
EGF_MA key pair equal to the strength of the MSCA
key pair used to sign the corresponding EGF_MA
certificate.
▼M1
CSM_95 An external GNSS facility shall use its EGF_MA key pair,
consisting of private key EGF_MA.SK and public key
EGF_MA.PK, exclusively to perform mutual authenti­
cation and session key agreement towards vehicle units,
as specified in section 11.4 of this Appendix.
▼B
CSM_96 The validity period of an EGF_MA certificate shall be 15
years.
CSM_97 An external GNSS facility shall not use the private key of
its EGF_MA key pair for coupling to a vehicle unit after
the corresponding certificate has expired.
Note: as explained in section 11.3.3, an EGF may
potentially use its private key for mutual authentication
towards the VU it is already coupled to, even after the
corresponding certificate has expired.
CSM_98 The EGF_MA key pair and corresponding certificate of a
given external GNSS facility shall not be replaced or
renewed in the field once the EGF has been put in
operation.
Note: This requirement does not forbid the possibility of
replacing EGF key pairs during a refurbishment or repair
in a secure environment controlled by the EGF manu­
facturer.
CSM_99 When put in operation, an external GNSS facility shall
contain the following cryptographic keys and certificates:
— The EGF_MA private key and corresponding certifi­
cate
— The MSCA_VU-EGF certificate containing the
MSCA_VU-EGF.PK public key to be used for verifi­
cation of the EGF_MA certificate
— The EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key
to be used for verification of the MSCA_VU-EGF
certificate
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— The EUR certificate whose validity period directly
precedes the validity period of the EUR certificate to
be used to verify the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate, if
existing
— The link certificate linking these two EUR certificates,
if existing
9.1.7 Overview: Certificate Replacement
Figure 1 below shows how different generations of ERCA root
certificates, ERCA link certificates, MSCA certificates and equipment
(VU and card) certificates are issued and used over time:
▼M1
Figure 1
Issuance and usage of different generations of ERCA root certificates, ERCA link certificates, MSCA certificates
and equipment certificates
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Notes to Figure 1:
1. Different generations of the root certificate are indicated by a number
in brackets. E.g. ERCA (1) is the first generation of ERCA root
certificate; ERCA (2) is the second generation, etc.
2. Other certificates are indicated by two numbers in brackets, the first
one indicating the root certificate generation under which they are
issued, the second one the generation of the certificate itself. E.g.
MSCA_Card (1-1) is the first MSCA_Card certificate issued under
ERCA (1); MSCA_Card (2-1) is the first MSCA_Card certificate
issued under ERCA (2); MSCA_Card (2-last) is the last
MSCA_Card certificate issued under ERCA (2); Card_MA(2-1) is
the first Card certificate for mutual authentication that is issued
under ERCA (2), etc.
3. The MSCA_Card (2-1) and MSCA_Card (1-last) certificates are
issued at almost but not exactly the same date. MSCA_Card (2-1)
is the first MSCA_Card certificate issued under ERCA (2) and will be
issued slightly later than MSCA_Card (1-last), the last MSCA_Card
certificate under ERCA (1).
4. As shown in the figure, the first VU and Card certificates issued
under ERCA (2) will appear almost two years before the last VU
and Card certificates issued under ERCA (1) will appear. This is
because of the fact that VU and Card certificates are issued under
an MSCA certificate, not directly under the ERCA certificate. The
MSCA (2-1) certificate will be issued directly after ERCA (2)
becomes valid, but the MSCA (1-last) certificate will be issued only
slightly before that time, at the last moment the ERCA (1) certificate
is still valid. Therefore, these two MSCA certificates will have almost
the same validity period, despite the fact that they are of different
generations.
5. The validity period shown for cards is the one for driver cards (5
years).
▼M1
6. To save space, the difference in validity period between the Card_MA
and Card_Sign certificates is shown only for the first generation.
▼B
9.2. Symmetric Keys
9.2.1 Keys for Securing VU — Motion Sensor Communication
9.2.1.1 General
Note: readers of this section are supposed to be familiar with the contents
of [ISO 16844-3] describing the interface between a vehicle unit and a
motion sensor. The pairing process between a VU and a motion sensor is
described in detail in chapter 12 of this Appendix.
CSM_100 A number of symmetric keys is needed for pairing vehicle
units and motion sensors, for mutual authentication between
vehicle units and motion sensors and for encrypting
communication between vehicle units and motion sensors,
as shown in Table 3. All of these keys shall be AES keys,
with a key length equal to the length of the motion sensor
master key, which shall be linked to the length of the
(foreseen) European root key pair as described in CSM_50.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 459
Table 3
Keys for securing vehicle unit — motion sensor communication
Key Symbol Generated by Generation method Stored by
Motion Sensor Master
Key — VU part
K M-VU ERCA Random ERCA, MSCAs involved in
issuing VUs certificates, VU
manufacturers, vehicle units
Motion Sensor Master
Key — Workshop part
K M-WC ERCA Random ERCA, MSCAs, card manu­
facturers, workshop cards
Motion Sensor Master
Key
K M Not independently
generated
Calculated as K M = K M-
VU XOR K M-WC
ERCA, MSCAs involved in
issuing motion sensors keys
(optionally) (*)
Identification Key K ID Not independently
generated
Calculated as K ID = K M
XOR CV, where CV is
specified in CSM_106
ERCA, MSCAs involved in
issuing motion sensors keys
(optionally) (*)
Pairing Key K P Motion sensor
manufacturer
Random One motion sensor
Session Key K S VU (during
pairing of VU and
motion sensor)
Random One VU and one motion sensor
(*) Storage of K M and K ID is optional, as these keys can be derived from K M-VU , K M-WC and CV.
CSM_101 The European Root Certificate Authority shall generate K M-
VU and K M-WC , two random and unique AES keys from
which the motion sensor master key K M can be calculated
as K M-VU XOR K M-WC . The ERCA shall communicate K M,
K M-VU and K M-WC to Member State Certificate Authorities
upon their request.
CSM_102 The ERCA shall assign to each motion sensor master key
K M a unique version number, which shall also be applicable
for the constituting keys K M-VU and K M-WC and for the
related identification key K ID. The ERCA shall inform the
MSCAs about the version number when sending K M-VU and
K M-WC to them.
Note: The version number is used to distinguish different
generations of these keys, as explained in detail in
section 9.2.1.2.
CSM_103 A Member State Certificate Authority shall forward K M-VU,
together with its version number, to vehicle unit manu­
facturers upon their request. The VU manufacturers shall
insert K M-VU and its version number in all manufactured
VUs.
CSM_104 A Member State Certificate Authority shall ensure that K M-
WC , together with its version number, is inserted in every
workshop card issued under its responsibility.
Notes:
— See the description of data type
in Appendix 2.
▼B
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— as explained in section 9.2.1.2, in fact multiple
generations of K M-WC may have to be inserted in a
single workshop card.
CSM_105 In addition to the AES key specified in CSM_104, a MSCA
shall ensure that the TDES key Km WC, specified in
requirement CSM_037 in Part A of this Appendix, is
inserted in every workshop card issued under its
responsibility.
Notes:
— This allows a second-generation workshop card to be
used for coupling a first-generation VU.
— A second-generation workshop card will contain two
different applications, one complying with Part B of
this Appendix and one complying with Part A. The
latter will contain the TDES key Km WC .
CSM_106 An MSCA involved in issuing motion sensors shall derive
the identification key from the motion sensor master key by
XORing it with a constant vector CV. The value of CV shall
be as follows:
▼M1
— For 128-bit motion sensor master keys: CV = ‘B6 44 2C
45 0E F8 D3 62 0B 7A 8A 97 91 E4 5D 83’
▼B
— For 192-bit motion sensor master keys: CV = ‘72 AD
EA FA 00 BB F4 EE F4 99 15 70 5B 7E EE BB 1C 54
ED 46 8B 0E F8 25’
— For 256-bit motion sensor master keys: CV = ‘1D 74
DB F0 34 C7 37 2F 65 55 DE D5 DC D1 9A C3 23 D6
A6 25 64 CD BE 2D 42 0D 85 D2 32 63 AD 60’
Note: the constant vectors have been generated as follows:
Pi_10 = first 10 bytes of the decimal portion of the math­
ematical constant π = ‘24 3F 6A 88 85 A3 08 D3 13 19’
CV_128-bits = first 16 bytes of SHA-256(Pi_10)
CV_192-bits = first 24 bytes of SHA-384(Pi_10)
CV_256-bits = first 32 bytes of SHA-512(Pi_10)
CSM_107 ►M1 Each Motion sensor manufacturer shall generate a
random and unique pairing key K P for every motion
sensor, and shall send each pairing key to its Member
State Certificate Authority. The MSCA shall encrypt each
pairing key separately with the motion sensor master key
K M and shall return the encrypted key to the motion sensor
manufacturer. For each encrypted key, the MSCA shall
notify the motion sensor manufacturer of the version
number of the associated K M . ◄
Note: as explained in section 9.2.1.2, in fact a motion sensor
manufacturer may have to generate multiple unique pairing
keys for a single motion sensor.
▼B
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CSM_108 Each motion sensor manufacturer shall generate a unique
serial number for every motion sensor, and shall send all
serial numbers to its Member State Certificate Authority.
The MSCA shall encrypt each serial number separately
with the identification key K ID and shall return the
encrypted serial number to the motion sensor manufacturer.
For each encrypted serial number, the MSCA shall notify
the motion sensor manufacturer of the version number of the
associated K ID .
▼B
CSM_109 For requirements CSM_107 and CSM_108, the MSCA shall
use the AES algorithm in the Cipher Block Chaining mode
of operation, as defined in [ISO 10116], with an interleave
parameter m = 1 and an initialization vector SV = ‘00’ {16},
i.e. sixteen bytes with binary value 0. When necessary, the
MSCA shall use padding method 2 defined in [ISO 9797-1].
CSM_110 The motion sensor manufacturer shall store the encrypted
pairing key and the encrypted serial number in the
intended motion sensor, together with the corresponding
plain text values and the version number of K M and K ID
used for encrypting.
Note: as explained in section 9.2.1.2, in fact a motion sensor
manufacturer may have to insert multiple encrypted pairing
keys and multiple encrypted serial numbers in a single
motion sensor.
CSM_111 In addition to the AES-based cryptographic material
specified in CSM_110, a motion sensor manufacturer may
also store in each motion sensor the TDES-based crypto­
graphic material specified in requirement CSM_037 in Part
A of this Appendix.
Note: doing so will allow a second-generation motion sensor
to be coupled to a first-generation VU.
CSM_112 The length of the session key K S generated by a VU during
the pairing to a motion sensor shall be linked to the length
of its K M-VU, as described in CSM_50.
9.2.1.2 Motion Sensor Master Key Replacement in Second-Generation
Equipment
CSM_113 Each motion sensor master key and all related keys (see
Table 3) is associated to a particular generation of the
ERCA root key pair. These keys shall therefore be
replaced every 17 years. The validity period of each
motion sensor master key generation shall begin one year
before the associated ERCA root key pair becomes valid and
shall end when the associated ERCA root key pair expires.
This is depicted in Figure 2.
▼M1
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 462
Figure 2
Issuance and usage of different generations of the motion sensor master key in vehicle units, motions sensors and
workshop cards
CSM_114 At least one year before generating a new European root key
pair, as described in CSM_56, the ERCA shall generate a
new motion sensor master key K M by generating a new K M-
VU and K M-WC . The length of the motion sensor master key
shall be linked to the foreseen strength of the new European
root key pair, according to CSM_50. The ERCA shall
communicate the new K M , K M-VU and K M-WC to the
MSCAs upon their request, together with their version
number.
CSM_115 An MSCA shall ensure that all valid generations of K M-WC
are stored in every workshop card issued under its authority,
together with their version numbers, as shown in Figure 2.
Note: this implies that in the last year of the validity period of
an ERCA certificate, workshop cards will be issued with three
different generations of K M-WC , as shown in Figure 2.
CSM_116 In relation to the process described in CSM_107 and
CSM_108 above: An MSCA shall encrypt each pairing
key K P it receives from a motion sensor manufacturer
separately with each valid generation of the motion sensor
master key K M . An MSCA shall also encrypt each serial
number it receives from a motion sensor manufacturer
separately with each valid generation of the identification
key K ID . A motion sensor manufacturer shall store all
encryptions of the pairing key and all encryptions of the
serial number in the intended motion sensor, together with
the corresponding plain text values and the version
number(s) of K M and K ID used for encrypting.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 463
Note: This implies that in the last year of the validity period
of an ERCA certificate, motion sensors will be issued with
encrypted data based on three different generations of K M,
as shown in Figure 2.
CSM_117 In relation to the process described in CSM_107 above:
Since the length of the pairing key K P shall be linked to
the length of K M (see CSM_100), a motion sensor manu­
facturer may have to generate up to three different pairing
keys (of different lengths) for one motion sensor, in case
subsequent generations of K M have different lengths. In such
a case, the manufacturer shall send each pairing key to the
MSCA. The MSCA shall ensure that each pairing key is
encrypted with the correct generation of the motion sensor
master key, i.e. the one having the same length.
Note: In case the motion sensor manufacturer chooses to
generate a TDES-based pairing key for a second-generation
motion sensor (see CSM_111), the manufacturer shall
indicate to the MSCA that the TDES-based motion sensor
master key must be used for encrypting this pairing key.
This is because the length of a TDES key may be equal
to that of an AES key, so the MSCA cannot judge from the
key length alone.
CSM_118 Vehicle unit manufacturers shall insert only one generation
of K M-VU in each vehicle unit, together with its version
number. This K M-VU generation shall be linked to the
ERCA certificate upon which the VU's certificates are
based.
Notes:
— A vehicle unit based on the generation X ERCA certifi­
cate shall only contain the generation X K M-VU, even if it
is issued after the start of the validity period of the
generation X+1 ERCA certificate. This is shown in
Figure 2.
— A VU of generation X cannot be paired to a motion
sensor of generation X-1.
— Since workshop cards have a validity period of one year,
the result of CSM_113 — CSM_118 is that all
workshop cards will contain the new K M-WC at the
moment the first VU containing the new K M-VU is
issued. Therefore, such a VU will always be able to
calculate the new K M. Moreover, by that time most
new motion sensors will contain encrypted data based
on the new K M as well.
9.2.2 Keys for Securing DSRC Communication
9.2.2.1 General
CSM_119 The authenticity and confidentiality of data communicated
from a vehicle unit to a control authority over a DSRC
remote communication channel shall be ensured by means
of a set of VU-specific AES keys derived from a single
DSRC master key, KM DSRC .
▼B
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CSM_120 The DSRC master key KM DSRC shall be an AES key that is
securely generated, stored and distributed by the ERCA. The
key length may be 128, 192 or 256 bits and shall be linked
to the length of the European root key pair, as described in
CSM_50.
CSM_121 The ERCA shall communicate the DSRC master key to
Member State Certificate Authorities upon their request in
a secure manner, to allow them to derive VU-specific DSRC
keys and to ensure that the DSRC master key is inserted in
all control cards and workshop cards issued under their
responsibility.
CSM_122 The ERCA shall assign to each DSRC master key a unique
version number. The ERCA shall inform the MSCAs about
the version number when sending the DSRC master key to
them.
Note: The version number is used to distinguish different
generations of the DSRC master key, as explained in detail
in section 9.2.2.2.
▼M1
CSM_123 For every vehicle unit, the vehicle unit manufacturer shall
create a unique VU serial number and shall send this
number to its Member State Certificate Authority in a
request to obtain a set of two VU-specific DSRC keys.
The VU serial number shall have data type
.
Note:
— This VU serial number shall be identical to the vuSer­
ialNumber element of VuIdentification, see Appendix 1
and to the Certificate Holder Reference in the VU’s
certificates.
— The VU serial number may not be known at the moment
a vehicle unit manufacturer requests the VU-specific
DSRC keys. In this case, the VU manufacturer shall
send instead the unique certificate request ID it used
when requesting the VU’s certificates; see CSM_153.
This certificate request ID shall therefore be equal to
the Certificate Holder Reference in the VU’s certificates.
▼B
CSM_124 Upon receiving a request for VU-specific DSRC keys, the
MSCA shall derive two AES keys for the vehicle unit,
called K_VU DSRC _ENC and K_VU DSRC _MAC. These
VU-specific keys shall have the same length as the DSRC
master key. The MSCA shall use the key derivation function
defined in [RFC 5869]. The hash function that is necessary
to instantiate the HMAC-Hash function shall be linked to
the length of the DSRC master key, as described in
CSM_50. The key derivation function in [RFC 5869] shall
be used as follows:
Step 1 (Extract):
— PRK = HMAC-Hash (salt, IKM) where salt is an empty
string ‘’ and IKM is KM DSRC .
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 465
Step 2 (Expand):
— OKM = T(1), where
T(1) = HMAC-Hash (PRK, T(0) || info || ‘01’) with
— T(0) = an empty string (‘’)
— ►M1 info = VU serial number or certificate request
ID, as specified in CSM_123 ◄
— K_VU DSRC _ENC = first L octets of OKM and
K_VU DSRC _MAC = last L octets of OKM
where L is the required length of K_VU DSRC _ENC and
K_VU DSRC _MAC in octets.
CSM_125 The MSCA shall distribute K_VU DSRC _ENC and
K_VU DSRC _MAC to the VU manufacturer in a secure
manner for insertion in the intended vehicle unit.
CSM_126 When issued, a vehicle unit shall have stored
K_VU DSRC _ENC and K_VU DSRC _MAC in its secure
memory, in order to be able to ensure the integrity, auth­
enticity and confidentiality of data sent over the remote
communication channel. A vehicle unit shall also store the
version number of the DSRC master key used to derive
these VU-specific keys.
CSM_127 When issued, control cards and workshop cards shall have
stored KM DSRC in their secure memory, in order to be able
to verify the integrity and authenticity of data sent by a VU
over the remote communication channel and to decrypt this
data. Control cards and workshop cards shall also store the
version number of the DSRC master key.
Note: as explained in section 9.2.2.2, in fact multiple
generations of KM DSRC may have to be inserted in a
single workshop card or control card.
▼M1
CSM_128 The MSCA shall keep records of all VU-specific DSRC
keys it generated, their version number and the VU serial
number or certificate request ID used in deriving them.
▼B
9.2.2.2 DSRC Master Key Replacement
CSM_129 Each DSRC master key is associated to a particular
generation of the ERCA root key pair. The ERCA shall
therefore replace the DSRC master key every 17 years.
The validity period of each DSRC master key generation
shall begin two years before the associated ERCA root
key pair becomes valid and shall end when the associated
ERCA root key pair expires. This is depicted in Figure 3.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 466
Figure 3
Issuance and usage of different generations of the DSRC master key in vehicle units, workshop cards and control
cards
CSM_130 At least two years before generating a new European root
key pair, as described in CSM_56, the ERCA shall generate
a new DSRC master key. The length of the DSRC key shall
be linked to the foreseen strength of the new European root
key pair, according to CSM_50. The ERCA shall
communicate the new DSRC master key to the MSCAs
upon their request, together with its version number.
CSM_131 An MSCA shall ensure that all valid generations of KM DSRC
are stored in every control card issued under its authority,
together with their version numbers, as shown in Figure 3.
Note: this implies that in the last two years of the validity
period of an ERCA certificate, control cards will be issued
with three different generations of KM DSRC , as shown in
Figure 3.
CSM_132 An MSCA shall ensure that all generations of KM DSRC that
have been valid for at least a year and are still valid, are
stored in every workshop card issued under its authority,
together with their version numbers, as shown in Figure 3.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 467
Note: this implies that in the last year of the validity period
of an ERCA certificate, workshop cards will be issued with
three different generations of KM DSRC , as shown in
Figure 3.
CSM_133 Vehicle unit manufacturers shall insert only one set of
VU-specific DSRC keys into each vehicle unit, together
with its version number. This set of keys shall be derived
from the KM DSRC generation linked to the ERCA certificate
upon which the VU's certificates are based.
Notes:
— This implies that a vehicle unit based on the generation
X ERCA certificate shall only contain the generation X
K_VU DSRC _ENC and K_VU DSRC _MAC , even if the VU
is issued after the start of the validity period of the
generation X+1 ERCA certificate. This is shown in
Figure 3.
— Since workshop cards have a validity period of one year
and control cards of two years, the result of CSM_131
— CSM_133 is that all workshop cards and control
cards will contain the new DSRC master key at the
moment the first VU containing VU-specific keys
based on that master key will be issued.
9.3. Certificates
9.3.1 General
CSM_134 All certificates in the European Smart Tachograph system
shall be self-descriptive, card-verifiable (CV) certificates
according to [ISO 7816-4] and [ISO 7816-8].
CSM_135 ►M1 The Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) according
to [ISO 8825-1] shall be used to encode the data objects
within certificates. Table 4 shows the full certificate
encoding, including all tag and length bytes. ◄
Note: this encoding results in a Tag-Length-Value (TLV)
structure as follows:
Tag: The tag is encoded in one or two octets and
indicates the content.
Length: The length is encoded as an unsigned integer in
one, two, or three octets, resulting in a maximum
length of 65 535 octets. The minimum number of
octets shall be used.
Value: The value is encoded in zero or more octets
9.3.2 Certificate Content
CSM_136 All certificates shall have the structure shown in the certifi­
cate profile in Table 4.
Table 4
Certificate Profile version 1
Field Field ID Tag Length (bytes)
ASN.1 data type
(see Appendix 1)
ECC Certificate C ‘7F 21’ var
ECC Certificate Body B ‘7F 4E’ var
▼B
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Field Field ID Tag Length (bytes)
ASN.1 data type
(see Appendix 1)
Certificate Profile
Identifier
CPI ‘5F 29’ ‘01’
Certificate Authority
Reference
CAR ‘42’ ‘08’
Certificate Holder
Authorisation
CHA ‘5F 4C’ ‘07’
Public Key PK ‘7F 49’ var
Domain Parameters DP ‘06’ var
Public Point PP ‘86’ var
Certificate Holder
Reference
CHR ‘5F 20’ ‘08’
Certificate Effective
Date
CEfD ‘5F 25’ ‘04’
Certificate Expiration
Date
CExD ‘5F 24’ ‘04’
ECC Certificate
Signature
S ‘5F 37’ var
Note: the Field ID will be used in later sections of this
Appendix to indicate individual fields of a certificate, e.g.
X.CAR is the Certificate Authority Reference mentioned in
the certificate of user X.
9.3.2.1 Certificate Profile Identifier
CSM_137 Certificates shall use a Certificate Profile Identifier to
indicate the certificate profile used. Version 1, as specified
in Table 4, shall be identified by a value of ‘00’.
9.3.2.2 Certificate Authority Reference
CSM_138 The Certificate Authority Reference shall be used to identify
the public key to be used to verify the certificate signature.
The Certificate Authority Reference shall therefore be equal
to the Certificate Holder Reference in the certificate of the
corresponding certificate authority.
CSM_139 An ERCA root certificate shall be self-signed, i.e., the Cer­
tificate Authority Reference and the Certificate Holder
Reference in the certificate shall be equal.
▼B
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CSM_140 For an ERCA link certificate, the Certificate Holder
Reference shall be equal to the CHR of the new ERCA
root certificate. The Certificate Authority Reference for a
link certificate shall be equal to the CHR of the previous
ERCA root certificate.
9.3.2.3 Certificate Holder Authorisation
▼M1
CSM_141 The Certificate Holder Authorisation shall be used to
identify the type of certificate. It consists of the six most
significant bytes of the Tachograph Application ID, conca­
tenated with the equipment type, which indicates the type of
equipment for which the certificate is intended. In the case
of a VU certificate, a driver card certificate or a workshop
card certificate, the equipment type is also used to differ­
entiate between a certificate for Mutual Authentication and a
certificate for creating digital signatures (see section 9.1 and
Appendix 1, data type EquipmentType).
▼B
9.3.2.4 Public Key
The Public Key nests two data elements: the standardized domain
parameters to be used with the public key in the certificate and the
value of the public point.
CSM_142 The data element Domain Parameters shall contain one of
the object identifiers specified in Table 1 to reference a set
of standardized domain parameters.
CSM_143 The data element Public Point shall contain the public point.
Elliptic curve public points shall be converted to octet
strings as specified in [TR-03111]. The uncompressed
encoding format shall be used. When recovering an
elliptic curve point from its encoded format, the validations
described in [TR-03111] shall always be carried out.
9.3.2.5 Certificate Holder Reference
CSM_144 The Certificate Holder Reference is an identifier for the
public key provided in the certificate. It shall be used to
reference this public key in other certificates.
CSM_145 For card certificates and external GNSS facility certificates,
the Certificate Holder Reference shall have the
data type specified in
Appendix 1.
CSM_146 For vehicle units, the manufacturer, when requesting a
certificate, may or may not know the manufacturer-specific
serial number of the VU for which that certificate and the
associated private key is intended. In the first case, the
Certificate Holder Reference shall have the
data type specified in
Appendix 1. In the latter case, the Certificate Holder
Reference shall have the
data type specified in Appendix 1.
▼B
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Note: For a card certificate, the value of the CHR shall be
equal to the value of the cardExtendedSerialNumber in
EF_ICC; see Appendix 2. For an EGF certificate, the
value of the CHR shall be equal to the value of the
sensorGNSSSerialNumber in EF_ICC; see Appendix 14.
For a VU certificate, the value of the CHR shall be equal
to the vuSerialNumber element of VuIdentification, see
Appendix 1, unless the manufacturer does not know the
manufacturer-specific serial number at the time the certifi­
cate is requested.
▼B
CSM_147 For ERCA and MSCA certificates, the Certificate Holder Reference
shall have the data type
specified in Appendix 1.
9.3.2.6 Certificate Effective Date
▼M1
CSM_148 The Certificate Effective Date shall indicate the starting date
and time of the validity period of the certificate.
▼B
9.3.2.7 Certificate Expiration Date
CSM_149 The Certificate Expiration Date shall indicate the end date
and time of the validity period of the certificate.
9.3.2.8 Certificate Signature
CSM_150 The signature on the certificate shall be created over the
encoded certificate body, including the certificate body tag
and length. The signature algorithm shall be ECDSA, as
specified in [DSS], using the hashing algorithm linked to
the key size of the signing authority, as specified in
CSM_50. The signature format shall be plain, as specified
in [TR-03111].
9.3.3 Requesting Certificates
CSM_151 ►M1 When requesting a certificate, an MSCA shall send
the following data to the ERCA: ◄
— The Certificate Profile Identifier of the requested certifi­
cate
— The Certificate Authority Reference expected to be used
for signing the certificate.
— The Public Key to be signed
CSM_152 In addition to the data in CSM_151, an MSCA shall send
the following data in a certificate request to the ERCA,
allowing the ERCA to create the Certificate Holder
Reference of the new MSCA certificate:
— The numerical nation code of the Certification Authority
(data type defined in Appendix 1)
— The alphanumerical nation code of the Certification
Authority (data type defined in
Appendix 1)
— The 1-byte serial number to distinguish the different
keys of the Certification Authority in the case keys are
changed
— The two-byte field containing Certification Authority
specific additional info
▼M1
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CSM_153 An equipment manufacturer shall send the following data in
a certificate request to an MSCA, allowing the MSCA to
create the Certificate Holder Reference of the new
equipment certificate:
— If known (see CSM_154), a serial number for the
equipment, unique for the manufacturer, the equipment's
type and the month of manufacturing. Otherwise, a
unique certificate request identifier.
— The month and the year of equipment manufacturing or
of the certificate request.
The manufacturer shall ensure that this data is correct and that the
certificate returned by the MSCA is inserted in the intended equipment.
▼B
CSM_154 In the case of a VU, the manufacturer, when requesting a
certificate, may or may not know the manufacturer-specific
serial number of the VU for which that certificate and the
associated private key is intended. If known, the VU manu­
facturer shall send the serial number to the MSCA. If not
known, the manufacturer shall uniquely identify each certifi­
cate request and send this certificate request serial number to
the MSCA. The resulting certificate will then contain the
certificate request serial number. After inserting the certifi­
cate in a specific VU, the manufacturer shall communicate
the connection between the certificate request serial number
and the VU identification to the MSCA.
10. VU- CARD MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND SECURE
MESSAGING
10.1. General
CSM_155 On a high level, secure communication between a vehicle
unit and a tachograph card shall be based on the following
steps:
— First, each party shall demonstrate to the other that it
owns a valid public key certificate, signed by a Member
State Certificate Authority. In turn, the MSCA public
key certificate must be signed by the European root
certificate authority. This step is called certificate chain
verification and is specified in detail in section 10.2
— Second, the vehicle unit shall demonstrate to the card
that it is in possession of the private key corresponding
to the public key in the presented certificate. It does so
by signing a random number sent by the card. The card
verifies the signature over the random number. If this
verification is successful, the VU is authenticated. This
step is called VU Authentication and is specified in
detail in section 10.3.
▼M1
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— Third, both parties independently calculate two AES
session keys using an asymmetric key agreement
algorithm. Using one of these session keys, the card
creates a message authentication code (MAC) over
some data sent by the VU. The VU verifies the MAC.
If this verification is successful, the card is authenticated.
This step is called Card Authentication and is specified
in detail in section 10.4.
— Fourth, the VU and the card shall use the agreed session
keys to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and auth­
enticity of all exchanged messages. This is called
Secure Messaging and is specified in detail in
section 10.5.
CSM_156 The mechanism described in CSM_155 shall be triggered by
the vehicle unit whenever a card is inserted into one of its
card slots.
10.2. Mutual Certificate Chain Verification
10.2.1 Card Certificate Chain Verification by VU
CSM_157 ►M1 Vehicle units shall use the protocol depicted in
Figure 4 for verifying a tachograph card’s certificate
chain. For every certificate it reads from the card, the VU
shall verify that the Certificate Holder Authorisation (CHA)
field is correct:
— The CHA field of the Card certificate shall indicate a
card certificate for mutual authentication (see Appendix
1, data type EquipmentType).
— The CHA of the Card.CA certificate shall indicate an
MSCA.
— The CHA of the Card.Link certificate shall indicate the
ERCA. ◄
Notes to Figure 4:
— The Card certificates and public keys mentioned in the
figure are those for mutual authentication. Section 9.1.5
denotes these as Card_MA.
— The Card.CA certificates and public keys mentioned in
the figure are those for signing card certificates and it is
indicated in the CAR of the Card certificate. Section
9.1.3 denotes these as MSCA_Card.
— The Card.CA.EUR certificate mentioned in the figure is
the European root certificate that is indicated in the CAR
of the Card.CA certificate.
— The Card.Link certificate mentioned in the figure is the
card's link certificate, if present. As specified in
section 9.1.2, this is a link certificate for a new
European root key pair created by the ERCA and
signed by the previous European private key.
▼B
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— The Card.Link.EUR certificate is the European root cer­
tificate that is indicated in the CAR of the Card.Link
certificate.
CSM_158 As depicted in Figure 4, verification of the card's
certificate chain shall begin upon card insertion. The
vehicle unit shall read the card holder reference
( ) from EF ICC. The
VU shall check if it knows the card, i.e., if it has
successfully verified the card's certificate chain in the past
and stored it for future reference. If it does, and the card
certificate is still valid, the process continues with the verifi­
cation of the VU certificate chain. Otherwise, the VU shall
successively read from the card the MSCA_Card certificate
to be used for verifying the card certificate, the Card.CA.
EUR certificate to be used for verifying the MSCA_Card
certificate, and possibly the link certificate, until it finds a
certificate it knows or it can verify. If such a certificate is
found, the VU shall use that certificate to verify the
underlying card certificates it has read from the card. If
successful, the process continues with the verification of
the VU certificate chain. If not successful, the VU shall
ignore the card.
Note: There are three ways in which the VU may know the
Card.CA.EUR certificate:
— the Card.CA.EUR certificate is the same certificate as
the VU's own EUR certificate;
— the Card.CA.EUR certificate precedes the
VU's own EUR certificate and the VU contained this
certificate already at issuance (see CSM_81);
— the Card.CA.EUR certificate succeeds the
VU's own EUR certificate and the VU received a link
certificate in the past from another tachograph card,
verified it and stored it for future reference.
CSM_159 As indicated in Figure 4, once the VU has verified the
authenticity and validity of a previously unknown certificate,
it may store this certificate for future reference, such that it
does not need to verify that certificate's authenticity again if
it is presented to the VU again. Instead of storing the entire
certificate, a VU may choose to store only the contents of
the Certificate Body, as specified in section 9.3.2.
►M1 Whereas storing of all other types of certificate is
optional, it is mandatory for a VU to store a new link
certificate presented by a card. ◄
CSM_160 The VU shall verify the temporal validity of any certificate
read from the card or stored in its memory, and shall reject
expired certificates. For verifying the temporal validity of a
certificate presented by the card a VU shall use its internal
clock.
▼B
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Figure 4
Protocol for Card Certificate Chain Verification by VU
10.2.2 VU Certificate Chain Verification by Card
CSM_161 ►M1 Tachograph cards shall use the protocol depicted in
Figure 5 for verifying a VU's certificate chain. For every
certificate presented by the VU, the card shall verify that the
Certificate Holder Authorisation (CHA) field is correct:
— The CHA of the VU.Link certificate shall indicate the
ERCA.
▼B
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— The CHA of the VU.CA certificate shall indicate an
MSCA.
— The CHA field of the VU certificate shall indicate a VU
certificate for mutual authentication (see Appendix 1,
data type EquipmentType). ◄
Figure 5
Protocol for VU Certificate Chain Verification by Card
Notes to Figure 5:
— The VU certificates and public keys mentioned in the figure are those
for mutual authentication. Section 9.1.4 denotes these as VU_MA.
▼B
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— The VU.CA certificates and public keys mentioned in the figure are
those for signing VU and external GNSS facility certificates. Section
9.1.3 denotes these as MSCA_VU-EGF.
— The VU.CA.EUR certificate mentioned in the figure is the European
root certificate that is indicated in the CAR of the VU.CA certificate.
— The VU.Link certificate mentioned in the figure is the VU's link
certificate, if present. As specified in section 9.1.2, this is a link
certificate for a new European root key pair created by the ERCA
and signed by the previous European private key.
— The VU.Link.EUR certificate is the European root certificate that is
indicated in the CAR of the VU.Link certificate.
CSM_162 As depicted in Figure 5, verification of the certificate chain
of the vehicle unit shall begin with the vehicle unit
attempting to set its own public key for use in the
tachograph card. If this succeeds, it means that the card
successfully verified the VU's certificate chain in the past,
and has stored the VU certificate for future reference. In this
case, the VU certificate is set for use and the process
continues with VU Authentication. If the card does not
know the VU certificate, the VU shall successively
present the VU.CA certificate to be used for verifying its
VU certificate, the VU.CA.EUR certificate to be used for
verifying the VU.CA certificate, and possibly the link
certificate, in order to find a certificate known or verifiable
by the card. If such a certificate is found, the card shall use
that certificate to verify the underlying VU certificates
presented to it. If successful, the VU shall finally set its
public key for use in the tachograph card. If not successful,
the VU shall ignore the card.
Note: There are three ways in which the card may know the
VU.CA.EUR certificate:
— the VU.CA.EUR certificate is the same certificate as the
card's own EUR certificate;
— the VU.CA.EUR certificate precedes the card's
own EUR certificate and the card contained this certifi­
cate already at issuance (see CSM_91);
— the VU.CA.EUR certificate succeeds the card's
own EUR certificate and the card received a link certifi­
cate in the past from another vehicle unit, verified it and
stored it for future reference.
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CSM_163 The VU shall use the MSE: Set AT command to set its
public key for use in the tachograph card. As specified in
Appendix 2, this command contains an indication of the
cryptographic mechanism that will be used with the key
that is set. This mechanism shall be ‘VU Authentication
using the ECDSA algorithm, in combination with the
hashing algorithm linked to the key size of the VU's
VU_MA key pair, as specified in CSM_50’.
CSM_164 The MSE: Set AT command also contains an indication of
the ephemeral key pair which the VU will use during
session key agreement (see section 10.4). Therefore,
before sending the MSE: Set AT command, the VU shall
generate an ephemeral ECC key pair. For generating the
ephemeral key pair, the VU shall use the standardized
domain parameters indicated in the card certificate. The
ephemeral key pair is denoted as (VU.SK eph , VU.PK eph ,
Card.DP). The VU shall take the x-coordinate of the
ECDH ephemeral public point as the key identification;
this is called the compressed representation of the public
key and denoted as Comp(VU.PK eph ).
▼M1
CSM_165 If the MSE: Set AT command is successful, the card shall
set the indicated VU.PK for subsequent use during Vehicle
Authentication, and shall temporarily store
Comp(VU.PKeph). In case two or more successful MSE:
Set AT commands are sent before session key agreement is
performed, the card shall store only the last
Comp(VU.PKeph) received. The card shall reset
Comp(VU.PKeph) after a successful GENERAL AUTH­
ENTICATE command.
▼B
CSM_166 The card shall verify the temporal validity of any certificate
presented by the VU or referenced by the VU while stored
in the card's memory, and shall reject expired certificates.
CSM_167 For verifying the temporal validity of a certificate presented
by the VU, each tachograph card shall internally store some
data representing the current time. This data shall not be
directly updatable by a VU. At issuance, the current time of
a card shall be set equal to the Effective Date of the card's
Card_MA certificate. A card shall update its current time if
the Effective Date of an authentic ‘valid source of time’
certificate presented by a VU is more recent than the
card's current time. In that case, the card shall set its
current time to the Effective Date of that certificate. The
card shall accept only the following certificates as a valid
source of time:
— Second-generation ERCA link certificates
— Second-generation MSCA certificates
— Second-generation VU certificates issued by the same
country as the card's own card certificate(s).
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Note: the last requirement implies that a card shall be able
to recognize the CAR of the VU certificate, i.e. the
MSCA_VU-EGF certificate. This will not be the same as
the CAR of its own certificate, which is the MSCA_Card
certificate.
CSM_168 As indicated in Figure 5, once the card has verified the
authenticity and validity of a previously unknown
certificate, it may store this certificate for future reference,
such that it does not need to verify that certificate's auth­
enticity again if it is presented to the card again. Instead xof
storing the entire certificate, a card may choose to store only
the contents of the Certificate Body, as specified in
section 9.3.2.
10.3. VU Authentication
CSM_169 Vehicle units and cards shall use the VU Authentication
protocol depicted in Figure 6 to authenticate the VU
towards the card. VU Authentication enables the tachograph
card to explicitly verify that the VU is authentic. To do so,
the VU shall use its private key to sign a challenge
generated by the card.
CSM_170 ►M1 Next to the card challenge, the VU shall include in
the signature the certificate holder reference taken from the
card certificate. ◄
Note: This ensures that the card to which the VU auth­
enticates itself is the same card whose certificate chain the
VU has verified previously.
CSM_171 The VU shall also include in the signature the identifier of
the ephemeral public key Comp(VU.PK eph ) which the VU
will use to set up Secure Messaging during the Chip Auth­
entication process specified in section 10.4.
Note: This ensures that the VU with which a card
communicates during a Secure Messaging session is the
same VU that was authenticated by the card.
▼B
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Figure 6
VU Authentication protocol
▼B
CSM_172 If multiple GET CHALLENGE commands are sent by the
VU during VU Authentication, the card shall return a new
8-byte random challenge each time, but shall store only the
last challenge.
CSM_173 The signing algorithm used by the VU for VU Authenti­
cation shall be ECDSA as specified in [DSS], using the
hashing algorithm linked to the key size of the VU's
VU_MA key pair, as specified in CSM_50. The signature
format shall be plain, as specified in [TR-03111]. The VU
shall send the resulting signature to the card.
▼M1
CSM_174 Upon receiving the VU’s signature in an EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE command, the card shall
— Calculate the authentication token by concatenating
Card.CHR, the card challenge rcard and the identifier
of the VU ephemeral public key Comp(VU.PKeph),
— Verify the VU’s signature using the ECDSA algorithm,
using the hashing algorithm linked to the key size of the
VU’s VU_MA key pair as specified in CSM_50, in
combination with VU.PK and the calculated authenti­
cation token.
▼M1
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10.4. Chip Authentication and Session Key Agreement
CSM_175 Vehicle units and cards shall use the Chip Authentication
protocol depicted in Figure 7 to authenticate the card
towards the VU. Chip Authentication enables the vehicle
unit to explicitly verify that the card is authentic.
Figure 7
Chip Authentication and session key agreement
CSM_176 The VU and the card shall take the following steps:
1. The vehicle unit initiates the Chip Authentication process
by sending the MSE: Set AT command indicating ‘Chip
Authentication using the ECDH algorithm resulting in an
AES session key length linked to the key size of the
card's Card_MA key pair, as specified in CSM_50’.
The VU shall determine the key size of the card's key
pair from the card certificate.
▼M1
2. The VU sends the public point VU.PK eph of its
ephemeral key pair to the card. The public point shall
be converted to an octet string as specified in [TR-
03111]. The uncompressed encoding format shall be
used. As explained in CSM_164, the VU generated
this ephemeral key pair prior to the verification of the
VU certificate chain. The VU sent the identifier of the
ephemeral public key Comp(VU.PK eph ) to the card, and
the card stored it.
▼B
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3. The card computes Comp(VU.PK eph ) from VU.PK eph and
compares this to the stored value of Comp(VU.PK eph ).
4. Using the ECDH algorithm in combination with the
card's static private key and the VU's ephemeral public
key, the card computes a secret K.
5. The card chooses a random 8-byte nonce N PICC and uses
it to derive two AES session keys K MAC and K ENC from
K. See CSM_179.
▼M1
6. Using K MAC , the card computes an authentication token
over the VU ephemeral public point: T PICC =
CMAC(K MAC , VU.PK eph ). The public point shall be in
the format used by the VU (see bullet 2 above). The card
sends N PICC and T PICC to the vehicle unit.
▼B
7. Using the ECDH algorithm in combination with the
card's static public key and the VU's ephemeral private
key, the VU computes the same secret K as the card did
in step 4.
8. The VU derives session keys K MAC and K ENC from K
and N PICC ; see CSM_179.
9. The VU verifies the authentication token T PICC .
CSM_177 In step 3 above, the card shall compute Comp(VU.PKeph)
as the x-coordinate of the public point in VU.PKeph.
CSM_178 In steps 4 and 7 above, the card and the vehicle unit shall
use the ECKA-EG algorithm as defined in [TR-03111].
CSM_179 In steps 5 and 8 above, the card and the vehicle unit shall
use the key derivation function for AES session keys
defined in [TR-03111], with the following precisions and
changes:
— The value of the counter shall be ‘00 00 00 01’ for
K ENC and ‘00 00 00 02’ for K MAC.
— The optional nonce r shall be used and shall be equal to
N PICC.
— For deriving 128-bits AES keys, the hashing algorithm
to be used shall be SHA-256.
— For deriving 192-bits AES keys, the hashing algorithm
to be used shall be SHA-384.
— For deriving 256-bits AES keys, the hashing algorithm
to be used shall be SHA-512.
The length of the session keys (i.e. the length at which the
hash is truncated) shall be linked to the size of the
Card_MA key pair, as specified in CSM_50.
▼B
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CSM_180 In steps 6 and 9 above, the card and the vehicle unit shall
use the AES algorithm in CMAC mode, as specified in [SP
800-38B]. The length of T PICC shall be linked to the length
of the AES session keys, as specified in CSM_50.
10.5. Secure Messaging
10.5.1 General
CSM_181 All commands and responses exchanged between a vehicle
unit and a tachograph card after successful Chip Authenti­
cation took place and until the end of the session shall be
protected by Secure Messaging.
CSM_182 Except when reading from a file with access condition
SM-R-ENC-MAC-G2 (see Appendix 2, section 4), Secure
Messaging shall be used in authentication-only mode. In
this mode, a cryptographic checksum (a.k.a. MAC) is
added to all commands and responses to ensure message
authenticity and integrity.
CSM_183 When reading data from a file with access condition SM-R-
ENC-MAC-G2, Secure Messaging shall be used in
encrypt-then-authenticate mode, i.e. the response data is
encrypted first to ensure message confidentiality, and
afterwards a MAC over the formatted encrypted data is
calculated to ensure authenticity and integrity.
CSM_184 Secure Messaging shall use AES as defined in [AES] with
the session keys K MAC and K ENC that were agreed during
Chip Authentication.
CSM_185 An unsigned integer shall be used as the Send Sequence
Counter (SSC) to prevent replay attacks. The size of the
SSC shall be equal to the AES block size, i.e. 128 bits.
The SSC shall be in MSB-first format. The Send Sequence
Counter shall be initialized to zero (i.e. ‘00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00’) when Secure Messaging is
started. The SSC shall be increased every time before a
command or response APDU is generated, i.e. since the
starting value of the SSC in a SM session is 0, in the
first command the value of the SSC will be 1. The value
of SSC for the first response will be 2.
CSM_186 For message encryption, K ENC shall be used with AES in
the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation, as
defined in [ISO 10116], with an interleave parameter m =
1 and an initialization vector SV = E(K ENC , SSC), i.e. the
current value of the Send Sequence Counter encrypted with
K ENC .
CSM_187 For message authentication, K MAC shall be used with AES
in CMAC mode as specified in [SP 800-38B]. The length of
the MAC shall be linked to the length of the AES session
keys, as specified in CSM_50. The Send Sequence Counter
shall be included in the MAC by prepending it before the
datagram to be authenticated.
▼B
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10.5.2 Secure Message Structure
CSM_188 Secure Messaging shall make use only of the Secure
Messaging data objects (see [ISO 7816-4]) listed in Table
5. In any message, these data objects shall be used in the
order specified in this table.
Table 5
Secure Messaging Data Objects
Data Object Name Tag
Presence (M) andatory, (C)
onditional or (F) orbidden
in
Commands Responses
Plain value not encoded in BER-TLV ‘81’ C C
Plain value encoded in BER-TLV, but
not including SM DOs
‘B3’ C C
Padding-content indicator followed by
cryptogram, plain value not encoded
in BER-TLV
‘87’ C C
Protected Le ‘97’ C F
Processing Status ‘99’ F M
Cryptographic Checksum ‘8E’ M M
Note: As specified in Appendix 2, tachograph cards may
support the READ BINARY and UPDATE BINARY
command with an odd INS byte (‘B1’ resp. ‘D7’). These
command variants are required to read and update files with
more than 32 768 bytes or more. In case such a variant is
used, a data object with tag ‘B3’ shall be used instead of an
object with tag ‘81’. See Appendix 2 for more information.
CSM_189 All SM data objects shall be encoded in DER TLV as
specified in [ISO 8825-1]. This encoding results in a Tag-
Length-Value (TLV) structure as follows:
Tag: The tag is encoded in one or two octets and
indicates the content.
Length: The length is encoded as an unsigned integer in
one, two, or three octets, resulting in a maximum
length of 65 535 octets. The minimum number of
octets shall be used.
Value: The value is encoded in zero or more octets
CSM_190 APDUs protected by Secure Messaging shall be created as
follows:
— The command header shall be included in the MAC
calculation, therefore value ‘0C’shall be used for the
class byte CLA.
▼B
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— As specified in Appendix 2, all INS bytes shall be even,
with the possible exception of odd INS bytes for the
READ BINARY and UPDATE BINARY commands.
— The actual value of Lc will be modified to Lc' after
application of secure messaging.
— The Data field shall consist of SM data objects.
— In the protected command APDU the new Le byte shall
be set to ‘00’. If required, a data object ‘97’ shall be
included in the Data field in order to convey the original
value of Le.
▼M1
CSM_191 Any data object to be encrypted shall be padded according
to [ISO 7816-4] using padding-content indicator ‘01’. For
the calculation of the MAC, data objects in the APDU shall
be padded according to [ISO 7816-4].
Note: Padding for Secure Messaging is always performed
by the secure messaging layer, not by the CMAC or CBC
algorithms.
Summary and Examples
A command APDU with applied Secure Messaging will have the
following structure, depending on the case of the respective unsecured
command (DO is data object):
Case 1: CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘8E’ || Le
Case 2: CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘97’ || DO‘8E’ ||
Le
Case 3 (even INS byte): CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘81’ || DO‘8E’ ||
Le
Case 3 (odd INS byte): CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘B3’ || DO‘8E’ ||
Le
Case 4 (even INS byte): CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘81’ || DO‘97’ ||
DO‘8E’ || Le
Case 4 (odd INS byte): CLA INS P1 P2 || Lc' || DO ‘B3’ || DO‘97’ ||
DO‘8E’ || Le
where Le = ‘00’ or ‘00 00’ depending on whether short length fields or
extended length fields are used; see [ISO 7816-4].
A response APDU with applied Secure Messaging will have the
following structure, depending on the case of the respective unsecured
response:
Case 1 or 3: DO ‘99’ || DO ‘8E’ ||
SW1SW2
Case 2 or 4 (even INS byte) without
encryption
:
DO ‘81’ || DO ‘99’ || DO
‘8E’ || SW1SW2
Case 2 or 4 (even INS byte) with
encryption: DO ‘87’ || DO ‘99’ || DO
‘8E’ || SW1SW2
Case 2 or 4 (odd INS byte) without
encryption:
DO ‘B3’ || DO ‘99’ || DO
‘8E’ || SW1SW2
Note: Case 2 or 4 (odd INS byte) with encryption is never used in the
communication between a VU and a card.
▼B
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Below are three example APDU transformations for commands with
even INS code. Figure 8 shows an authenticated Case 4 command
APDU, Figure 9 shows an authenticated Case 1/Case 3 response
APDU, and Figure 10 shows an encrypted and authenticated Case
2/Case 4 response APDU.
Figure 8
Transformation of an authenticated Case 4 Command APDU
Figure 9
Transformation of an authenticated Case 1 / Case 3 Response APDU
▼M1
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Figure 10
Transformation of an encrypted and authenticated Case 2/Case 4 Response APDU
▼B
10.5.3 Secure Messaging Session Abortion
CSM_192 A vehicle unit shall abort an ongoing Secure Messaging
session if and only if one of the following conditions occur:
— it receives a plain response APDU,
— it detects a Secure Messaging error in a response APDU:
— An expected Secure Messaging data object is missing,
the order of data objects is incorrect, or an unknown
data object is included.
— A Secure Messaging data object is incorrect, e.g. the
MAC value is incorrect, the TLV structure is incorrect
or the padding indicator in tag ‘87’ is not equal to
‘01’.
— the card sends a status byte indicating it detected an SM
error (see CSM_194),
— the limit for the number of commands and associated
responses within the current session is reached. For a
given VU, this limit shall be defined by its manufacturer,
taking into account the security requirements of the
hardware used, with a maximum value of 240 SM
commands and associated responses per session.
▼M1
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CSM_193 A tachograph card shall abort an ongoing Secure Messaging
session if and only if one of the following conditions occur:
— it receives a plain command APDU,
— it detects a Secure Messaging error in a command APDU:
— An expected Secure Messaging data object is missing,
the order of data objects is incorrect, or an unknown
data object is included.
— A Secure Messaging data object is incorrect, e.g. the
MAC value is incorrect or the TLV structure is
incorrect.
— it is depowered or reset,
— the VU starts the VU Authentication process,
— the limit for the number of commands and associated
responses within the current session is reached. For a
given card, this limit shall be defined by its manufacturer,
taking into account the security requirements of the
hardware used, with a maximum value of 240 SM
commands and associated responses per session.
▼B
CSM_194 Regarding SM error handling by a tachograph card:
— If in a command APDU some expected Secure Messaging
data objects are missing, the order of data objects is
incorrect or unknown data objects are included, a
tachograph card shall respond with status bytes ‘69 87’.
— If a Secure Messaging data object in a command APDU is
incorrect, a tachograph card shall respond with status
bytes ‘69 88’.
In such a case, the status bytes shall be returned without
using SM.
CSM_195 If a Secure Messaging session between a VU and a
tachograph card is aborted, the VU and the tachograph card
shall
— securely destroy the stored session keys
— immediately establish a new Secure Messaging session, as
described in sections 10.2 — 10.5.
CSM_196 If for any reason the VU decides to restart mutual authenti­
cation towards an inserted card, the process shall restart with
verification of the card certificate chain, as described in
section 10.2, and shall continue as described in sections
10.2 — 10.5.
▼M1
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11. VU — EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY COUPLING, MUTUAL AUTH­
ENTICATION AND SECURE MESSAGING
11.1. General
CSM_197 The GNSS facility used by a VU to determine its position
may be internal, (i.e. built into the VU casing and not
detachable), or it may be an external module. In the first
case, there is no need to standardize the internal communi­
cation between the GNSS facility and the VU, and the
requirements in this chapter do not apply. In the latter case,
communication between the VU and the external GNSS
facility shall be standardized and protected as described in
this chapter.
CSM_198 Secure communication between a vehicle unit and an external
GNSS facility shall take place in the same way as secure
communication between a vehicle unit and a tachograph
card, with the external GNSS facility (EGF) taking the role
of the card. All requirements mentioned in chapter 10 for
tachograph cards shall be satisfied by an EGF, taking into
account the deviations, clarifications and additions
mentioned in this chapter. In particular, mutual certificate
chain verification, VU Authentication and Chip Authenti­
cation shall be performed as described in sections 11.3 and
11.4.
CSM_199 Communication between a vehicle unit and an EGF differs
from communication between a vehicle unit and a card in the
fact that a vehicle unit and an EGF must be coupled once in a
workshop before the VU and the EGF can exchange
GNSS-based data during normal operation. The coupling
process is described in section 11.2.
CSM_200 For communication between a vehicle unit and an EGF,
APDU commands and responses based on [ISO 7816-4]
and [ISO 7816-8] shall be used. The exact structure of
these APDUs is defined in Appendix 2 of this Annex.
11.2. VU and External GNSS Facility Coupling
CSM_201 A vehicle unit and an EGF in a vehicle shall be coupled by a
workshop. Only a coupled vehicle unit and EGF shall be able
to communicate during normal operation.
CSM_202 Coupling of a vehicle unit and an EGF shall only be possible
if the vehicle unit is in calibration mode. The coupling shall
be initiated by the vehicle unit.
CSM_203 A workshop may re-couple a vehicle unit to another EGF or
to the same EGF at any time. During re-coupling, the VU
shall securely destroy the existing EGF_MA certificate in its
memory and shall store the EGF_MA certificate of the EGF
to which it is being coupled.
CSM_204 A workshop may re-couple an external GNSS facility to
another VU or to the same VU at any time. During
re-coupling, the EGF shall securely destroy the existing
VU_MA certificate in its memory and shall store the
VU_MA certificate of the VU to which it is being coupled.
▼B
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11.3. Mutual Certificate Chain Verification
11.3.1 General
CSM_205 Mutual certificate chain verification between a VU and an
EGF shall take place only during the coupling of the VU
and the EGF by a workshop. During normal operation of a
coupled VU and EGF, no certificates shall be verified.
Instead, the VU and EGF shall trust the certificates they
stored during the coupling, after checking the temporal
validity of these certificates. The VU and the EGF shall not
trust any other certificates for protecting the VU — EGF
communication during normal operation.
11.3.2 During VU — EGF Coupling
CSM_206 During the coupling to an EGF, a vehicle unit shall use the
protocol depicted in Figure 4 (section 10.2.1) for verifying the
external GNSS facility's certificate chain.
Notes to Figure 4 within this context:
— Communication control is out of the scope of this
Appendix. However, an EGF is not a smart card and
hence the VU will probably not send a Reset to initiate
the communication and will not receive an ATR.
— The Card certificates and public keys mentioned in the
figure shall be interpreted as the EGF's certificates and
public keys for mutual authentication. Section 9.1.6
denotes these as EGF_MA.
— The Card.CA certificates and public keys mentioned in
the figure shall be interpreted as the MSCA's certificates
and public keys for signing EGF certificates. Section 9.1.3
denotes these as MSCA_VU-EGF.
— The Card.CA.EUR certificate mentioned in the figure
shall be interpreted as the European root certificate that
is indicated in the CAR of the MSCA_VU-EGF
certificate.
— The Card.Link certificate mentioned in the figure shall be
interpreted as the EGF's link certificate, if present. As
specified in section 9.1.2, this is a link certificate for a
new European root key pair created by the ERCA and
signed by the previous European private key.
— The Card.Link.EUR certificate is the European root cer­
tificate that is indicated in the CAR of the Card.Link
certificate.
— Instead of the , the VU
shall read the from EF
ICC.
— Instead of selecting the Tachograph AID, the VU shall
select the EGF AID.
— ‘Ignore Card’ shall be interpreted as ‘Ignore EGF’.
▼B
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CSM_207 Once it has verified the EGF_MA certificate, the vehicle unit
shall store this certificate for use during normal operation; see
section 11.3.3.
CSM_208 ►M1 During the coupling to a VU, an external GNSS
facility shall use the protocol depicted in Figure 5 (section
10.2.2) for verifying the VU's certificate chain. ◄
Notes to Figure 5 within this context:
— The VU shall generate a fresh ephemeral key pair using
the domain parameters in the EGF certificate.
— The VU certificates and public keys mentioned in the
figure are those for mutual authentication. Section 9.1.4
denotes these as VU_MA.
— The VU.CA certificates and public keys mentioned in the
figure are those for signing VU and external GNSS
facility certificates. Section 9.1.3 denotes these as
MSCA_VU-EGF.
— The VU.CA.EUR certificate mentioned in the figure is the
European root certificate that is indicated in the CAR of
the VU.CA certificate.
— The VU.Link certificate mentioned in the figure is the
VU's link certificate, if present. As specified in
section 9.1.2, this is a link certificate for a new
European root key pair created by the ERCA and
signed by the previous European private key.
— The VU.Link.EUR certificate is the European root certifi­
cate that is indicated in the CAR of the VU.Link
certificate.
CSM_209 In deviation from requirement CSM_167, an EGF shall use
the GNSS time to verify the temporal validity of any certifi­
cate presented.
▼M1
CSM_210 Once it has verified the VU_MA certificate, the external
GNSS facility shall store this certificate for use during
normal operation; see section 11.3.3.
▼B
11.3.3 During Normal Operation
CSM_211 ►M1 During normal operation, a vehicle unit and an EGF
shall use the protocol depicted in Figure 11 for verifying the
temporal validity of the stored EGF_MA certificate and for
setting the VU_MA public key for subsequent VU Authenti­
cation. No further mutual verification of the certificate chains
shall take place during normal operation. ◄
Note that Figure 11 in essence consists of the first steps
shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Again, note that since an
EGF is not a smart card, the VU will probably not send a
Reset to initiate the communication and will not receive an
ATR. In any case this is out of the scope of this Appendix.
▼B
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Figure 11
Mutual verification of certificate temporal validity during normal VU — EGF operation
CSM_212 As shown in Figure 11, the vehicle unit shall log an error if
the EGF_MA certificate is no longer valid. However, mutual
authentication, key agreement and subsequent communication
via secure messaging shall proceed normally.
11.4. VU Authentication, Chip Authentication and Session Key Agreement
CSM_213 VU Authentication, Chip Authentication and session key
agreement between a VU and an EGF shall take place
during coupling and whenever a Secure Messaging session
is re-established during normal operation. The VU and the
EGF shall carry out the processes described in sections 10.3
and 10.4. All requirements in these sections shall apply.
11.5. Secure Messaging
CSM_214 All commands and responses exchanged between a vehicle
unit and an external GNSS facility after successful Chip
Authentication took place and until the end of the session
shall be protected by Secure Messaging.in authentication-only
mode. All requirements in section 10.5 shall apply.
CSM_215 If a Secure Messaging session between a VU and an EGF is
aborted, the VU shall immediately establish a new Secure
Messaging session, as described in section 11.3.3 and 11.4.
12. VU — MOTION SENSOR PAIRING AND COMMUNICATION
12.1. General
CSM_216 A vehicle unit and a motion sensor shall communicate using
the interface protocol specified in [ISO 16844-3] during
pairing and in normal operation, with the changes described
in this chapter and in section 9.2.1.
▼B
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Note: readers of this chapter are supposed to be familiar with
the contents of [ISO 16844-3].
12.2. VU — Motion Sensor Pairing Using Different Key Generations
As explained in section 9.2.1, the motion sensor master key and all
associated keys are regularly replaced. This leads to the presence of up
to three motion sensor-related AES keys K M-WC (of consecutive key
generations) in workshop cards. Similarly, in motion sensors up to
three different AES-based encryptions of data (based on consecutive
generations of the motion sensor master key K M ) may be present. A
vehicle unit contains only one motion sensor-related key K M-VU.
CSM_217 A second-generation VU and a second-generation motion
sensor shall be paired as follows (compare Table 6 in [ISO
16844-3]):
1. A second-generation workshop card is inserted into the
VU and the VU is connected to the motion sensor.
2. The VU reads all available K M-WC keys from the
workshop card, inspects their key version numbers and
chooses the one matching the version number of the
VU's K M-VU key. If the matching K M-WC key is not
present on the workshop card, the VU aborts the pairing
process and shows an appropriate error message to the
workshop card holder.
3. The VU calculates the motion sensor master key K M from
K M-VU and K M-WC, and the identification key K ID from
K M , as specified in section 9.2.1.
4. The VU sends the instruction to initiate the pairing process
towards the motion sensor, as described in [ISO 16844-3],
and encrypts the serial number it receives from the motion
sensor with the identification key K ID. The VU sends the
encrypted serial number back to the motion sensor.
5. The motion sensor matches the encrypted serial number
consecutively with each of the encryptions of the serial
number it holds internally. If it finds a match, the VU is
authenticated. The motion sensor notes the generation of
K ID used by the VU and returns the matching encrypted
version of its pairing key; i.e. the encryption that was
created using the same generation of K M .
6. The VU decrypts the pairing key using K M , generates a
session key K S, encrypts it with the pairing key and sends
the result to the motion sensor. The motion sensor decrypts
K S .
7. The VU assembles the pairing information as defined in
[ISO 16844-3], encrypts the information with the pairing
key, and sends the result to the motion sensor. The motion
sensor decrypts the pairing information.
8. The motion sensor encrypts the received pairing
information with the received K S and returns this to the
VU. The VU verifies that the pairing information is the
same information which the VU sent to the motion sensor
▼B
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in the previous step. If it is, this proves that the motion
sensor used the same K S as the VU and hence in step 5
sent its pairing key encrypted with the correct generation
of K M . Hence, the motion sensor is authenticated.
Note that steps 2 and 5 are different from the standard
process in [ISO 16844-3]; the other steps are standard.
Example: Suppose a pairing takes place in the first year of the
validity of the ERCA (3) certificate; see Figure 2 in
section 9.2.1.2. Moreover
— Suppose the motion sensor was issued in the last year of
the validity of the ERCA (1) certificate. It will therefore
contain the following keys and data:
— N s [1]: its serial number encrypted with generation 1 of
K ID ,
— N s [2]: its serial number encrypted with generation 2 of
K ID ,
— N s [3]: its serial number encrypted with generation 3 of
K ID ,
— K P [1]: its generation-1 pairing key ( 1 ), encrypted with
generation 1 of K M ,
— K P [2]: its generation-2 pairing key, encrypted with
generation 2 of K M ,
— K P [3]: its generation-3 pairing key, encrypted with
generation 3 of K M ,
— Suppose that the workshop card was issued in the first
year of the validity of the ERCA (3) certificate. It will
therefore contain the generation 2 and generation 3 of the
K M-WC key.
— Suppose the VU is a generation-2 VU, containing the
generation 2 of K M-VU.
In this case, the following will happen in steps 2 — 5:
— Step 2: The VU reads generation 2 and generation 3 of
K M-WC from the workshop card and inspects their version
numbers.
— Step 3: The VU combines the generation-2 K M-WC with
its K M-VU to compute K M and K ID.
— Step 4: The VU encrypts the serial number it receives
from the motion sensor with K ID.
— Step 5: The motion sensor compares the received data
with N s [1] and doesn't find a match. Next, it compares
the data with N s [2] and finds a match. It concludes that
the VU is a generation-2 VU, and therefore sends back
K P [2].
▼B
( 1 ) Note that the generation-1, generation-2 and generation-3 pairing keys may actually be
the same key, or may be three different keys having different lengths, as explained in
CSM_117.
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12.3. VU — Motion Sensor Pairing and Communication using AES
CSM_218 As specified in Table 3 in section 9.2.1, all keys involved in
the pairing of a (second-generation) vehicle unit and a motion
sensor and in subsequent communication shall be AES keys,
rather than double-length TDES keys as specified in [ISO
16844-3]. These AES keys may have a length of 128, 192
or 256 bits. Since the AES block size is 16 bytes, the length
of an encrypted message must be a multiple of 16 bytes,
compared to 8 bytes for TDES. Moreover, some of these
messages will be used to transport AES keys, the length of
which may be 128, 192 or 256 bits. Therefore, the number of
data bytes per instruction in Table 5 of [ISO 16844-3] shall
be changed as shown in Table 6:
▼M1
Table 6
Number of plaintext and encrypted data bytes per instruction defined in [ISO 16844-3]
Instruction Request / reply Description of data
# of plaintext data
bytes according to
[ISO 16844-3]
# of plaintext data
bytes using AES
keys
# of encrypted data bytes when
using AES keys of bitlength
128 192 256
10 request Authentication data +
file number
8 8 16 16 16
11 reply Authentication data +
file contents
16 or 32, depend
on file
16 or32, depend on
file
32 / 48 32 / 48 32 / 48
41 request MoS serial number 8 8 16 16 16
41 reply Pairing key 16 16 / 24 / 32 16 32 32
42 request Session key 16 16 / 24 / 32 16 32 32
43 request Pairing information 24 24 32 32 32
50 reply Pairing information 24 24 32 32 32
70 request Authentication data 8 8 16 16 16
80 reply MoS counter value +
auth. data
8 8 16 16 16
▼B
CSM_219 The pairing information that is sent in instructions 43 (VU
request) and 50 (MoS reply) shall be assembled as specified
in section 7.6.10 of [ISO 16844-3], except that the AES
algorithm shall be used instead of the TDES algorithm in
the pairing data encryption scheme, thus resulting in two
AES encryptions, and adopting the padding specified in
CSM_220 to fit with the AES block size. The key K' p used
for this encryption shall be generated as follows:
— In case the pairing key K P is 16 bytes long: K' p = K P
XOR (N s ||N s )
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— In case the pairing key K P is 24 bytes long: K' p = K P
XOR (N s ||N s ||N s )
— In case the pairing key K P is 32 bytes long: K' p = K P
XOR (N s ||N s ||N s ||N s )
where N s is the 8-byte serial number of the motion sensor.
CSM_220 In case the plaintext data length (using AES keys) is not a
multiple of 16 bytes, padding method 2 defined in [ISO 9797-
1] shall be used.
Note: in [ISO 16844-3], the number of plaintext data bytes is
always a multiple of 8, such that padding is not necessary
when using TDES. The definition of data and messages in
[ISO 16844-3] is not changed by this part of this Appendix,
thus necessitating the application of padding.
CSM_221 For instruction 11 and in case more than one block of data
must be encrypted, the Cipher Block Chaining mode of
operation shall be used as defined in [ISO 10116], with an
interleave parameter m = 1. The IV to be used shall be
— For instruction 11: the 8-byte authentication block
specified in section 7.6.3.3 of [ISO 16844-3], padded
using padding method 2 defined in [ISO 9797-1]; see
also section 7.6.5 and 7.6.6 of [ISO 16844-3].
— For all other instructions in which more than 16 bytes are
transferred, as specified in Table 6: ‘00’ {16}, i.e. sixteen
bytes with binary value 0.
Note: As shown in section 7.6.5 and 7.6.6 of [ISO 16844-3],
when the MoS encrypts data files for inclusion in instruction
11, the authentication block is both
— Used as the initialization vector for the CBC-mode
encryption of the data files
— Encrypted and included as the first block in the data that
is sent to the VU.
12.4. VU — Motion Sensor Pairing For Different Equipment Generations
CSM_222 As explained in section 9.2.1, a second-generation motion
sensor may contain the TDES-based encryption of the
pairing data (as defined in Part A of this Appendix), which
allows the motion sensor to be paired to a first-generation
VU. If this is the case, a first-generation VU and a second-
generation motion sensor shall be paired as described in Part
A of this Appendix and in [ISO 16844-3]. For the pairing
process either a first-generation or a second-generation
workshop card may be used.
Notes:
— It is not possible to pair a second-generation VU to a first-
generation motion sensor.
▼B
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— It is not possible to use a first-generation workshop card
for coupling a second-generation VU to a motion sensor.
13. SECURITY FOR REMOTE COMMUNICATION OVER DSRC
13.1. General
As specified in Appendix 14, a VU regularly generates Remote
Tachograph Monitoring (RTM) data and sends this data to the (internal
or external) Remote Communication Facility (RCF). The remote
communication facility is responsible for sending this data over the
DSRC interface described in Appendix 14 to the remote interrogator.
Appendix 1 specifies that the RTM data is the concatenation of:
Encrypted tachograph payload the encryption of the plaintext
tachograph payload
DSRC security data described below
The plaintext tachograph payload data format is specified in Appendix 1
and further described in Appendix 14. This section describes the structure
of the DSRC security data; the formal specification is in Appendix 1.
CSM_223 The plaintext data communicated
by a VU to a Remote Communication Facility (if the RCF
is external to the VU) or from the VU to a remote inter­
rogator over the DSRC interface (if the RCF is internal in
the VU) shall be protected in encrypt-then-authenticate mode,
i.e. the tachograph payload data is encrypted first to ensure
message confidentiality, and afterwards a MAC is calculated
to ensure data authenticity and integrity.
CSM_224 The DSRC security data shall consist of the concatenation of
the following data elements in the following order; see also
Figure 12:
Current date time the current date and time of the VU (data type )
Counter a 3-byte counter, see CSM_225
▼M1
VU serial number the VU’s serial number or certificate request ID (data type
VuSerialNumber or CertificateRequestID) – see CSM_123
▼B
DSRC master key version number the 1-byte version number of the DSRC master key from
which the VU-specific DSRC keys were derived, see
section 9.2.2.
MAC the MAC calculated over all previous bytes in the RTM
data.
CSM_225 The 3-byte counter in the DSRC security data shall be in
MSB-first format. The first time a VU calculates a set of
RTM data after it is taken into production, it shall set the
value of the counter to 0. The VU shall increase the value of
the counter data by 1, each time before it calculates a next set
of RTM data.
▼B
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13.2. Tachograph Payload Encryption and MAC Generation
CSM_226 Given a plaintext data element with data type
as described in Appendix 14, a
VU shall encrypt this data as shown in Figure 12: the VU's
DSRC key for encryption K_VU DSRC _ENC (see
section 9.2.2) shall be used with AES in the Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC) mode of operation, as defined in [ISO
10116], with an interleave parameter m = 1. The initialization
vector shall be equal to IV = current date time || ‘00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00’ || counter, where current date time and
counter are specified in CSM_224. The data to be
encrypted shall be padded using method 2 defined in [ISO
9797-1].
CSM_227 A VU shall calculate the MAC in the DSRC security data as
shown in Figure 12: the MAC shall be calculated over all
preceding bytes in the RTM data, up to and including the
DSRC master key version number, and including the tags and
lengths of the data objects. The VU shall use its DSRC key
for authenticity K_VU DSRC _MAC (see section 9.2.2) with the
AES algorithm in CMAC mode as specified in [SP 800-38B].
The length of the MAC shall be linked to the length of the
VU-specific DSRC keys, as specified in CSM_50.
Figure 12
Tachograph payload encryption and MAC generation
13.3. Verification and Decryption of Tachograph Payload
CSM_228 When a remote interrogator receives RTM data from a VU, it
shall send the entire RTM data to a control card in the data
field of a PROCESS DSRC MESSAGE command, as
described in Appendix 2. Then:
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1. The control card shall inspect the DSRC master key
version number in the DSRC security data. If the control
card does not know the indicated DSRC master key, it
shall return an error specified in Appendix 2 and abort
the process.
▼M1
2. The control card shall use the indicated DSRC master key
in combination with the VU serial number or the certifi­
cate request ID in the DSRC security data to derive the
VU-specific DSRC keys K_VU DSRC _ENC and
K_VU DSRC _MAC, as specified in CSM_124.
▼B
3. The control card shall use K_VU DSRC _MAC to verify the
MAC in the DSRC security data, as specified in
CSM_227. If the MAC is incorrect, the control card
shall return an error specified in Appendix 2 and abort
the process.
4. The control card shall use K_VU DSRC _ENC to decrypt the
encrypted tachograph payload, as specified in CSM_226.
The control card shall remove the padding and shall return
the decrypted tachograph payload data to the remote
interrogator.
CSM_229 In order to prevent replay attacks, the remote interrogator
shall verify the freshness of the RTM data by verifying that
the current date time in the DSRC security data does not
deviate too much from the current time of the remote
interrogator.
Notes:
— This requires the remote interrogator to have an accurate
and reliable source of time.
— Since Appendix 14 requires a VU to calculate a new set of
RTM data every 60 seconds, and the clock of the VU is
allowed to deviate 1 minute from the real time, a lower
limit for the freshness of the RTM data is 2 minutes. The
actual freshness to be required also depends on the
accuracy of the clock of the remote interrogator.
CSM_230 When a workshop verifies the correct functioning of the
DSRC functionality of a VU, it shall send the entire RTM
data received from the VU to a workshop card in the data
field of a PROCESS DSRC MESSAGE command, as
described in Appendix 2. The workshop card shall perform
all checks and actions specified in CSM_228.
14. SIGNING DATA DOWNLOADS AND VERIFYING SIGNATURES
14.1. General
CSM_231 The Intelligent Dedicated Equipment (IDE) shall store data
received from a VU or a card during one download session
within one physical data file. Data may be stored on an ESM
(external storage medium). This file contains digital
signatures over data blocks, as specified in Appendix 7.
This file shall also contain the following certificates (refer
to section 9.1):
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— In case of a VU download:
— The VU_Sign certificate
— The MSCA_VU-EGF certificate containing the public
key to be used for verification of the VU_Sign certifi­
cate
— In case of a Card download:
— The Card_Sign certificate
— The MSCA_Card certificate containing the public key
to be used for verification of the Card_Sign certificate
CSM_232 The IDE shall also dispose of.
— In case it uses a control card to verify the signature, as
shown in Figure 13: The link certificate linking
the latest EUR certificate to the EUR certificate whose
validity period directly precedes it, if existing.
— In case it verifies the signature itself: all valid European
root certificates.
Note: the method the IDE uses to retrieve these certificates is
not specified in this Appendix.
14.2. Signature generation
CSM_233 The signing algorithm to create digital signatures over down­
loaded data shall be ECDSA as specified in [DSS], using the
hashing algorithm linked to the key size of the VU or the
card, as specified in CSM_50. The signature format shall be
plain, as specified in [TR-03111].
14.3. Signature verification
CSM_234 ►M1 An IDE may perform verification of a signature over
downloaded data itself or it may use a control card for this
purpose. In case it uses a control card, signature verification
shall take place as shown in Figure 13. For verifying the
temporal validity of a certificate presented by the IDE, the
control card shall use its internal current time, as specified in
CSM_167. The control card shall update its current time if
the Effective Date of an authentic ‘valid source of time’
certificate is more recent than the card’s current time. The
card shall accept only the following certificates as a valid
source of time:
— Second-generation ERCA link certificates
— Second-generation MSCA certificates
— Second-generation VU_Sign or Card_Sign certificates
issued by the same country as the control card’s own
card certificate.
In case it performs signature verification itself, the IDE shall
verify the authenticity and validity of all certificates in the
certificate chain in the data file, and it shall verify the
signature over the data following the signature scheme
defined in [DSS]. In both cases, for every certificate read
from the data file, it is necessary to verify that the Certificate
Holder Authorisation (CHA) field is correct:
— The CHA field of the EQT certificate shall indicate a VU
or Card (as applicable) certificate for signing (see
Appendix 1, data type EquipmentType).
▼B
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— The CHA of the EQT.CA certificate shall indicate an
MSCA.
— The CHA of the EQT.Link certificate shall indicate the
ERCA. ◄
Notes to Figure 13:
— The equipment that signed the data to be analysed is
denoted EQT.
— The EQT certificates and public keys mentioned in the
figure are those for signing, i.e. VU_Sign or Card_Sign.
— The EQT.CA certificates and public keys mentioned in
the figure are those for signing VU or Card certificates,
as applicable.
— The EQT.CA.EUR certificate mentioned in the figure is
the European root certificate that is indicated in the CAR
of the EQT.CA certificate.
— The EQT.Link certificate mentioned in the figure is the
EQT's link certificate, if present. As specified in
section 9.1.2, this is a link certificate for a new
European root key pair created by the ERCA and
signed with the previous European private key.
— The EQT.Link.EUR certificate is the European root cer­
tificate that is indicated in the CAR of the EQT.Link
certificate.
CSM_235 For calculating the hash M sent to the control card in the
PSO:Hash command, the IDE shall use the hashing algorithm
linked to the key size of the VU or the card from which the
data is downloaded, as specified in CSM_50.
CSM_236 For verifying the EQT's signature, the control card shall
follow the signature scheme defined in [DSS].
Note: This document does not specify any action to undertake
if a signature over a downloaded data file cannot be verified
or if the verification is unsuccessful.
▼B
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Figure 13
Protocol for verification of the signature over a downloaded data file
▼M1
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Appendix 12
POSITIONING BASED ON GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE
SYSTEM (GNSS)
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Scope
▼M3
1.1.1 References
▼B
1.2. Acronyms and notations
▼M3
2. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GNSS RECEIVER
3. SENTENCES PROVIDED BY THE GNSS RECEIVER
▼B
4. VEHICLE UNIT WITH AN EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY
4.1. Configuration
4.1.1 Main components and interfaces
4.1.2 External GNSS facility state at the end of production
4.2. Communication between the external GNSS facility and the vehicle unit
4.2.1 Communication Protocol
4.2.2 Secure transfer of GNSS data
4.2.3 Structure of the Read Record command
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4.2.4 Structure of the WriteRecord command
4.2.5 Other commands
▼B
4.3. Coupling, mutual authentication and session key agreement of the
external GNSS facility with vehicle unit
4.4. Error Handling
4.4.1 Communication error with the external GNSS facility
4.4.2 Breach of the physical integrity of the external GNSS facility
4.4.3 Absence of position information from GNSS receiver
4.4.4 External GNSS facility certificate expired
5. VEHICLE UNIT WITHOUT AN EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY
5.1. Configuration
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5.2. Transfer of information from the GNSS receiver to the VU
__________
5.3. Transfer of information from the VU to the GNSS receiver
5.4. Error handling
▼B
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5.4.1. Absence of position information from GNSS receiver
6. POSITION DATA PROCESSING AND RECORDING BY THE VU
7. GNSS TIME CONFLICT
8. VEHICLE MOTION CONFLICT
1. INTRODUCTION
This Appendix provides the technical requirements for the GNSS
receiver and GNSS data used by the Vehicle Unit, including the
protocols that must be implemented to assure the secure and correct
data transfer of the positioning information.
1.1. Scope
GNS_1 The Vehicle Unit shall collect location data from at least one
GNSS satellite network.
The Vehicle Unit may be with or without an external GNSS
facility as described in Figure 1:
1.1.1 References
The following references are used in this part of this Appendix.
NMEA NMEA (National Marine Electronics Association) 0183
Interface Standard, V4.11
▼B
Figure 1
Different configurations for GNSS receiver
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1.2. Acronyms and notations
The following acronyms are used in this appendix:
DOP Dilution of Precision
EGF Elementary file GNSS Facility
EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GSA GPS DOP and active satellites
HDOP Horizontal Dilution of Precision
ICD Interface Control Document
NMEA National Marine Electronics Association
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OSNMA Galileo Open Service Navigation Messages Authentication
▼B
PDOP Position Dilution of Precision
RMC Recommended Minimum Specific
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RTC Real Time Clock
▼B
SIS Signal in Space
VDOP Vertical Dilution of Precision
VU Vehicle Unit
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2. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GNSS RECEIVER
▼B
Regardless of the configuration of the Smart Tachograph with or without
an external GNSS facility, the provision of accurate and reliable posi­
tioning information is an essential element of the effective operation of
the Smart Tachograph. Therefore, it is appropriate to require its compati­
bility with the services provided by the Galileo and European Geos­
tationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) programmes as set out
in Regulation (EU) No 1285/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
Council ( 1 ). The system established under the Galileo programme is an
independent global satellite navigation system and the one established
under the EGNOS programme is a regional satellite navigation system
improving the quality of the Global Positioning System signal.
GNS_2 Manufacturers shall ensure that the GNSS receivers in the
Smart Tachographs are compatible with the positioning
services provided by the Galileo and the EGNOS systems.
Manufacturers may also choose, in addition, compatibility
with other satellite navigation systems.
▼B
( 1 ) Regulation (EU) No 1285/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 December 2013 on the implementation and exploitation of European satellite navi­
gation systems and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 876/2002 and Regulation (EC)
No 683/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013,
p. 1).
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GNS_3 The GNSS receiver shall have the capability to support Navi­
gation Messages Authentication on the Open Service of
Galileo (OSNMA).
GNS_3a The GNSS receiver shall perform a number of consistency
checks in order to verify that the measurements computed by
the GNSS receiver on the basis of the OSNMA data have
resulted in the correct information about the position, velocity
and data of the vehicle, and have therefore not been influenced
by any external attack such as meaconing. These consistency
checks shall consist, for instance, of:
— detection of abnormal power emissions by means of
combined monitoring of the Automatic Gain Control
(AGC) and Carrier-to-Noise density ratio (C/N0),
— pseudorange measurement consistency and Doppler
measurement consistency over time, including the
detection of abrupt measurement jumps,
— receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) tech­
niques, including the detection of inconsistent
measurements with the estimated position,
— position and velocity checks, including abnormal position
and velocity solutions, sudden jumps and behaviour not
consistent with the dynamics of the vehicle,
— time and frequency consistency, including clock jumps and
drifts that are not consistent with the receiver clock
characteristics.
GNS_3b The European Commission shall develop and approve the
following documents:
— A Signal in Space Interface Control Document (SIS ICD),
specifying in detail the OSNMA information transmitted in
the Galileo signal.
— OSNMA Receiver Guidelines, providing the requirements
and processes in the receivers to guarantee a secure im­
plementation of OSNMA, as well as recommendations to
enhance OSNMA performance.
GNSS receivers fitted in tachographs, either internal or
external, shall be constructed in accordance with the SIS ICD
and the OSNMA receiver guidelines.
GNS_3c The GNSS receiver shall provide position messages, called
authenticated position messages in this Annex and its
Appendixes, which are elaborated using only satellites from
which the authenticity of the navigation messages has been
successfully verified.
GNS_3d The GNSS receiver shall also provide standard position
messages, elaborated using the satellites in view, regardless
whether they are authenticated or not.
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GNS_3e The GNSS receiver shall use the VU Real Time Clock (RTC)
as time reference for the time synchronisation necessary for
OSNMA.
GNS_3f The VU RTC time shall be provided to the GNSS receiver by
the VU.
GNS_3g The maximal time drift specified in requirement 41 of
Annex IC, shall be provided to the GNSS receiver by the
VU, along with the VU RTC time.
3. SENTENCES PROVIDED BY THE GNSS RECEIVER
This section describes the sentences used in the functioning of the Smart
Tachograph, for transmitting standard and authenticated position
messages. This section is valid both for the configuration of the Smart
Tachograph with or without an external GNSS facility.
GNS_4 The standard position data is based on the NMEA sentence
Recommended Minimum Specific (RMC) GNSS Data, which
contains the Position information (Latitude, Longitude), Time
in UTC format (hhmmss.ss), and Speed Over Ground in
Knots plus additional values.
The format of the RMC sentence is the following (as from
NMEA V4.11 standard):
Figure 2
Structure of the RMC sentence
$–RMC,hhmmss.ss,A,llll.ll,a,yyyyy.yy,a,x.x,x .x,xxxx,x.x,a,a,a*hh
(1) Time (UTC)
(2) Status, A= Valid position, V= Warning
(3) Latitude
(4) N or S
(5) Longitude
(6) E or W
(7) Speed over ground in knots
(8) Track made good, degrees true
(9) Date, ddmmyy
(10) Magnetic Variation, degrees
(11) E or W
(12) FAA Mode Indicator
(13) Navigational status
(14) Checksum
The Navigational status is optional and may not be present in
the RMC sentence.
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The Status gives indication if the GNSS signal is available.
Until the value of the Status is not set to ‘A’, the received data
(e.g., on Time or Latitude/Longitude) cannot be used to record
the position of the vehicle in the VU.
The resolution of the position is based on the format of the
RMC sentence described above. The first part of the fields 3)
and 5) are used to represent the degrees. The rest are used to
represent the minutes with three decimals. So the resolution is
1/1 000 of minute or 1/60 000 of degree (because one minute
is 1/60 of a degree).
GNS_4a The authenticated position data is based on a NMEA-like
sentence, Authenticated Minimum Specific (AMC) Data,
which contains the Position information (Latitude, Longitude),
Time in UTC format (hhmmss.ss), and Speed Over Ground in
Knots plus additional values.
The format of the AMC sentence is the following (as from
NMEA V4.11 standard, except for value number 2):
Figure 3
Structure of the AMC sentence
$–AMC,hhmmss.ss,A,llll.ll,a,yyyyy.yy,a,x.x,x.x,xxxx,x.x,a,a,a*hh
(1) Time (UTC)
(2) Status, A=Authenticated position (established using at least 4 satellites from
which the authenticity of the navigation messages has been successfully
verified), J=jamming or O=other GNSS attack in the absence of failed
authentication of navigation messages (by implemented consistency
checks according to GNS_3a), F=failed authentication of navigation
messages (as detected by OSNMA verifications specified in the
documents referred to in GNS_3b), V=Void (authenticated position is not
available for any other reason)
(3) Latitude
(4) N or S
(5) Longitude
(6) E or W
(7) Speed over ground in knots
(8) Track made good, degrees true
(9) Date, ddmmyy
(10) Magnetic Variation, degrees
(11) E or W
(12) FAA Mode Indicator
(13) Navigational status
(14) Checksum
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The Navigational status is optional and may not be present in
the AMC sentence.
The Status gives indication if an authenticated GNSS position
is available, if an attack on the GNSS signals has been
detected, if authentication of navigation messages has failed,
or if GNSS position is void. When the value of the Status is
not set to ‘A’, the received data (e.g. Time or Latitude/
Longitude) are considered to be not valid, and may not be
used to record the position of the vehicle in the VU. When the
value of the Status is set to ‘J’ (jamming), ‘O’ (other GNSS
attack), or ‘F’ (failed authentication of navigation messages), a
GNSS anomaly event shall be recorded in the VU, as defined
in Annex IC and Appendix 1 (EventFaultCode).
GNS_5 The Vehicle Unit shall store in the VU database the position
information for latitude and longitude with a resolution of
1/10 of minute or 1/600 of a degree as described in
Appendix 1 for type GeoCoordinates.
The GPS DOP and active satellites (GSA) command, as from
NMEA V4.11 standard, can be used by the VU to determine
and record the signal availability and accuracy of standard
positions. In particular the HDOP is used to provide an indi­
cation on the level of accuracy of the recorded location data
(see 4.2.2). The VU will store the value of the Horizontal
Dilution of Precision (HDOP) calculated as the minimum of
the HDOP values collected on the available GNSS systems.
The GNSS Id. indicates the corresponding NMEA Id. for
every GNSS constellation and Satellite-Based Augmentation
System (SBAS).
Figure 4
Structure of the GSA sentence (standard positions)
$–GSA,a,a,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x.x,x.x,x.x,a*h h
(1) Selection mode
(2) Mode
(3) ID of 1 st satellite used for fix
(4) ID of 2 nd satellite used for fix
…
(14) ID of 12th satellite used for fix
(15) PDOP
(16) HDOP
(17) VDOP
(18) System ID
(19) Checksum
The System ID is optional and may not be present in the GSA
sentence.
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Similarly, the NMEA-like sentence authenticated active
satellites (ASA) command can be used by the VU to
determine and record the signal availability and accuracy of
authenticated positions. Values 1 to 18 are defined in NMEA
V4.11 standard.
Figure 5
Structure of the ASA sentence (authenticated positions)
$–ASA,a,a,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x.x,x.x,x.x,a*h h
(1) Selection mode
(2) Mode
(3) ID of 1 st satellite used for fix
(4) ID of 2 nd satellite used for fix
…
(14) ID of 12 th satellite used for fix
(15) PDOP
(16) HDOP
(17) VDOP
(18) System ID
(19) Checksum
The System ID is optional and may not be present in the ASA
sentence.
GNS_6 When an external GNSS facility is used, the GSA sentence
shall be stored in the GNSS Secure Transceiver with record
number ‘02’ to ‘06’, and the ASA sentence shall be stored
with record number ‘12’ to ‘16’.
GNS_7 The maximum size of the sentences (e.g., RMC, AMC, GSA,
ASA or others), which can be used for the sizing of the read
record command shall be 85 bytes (see Table 1).
▼B
4. VEHICLE UNIT WITH AN EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY
4.1. Configuration
4.1.1 Main components and interfaces
In this configuration, the GNSS receiver is a part of the external GNSS
facility.
GNS_8 The external GNSS facility must be powered with a specific
vehicle interface.
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GNS_9 The external GNSS facility shall consist of the following
components (see Figure 6):
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(a) A commercial GNSS receiver to provide the position
data through the GNSS data interface. For example, the
GNSS data interface can be NMEA standard V4.11
where the GNSS receiver acts as a talker and
transmits NMEA sentences to the GNSS Secure Trans­
ceiver with a frequency of 1Hz for the pre-defined set
of NMEA and NMEA-like sentences, which must
include at least the RMC, AMC, GSA and ASA
sentences. The implementation of the GNSS data
interface is a choice of the manufacturers of the
external GNSS facility.
▼B
(b) A transceiver unit (GNSS Secure Transceiver) with the
capability to support standard ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013
(see 4.2.1) to communicate with the vehicle unit and
support the GNSS data interface to the GNSS receiver.
The unit is provided with a memory to store the identi­
fication data of the GNSS receiver and external GNSS
facility.
▼M3
(c) An enclosure system with tamper detection function,
which encapsulates both the GNSS receiver and the
GNSS Secure Transceiver. The tamper detection
function shall implement the security protection
measures as requested in the Protection Profile of the
Smart Tachograph.
▼B
(d) A GNSS antenna installed on the vehicle and connected
to the GNSS receiver through the enclosure system.
GNS_10 The external GNSS facility has at least the following
external interfaces:
(a) the interface to the GNSS antenna installed on the
vehicle truck, if an external antenna is used.
(b) the interface to the Vehicle Unit.
GNS_11 In the VU, the VU Secure Transceiver is the other end of
the secure communication with the GNSS Secure Trans­
ceiver and it must support ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 for the
connection to the external GNSS facility.
GNS_12 For the physical layer of the communication with the
external GNSS facility, the vehicule unit shall support
ISO/IEC 7816-12:2005 or another standard able to
support ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013. (see 4.2.1).
4.1.2 External GNSS facility state at the end of production
GNS_13 The external GNSS facility shall store the following values
in the non-volatile memory of the GNSS Secure Trans­
ceiver when it leaves the factory:
— the EGF_MA key pair and corresponding certificate,
— the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate containing the
MSCA_VU-EGF.PK public key to be used for verifi­
cation of the EGF_MA certificate,
— the EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key
to be used for verification of the MSCA_VU-EGF
certificate,
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— the EUR certificate whose validity period directly
precedes the validity period of the EUR certificate to
be used to verify the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate, if
existing,
— the link certificate linking these two EUR certificates, if
existing,
— the extended serial-number of the external GNSS
facility,
— operating system identifier of the GNSS facility,
— type approval number of the external GNSS facility;
— Identifier of the security component of the external
GNSS module.
4.2. Communication between the external GNSS facility and the vehicle
unit
4.2.1 Communication Protocol
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GNS_14 The communication protocol between the external GNSS
facility and the vehicle unit shall support the following
functions:
1. The collection and distribution of GNSS data (e.g.,
position, timing, speed),
2. The collection of the configuration data of the external
GNSS facility,
3. The management protocol to support the coupling,
mutual authentication and session key agreement
between the external GNSS facility and the VU,
4. The transmission to the external GNSS facility of the
VU RTC time and of the maximal difference between
true time and the VU RTC time.
▼B
GNS_15 The communication protocol shall be based on standard
ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 with the VU Secure Transceiver
playing the master role and the GNSS Secure Transceiver
playing the slave role. The physical connection between the
external GNSS facility and the vehicule unit is based on
ISO/IEC 7816-12:2005 or another standard able to support
ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013
▼M1
GNS_16 In the communication protocol, extended length fields shall
not be supported.
▼B
GNS_17 The communication protocol of ISO 7816 (both *-4:2013
and *-12:2005) between the external GNSS facility and the
VU shall be set to T = 1.
▼B
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GNS_18 Regarding the functions 1) the collection and distribution of
GNSS data and 2) the collection of the configuration data
of the external GNSS facility and 3) management protocol,
the GNSS Secure Transceiver shall simulate a smart card
with a file system architecture composed by a Master
File (MF), a Dedicated File (DF) with Application Identifier
specified in Appendix 1 chapter 6.2 (‘FF 44 54 45 47 4D’)
and with 3 EFs containing certificates and one single
Elementary File (EF.EGF) with file identifier equal to
‘2F2F’ as described in Table 1.
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GNS_18a Regarding the function 4) the transmission to the external
GNSS facility of the VU RTC time and of the maximal
difference between true time and the VU RTC time, the
GNSS Secure Transceiver shall use an EF (EF VU) in
the same DF with file identifier equal to ‘2F30’ as
described in Table 1.
▼B
GNS_19 The GNSS Secure Transceiver shall store the data coming
from the GNSS receiver and the configuration in the
EF.EGF. This is a linear, variable-length record file with
an identifier equal to ‘2F2F’ in hexadecimal format.
▼M3
GNS_19a The GNSS Secure Transceiver shall store the data coming
from the VU in the EF VU. This is a linear, fixed-length
record file with an identifier equal to ‘2F30’ in hexadecimal
format.
GNS_20 The GNSS Secure Transceiver shall use a memory to store
the data and be able to perform as many read/write cycles
as needed during a lifetime of at least 15 years. Apart from
this aspect, the internal design and implementation of the
GNSS Secure Transceiver is left to the manufacturers.
▼M1
The mapping of record numbers and data is provided in
Table 1. Note that there are five GSA sentences for the
GNSS constellations and Satellite-Based Augmentation
System (SBAS).
▼B
GNS_21 The file structure is provided in Table 1. For the access
conditions (ALW, NEV, SM-MAC) see Appendix 2
chapter 3.5.
▼M3
Table 1
File Structure
Access conditions
File File ID Read Update Encrypted
MF 3F00
EF.ICC 0002 ALW NEV
(by VU)
No
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Access conditions
File File ID Read Update Encrypted
DF GNSS Facility 0501 ALW NEV No
EF EGF_MACertificate C100 ALW NEV No
EF CA_Certificate C108 ALW NEV No
EF Link_Certificate C109 ALW NEV No
EF EGF 2F2F SM-MAC NEV
(by VU)
No
EF VU 2F30 SM-MAC SM-MAC No
File / Data element Record no Size (bytes)
Default
values
Min Max
MF 552 1031
EF.ICC
sensorGNSSSerialNumber 8 8
DF GNSS Facility 612 1023
EF EGF_MACertificate 204 341
EGFCertificate 204 341 {00..00}
EF CA_Certificate 204 341
MemberStateCertificate 204 341 {00..00}
EF Link_Certificate 204 341
LinkCertificate 204 341 {00..00}
EF EGF
RMC NMEA Sentence '01' 85 85
1st GSA NMEA Sentence '02' 85 85
2nd GSA NMEA Sentence '03' 85 85
3rd GSA NMEA Sentence '04' 85 85
4th GSA NMEA Sentence '05' 85 85
5th GSA NMEA Sentence '06' 85 85
Extended serial-number of the external
GNSS facility defined in Appendix 1
as SensorGNSSSerialNumber.
'07' 8 8
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File / Data element Record no Size (bytes)
Default
values
Operating system identifier of the
GNSS Secure Transceiver defined in
Appendix 1 as SensorOSIdentifier.
'08' 2 2
Type approval number of the external
GNSS facility defined in Appendix 1
as SensorExternalGNSSApproval­
Number.
'09' 16 16
Identifier of the security component of
the external GNSS facility defined in
Appendix 1 as SensorExternalGNSS­
SCIdentifier
'10' 8 8
AMC Sentence '11' 85 85
1st ASA Sentence '12' 85 85
2nd ASA Sentence '13' 85 85
3rd ASA Sentence '14' 85 85
4th ASA Sentence '15' 85 85
5th ASA Sentence '16' 85 85
RFU – Reserved for Future Use From '17'
to 'FD'
EF VU
VuRtcTime (see Appendix 1) '01' 4 4 {00..00}
VuGnssMaximalTimeDifference (see
Appendix 1)
'02' 2 2 {00..00}
▼B
4.2.2 Secure transfer of GNSS data
▼M3
GNS_22 The secure transfer of GNSS position data, VU RTC time
and maximal time difference between true time and the VU
RTC time shall be allowed only in the following conditions:
▼B
1. The coupling process has been completed as described
in Appendix 11. Common security mechanisms.
2. The periodic mutual authentication and session key
agreement between the VU and the external GNSS
facility also described in Appendix 11. Common
security mechanisms has been executed with the
indicated frequency.
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GNS_23 Every T seconds, where T is a value lower or equal to 20,
unless coupling or mutual authentication and session key
agreement takes place, the VU requests from the external
GNSS facility the position information on the basis of the
following flow:
1. The VU requests position data from the External GNSS
facility together with Dilution of Precision data (from the
GSA and ASA sentences). The VU Secure Transceiver
shall use the ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 SELECT and READ
RECORD(S) commands in secure messaging
authentication-only mode as described in section 11.5
of Appendix 11 with the file identifier ‘2F2F’ and
RECORD number equal to ‘01’ for RMC NMEA
sentence, ‘02’,‘03’,‘04’,‘05’,‘06’ for GSA NMEA
sentence, ‘11’ for AMC sentence, and
‘12’,‘13’,‘14’,‘15’,‘16’ for ASA sentence.
2. The last position data received is stored in the EF with
identifier ‘2F2F’ and the records described in Table 1 in
the GNSS secure transceiver as the GNSS secure trans­
ceiver receives NMEA data with a frequency of at least
1 Hz from the GNSS receiver through the GNSS data
interface.
3. The GNSS Secure Transceiver sends the response to the
VU Secure Transceiver by using the APDU response
message in secure messaging authentication-only mode
as described in section 11.5 of Appendix 11.
4. The VU Secure Transceiver checks the authenticity and
integrity of the received response. In case of positive
outcome, the position data is transferred to the VU
processor through the GNSS data interface.
5. The VU processor checks the received data extracting
the information (e.g., latitude, longitude, time) from the
RMC NMEA sentence. The RMC NMEA sentence
includes the information if the non-authenticated
position is valid. If the non-authenticated position is
valid, the VU processor also extracts the values of
HDOP from GSA NMEA sentences and calculates the
minimum value on the available satellite systems (i.e.,
when the fix is available).
6. The VU processor also extracts the information (e.g.,
latitude, longitude, time) from the AMC sentence. The
AMC sentence includes the information if the auth­
enticated position is not valid or GNSS signal has
been attacked. If the position is valid, the VU
processor also extracts the values of HDOP from ASA
sentences and calculates the minimum value on the
available satellite systems (i.e., when the fix is
available).
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GNS_23a The VU shall also write VU RTC time and maximal time
difference between true time and the VU RTC time as
needed, by using the ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 SELECT and
WRITE RECORD(S) commands in secure messaging
authentication-only mode as described in section 11.5 of
Appendix 11 with the file identifier ‘2F30’ and RECORD
number equal to ‘01’ for VuRtcTime and ‘02’ for Maxi­
malTimeDifference.
▼B
4.2.3 Structure of the Read Record command
This section describes in detail the structure of the Read Record
command. Secure messaging (authentication-only mode) is added as
described in Appendix 11 Common security mechanisms.
GNS_24 The command shall support the Secure Messaging
authentication-only-mode, see Appendix 11.
GNS_25 Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘0Ch’ Secure messaging asked.
INS 1 ‘B2h’ Read Record
P1 1 ‘XXh’ Record number (‘00’ references the
current record)
P2 1 ‘04h’ Read the record with the record number
indicated in P1
Le 1 ‘XXh’ Length of data expected. Number of
Bytes to be read.
GNS_26 The record referenced in P1 becomes the current record.
Byte Length Value Description
#1-#X X ‘XX..XXh’ Data read
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the GNSS secure trans­
ceiver returns ‘9000’.
— If the current file is not record oriented, the GNSS
secure transceiver returns ‘6981’.
— If the command is used with P1 = ‘00’ but there is no
current EF the GNSS secure transceiver returns ‘6986’
(command not allowed).
▼M3
— If the record is not found, the GNSS secure transceiver
returns ‘6A83’.
— If the external GNSS facility has detected tampering, it
shall return status words ‘6690’.
__________
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4.2.4 Structure of the WriteRecord command
This section describes in detail the structure of the Write Record
command. Secure messaging (authentication-only mode) is added as
described in Appendix 11 Common security mechanisms.
GNS_26a The command shall support the Secure Messaging
authentication-only-mode, see Appendix 11.
GNS_26b Command Message
Byte Length Value Description
CLA 1 ‘0Ch’ Secure messaging asked.
INS 1 ‘D2h’ Write Record
P1 1 ‘XXh’ Record number ('00' references the
current record)
P2 1 ‘04h’ Write the record with the record number
indicated in P1
Data X ‘XXh’ Data
GNS_26c The record referenced in P1 becomes the current record.
Byte Length Value Description
SW 2 ‘XXXXh’ Status Words (SW1,SW2)
— If the command is successful, the GNSS secure trans­
ceiver returns ‘9000’.
— If the current file is not record oriented, the GNSS
secure transceiver returns '6981'.
— If the command is used with P1 = '00' but there is no
current EF the GNSS secure transceiver returns '6986'
(command not allowed).
— If the record is not found, the GNSS secure transceiver
returns '6A83'.
— If the external GNSS facility has detected tampering, it
shall return status words ‘6690’.
4.2.5 Other commands
GNS_27 The GNSS Secure Transceiver shall support the following
tachograph generation 2 commands specified in Appendix 2:
Command Reference
Select Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.1
Read Binary Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.2
Get Challenge Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.4
PSO: Verify Certificate Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.7
External Authenticate Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.9
General Authenticate Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.10
MSE:SET Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.11
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4.3. Coupling, mutual authentication and session key agreement of the
external GNSS facility with vehicle unit
The coupling, mutual authentication and session key agreement of the
external GNSS facility with the vehicle unit is described in Appendix
11. Common security mechanisms, Chapter 11.
4.4. Error Handling
This section describes how potential error conditions by the external
GNSS facility are addressed and recorded in the VU.
4.4.1 Communication error with the external GNSS facility
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GNS_28 A communication error with the external GNSS facility
event shall be recorded in the VU, as defined in
requirement 82 of Annex IC and Appendix 1 (Event­
FaultType). In this context, a communication error is
triggered when the VU Secure Transceiver does not
receive a response message after a request message as
described in 4.2.
▼B
4.4.2 Breach of the physical integrity of the external GNSS facility
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GNS_29 If the external GNSS facility has been breached, the GNSS
Secure Transceiver shall ensure that cryptographic material
is unavailable. As described in GNS_25 and GNS_26, the
VU shall detect tampering if the Response has status
‘6690’. The VU shall then generate and record a security
breach attempt event as defined in requirement 85 of
Annex IC and Appendix 1 (EventFaultType for tamper
detection of GNSS). Alternately, the external GNSS
facility may respond to VU requests without secure
messaging and with status ‘6A88’.
▼B
4.4.3 Absence of position information from GNSS receiver
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GNS_30 If the GNSS Secure Transceiver does not receive data from
the GNSS receiver, the GNSS Secure Transceiver shall
generate a response message to the READ RECORD
command with RECORD number equal to ‘01’ with a
Data Field of 12 bytes all set to 0xFF. Upon reception
of the Response message with this value of the data
field, the VU shall generate and record an absence of
position information from GNSS receiver event, as
defined in requirement 81 of Annex IC and Appendix 1
(EventFaultType).
▼B
4.4.4 External GNSS facility certificate expired
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GNS_31 If the VU detects that the EGF certificate used for mutual
authentication is not valid any longer, the VU shall
generate and record a security breach attempt event as
defined in requirement 85 of Annex IC and Appendix 1
(EventFaultType for external GNSS facility certificate
expired). The VU shall still use the received GNSS
position data.
▼B
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Figure 6
Schema of the external GNSS facility
▼B
5. VEHICLE UNIT WITHOUT AN EXTERNAL GNSS FACILITY
5.1. Configuration
In this configuration, the GNSS receiver is inside the Vehicle Unit as
described in Figure 1.
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GNS_32 For transmitting position, DOP and satellites data, the
GNSS receiver shall act as a talker and transmit NMEA
or NMEA-like sentences to the VU processor, which shall
act as a listener with a frequency of 1/10 Hz or faster for
the pre-defined set of sentences, which shall include at
least the RMC, GSA, AMC and ASA sentences. Alter­
natively, the VU processor and the internal GNSS
receiver may use other data formats to exchange the data
contained in the NMEA or NMEA-like sentences specified
in GNS_4, GNS_4a and GNS_5.
▼B
GNS_33 An external GNSS antenna installed on the vehicle or an
internal GNSS antenna shall be connected to the VU.
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5.2. Transfer of information from the GNSS receiver to the VU
GNS_34 The VU processor checks the received data extracting the
information (e.g., latitude, longitude, time) from the RMC
NMEA sentence and the AMC sentence.
GNS_35 The RMC NMEA sentence includes the information if the
non-authenticated position is valid. If the non-authenticated
position is not valid, the position data is not available and
it cannot be used to record the position of the vehicle. If
the non-authenticated position is valid, the VU processor
also extracts the values of HDOP from GSA NMEA.
GNS_36 The VU processor also extracts the information (e.g.
latitude, longitude, time) from the AMC sentence. The
AMC sentence includes the information if the
non-authenticated position is valid according to GNS_4a.
If the non-authenticated position is valid, the VU processor
also extracts the values of HDOP from ASA sentences.
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5.3. Transfer of information from the VU to the GNSS receiver
GNS_37 The VU processor provides to the GNSS receiver the VU
RTC time and the maximal difference between true time
and the VU RTC time, in accordance with GNS_3f and
GNS_3g.
5.4. Error handling
5.4.1 Absence of position information from GNSS receiver
GNS_38 The VU shall generate and record an absence of position
information from GNSS receiver event, as defined in
requirement 81 of Annex IC and Appendix 1 (Event­
FaultType).
6. POSITION DATA PROCESSING AND RECORDING BY THE VU
This section is valid both for the configuration of the Smart
Tachograph with or without an external GNSS facility.
GNS_39 Position data shall be stored in the VU, together with a flag
indicating if the position has been authenticated. When
position data need to be recorded in the VU, the
following rules shall apply:
(a) If both authenticated and standard positions are valid
and consistent, the standard position and its accuracy
shall be recorded in the VU and the flag shall be set to
‘authenticated’.
(b) If both authenticated and standard positions are valid
but not consistent, the VU shall store the authenticated
position and its accuracy, and the flag shall be set to
‘authenticated’.
(c) If the authenticated position is valid and the standard
position is not valid, the VU shall record the auth­
enticated position and its accuracy, and the flag shall
be set to ‘authenticated’.
(d) If the standard position is valid and the authenticated
position is not valid, the VU shall record the standard
position and its accuracy, and the flag shall be set to
‘not authenticated’.
Authenticated and standard positions are considered as
consistent, as shown in Figure 7, when the horizontal auth­
enticated position can be found in a circle centered at the
horizontal standard position, which radius results of
rounding up to the nearest upper whole number the value
of R_H calculated according to the following formula:
R_H = 1.74 • σ UERE • HDOP
where:
— R_H is the relative radius of a circle around the
estimated horizontal position, in meters. It is an
indicator that is used to check consistency between
standard and authenticated positions.
— σ UERE is the standard deviation for the user equivalent
range error (UERE), which models all measurement
errors for the target application, including urban
environments. A constant value of σ UERE = 10 meters
shall be used.
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— HDOP is the horizontal dilution of precision calculated
by the GNSS receiver.
— σ UERE . HDOP is the estimation of the root mean
squared error in the horizontal domain.
Figure 7
Consistent Authenticated and Standard (non-authenticated)
positions
GNS_40 When the value of the Status in a received AMC sentence
is set to ‘J’ or ‘O’ or ‘F’ in accordance with requirement
GNS_4a, the VU shall generate and record a GNSS
anomaly event, as defined in requirement 88a of
Annex IC and Appendix 1 (EventFaultType). The vehicle
unit may perform additional checks before storing a GNSS
anomaly event following the reception of a ‘J’ or ‘O’
setting.
7. GNSS TIME CONFLICT
GNS_41 If the VU detects a discrepancy between the time of the
vehicle unit’s time measurement function and the time
originating from the GNSS signals, it shall generate and
record a time conflict event, as defined in requirement 86
of Annex IC and Appendix 1 (EventFaultType).
8. VEHICLE MOTION CONFLICT
GNS_42 The VU shall trigger and record a Vehicle Motion Conflict
event in accordance with requirement 84 of Annex IC, in
case motion information calculated from the motion sensor
is contradicted by motion information calculated from the
internal GNSS receiver, from the external GNSS facility, or
by other independent motion source(s) as set out in
requirement 26 of Annex IC.
The vehicle motion conflict event shall be triggered upon
occurrence of one of the following trigger conditions:
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Trigger condition 1:
The trimmed mean value of the speed differences between
these sources shall be used, when the position information
from the GNSS receiver is available and when the ignition
of the vehicle is switched on, as specified below:
— every 10 seconds maximum, the absolute value of the
difference between the vehicle speed estimated from
the GNSS and the one estimated from the motion
sensor shall be computed.
— all the computed values in a time window containing
the last 5 minutes of vehicle movement shall be used to
compute the trimmed mean value.
— the trimmed mean value shall be computed as the
average of 80% of the remaining values, after having
eliminated the highest ones in absolute values.
The Vehicle Motion Conflict event shall be triggered if the
trimmed mean value is above 10 km/h for five uninter­
rupted minutes of vehicle movement. (Note: the use of
the trimmed mean on the last 5 minutes is applied to
mitigate the risk of measurement outliers and transient
values).
For the trimmed mean computation, the vehicle shall be
considered as moving if at least one vehicle speed value
estimated either from motion sensor or from GNSS
receiver is not equal to zero.
Trigger condition 2:
The vehicle motion conflict event shall also be triggered if
the following condition is true:
GnssDistance>[OdometerDifference×OdometerTolerance­
Factor+Minimum (SlipDistanceUpperlimit;(OdometerDif­
ference×SlipFactor))+GnssTolerance+FerryTrainDistance]
where:
— GnssDistance is the distance between the current
position of the vehicle and the previous one, both
obtained from valid authenticated position messages,
without considering the height,
— OdometerDifference is the difference between the
current odometer value and the odometer value corre­
sponding to the previous valid authenticated position
message,
— OdometerToleranceFactor is equal to 1.1 (worst case
tolerance factor for all measurement tolerances of the
vehicle odometer),
— GnssTolerance is equal to 1 km (worst case GNSS
tolerance),
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— Minimum (SlipDistanceUpperLimit; (OdometerDif­
ference * SlipFactor)) is the minimum value between:
— SlipDistanceUpperLimit which is equal to 10 km
(upper limit of the slip distance caused by
slipping effects during braking),
— and OdometerDifference * SlipFactor, in which
SlipFactor is equal to 0.2 (maximal influence of
slipping effects during breaking),
— FerryTrainDistance is computed as: FerryTrainDistance
=200km/h * tFerryTrain, where tFerryTrain is the sum
of the durations in hours of the ferry/train crossings in
the considered time interval. The duration of a
ferry/train crossings is defined as the time difference
between its end flag and its beginning flag.
The preceding verifications shall be performed every 15
minutes if the necessary position data are available,
otherwise as soon as the position data are available.
For this trigger condition:
— date and time of beginning of event shall be equal to
the date and time when the previous position message
was received,
— date and time of end of event shall be equal to the date
and time when the checked condition becomes false
again.
Trigger condition 3:
The vehicle unit encounters a discrepancy consisting of the
motion sensor not detecting any movement and the inde­
pendent motion source detecting movement for a specific
period. The conditions to record a discrepancy as well as
the period of detection of the discrepancy shall be set out
by the vehicle unit manufacturer, although the discrepancy
shall be detected in no more than three hours.
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Appendix 13
ITS INTERFACE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Scope
1.2. Acronyms and definitions
2. REFERENCED STANDARDS
3. ITS INTERFACE WORKING PRINCIPLES
3.1. Communication technology
3.2. Available services
3.3. Access through the ITS interface
3.4. Data available and need of driver consent
4. LIST OF DATA AVAILABLE THROUGH THE ITS INTERFACE AND
PERSONAL/NOT PERSONAL CLASSIFICATION
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Scope
ITS_01 This Appendix specifies the basics of the communication through
the tachograph interface with Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS),
requested in Articles 10 and 11 of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.
ITS_02 The ITS interface shall allow external devices to obtain data from
the tachograph, to use tachograph services and also to provide data
to the tachograph.
Other tachograph interfaces (e.g. CAN bus) may also be used for
that purpose.
This Appendix does not specify:
— how data provided through the ITS interface are collected and
managed within the tachograph,
— the form of presentation of collected data to applications hosted
on the external device,
— the ITS security specification in addition to what provides
Bluetooth®,
— the Bluetooth® protocols used by the ITS interface.
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1.2. Acronyms and definitions
The following acronyms and definitions specific to this Appendix are used:
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
ITS Intelligent Transport System
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
VU Vehicle Unit
ITS unit an external device or application using the VU ITS
interface.
2. REFERENCED STANDARDS
ITS_03 This Appendix refers to and depends upon all or parts of the
following regulations and standards. Within the clauses of this
Appendix, the relevant standards, or relevant clauses of standards,
are referred to. In the event of any contradiction the clauses of this
Appendix shall take precedence.
Standards referenced to in this Appendix are:
— Bluetooth® – Core Version 5.0.
— ISO 16844-7: Road vehicles -Tachograph systems - Part 7:
Parameters
— ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994 Information technology - Open Systems
Interconnection - Basic Reference Model, the Basic Model
3. ITS INTERFACE WORKING PRINCIPLES
ITS_04 The VU shall be responsible to keep updated and maintain
tachograph data transmitted through the ITS interface, without
any involvement of the ITS interface.
3.1. Communication technology
ITS_05 Communication through the ITS interface shall be performed via
Bluetooth® interface and be compatible to Bluetooth® Low
Energy according to Bluetooth version 5.0 or newer.
ITS_06 The communication between the VU and the ITS unit shall be
established after a Bluetooth® pairing process has been completed.
ITS_07 A secure and encrypted communication shall be established
between the VU and the ITS unit, in accordance with the
Bluetooth® specification mechanisms. This Appendix does not
specify encryption or other security mechanisms in addition to
what Bluetooth® provides.
ITS_08 Bluetooth® is using a server/client model to control the trans­
mission of data between devices, in which the VU shall be the
server and the ITS unit shall be the client.
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3.2. Available services
ITS_09 The data to be transmitted through the ITS interface in accordance
with point 4 shall be made available through the services specified
in Appendix 7 and Appendix 8. In addition, the VU shall make
available to the ITS unit the services that are necessary for manual
data entry in accordance with requirement 61 of Annex IC, and
optionally, for other data entries in real time.
Figure 1
partition of the communication through the ITS interface according to the OSI Model layers
ITS_10 When the download interface is used via the front connector, the
VU shall not provide the download services specified in Appendix
7 via ITS Bluetooth® connection.
ITS_11 When the calibration interface is used via the front connector, the
VU shall not provide the calibration services specified in Appendix
8 via ITS Bluetooth® connection.
3.3. Access through the ITS interface
ITS_12 The ITS interface shall provide a wireless access to all services
specified in Appendix 7 and Appendix 8, in replacement of a cable
connection to the front connector for calibration and download
specified in Appendix 6.
ITS_13 The VU shall make the ITS interface available to the user
according to the combination of valid tachograph cards inserted
in the VU, as specified in Table 1.
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Table 1
Availability of ITS interface depending on the type of card inserted in the tachograph
Availability of the ITS
interface
Driver slot
No card Driver card Control card Workshop card Company card
C
o Ä
d
ri
ve
rs
lo
t
No card Not available Available Available Available Available
Driver card Available Available Available Available Available
Control card Available Available Available Not available Not available
Workshop card Available Available Not available Available Not available
Company card Available Available Not available Not available Available
ITS_14 After a successful ITS Bluetooth® pairing, the VU shall assign the
ITS Bluetooth® connection to the specific inserted tachograph card
according to Table 2:
Table 2
Assignment of the ITS connection depending on the type of card inserted in the tachograph
Assignment of the ITS
Bluetooth® connection
Driver slot
No card Driver card Control card Workshop card Company card
C
o Ä
d
ri
ve
rs
lo
t
No card Not available Driver card Control card Workshop card Company card
Driver card Driver card Driver
card (**)
Control card Workshop card Company card
Control card Control card Control card Control card (*) Not available Not available
Workshop card Workshop card Workshop card Not available Workshop
card (*)
Not available
Company card Company card Company card Not available Not available Company
card (*)
(*) The ITS Bluetooth® connection shall be assigned to the tachograph card in the driver slot of the VU.
(**) The user shall select the card to which the ITS Bluetooth® connection shall be assigned (inserted in the driver or in the co-driver
slot).
ITS_15 If a tachograph card is withdrawn, then the VU shall terminate the
ITS Bluetooth® connection which is assigned to this card.
ITS_16 The VU shall support the ITS connection to at least one ITS unit
and may support connections to multiple ITS units at the same
time.
ITS_17 The access rights to the data and services available via the ITS
interface shall comply with requirements 12 and 13 of Annex IC,
in addition to the driver consent specified in section 3.4 of this
Appendix.
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3.4. Data available and need of driver consent
ITS_18 All tachograph data available via the services referred to in
point 3.3 shall be classified as either personal or not personal for
the driver, co-driver or both.
ITS_19 At least the list of data classified as mandatory in section 4 shall be
made available through the ITS interface.
ITS_20 The data in section 4 that are classified as ‘personal’ shall only be
accessible upon driver consent, accepting therefore that the
personal data can leave the vehicle network, except in the case
set out in requirement ITS_25, for which the driver consent is
not needed.
ITS_21 Data additional to those gathered in point 4 and considered as
mandatory may be made available through the ITS interface. Ad­
ditional data which are not included in point 4 shall be classified as
‘personal’ or not ‘personal’ by the VU manufacturer, being the
driver consent requested for those data that have been classified
as personal, except in the case set out in requirement ITS_25, for
which the driver consent is not needed.
ITS_22 Upon insertion of a driver card which is unknown to the vehicle
unit, the cardholder shall be prompted by the tachograph to enter
the consent for transmission of personal data output through the
ITS interface, in accordance with requirement 61 of Annex IC.
ITS_23 The consent status (enabled/disabled) shall be recorded in the data
memory of the vehicle unit.
ITS_24 In case of multiple drivers, only the personal data related to the
drivers who gave their consent shall be accessible through the ITS
interface. For instance, in a crew situation, if only the driver has
given his/her consent, personal data related to the co-driver shall
not be accessible.
ITS_25 When the VU is in control, company or calibration modes, the
access rights through the ITS interface shall be managed
according to requirements 12 and 13 of Annex IC, hence the
driver consent not being needed.
4. LIST OF DATA AVAILABLE THROUGH THE ITS INTERFACE AND
PERSONAL/NOT PERSONAL CLASSIFICATION
Data name Data format Source
Data classification (personal/ not
personal) Consent for the avail­
ability of the data
Availability
driver co-driver
VehicleIdentification­
Number
Appendix 8 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
CalibrationDate ISO 16844-7 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
TachographVehi­
cleSpeed
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent mandatory
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Data name Data format Source
Data classification (personal/ not
personal) Consent for the avail­
ability of the data
Availability
driver co-driver
Driver1WorkingState ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent mandatory
Driver2WorkingState ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent mandatory
DriveRecognize ISO 16844-7 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
Driver1TimeRelated­
States
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent mandatory
Driver2TimeRelated­
States
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent mandatory
DriverCardDriver1 ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent mandatory
DriverCardDriver2 ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent mandatory
OverSpeed ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent mandatory
TimeDate Appendix 8 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
HighResolutionTot­
alVehicleDistance
ISO 16844-7 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
HighResolutionTrip­
Distance
ISO 16844-7 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
ServiceComponentI­
dentification
ISO 16844-7 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
ServiceDelayCalend­
arTimeBased
ISO 16844-7 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
Driver1Identification ISO 16844-7 Driv­
er
Card
personal N/A driver consent mandatory
Driver2Identification ISO 16844-7 Driv­
er
Card
N/A personal co-driver consent mandatory
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Data name Data format Source
Data classification (personal/ not
personal) Consent for the avail­
ability of the data
Availability
driver co-driver
NextCalibrationDate Appendix 8 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
Driver1Continuous­
DrivingTime
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent mandatory
Driver2Continuous­
DrivingTime
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent mandatory
Driver1Cumulative­
BreakTime
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent mandatory
Driver2Cumulative­
BreakTime
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent mandatory
Driver1CurrentDur­
ationOfSelectedAc­
tivity
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent mandatory
Driver2CurrentDur­
ationOfSelectedAc­
tivity
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent mandatory
SpeedAuthorised Appendix 8 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
TachographCardSlot1 ISO 16844-7 VU not personal N/A no need of
consent
mandatory
TachographCardSlot2 ISO 16844-7 VU N/A not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
Driver1Name ISO 16844-7 Driv­
er
Card
personal N/A driver consent mandatory
Driver2Name ISO 16844-7 Driv­
er
Card
N/A personal co-driver consent mandatory
OutOfScopeCondition ISO 16844-7 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
ModeOfOperation ISO 16844-7 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
Driver1Cumulated­
DrivingTimePreviou­
sAndCurrentWeek
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent mandatory
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Data name Data format Source
Data classification (personal/ not
personal) Consent for the avail­
ability of the data
Availability
driver co-driver
Driver2Cumulated­
DrivingTimePreviou­
sAndCurrentWeek
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent mandatory
EngineSpeed ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
RegisteringMem­
berState
Appendix 8 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
VehicleRegistration­
Number
Appendix 8 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
mandatory
Driver1EndOfLast­
DailyRestPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2EndOfLast­
DailyRestPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1EndOfLast­
WeeklyRestPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2EndOfLast­
WeeklyRestPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1EndOfSecond­
LastWeeklyRestPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2EndOfSecond­
LastWeeklyRestPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A Personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1TimeLastLoa­
dUnloadOperation
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2TimeLastLoa­
dUnloadOperation
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1CurrentDaily­
DrivingTime
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2CurrentDaily­
DrivingTime
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1CurrentWeekly­
DrivingTime
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2CurrentWeekly­
DrivingTime
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
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Data name Data format Source
Data classification (personal/ not
personal) Consent for the avail­
ability of the data
Availability
driver co-driver
Driver1TimeLeftUntil­
NewDailyRestPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2TimeLeftUntil­
NewDailyRestPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1Card­
ExpiryDate
ISO 16844-7 Driv­
er
Card
personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2Card­
ExpiryDate
ISO 16844-7 Driv­
er
Card
N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1CardNextMan­
datoryDownloadDate
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2CardNextMan­
datoryDownloadDate
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
TachographNextMan­
datoryDownloadDate
ISO 16844-7 VU not personal not personal no need of
consent
optional
Driver1TimeLeftUntil­
NewWeeklyRestPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2TimeLeftUntil­
NewWeeklyRestPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1Numbe­
rOfTimes9hDailyDriv­
ingTimesExceeded
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2Numbe­
rOfTimes9hDailyDriv­
ingTimesExceeded
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1CumulativeUn­
interruptedRestTime
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2CumulativeUn­
interruptedRestTime
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1Minimum­
DailyRest
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2Minimum­
DailyRest
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
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Data name Data format Source
Data classification (personal/ not
personal) Consent for the avail­
ability of the data
Availability
driver co-driver
Driver1Minimum­
WeeklyRest
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2Minimum­
WeeklyRest
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1Maximum­
DailyPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2Maximum­
DailyPeriod
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1Maximum­
DailyDrivingTime
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2Maximum­
DailyDrivingTime
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1NumberOfUse­
dReducedDailyRest­
Periods
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2NumberOfUse­
dReducedDailyRest­
Periods
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
Driver1RemainingCur­
rentDrivingTime
ISO 16844-7 VU personal N/A driver consent optional
Driver2RemainingCur­
rentDrivingTime
ISO 16844-7 VU N/A personal co-driver consent optional
VehiclePosition Appendix 8 VU personal personal driver and
co-driver consent
mandatory
ByDefaultLoadType Appendix 8 VU personal personal driver and
co-driver consent
mandatory
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Appendix 14
REMOTE COMMUNICATION FUNCTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
2. SCOPE
3. ACRONYMS, DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
4. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS
4.1 Overview
4.1.1 Preconditions to data transfer via 5.8 GHz DSRC interface
4.1.2 Profile 1a: via a hand aimed or temporary roadside mounted and aimed
Remote Early Detection Communication Reader
4.1.3 Profile 1b: via a vehicle mounted and directed Remote Early Detection
Communication Reader (REDCR)
4.2 Security/Integrity
5. REMOTE COMMUNICATION DESIGN AND PROTOCOLS
5.1 Design
5.2 Workflow
5.2.1 Operations
5.2.2 Interpretation of the Data received via the DSRC communication
5.3 DSRC Physical interface parameters for remote communication
5.3.1 Location constraints
5.3.2 Downlink and uplink parameters
5.3.3 Antenna design
5.4 DSRC Protocol requirements for RTM
5.4.1 Overview
5.4.2 Commands
5.4.3 Interrogation command sequence
5.4.4 Data structures
5.4.5 Elements of RtmData, actions performed and definitions
5.4.6 Data transfer mechanism
5.4.7 Detailed DSRC transaction description
5.4.8 DSRC Test transaction description
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5.5 Reserved for future use
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5.6 Data transfer between the DSRC-VU and VU
5.6.1 Physical Connection and interfaces
5.6.2 Application Protocol
5.7 Error handling
5.7.1 Recording and communication of the Data in the DSRC-VU
5.7.2 Wireless Communication errors
6. COMMISSIONING AND PERIODIC INSPECTION TESTS FOR THE
REMOTE COMMUNICATION FUNCTION
6.1 General
6.2 ECHO
6.3 Tests to validate the secure data content
1. INTRODUCTION
This Appendix specifies the design and the procedures to follow in order
to perform the remote communication function (the Communication) as
required in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 (the Regulation).
DSC_1 Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 determines that the tachograph
shall be equipped with a remote communication functionality
that shall enable agents of the competent control authorities to
read tachograph information from passing vehicles by using
remote interrogation equipment (the Remote early detection
communication reader [REDCR]), specifically, interrogation
equipment connecting wirelessly using CEN 5.8 GHz
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) interfaces.
It is important to comprehend that this functionality is intended
to serve only as a pre-filter in order to select vehicles for
closer inspection, and it does not replace the formal inspection
process as determined in the provisions of Regulation (EU)
No 165/2014. See recital 9 in the preamble of this regulation,
stating that remote communication between the tachograph and
control authorities for roadside control purposes facilitates
targeted roadside checks.
DSC_2 The Data shall be exchanged using the Communication which
shall be a wireless intercourse using 5.8 GHz DSRC wireless
communications consistent with this Appendix and tested
against the appropriate parameters of EN 300 674-1, {Elec­
tromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM);
Road Transport and Traffic Telematics (RTTT); Dedicated
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Short Range Communication (DSRC) transmission equipment
(500 kbit/s / 250 kbit/s) operating in the 5,8 GHz Industrial,
Scientific and Medical (ISM) band; Part 1: General characte­
ristics and test methods for Road Side Units (RSU) and On
-Board Units (OBU)}.
DSC_3 The Communication shall be established with the communi­
cations equipment only when so requested by the equipment of
the competent control authority using compliant radio-
communication means (the Remote early detection communi­
cation reader (REDCR)).
DSC_4 The Data shall be secured to ensure integrity.
DSC_5 Access to the Data communicated shall be restricted to
competent control authorities authorised to check
infringements of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 and of
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 and to workshops in so far as
it is necessary to verify the correct functioning of the
tachograph.
DSC_6 The Data exchanged during the Communication shall be
limited to the data necessary for the purpose of targeting
roadside checks of vehicles with a potentially manipulated or
misused tachograph.
DSC_7 Data integrity and security shall be obtained by securing the
Data within the Vehicle Unit (VU) and by passing only the
secured payload data and security related data (see 5.4.4)
across the wireless 5.8 GHz DSRC remote communication
medium, meaning that only authorised persons of competent
control authorities have the means to understand the data
passed across the Communication and to verify its authenticity.
See Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms.
DSC_8 The Data shall contain a timestamp for the time of its last
update.
DSC_9 The content of the security data shall be known only to and
within the control of the competent control authorities, and
those parties with whom they share this information and is
outwith the provisions of the Communication that is the
subject of this Appendix, save that the Communication
makes provision to transfer a packet of security data with
every packet of payload data.
DSC_10 The same architecture and equipment shall be capable be used
to acquire other data concepts (such as weigh–on-board) using
the architecture specified herein.
DSC_11 For clarification, in accordance with the provisions of
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 (Article 7), data concerning
the identity of the driver shall not be communicated across
the Communication.
2. SCOPE
The scope of this Appendix is to specify how agents of the competent
control authorities use a specified 5.8 GHz DSRC wireless communi­
cation to remotely obtain data (the Data) from a targeted vehicle that
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identifies that the targeted vehicle is in potential violation of
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 and should be targeted for consideration
to be stopped for further investigation.
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 requires that the Data collected shall be
limited to data or pertaining to data that identifies a potential
infringement, as defined in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.
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In this scenario, the time available for communication is limited, because
the Communication is targeted and of a short- range design. Further, the
same communication means for remote tachograph monitoring (RTM)
may also be used by the competent control authorities for other appli­
cations (such as the maximal weights and dimensions for heavy goods
vehicles defined in Directive (EU) 2015/719) and such operations may
be separate or sequential at the discretion of the competent control
authorities.
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This Appendix specifies:
— The communications equipment, procedures and protocols to be used
for the Communication
— The Standards and Regulations to which the radio equipment shall
comply
— The presentation of the Data to the Communication equipment
— The enquiry and download procedures and sequence of operations
— The Data to be transferred
— Potential interpretation of the Data transferred across the Communi­
cation
— The provisions for security data relating to the Communication
— The availability of the Data to the competent control authorities
— How the Remote early detection communication reader can request
different freight and fleet data concepts
For clarification, this Appendix does not specify:
— the collection of the Data operation and management within the VU
(which shall be a function of product design unless specified
elsewhere within Regulation (EU) No 165/2014)
— the form of presentation of collected data to the agent of the
competent control authorities, nor the criteria which shall be used
by the competent control authorities to decide which vehicles to stop
(which shall be a function of product design unless specified
elsewhere within Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 or a policy
decision of the competent control authorities). For clarification: the
Communication only makes the Data available to the competent
control authorities in order that they may make informed decisions
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— Data security provisions (such as encryption) concerning the content
of the Data (which shall be specified within Appendix 11 Common
Security Mechanisms).
— detail of any data concepts other than RTM which may be obtained
using the same architecture and equipment
— detail of the behaviour and management between VU's and the
DSRC-VU, nor the behaviour within the DSRC-VU (other than to
provide the Data when so requested by an REDCR).
3. ACRONYMS, DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
The following acronyms and definitions specific to this Appendix are
used in this appendix:
the Antenna electrical device which converts
electric power into radio waves, and
vice versa used in combination with a
radio transmitter or radio receiver. In
operation, a radio transmitter supplies
an electric current oscillating at radio
frequency to the antenna's terminals,
and the antenna radiates the energy
from the current as electromagnetic
waves (radio waves). In reception, an
antenna intercepts some of the power
of an electromagnetic wave in order to
produce a tiny voltage at its terminals,
that is applied to a receiver to be
amplified
the Communication exchange of information/data between
a DSRC-REDCR and a DSRC-VU
according to section 5 in a master-
slave relationship to obtain the Data.
the Data secured data of defined format (see
5.4.4) requested by the DSRC-
REDCR and provided to the DSRC-
REDCR by the DSRC-VU across a
5.8 GHz DSRC link as defined in 5
below
Regulation (EC) No 165/2014 Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the
European Parliament and of the
Council of 4 February 2014 on tacho­
graphs in road transport, repealing
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Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85
on recording equipment in road
transport and amending Regulation
(EC) No 561/2006 of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the
harmonisation of certain social legis­
lation relating to road transport
AID Application Identifier
BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
BST Beacon Service Table
CIWD Card insertion while driving
CRC cyclic redundancy check
DSC (n) identifier of a requirement for a
specific DSRC appendix
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communi­
cation
DSRC-REDCR DSRC — Remote Early Detection
Communication Reader.
DSRC-VU DSRC — Vehicle Unit. This is the
‘remote early detection facility’
defined in Annex 1C.
DWVC Driving without valid card
EID Element Identifier
LLC Logical Link Control
LPDU LLC Protocol Data Unit
OWS Onboard Weighing System
PDU Protocol Data Unit
REDCR Remote early detection communication
reader. This is the ‘remote early
detection communication reader
equipment’ defined in Annex 1C.
RTM Remote Tachograph Monitoring
SM-REDCR Security Module-Remote early
detection communication reader
TARV Telematics Applications for Regulated
Vehicles (ISO 15638 series of
Standards)
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VU Vehicle Unit
VUPM Vehicle Unit Payload Memory
VUSM Vehicle Unit Security Module
VST Vehicle Service Table
WIM Weigh in motion
WOB Weigh on board
The specification defined in this Appendix refers to and depends upon
all or parts of the following regulations and standards. Within the
clauses of this Appendix the relevant standards, or relevant clauses of
standards, are specified. In the event of any contradiction the clauses of
this Appendix shall take precedence. In the event of any contradiction
where no specification is clearly determined in this Appendix, operating
within ERC 70-03 (and tested against the appropriate parameters of EN
300 674-1) shall take precedence, followed in descending order of pref­
erence by EN 12795, EN 12253 EN 12834 and EN 13372, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4
and 7.1.
Regulations and standards referenced in this Appendix are:
[1] Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 4 February 2014 on tachographs in road transport,
repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording
equipment in road transport and amending Regulation (EC)
No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road
transport.
[2] Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain
social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council
Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and
repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (Text with EEA
relevance).
[3] ERC 70-03 CEPT: ECC Recommendation 70-03: Relating to the
Use of Short Range Devices (SRD)
[4] ISO 15638 Intelligent transport systems — Framework for coop­
erative telematics applications for regulated commercial freight
vehicles (TARV).
[5] EN 300 674-1 Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum
Matters (ERM); Road Transport and Traffic Telematics (RTTT);
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) transmission
equipment (500 kbit/s / 250 kbit/s) operating in the 5,8 GHz
Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) band; Part 1: General
characteristics and test methods for Road Side Units (RSU) and
On-Board Units (OBU).
[6] EN 12253 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated
short-range communication — Physical layer using microwave at
5.8 GHz.
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[7] EN 12795 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated
short-range communication — Data link layer: medium access
and logical link control.
[8] EN 12834 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated
short-range communication — Application layer.
[9] EN 13372 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated
short-range communication — Profiles for RTTT applications
[10] ISO 14906 Electronic fee collection — Application interface defi­
nition for dedicated short- range communication
4. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS
4.1 Overview
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 provides specific and controlled scenarios
within which the Communication is to be used.
The scenarios supported are:
‘Communication Profile 1: Roadside inspection using a short range
wireless communication Remote Early Detection Communication
Reader instigating a physical roadside inspection (master-:-slave)
Reader Profile 1a: via a hand aimed or temporary roadside mounted
and aimed Remote Early Detection Communication
Reader Profile 1b: via a vehicle mounted and directed Remote Early
Detection Communication Reader’.
4.1.1 Preconditions to data transfer via 5,8 GHz DSRC interface
NOTE: In order to understand the context of the preconditions the reader
is referred to Figure 14.3 below.
4.1.1.1 Data held in VU
DSC_12 The VU shall be responsible to keep updated every 60 seconds
and maintain the data to be stored in the VU, without any
involvement of the DSRC communication function. The
means by which this is achieved is internal to the VU,
specified in Regulation (EU) No 165/2014, Annex 1 C,
section 3.19 ‘Remote communication for targeted roadside
checks’ and is not specified in this Appendix.
4.1.1.2 Data provided to DSRC-VU Facility
DSC_13 The VU shall be responsible to update the DSRC tachograph
data (the Data) whenever the data stored in the VU is updated
at the interval determined in 4.1.1.1 (DSC_12), without any
involvement of the DSRC communication function.
DSC_14 The VU data shall be used as a basis to populate and update
the Data, the means by which this is achieved, is specified in
Annex 1.C, section 3.19 ‘Remote communication for targeted
roadside checks’ or if there is no such specification it is a
function of product design and is not specified in this
Appendix. For the design of the connection between
DSRC-VU facility and the VU, please refer to section 5.6.
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4.1.1.3 Content of the Data
DSC_15 The content and format of the Data shall be such that, once
decrypted, it shall be structured and made available in the form
and format specified in 5.4.4 of this Appendix (Data
structures).
4.1.1.4 Data presentation
DSC_16 The Data, having been kept frequently updated in accordance
with the procedures determined in 4.1.1.1, shall be secured
prior to presentation to the DSRC-VU, and presented as a
secured data concept value, for temporary storage in the
DSRC-VU as the current version of the Data. This data is
transferred from the VUSM to the DSRC function VUPM.
The VUSM and VUPM are functions and not necessarily
physical entities. The form of physical instantiation to
perform these functions shall be a matter of product design
unless specified elsewhere in Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.
4.1.1.5 Security data
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DSC_17 Security data (DSRCSecurityData), comprising the data
required by the REDCR to complete its ability to decrypt the
Data shall be supplied as defined in Appendix 11 Common
Security Mechanisms, for temporary storage in the DSRC-VU
as the current version of DSRCSecurityData, in the form
defined in section 5.4.4 of this Appendix.
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4.1.1.6 VUPM data available for transfer across the DSRC interface
DSC_18 The data concept which shall always be available in the DSRC
function VUPM for immediate transfer upon request by the
REDCR is defined in section 5.4.4 for full ASN.1 Module
specifications.
General overview of communication Profile 1
This profile covers the use case where an agent of the competent control
authorities, uses a short range remote communication Remote Early
Detection Communication Reader (5.8 GHz DSRC interfaces operating
within ERC 70-03, and tested against the appropriate parameters of EN
300 674-1 as described in section 5) (the REDCR) to remotely identify a
vehicle which is potentially in violation of Regulation (EU)
No 165/2014. Once identified, the agent of the competent control auth­
orities who is controlling the interrogation decides whether the vehicle
should be stopped.
4.1.2 Profile 1a: via a hand aimed or temporary roadside mounted and aimed
Remote Early Detection Communication Reader
In this use case the agent of the competent control authorities is situated
at the roadside, and aims a hand held, tripod mounted, or similar
portable, REDCR from the roadside towards the centre of the windshield
of the targeted vehicle. The interrogation is made using 5.8 GHz DSRC
interfaces operating within ERC 70-03, and tested against the appro­
priate parameters of EN 300 674-1 as described in section 5. See
Figure 14.1 (Use Case 1).
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Figure 14.1
Roadside interrogation using 5,8 GHz DSRC
4.1.3 Profile 1b: via a vehicle mounted and directed Remote Early Detection
Communication Reader (REDCR)
In this use case the agent of the competent control authorities is situated
within a moving vehicle, and either aims a hand held, portable REDCR
from the vehicle towards the centre of the windshield of the targeted
vehicle, or the REDCR is mounted within or on the vehicle so as to
point towards the centre of the windshield of the targeted vehicle when
the Remote Early Detection Communication Reader's vehicle is in a
particular position relevant to the targeted vehicle (for example
directly ahead in a stream of traffic). The interrogation is made using
5.8 GHz DSRC interfaces operating within ERC 70-03, and tested
against the appropriate parameters of EN 300 674-1 as described in
section 5. See Figure 14.2. (Use Case 2).
Figure 14.2
Vehicle based interrogation using 5,8 GHz DSRC
4.2 Security/Integrity
To give the possibility to verify the authenticity and integrity of down­
loaded data through the remote communication, the secured Data is
verified and decrypted in accordance with Appendix 11 Common
Security Mechanisms.
5. REMOTE COMMUNICATION DESIGN AND PROTOCOLS
5.1 Design
The design of the remote communication function in the Smart
Tachograph is shown as described in Figure 14.3.
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Figure 14.3
Design of the remote communication function
DSC_19 The following functions are located in the VU:
— Security Module (VUSM). This function present in the VU
is responsible for securing the Data which is to be trans­
mitted from the DSRC-VU to the agent of the competent
control authorities via remote communication.
— The secured data is stored in the VUSM memory. At
intervals determined in 4.1.1.1 (DSC_12), the VU
encrypts and replenishes the RTMdata concept (which
comprises payload data and security data concept values
determined below in this Appendix) held in the memory of
the DSRC-VU. The operation of the security module is
defined in Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms
and outwith the scope of this Appendix, save that it shall
be required to provide updates to the VU Communication
facility each time the VUSM data changes.
— The communication between the VU and the DSRC-VU
may be a wired communication or a Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE) communication, and the physical location
of the DSRC-VU may be integral with the antenna on
the windshield of the vehicle, may be internal to the
VU, or located somewhere between.
— The DSRC-VU shall have a reliable source of power
available at all times. The means by which it is provided
with its power is a design decision.
— The memory of the DSRC-VU shall be non-volatile in
order to maintain the Data in the DSRC-VU even when
the vehicle ignition is switched off.
— If the communication between the VU and the DSRC-VU
is made via BLE and the power source is a non-recharging
battery, the power source of the DSRC-VU shall be
replaced at every Periodic Inspection, and the manufacturer
of the DSRC-VU equipment shall be responsible to ensure
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that the power supply is adequate to last from one Periodic
Inspection to the next Periodic Inspection, maintaining
normal access to the data by an REDCR throughout the
period without failure or interruption.
— VU RTM ‘payload memory’ facility (VUPM). This
function present in the VU is responsible for providing
and updating the Data. The content of The Data. (‘Tacho­
graphPayload’) is defined in 5.4.4/5.4.5 below and is
updated at the interval determined in 4.1.1.1 (DSC_12).
— DSRC-VU. This is the function, within or connected to the
antenna and in communication with the VU through a
wired or wireless (BLE) connection, which holds the
current data (VUPM-data) and manages the response to
an interrogation across the 5.8 GHz DSRC medium.
Disconnection of the DSRC facility or interference
during normal vehicle operation with the functioning of
the DSRC facility shall be construed as a violation of
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.
— Security module (REDCR) (SM-REDCR) is the function
used to decrypt and check integrity of the data originating
from the VU. The means by which this is achieved is
determined in Appendix 11 Common Security
Mechanisms, and is not defined in this Appendix.
— The DSRC facility (REDCR) (DSRC-REDCR) function
comprises a 5.8 GHz transceiver and associated firmware
and software which manages the Communication with the
DSRC-VU according to this Appendix.
— The DSRC-REDCR interrogates the DSRC-VU of the
targeted vehicle and obtains the Data (the targeted
vehicle's current VUPM-data) via the DSRC link and
processes and stores the received data in its SM-REDCR.
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— The DSRC-VU antenna shall be positioned at a location
where it optimizes the DSRC communication between the
vehicle and the roadside reader antenna, when the reader is
installed 15 meters distance in front of the vehicle and 2
meters height, targeting the horizontal and vertical centre
of the windscreen. For light vehicles an installation corre­
sponding to the upper part of the windscreen is suitable.
For all the other vehicles the DSRC antenna shall be
installed either near the lower or near the upper part of
the windscreen.
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DSC_20 The Antenna and The Communication shall operate within
ERC 70-03, tested against the appropriate parameters of EN
300 674-1 as described in section 5. The Antenna and the
Communication can implement mitigation techniques against
the risk of wireless interference as described in ECC report
228 using e.g., filters in the CEN DSRC 5.8 GHz communi­
cation.
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DSC_21 The DSRC antenna shall be connected to the DSRC-VU
facility either directly within the module mounted to or close
to the windshield, or through a dedicated cable constructed in
a manner to make illegal disconnection difficult. Discon­
nection of or interference with the functioning of Antenna
shall be a violation of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.
Deliberate masking or otherwise detrimentally affecting the
operational performance of the Antenna shall be construed as
a violation of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.
DSC_22 ►M1 The form factor of the antenna is not defined and shall
be a commercial decision, so long as the fitted DSRC-VU
meets the conformance requirements defined in section 5
below. The antenna shall be positioned as determined in
DSC_19 and efficiently support the use cases described in in
4.1.2 and 4.1.3. ◄
Figure 14.4
Example of positioning of the 5,8 GHz DSRC antenna in the
windshield of regulated vehicles
The form factor of the REDCR and its antenna may vary according to
the circumstances of the reader (tripod mounted, hand held, vehicle
mounted, etc.) and the modus operandi employed by the agent of the
competent control authorities.
A display and/or notification function is used to present the results of the
remote communication function to the agent of the competent control
authorities. A display may be provided on a screen, as a printed output,
an audio signal, or a combination of such notifications. The form of
such display and/or notification is a matter of the requirements of the
agents of the competent control authorities and equipment design and is
not specified within this Appendix.
DSC_23 The design and form factor of the REDCR shall be a function
of commercial design, operating within ERC 70-03, and the
design and performance specifications defined in this
Appendix, (section 5.3.2), thus providing the marketplace
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maximum flexibility to design and provide equipment to cover
the specific interrogation scenarios of any particular competent
control authority.
DSC_24 The design and form factor of the DSRC-VU and its posi­
tioning inside or outside the VU shall be a function of
commercial design, operating within ERC 70-03 and the
design and performance specifications defined in this
Appendix (section 5.3.2) and within this Clause (5.1).
DSC_25 However, the DSRC-VU shall be reasonably capable to accept
data concept values from other intelligent vehicle equipment
by means of an open industry standard connection and
protocols. (For example from weigh on board equipment), so
long as such data concepts are identified by unique and known
application identifiers/file names, and the instructions to
operate such protocols shall be made available to the
European Commission, and available without charge to manu­
facturers of relevant equipment.
5.2 Workflow
5.2.1 Operations
The workflow of operations is represented in Figure 14.5.
Figure 14.5
Workflow for remote communication function
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The steps are described below:
a. Whenever the vehicle is in operation (ignition ON) the tachograph is
providing data to the VU function. The VU function prepares the
Data for the remote communication function (encrypted) and updates
the VUPM held in the memory of the DSRC-VU (as defined in
4.1.1.1 — 4.1.1.2). The Data collected shall be formatted as
determined in 5.4.4 — 5.4.5 below.
b. On every occasion that the Data is updated, the timestamp defined in
the security data concept shall be updated.
c. The VUSM function secures the data in accordance with the
procedures determined in Appendix 11.
d. On every occasion that the Data is updated (see 4.1.1.1 — 4.1.1.2),
the Data shall be transferred to the DSRC-VU, where it replaces any
previous data, in order that updated current data (the Data) shall
always be available to be provided in the event of an interrogation
by an REDCR. When supplied by the VU to the DSRC-VU the Data
shall be identifiable by the filename RTMData or by ApplicationID
and Attribute identifiers.
e. If an agent of the competent control authorities wishes to target a
vehicle and collect the Data from the targeted vehicle, the agent of
the competent control authorities shall first insert his/her smartcard in
the REDCR to enable the Communication and to allow the SM-
REDCR to verify its authenticity and decrypt the data.
f. The agent of the competent control authority then targets a vehicle
and requests the data through remote communication. The REDCR
opens a 5.8 GHz DSRC interface session with the DSRC-VU of the
targeted vehicle, and requests the Data. The Data is transferred to the
REDCR through the wireless communication system as a DSRC
Attribute using the Application service GET as defined in 5.4. The
Attribute contains the encrypted payload data values and the DSRC
security data.
g. The data is analyzed by the REDCR equipment and provided to the
agent of the competent control authority.
h. The agent of the competent control authority uses the data to assist in
a decision of whether or not to stop for a detailed inspection, or ask
another agent of the competent control authority to stop the vehicle.
5.2.2 Interpretation of the Data received via the DSRC communication
DSC_26 Data received across the 5.8 GHz interface shall carry the
meaning and import defined in 5.4.4 and 5.4.5 below and
only that meaning and import, and shall be understood
within the objectives defined therein. In accordance with the
provisions of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014, the Data shall
be used only to provide relevant information to a competent
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control authority to assist them to determine which vehicle
should be stopped for physical inspection, and shall be
subsequently destroyed in accordance with Article 9 of Regu­
lation (EU) No 165/2014.
5.3 DSRC Physical interface parameters for remote communication
5.3.1 Location constraints
DSC_27 The remote interrogation of vehicles using a 5.8GHz DSRC
interface should not be used within 200 metres of an opera­
tional 5.8 GHz DSRC gantry.
5.3.2 Downlink and uplink parameters
DSC_28 The equipment used for remote tachograph monitoring shall
conform to and operate within ERC70-03 and the parameters
defined in Tables 14.1 and 14.2 below.
DSC_29 Further, to ensure compatibility with the operational
parameters of other standardised 5.8 GHz DSRC systems,
the equipment used for remote tachograph monitoring shall
conform to parameters from EN 12253 and EN 13372.
Namely:
Table 14.1
Downlink parameters
Item No Parameter Value(s) Remark
D1 Downlink Carrier
Frequencies
There are four alternatives
which may be used by an
REDCR:
5,7975 GHz
5,8025 GHz
5,8075 GHz
5,8125 GHz
Within ERC 70-03.
Carrier Frequencies may be
selected by the implementer of the
roadside system and need not be
known in the DSRC-VU
(Consistent with EN 12253, EN
13372)
D1a (*) Tolerance of Carrier
Frequencies
within ± 5 ppm (Consistent with EN 12253)
D2 (*) RSU (REDCR) Transmitter
Spectrum Mask
Within ERC 70-03.
REDCR shall be according
to Class B,C as defined in
EN 12253.
No other specific require­
ment within this Annex
Parameter used for controlling
interference between interrogators
in proximity (as defined in EN
12253 and EN 13372).
D3 OBU(DSRC-VU) Minimum
Frequency Range
5,795 — 5,815 GHz (Consistent with EN 12253)
D4 (*) Maximum E.I.R.P. Within ERC 70-03
(unlicensed) and within
National Regulation
Maximum + 33 dBm
(Consistent with EN 12253)
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Item No Parameter Value(s) Remark
D4a Angular E.I.R.P. mask According to declared and
published specification of
interrogator designer
(Consistent with EN 12253)
D5 Polarisation Left hand circular (Consistent with EN 12253)
D5a Cross-Polarisation XPD:
In bore sight: (REDCR)
RSU t ≥ 15 dB
(DSRC-VU) OBU r ≥
10 dB
At -3 dB area: (REDCR)
RSU t ≥ 10 dB
(DSRC-VU) OBU r ≥ 6 dB
(Consistent with EN 12253)
D6 (*) Modulation Two level amplitude
modulation.
(Consistent with EN 12253)
D6a (*) Modulation Index 0,5 ... 0,9 (Consistent with EN 12253)
D6b Eye Pattern ≥ 90 % (time) / ≥ 85 %
(amplitude)
D7 (*) Data Coding FM0
‘1’ bit has transitions only
at the beginning and end
of the bit interval. ‘0’ bit
has an additional transition
in the middle of the bit
interval compared to the
‘1’ bit.
(Consistent with EN 12253)
D8 (*) Bit rate 500 kBit/s (Consistent with EN 12253)
D8a Tolerance of Bit Clock better than ± 100 ppm (Consistent with EN 12253)
D9 (*) Bit Error Rate (B.E.R.) for
communication
≤ 10 – 6 when incident
power at OBU (DSRC-
VU) is in the range given
by [D11a to D11b].
(Consistent with EN 12253)
D10 Wake-up trigger for OBU
(DSRC-VU)
OBU (DSRC-VU) shall
wake up on receiving any
frame with 11 or more
octets (including preamble)
No special wake-up pattern is
necessary.
DSRC-VU may wake up on
receiving a frame with less than
11 octets
(Consistent with EN 12253)
D10a Maximum Start Time ≤ 5 ms (Consistent with EN 12253)
D11 Communication zone Spatial region within which
a B.E.R. according to D9a
is achieved
(Consistent with EN 12253)
D11a (*) Power Limit for communi­
cation (upper).
– 24dBm (Consistent with EN 12253)
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Item No Parameter Value(s) Remark
D11b (*) Power Limit for communi­
cation (lower).
Incident power:
– 43 dBm (boresight)
– 41 dBm (within – 45°
± 45°Corresponding to the
plane parallel to the road
surface when the DSRC-
VU later is installed in the
vehicle (Azimuth))
(Consistent with EN 12253)
Extended requirement for hori­
zontal angles up to ±45°, due to
the use cases defined in this annex.
D12 (*) Cut-off power level of
(DSRC-VU)
– 60 dBm (Consistent with EN 12253)
D13 Preamble Preamble is mandatory. (Consistent with EN 12253)
D13a Preamble Length and
Pattern
16 bits ± 1 bit of FM0
coded ‘1’ bits
(Consistent with EN 12253)
D13b Preamble Wave form An alternating sequence of
low level and high level
with pulse duration of 2 μs.
The tolerance is given
byD8a
(Consistent with EN 12253)
D13c Trailing Bits The RSU (REDCR) is
permitted to transmit a
maximum of 8 bits after
the end flag. An OBU
(DSRC-VU) is not required
to take these additional bits
into account.
(Consistent with EN 12253)
(*) – Downlink parameters subject to conformance testing in accordance with relevant parameter test from EN 300 674-1.
Table 14.2
Uplink parameters
Item No. Parameter Value(s) Remark
U1 (*) Sub-carrier Frequencies A OBU (DSRC-VU) shall
support 1,5 MHz and
2,0 MHz
An RSU (REDCR) shall
support 1,5 MHz or
2,0 MHz or both. U1-0:
1,5 MHz U1-1: 2,0 MHz
Selection of sub-carrier frequency
(1,5 MHz or 2,0 MHz) depends on
the EN 13372 profile selected.
U1a (*) Tolerance of Sub- carrier
Frequencies
within ± 0,1 % (Consistent with EN 12253)
U1b Use of Side Bands Same data on both sides (Consistent with EN 12253)
U2 (*) OBU (DSRC-VU) Trans­
mitter Spectrum Mask
According to EN12253
1) Out band power:
see ETSI EN 300674-1
(Consistent with EN 12253)
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Item No. Parameter Value(s) Remark
2) In band power:
[U4a] dBm in 500 kHz
3) Emission in any other
uplink channel:
U2(3)-1 = – 35 dBm in
500 kHz
U4a (*) Maximum Single Side Band
E.I.R.P. (boresight)
Two options:
U4a-0: – 14 dBm
U4a-1: – 21 dBm
According to declared and published
specification of equipment designer
U4b (*) Maximum Single Side Band
E.I.R.P. (35°)
Two options:
— Not applicable
— – 17dBm
According to declared and published
specification of equipment designer
U5 Polarisation Left hand circular (Consistent with EN 12253)
U5a Cross Polarisation XPD:
In bore sight: (REDCR)
RSU r ≥ 15 dB
(DSRC-VU) OBU t ≥
10 dB
At – 3 dB: (REDCR) RSU
r ≥ 10 dB
(DSRC-VU) OBU t ≥ 6 dB
(Consistent with EN 12253)
U6 Sub-Carrier Modulation 2-PSK
Encoded data synchronised
with sub-carrier: Transitions
of encoded data coincide
with transitions of sub-
carrier.
(Consistent with EN 12253)
U6b Duty Cycle Duty Cycle:
50 % ± α, α ≤ 5 %
(Consistent with EN 12253)
U6c Modulation on Carrier Multiplication of modulated
sub- carrier with carrier.
(Consistent with EN 12253)
U7 (*) Data Coding NRZI (No transition at
beginning of ‘1’ bit, tran­
sition at beginning of ‘0’
bit, no transition within bit)
(Consistent with EN 12253)
U8 (*) Bit Rate 250 kbit/s (Consistent with EN 12253)
U8a Tolerance of Bit Clock Within ± 1 000 ppm (Consistent with EN 12253)
U9 Bit Error Rate (B.E.R.) for
communication
≤10 – 6 (Consistent with EN 12253)
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Item No. Parameter Value(s) Remark
U11 Communication Zone The spatial region within
which the DSRC-VU is
situated such that its trans­
missions are received by the
REDCR with a B.E.R. of
less than that given by U9a.
(Consistent with EN 12253)
U12a (*) Conversion Gain (lower
limit)
1 dB for each side band
Range of angle: Circularly
symmetric between bore
sight and ± 35°
and
within – 45° ± 45° Corre­
sponding to the plane
parallel to the road surface
when the DSRC-VU later is
installed in the vehicle
(Azimuth)
Greater that the specified value
range for horizontal angles up to
± 45°, due to the use cases
defined in this annex.
U12b (*) Conversion Gain (upper
limit)
10 dB for each side band Less than the specified value range
for each side band within a circular
cone around boresight of ± 45°
opening angle
U13 Preamble Preamble is mandatory. (Consistent with EN 12253)
U13a Preamble
Length and Pattern
32 to 36 μs modulated with
sub- carrier only, then 8 bits
of NRZI coded ‘0’ bits.
(Consistent with EN 12253)
U13b Trailing Bits The DSRC-VU is permitted
to transmit a maximum of 8
bits after the end flag. A
RSU (REDCR) is not
required to take these ad­
ditional bits into account.
(Consistent with EN 12253)
(*) – Uplink parameters subject to conformance testing in accordance with relevant parameter test from EN 300 674-1
5.3.3 Antenna design
5.3.3.1 REDCR antenna
DSC_30 The design of the REDCR antenna shall be a function of
commercial design, operating within the limits defined in
5.3.2 which is adapted to optimise the reading performance
of the DSRC-REDCR for the specific purpose and read
circumstances in which the REDCR has been designed to
operate.
5.3.3.2 VU antenna
DSC_31 The design of the DSRC-VU antenna shall be a function of
commercial design, operating within the limits defined in
5.3.2 which is adapted to optimise the reading performance
of the DSRC-REDCR for the specific purpose and read
circumstances in which the REDCR has been designed to
operate.
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DSC_32 The VU antenna shall be fixed to, or close to, the front wind­
shield of the vehicle as specified in 5.1 above.
DSC_33 In the test environment in a workshop (see section 6.3),
a DSRC-VU antenna, affixed according to 5.1 above, shall
successfully connect with a standard test communication and
successfully provide an RTM transaction as defined within
this Appendix, at a distance between 2 and 10 meters,
better than 99 % of the time, averaged over 1 000 read
interrogations.
5.4 DSRC Protocol requirements for RTM
5.4.1 Overview
DSC_34 The transaction protocol to download the Data across the
5.8 GHz DSRC interface link shall be according to the
following steps. This section describes a transaction flow
under ideal conditions without retransmissions or communi­
cation interrupts.
NOTE The purpose of the initialisation phase (Step 1) is to
set up the communication between the REDCR and
DSRC-VUs that have entered the 5.8 GHz DSRC (master-
slave) transaction zone but have not yet established communi­
cation with the REDCR, and to notify the application
processes.
— Step 1 Initialisation. The REDCR sends a frame
containing a ‘beacon service table’ (BST) that includes
the application identifiers (AIDs) in the service list that it
supports. In the RTM application this will simply be the
service with the AID value = 2 (Freight&Fleet). The
DSRC-VU evaluates the received BST, and shall
respond (see below) with the list of the supported appli­
cations within the Freight&Fleet domain, or shall not
respond if none are supported. If the REDCR does not
offer AID=2, the DSRC-VU shall not answer to the
REDCR.
— Step 2 The DSRC-VU sends a frame containing a request
for a private window allocation.
— Step 3 The REDCR sends a frame containing a private
window allocation.
— Step 4 The DSRC-VU uses the allocated private window
to send a frame containing its vehicle service table (VST).
This VST includes a list of all the different application
instantiations that this DSRC-VU supports in the
framework of AID=2. The different instantiations shall
be identified by means of uniquely generated EIDs,
each associated with an Application Context Mark
parameter value indicating the application and standard
supported.
— Step 5 Next the REDCR analyses the offered VST, and
either terminates the connection (RELEASE) since it is
not interested in anything the VST has to offer (i.e. it is
receiving a VST from a DSRC-VU that is not supporting
the RTM transaction), or, if it receives an appropriate
VST it starts an app instantiation.
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— Step 6 To bring this about, the REDCR shall send a
frame containing a command to retrieve the RTM data,
identifying the RTM application instantiation by spec­
ifying the identifier corresponding to the RTM application
instantiation (as specified by the DSRC-VU in the VST),
and shall allocate a private window.
— Step 7 The DSRC-VU uses the newly allocated private
window to send a frame that contains the addressed
identifier corresponding to the RTM application
instantiation as provided in the VST, followed by the
attribute RtmData (payload element + security element).
— Step 8 If there are multiple services requested, the value
‘n’ is changed to the next service reference number and
the process repeated.
— Step 9 The REDCR confirms receipt of the data by
sending a frame containing a RELEASE command to
the DSRC-VU to terminate the session OR if it has
failed to validate a successful receipt of the LDPU goes
back to step 6.
See Figure 14.6 for a pictorial description of the transaction
protocol.
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02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 556
Figure 14.6
RTM over 5,8 GHz DSRC process flow
5.4.2 Commands
DSC_35 The following commands are the only functions used in an
RTM transaction phase
— INITIALISATION.request: A command, issued from
the REDCR in the form of a broadcast with definition
of applications that the REDCR supports.
— INITIALISATION.response: An answer from the
DSRC-VU confirming the connection and containing a
list of supported application instances with characteristics
and information how to address them (EID).
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— GET.request: A command, issued from the REDCR to
the DSRC-VU, that specifies the application instantiation
to be addressed by means of a defined EID, as received in
the VST, instructing the DSRC-VU to send the selected
attribute(s) with the Data. The objective of the GET
command is for the REDCR to obtain the Data from
the DSRC-VU.
— GET.response: An answer from the DSRC-VU that
contains the Data requested.
— ACTION.request ECHO: A command, instructing the
DSRC-VU to send back data from the DSRC-VU to the
REDCR. The objective of the ECHO command is to
enable workshops or type approval test facilities to test
that the DSRC link is working without needing access to
security credentials.
— ACTION.response ECHO: An answer from the DSRC
VU on the ECHO command.
— EVENT_REPORT.request RELEASE: A command,
instructing the DSRC-VU that the transaction is ended.
The objective of the RELEASE command is to end the
session with the DSRC-VU. On receipt of the RELEASE
the DSRC-VU shall not respond to any further inter­
rogations under the current connection. Note that
according to EN 12834 a DSRC-VU will not connect
twice to the same interrogator unless it has been out of
the communication zone for 255 seconds or if the Beacon
ID of the interrogator is changed.
5.4.3 Interrogation command sequence
DSC_36 From the perspective of the command and response sequence,
the transaction is described as follows:
Sequence Sender Receiver Description Action
1 REDCR > DSRC-VU Initialisation of the
communication link —
Request
REDCR broadcasts BST
2 DSRC-VU > REDCR Initialisation of the
communication link —
Response
If BST supports AID=2 then
DSRC-VU Requests a private
window
3 REDCR > DSRC-VU Grants a private window Sends Frame containing
private window allocation
4 DSRC-VU > REDCR Sends VST Sends Frame comprising VST
5 REDCR > DSRC-VU Sends GET.request for data
in Attribute for specific
EID
6 DSRC-VU > REDCR Sends GET.response with
requested Attribute for
specific EID
Sends Attribute (RTMData,
OWSData….) with data for
specific EID
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Sequence Sender Receiver Description Action
▼M1
7 REDCR > DSRC-VU Sends GET.request for data
of other Attribute (if appro­
priate)
▼B
8 DSRC-VU > REDCR Sends GET.response with
requested Attribute
Sends Attribute with data for
specific EID
9 REDCR > DSRC-VU Acknowledges successful
receipt of data
Sends RELEASE command
which closes transaction
10 DSRC-VU Closes transaction
An example of the transaction sequence and contents of the
exchanged frames is defined in clauses 5.4.7 and 5.4.8
5.4.4 Data structures
DSC_37 The semantic structure of the Data when passed across the
5.8 GHz DSRC interface shall be consistent with what
described in this Appendix. The way these data are structured
is specified in this clause.
DSC_38 The payload (RTM data) consists of the concatenation of
1. EncryptedTachographPayload data, which is the encryption
of the TachographPayload defined in ASN.1 in
section 5.4.5. The method of encryption is described in
Appendix 11
2. DSRCSecurityData, specified in Appendix 11.
DSC_39 The RTM Data is being addressed as RTM Attribute=1 and is
transferred in the RTM container = 10.
DSC_40 The RTM Context Mark shall identify the supported standard
part in the TARV series of standards (RTM corresponds to
Part 9)
The ASN.1 module definition for the DSRC data within the
RTM application is defined as follows:
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► (1) (2) M1
► (3) M3
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5.4.5 Elements of RtmData, actions performed and definitions
DSC_41 The data values to be calculated by the VU and used to
update the secured data in the DSRC-VU shall be calculated
according to the rules defined in Table 14.3:
▼M3
Table 14.3
Elements of RtmData, actions performed and definitions
(1)
RTM Data Element
(2)
Action performed by the VU
(3)
ASN.1 definition of data
RTM1
Vehicle Registration
Plate
The VU shall set the value of
the tp15638VehicleRegistra­
tionPlate data element RTM1
from the recorded value of
the data type
VehicleRegistrationIdentifi­
cation as defined in
Appendix 1 VehicleRegis­
trationIdentification
Vehicle Registration
Plate expressed as a
string of characters
tp15638VehicleRegistra­
tionPlate LPN,
–Vehicle RegistrationPlate
using the data structure from
ISO 14906, but with the
following limitation for the
RTM application:
the SEQUENCE starts with
the Country Code, followed by
an alphabet indicator, followed
by the plate number itself,
which is always 14 octets
(padded with zero's) so the
LPN type length is always 17
octets (no length determinant
needed), of which 14 are the
‘real’ plate number.
RTM2
Speeding Event
The VU shall generate a
Boolean
value for data element RTM2
tp15638SpeedingEvent.
The tp15638SpeedingEvent
value shall be calculated by
the VU from the over
speeding events recorded in
the VU within the last 10
days, as defined in Annex IC.
1 (TRUE): if the most
recent over speeding
event ended within the
last 10 days or is still
ongoing;
0 (FALSE): in any other
case.
tp15638SpeedingEvent
BOOLEAN,
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(1)
RTM Data Element
(2)
Action performed by the VU
(3)
ASN.1 definition of data
RTM3
Driving Without
Valid Card
The VU shall generate a
Boolean
value for data element RTM3
tp15638DrivingWithout­
ValidCard.
The VU shall assign a value
of TRUE to the
tp15638DrivingWithout­
ValidCard variable if at least
one driving without an
appropriate card event has
been recorded in the VU
within the last 10 days as
defined in Annex IC.
1 (TRUE): if the most
recent driving without an
appropriate card event
ended within the last 10
days or is still ongoing;
0 (FALSE): in any other
case.
tp15638DrivingWithout­
ValidCard
BOOLEAN,
RTM4
Valid Driver Card
The VU shall generate a
Boolean value for data
element RTM4
tp15638DriverCard on the
basis of the inserted valid
driver card in the driver slot.
1 (TRUE): if no valid
driver card is present in
the driver slot of the
VU;
0 (FALSE): if a valid
driver card is present in
the driver slot of the
VU.
tp15638DriverCard
BOOLEAN,
RTM5
Card Insertion while
Driving
The VU shall generate a
Boolean value for data
element RTM5
tp15638CardInsertion.
The VU shall assign a value
of TRUE to the
tp15638CardInsertion
variable if at least one card
insertion while driving event
has been recorded in the VU
within the last 10 days as
defined in Annex IC.
1 (TRUE): if the most
recent card insertion
while driving event has
occurred within the last
10 days;
0 (FALSE): in any other
case.
tp15638CardInsertion
BOOLEAN,
RTM6
Motion Data Error
The VU shall generate a
Boolean
value for data element
RTM6.
The VU shall assign a value
of TRUE to the
tp15638MotionDataError
variable if at least one motion
data error event has been
recorded in the VU within
the last 10 days as defined in
Annex IC.
1 (TRUE): if the most
recent motion data error
event ended within the
last 10 days or is still
ongoing;
0 (FALSE): in any other
case.
tp15638MotionDataError
BOOLEAN,
▼M3
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(1)
RTM Data Element
(2)
Action performed by the VU
(3)
ASN.1 definition of data
RTM7
Vehicle Motion
Conflict
The VU shall generate a
Boolean
value for data element
RTM7.
The VU shall assign a value
of TRUE to the
tp15638VehicleMotion­
Conflict variable if at least
one vehicle motion conflict
event has been recorded in
the VU within the last 10
days.
1 (TRUE): if the most
recent vehicle motion
conflict event ended
within the last 10 days
or is still ongoing;
0 (FALSE): in any other
case.
tp15638VehicleMotionConflict
BOOLEAN,
RTM8
2nd Driver Card
The VU shall generate a
Boolean
value for data element RTM8
on the basis of Annex IC
(Driver Activity Data CREW
and CO-DRIVER).
If a valid co-driver card is
present the VU shall set the
value of RTM8 to TRUE.
1 (TRUE): if a valid
co-driver card is present
in the VU;
2 (FALSE): if no valid
co-driver card is present
in the VU.
tp156382ndDriverCard
BOOLEAN,
RTM9
Current Activity
The VU shall generate a
Boolean
value for data element
RTM9.
If the current activity is
recorded in the VU as any
activity other than DRIVING
as defined in Annex IC the
VU shall set the value of
RTM9 to TRUE.
1 (TRUE): other activity
selected;
0 (FALSE): driving
selected
tp15638CurrentActivity­
Driving
BOOLEAN
RTM10
Last Session Closed
The VU shall generate a
Boolean value for data
element RTM10.
If the last card session was
not properly closed as
defined in Annex IC the VU
shall set the value of RTM10
to TRUE.
1 (TRUE): at least one
of the inserted cards has
triggered a last card
session not correctly
closed event;
0 (FALSE): None of the
inserted cards has
triggered a last card
session not correctly
closed event.
tp15638LastSessionClosed
BOOLEAN
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(1)
RTM Data Element
(2)
Action performed by the VU
(3)
ASN.1 definition of data
RTM11
Power Supply
Interruption
The VU shall generate an
integer
value for data element
RTM11.
The VU shall assign a value
for the tp15638PowerSupply­
Interruption variable equal to
the number of the recorded
power supply interruption
events stored in the VU
within last 10 days as defined
in Annex IC.
If no power supply inter­
ruption event has been
recorded in the VU within
the last 10 days, it shall set
the value of RTM11 to 0.
Number of the recorded
power supply inter­
ruption events within the
last 10 days.
tp15638PowerSupplyInter­
ruption
INTEGER (0..127),
RTM12
Sensor Fault
The VU shall generate an
integer value for data element
RTM12.
The VU shall assign to the
variable sensorFault a value
of:
— 1 if an event of type
‘35’H Sensor
fault ended during the
last 10 days or is still
ongoing.
— 2 if an event of type
GNSS receiver fault
(either internal or
external with enum
values ‘36’H or
‘37’H) ended during the
last 10 days or is still
ongoing.
— 3 if an event of type
‘0E’H Communication
error with the external
GNSS facility event
ended during the last 10
days or is still ongoing.
— 4 If both Sensor Fault
and GNSS receiver
faults ended during the
last 10 days or are still
ongoing.
— 5 If both Sensor Fault
and Communication
error with the external
GNSS facility event
ended during the last 10
days or are still ongoing.
–sensor fault one octet
as per data dictionary
tp15638SensorFault INTEGER
(0..255),
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 564
(1)
RTM Data Element
(2)
Action performed by the VU
(3)
ASN.1 definition of data
— 6 If both GNSS receiver
fault and Communication
error with the external
GNSS facility event
ended during the last 10
days or are still ongoing.
— 7 If all three sensor faults
ended during the last 10
days or are still ongoing.
If no event have ended
during the last 10 days or is
still ongoing, the VU shall
set the value of RTM12 to 0.
RTM13
Time Adjustment
The VU shall generate an
integer value (timeReal from
Appendix 1) for data element
RTM13 on the basis of the
presence of Time Adjustment
data as defined in Annex IC.
The VU shall set the value of
RTM13 to the time at which
the last time adjustment data
event has occurred.
If no time adjustment event
as defined in Annex IC is
present in the VU data, it
shall set the value of RTM13
to 0.
oldTimeValue of the
most recent time
adjustment.
tp15638TimeAdjustment
INTEGER(0..4294967295),
RTM14
Security Breach
Attempt
The VU shall generate an
integer value (timeReal from
Appendix 1) for data element
RTM14 on the basis of the
presence of a security breach
attempt event as defined in
Annex IC.
The VU shall set the value of
the time of the latest security
breach attempt event
recorded by the VU.
If no security breach attempt
event as defined in Annex IC
is present in the VU data, it
shall set the value of RTM14
to 0.
Beginning time of the
latest stored security
breach attempt event.
tp15638LatestBreachAttempt
INTEGER(0..4294967295),
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 565
(1)
RTM Data Element
(2)
Action performed by the VU
(3)
ASN.1 definition of data
RTM15
Last Calibration
The VU shall generate an
integer value (timeReal from
Appendix 1) for data element
RTM15 on the basis of the
presence of Last Calibration
data as defined in Annex IC
and Appendix 1.
The VU shall set the value of
RTM15 to the oldTimeValue
of the latest calibration
record.
If there has been no cali­
bration, the VU shall set the
value of RTM15 to 0.
oldTimeValue of the
most recent calibration
record.
tp15638LastCalibrationData
INTEGER(0..4294967295),
RTM16
Previous Calibration
The VU shall generate an
integer value (timeReal from
Appendix 1) for data element
RTM16 on the basis of the
calibration record preceding
the last calibration.
The VU shall set the value of
RTM16 to the oldTimeValue
of the calibration record
preceding the last calibration.
If there has been no previous
calibration, the VU shall set
the value of RTM16 to 0.
oldTimeValue of the
calibration record
preceding the most
recent calibration record.
tp15638PrevCalibrationData
INTEGER(0..4294967295),
RTM17
Date Tachograph
Connected
The VU shall generate an
integer value (timeReal from
Appendix 1) for data element
RTM17.
The VU shall set the value of
RTM17 to the date of first
calibration of the VU in the
current vehicle.
The VU shall extract this
data from the VuCalibra­
tionData (Appendix 1) from
the vuCalibrationRecords
with CalibrationPurpose
equal to: ‘03’H
If there has been no previous
calibration, the VU shall set
the value of RTM17 to 0.
Date of first calibration
of the VU in the current
vehicle.
tp15638DateTachoConnected
INTEGER(0..4294967295),
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 566
(1)
RTM Data Element
(2)
Action performed by the VU
(3)
ASN.1 definition of data
RTM18
Current Speed
The VU shall generate an
integer
value for data element
RTM18.
The VU shall set the value of
RTM18 to the last current
recorded speed at the time of
the latest update of the
RtmData.
Last current recorded
speed
tp15638CurrentSpeed
INTEGER (0..255),
RTM19
Timestamp
The VU shall generate an
integer value for data element
RTM19 (timeReal from
Appendix 1).
The VU shall set the value of
RTM19 to the time of the
latest update of the RtmData.
Timestamp of current
TachographPayload
record
tp15638Timestamp
INTEGER(0..4294967295),
RTM20
Time at which the latest
authenticated vehicle
position was available
The VU shall generate an
integer value (timeReal from
Appendix 1) for data element
RTM20.
The VU shall set the value of
RTM20 to the time at which
the latest authenticated
vehicle position was available
from the GNSS receiver.
If no authenticated vehicle
position was available ever
from the GNSS receiver the
VU shall set the value of
RTM20 to 0.
Timestamp of the latest
authenticated vehicle
position
tp15638LatestAuthenticated­
Position
INTEGER(0..4294967295),
RTM21
Continuous driving time
The VU shall generate an
integer value for data element
RTM21.
The VU shall set the value of
RTM21 to the ongoing
continuous driving time of
the driver.
Continuous driving time
of the driver, encoded as
an integer value.
Length: 1 byte
Resolution: 2 minutes/bit
No offset
Data range: 0 to 250
A value of 250 shall
indicate that the
continuous driving time
of the driver is equal or
greater than 500
minutes.
Values 251 to 254 are
not used.
Value 255 indicates that
the information is not
available.
tp15638ContinuousDriv­
ingTime INTEGER(0..255),
▼M3
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(1)
RTM Data Element
(2)
Action performed by the VU
(3)
ASN.1 definition of data
RTM22
Longest daily driving
time for the ongoing and
previous RTM-shift,
calculated in accordance
with the Addendum to
Appendix 14
The VU shall generate an
integer value for data element
RTM22.
The VU shall set the value of
RTM22 to the longer of the
two daily driving times of the
driver, being either the
ongoing or the previous
RTM-shift.
Daily driving time of the
driver, encoded as an
integer value.
Length: 1 byte
Resolution: 4 minutes/bit
No offset
Data range: 0 to 250
A value of 250 shall
indicate that the daily
driving time of the driver
is equal or greater than
1 000 minutes.
Values 251 to 254 are
not used.
Value 255 indicates that
the information is not
available.
tp15638DailyDrivingTimeShift
INTEGER(0..255),
RTM23
Longest daily driving time
within the ongoing week,
calculated in accordance
with the Addendum to
Appendix 14
The VU shall generate an
integer value for data element
RTM23.
The VU shall set the value of
RTM23 to the longest daily
driving time of the driver,
being either the ongoing
RTM-shift or any completed
RTM-shift having started or
finished in the ongoing week.
Daily driving time of the
driver, encoded as an
integer value.
Length: 1 byte
Resolution: 4 minutes/bit
No offset
Data range: 0 to 250
A value of 250 shall
indicate that the daily
driving time of the driver
is equal or greater than
1 000 minutes.
Values 251 to 254 are
not used.
Value 255 indicates that
the information is not
available.
tp15638DailyDriving­
TimeWeek INTEGER(0..255),
RTM24
Weekly driving time,
calculated in accordance
with the Addendum to
Appendix 14
The VU shall generate an
integer value for data element
RTM24.
The VU shall set the value of
RTM24 to the weekly driving
time of the driver.
Weekly driving time of
the driver, encoded as an
integer value.
Length: 1 byte
Resolution: 20 minutes/
bit
No offset
Data range: 0 to 250
A value of 250 shall
indicate that the weekly
driving time of the driver
is equal or greater than
5 000 minutes.
Values 251 to 254 are
not used.
Value 255 indicates that
the information is not
available.
tp15638WeeklyDrivingTime
INTEGER(0..255),
▼M3
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(1)
RTM Data Element
(2)
Action performed by the VU
(3)
ASN.1 definition of data
RTM25
Fortnightly driving time,
calculated in accordance
with the Addendum to
Appendix 14
The VU shall generate an
integer value for data element
RTM25.
The VU shall set the value of
RTM25 to the fortnightly
driving time of the driver.
Fortnightly driving time
of the driver, encoded as
an integer value.
Length: 1 byte
Resolution: 30 minutes/
bit
No offset
Data range: 0 to 250
A value of 250 shall
indicate that the
fortnightly driving time
of the driver is equal or
greater than 7 500
minutes.
Values 251 to 254 are
not used.
Value 255 indicates that
the information is not
available.
tp15638FortnightlyDriv­
ingTime INTEGER(0..255),
Note: RTM22, RTM23, RTM24 and RTM25 shall be computed according to the
Addendum to this Appendix
▼B
5.4.6 Data transfer mechanism
DSC_42 Payload data defined previously are requested by the REDCR
after initialisation phase, and consequently transmitted by the
DSRC-VU in the allocated window. The command GET is
used by the REDCR to retrieve data.
▼M1
DSC_43 For all DSRC exchanges, data shall be encoded using PER
(Packed Encoding Rules) UNALIGNED, apart from
and , which shall
be encoded using OER (Octet Encoding Rules) defined in
ISO/IEC 8825-7, Rec. ITU-T X.696.
▼B
5.4.7 Detailed DSRC transaction description
DSC_44 Initialisation is performed according to DSC_44 — DSC_48
and Tables 14.4 — 14.9. In the initialisation phase, the
REDCR starts sending a frame containing a BST (Beacon
Service Table) according to EN 12834 and EN 13372, 6.2,
6.3, 6.4 and 7.1 with settings as specified in the following
Table 14.4.
Table 14.4
Initialisation — BST frame settings
Field Settings
Link Identifier Broadcast address
BeaconId As per EN 12834
▼M3
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Field Settings
Time As per EN 12834
Profile No extension, 0 or 1 to be
used
MandApplications No extension, EID not present,
Parameter not present, AID= 2
Freight&Fleet
NonMandApplications Not present
ProfileList No extension, number of
profiles in list = 0
Fragmentation header No fragmentation
Layer 2 settings Command PDU, UI command
A practical example of the settings specified in Table 14.4,
with an indication of bit encodings, is given in the following
Table 14.5.
Table 14.5
Initialisation — BST frame contents example
O
ct
et
#

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
1 FLAG Start flag
2 Broadcast ID Broadcast address
3 MAC Control Field Command PDU
4 LLC Control field UI command
5 Fragmentation header No fragmentation
6 BST Initialisation request
SEQUENCE {
OPTION indicator
BeaconID SEQUENCE {
ManufacturerId INTEGER (0..65535)
NonMand applications not
present
Manufacturer Identifier
7
8
IndividualID INTEGER (0..134217727)
}
27 bit ID available for
manufacturer
9
10
11
▼B
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O
ct
et
#

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
12 Time INTEGER (0..4294967295) 32 bit UNIX real time
13
14
15
16 Profile INTEGER (0..127,...) No extension. Example
profile 0
17 MandApplications SEQUENCE
(SIZE(0..127,...))
OF {
No extension, Number of
mandApplications = 1
18 SEQUENCE {
OPTION indicator EID not present
OPTION indicator
Parameter not present
AID DSRCApplicationEntityID } }
No extension. AID= 2
Freight&Fleet
19 ProfileList SEQUENCE (0..127,...) OF
Profile }
No extension, number of
profiles in list = 0
20 FCS Frame check sequence
21
22 Flag End Flag
DSC_45 A DSRC-VU, when receiving a BST, requires the allocation
of a private window, as specified by EN 12795 and EN
13372, 7.1.1, with no specific RTM settings. Table 14.6
provides an example of bit encoding.
Table 14.6
Initialisation — Private window allocation request frame contents
O
ct
et
#

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
1 FLAG Start flag
2 Private LID Link address of specific
DSRC-VU
3
4
5
6 MAC Control field Private window request
7 FCS Frame check sequence
8
9 Flag End Flag
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 571
DSC_46 The REDCR then answers by allocating a private window, as
specified by EN 12795 and EN 13372, 7.1.1 with no specific
RTM settings.
Table 14.7 provides an example of bit encoding.
Table 14.7
Initialisation — Private window allocation frame contents
O
ct
et
#

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
1 FLAG Start flag
2 Private LID Link address of the
specific DSRC-VU
3
4
5
6 MAC Control field Private window allocation
7 FCS Frame check sequence
8
9 Flag End Flag
DSC_47 The DSRC-VU, when receiving the private window allocation,
sends its VST (Vehicle Service Table) as defined in EN
12834 and EN 13372, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 7.1 with settings as
specified Table 14.8, using the allocated transmission
window.
Table 14.8
Initialisation — VST frame settings
Field Settings
Private LID As per EN 12834
VST parameters Fill=0, then for each supported appli­
cation: EID present, parameter
present, AID=2, EID as generated by
the OBU
Parameter No extension, Contains the RTM
Context Mark
ObeConfiguration The optional ObeStatus field may be
present, but shall not be used by the
REDCR
Fragmentation header No fragmentation
Layer 2 settings Command PDU, UI command
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 572
DSC_48 The DSRC-VU shall support the ‘Freight and Fleet’ appli­
cation, identified by the Application Identifier ‘2’. Other
Application Identifiers may be supported, but shall not be
present in this VST, as the BST only requires AID=2. The
‘Applications’ field contains a list of the supported application
instances in the DSRC-VU. For each supported application
instantiation, a reference to the appropriate standard is
given, made of an Rtm Context mark, which is composed
of an OBJECT IDENTIFIER representing the related
standard, its part (9 for RTM) and possibly its version, plus
an EID that is generated by the DSRC-VU, and associated to
that application instance.
A practical example of the settings specified in Table 14.8,
with an indication of bit encodings, is given in Table 14.9.
▼M3
Table 14.9
Initialisation – VST frame contents example
O
ct
et

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
1 FLAG 0111 1110 Start flag
2 Private LID xxxx xxxx Link address of the
specific DSRC-VU
3 xxxx xxxx
4 xxxx xxxx
5 xxxx xxxx
6 MAC Control field 1100 0000 Command PDU
7 LLC Control field 0000 0011 UI command
8 Fragmentation header 1xxx x001 No fragmentation
9 VST
SEQUENCE {
Fill BIT STRING (SIZE(4))
1001 Initialisation response
0000 Unused and set to 0
10 Profile INTEGER (0..127,...)
Applications SEQUENCE OF {
0000 0000 No extension. Example
profile 0
No extension, 1 appli­
cation
11 0000 0001
12 SEQUENCE {
OPTION indicator
OPTION indicator
AID DSRCApplicationEntityID
1 EID present
1 Parameter present
00 0010 No extension. AID= 2
Freight&Fleet
13 EID Dsrc-EID xxxx xxxx Defined within the OBU
and identifying the appli­
cation instance.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 573
O
ct
et

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
14 Parameter Container { 0000 0010 No extension, Container
Choice = 02,
Octet string
15 0000 0110 No extension, Rtm
Context Mark length = 6
16 Rtm-ContextMark ::= SEQUENCE {
StandardIdentifier
0000 0101 First octet is 05H, which
is its length.
Subsequent 5 octets encode
the Object Identifier of the
supported standard, part
and version.
{ISO (1) Standard (0)
TARV (15638) part9(9)
Version2 (2)}
17 standardIdentifier 0010 1000
18 1111 1010
19 0001 0110
20 0000 1001
21 0000 0010
22 ObeConfiguration Sequence {
OPTION indicator
0 ObeStatus not present
EquipmentClass INTEGER (0..32767) xxx xxxx This field shall be used to
carry
23 xxxx xxxx manufacturer’s indications
about the software/
hardware version of the
DSRC interface
24 ManufacturerId INTEGER (0..65535) xxxx xxxx Manufacturer identifier
for the DSRC-VU as
described in ISO 14816
Register
25 xxxx xxxx
26 FCS xxxx xxxx Frame check sequence
27 xxxx xxxx
28 Flag 0111 1110 End Flag
▼B
DCS_49 The REDCR then reads the data by issuing a GET command,
conforming to the GET command defined in EN 13372, 6.2,
6.3, 6.4 and EN 12834, with settings as specified in Table
14.10.
Table 14.10
Presentation — GET request frame settings
Field Settings
Invoker Identifier (IID) Not present
Link Identifier (LID) Link address of the specific
DSRC-VU
Chaining No
Element Identifier (EID) As specified in the VST.
No extension
▼M3
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 574
Field Settings
Access Credentials No
AttributeIdList No extension, 1 attribute, AttributeID
= 1 (RtmData)
Fragmentation No
Layer2 settings Command PDU, Polled ACn
command
Table 14.11 shows an example of reading the RTM data.
Table 14.11
Presentation — Get Request frame example
O
ct
et
#

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
1 FLAG Start flag
2 Private LID Link address of the
specific DSRC-VU
3
4
5
6 MAC Control field Command PDU
7 LLC Control field Polled ACn command, n
bit
8 Fragmentation header No fragmentation
9 Get.request
SEQUENCE {
Get request
OPTION indicator Access Credentials not
present
OPTION indicator IID not present
OPTION indicator AttributeIdList present
Fill BIT STRING(SIZE(1)) Set to 0.
10 EID INTEGER(0..127,…) The EID of the RTM
application instance, as
specified in the VST.
No extension
11 AttributeIdList SEQUENCE OF {
AttributeId }}
No extension, number of
attributes = 1
12 AttributeId=1, RtmData.
No extension
13 FCS Frame check sequence
14
15 Flag End Flag
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 575
DSC_50 The DSRC-VU, when receiving the GET request, sends a
GET response with the requested data conforming to the
GET response defined in EN 13372, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and EN
12834, with settings as specified in Table 14.12.
Table 14.12
Presentation — GET response frame settings
Field Settings
Invoker Identifier (IID) Not present
Link Identifier (LID) As per EN 12834
Chaining No
Element Identifier (EID) As specified in the VST.
Access Credentials No
Fragmentation No
Layer2 settings Response PDU, Response
available and command
accepted, ACn command
Table 14.13 shows an example of reading the RTM data.
Table 14.13
Presentation — Response frame contents example
O
ct
et
#

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
1 FLAG Start flag
2 Private LID Link address of the
specific DSRC-VU
3
4
5
6 MAC Control field Response PDU
7 LLC Control field Response available, ACn
command n bit
8 LLC Status field Response available and
command accepted
9 Fragmentation header No fragmentation
10 Get.response
SEQUENCE {
Get response
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 576
O
ct
et
#

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
OPTION indicator IID not present
OPTION indicator Attribute List present
OPTION indicator Return status not present
Fill BIT STRING(SIZE(1)) Not used
11 EID INTEGER(0..127,…) Responding from the
RTM application
Instance. No extension,
12 AttributeList SEQUENCE OF { No extension, number of
attributes = 1
13 Attributes SEQUENCE {
AttributeId
No extension,
AttributeId=1 (RtmData)
14 AttributeValue CONTAINER { No extension, Container
Choice = 10 10 .
15 RtmData
16
17
… …
n }}}}
n+1 FCS Frame check sequence
n+2
n+3 Flag End Flag
DSC_51 The REDCR then closes the connection by issuing a
EVENT_REPORT, RELEASE command conforming to EN
13372, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and EN 12834,7.3.8, with no specific
RTM settings. Table 14.14 shows a bit encoding example
of the RELEASE command.
Table 14.14
Termination. EVENT_REPORT Release frame contents
O
ct
et
#

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
1 FLAG Start flag
2 Private LID Link address of the
specific DSRC-VU
3
4
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 577
O
ct
et
#

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
5
6 MAC Control field The frame contains a
command LPDU
7 LLC Control field UI command
8 Fragmentation header No fragmentation
9 EVENT_REPORT.request
SEQUENCE {
EVENT_REPORT
(Release)
OPTION indicator Access Credentials not
present
OPTION indicator Event parameter not
present
OPTION indicator IID not present
Mode BOOLEAN No response expected
10 EID INTEGER (0..127,…) No extension, EID = 0
(System)
11 EventType INTEGER (0..127,…) } Event type 0 = Release
12 FCS Frame check sequence
13
14 Flag End Flag
DSC_52 The DSRC-VU is not expected to answer to the Release
command. The communication is then closed.
5.4.8 DSRC Test transaction description
DSC_53 Full tests that include securing the data, need to be carried out
as defined in Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms, by
authorised persons with access to security procedures, using
the normal GET command as defined above.
DSC_54 Commissioning and periodic inspection tests that require
decrypting and comprehension of the decrypted data content
shall be undertaken as specified in Appendix 11 Common
Security Mechanisms and Appendix 9, Type Approval List
of Minimum required tests.
However, the basic DSRC communication can be tested by
the command ECHO. Such tests may be required on commis­
sioning, at periodic inspection, or otherwise to the
requirement of the competent control authority or
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 (See 6 below)
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 578
DSC_55 In order to effect this basic communication test, the ECHO
command is issued by the REDCR during a session, i.e., after
an initialisation phase has been completed successfully. The
sequence of interactions is thus similar to that of an
interrogation:
— Step 1 The REDCR sends a ‘beacon service table’ (BST)
that includes the application identifiers (AIDs) in the
service list that it supports. In the RTM applications
this will simply be the service with the AID value = 2.
The DSRC-VU evaluates the received BST, and where it
identifies that the BST is requesting Freight&Fleet (AID
= 2), the DSRC-VU shall respond. If the REDCR does not
offer AID=2, the DSRC-VU shall shut down its trans­
action with the REDCR.
— Step 2 The DSRC-VU sends a request for a private
window allocation.
— Step 3 The REDCR sends a private window allocation.
— Step 4 The DSRC-VU uses the allocated private window
to send its vehicle service table (VST). This VST includes
a list of all the different application instantiations that this
DSRC-VU supports in the framework of AID=2. The
different instantiations shall be identified by means of
uniquely EIDs, each associated with a parameter value
indicating the instance of the application that is
supported.
— Step 5 Next the REDCR analyses the offered VST, and
either terminates the connection (RELEASE) since it is
not interested in anything the VST has to offer (i.e., it is
receiving a VST from a DSRC-VU that is not an RTM
VU, or, if it receives an appropriate VST it starts an app
instantiation.
— Step 6 The REDCR shall issue a command (ECHO) to
the specific DSRC-VU, and allocates a private window.
— Step 7 The DSRC-VU uses the newly allocated private
window to send an ECHO response frame.
The following tables give a practical example of an ECHO exchange
session.
DSC_56 Initialisation is performed according to 5.4.7 (DSC_44 —
DSC_48) and Tables 14.4 — 14.9
DSC_57 The REDCR then issues an ACTION, ECHO command
conforming to ISO 14906, containing 100 octets of data
and with no specific settings for RTM. Table 14.15 shows
the contents of the frame sent by the REDCR.
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 579
Table 14.15
ACTION, ECHO request frame example
O
ct
et
#

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
1 FLAG Start flag
2 Private LID Link address of the
specific DSRC-VU
3
4
5
6 MAC Control field Command PDU
7 LLC Control field Polled ACn command, n
bit
8 Fragmentation header No fragmentation
9 ACTION.request
SEQUENCE {
Action request (ECHO)
OPTION indicator Access Credentials not
present
OPTION indicator Action parameter present
OPTION indicator IID not present
Mode BOOLEAN Response expected
10 EID INTEGER (0..127,…) No extension, EID = 0
(System)
11 ActionType INTEGER (0..127,…) No extension, Action type
ECHO request
12 ActionParameter CONTAINER { No extension, Container
Choice = 2
13 No extension. String
length = 100 octets
14 Data to be echoed
… …
113 }}
114 FCS Frame check sequence
115
116 Flag End Flag
▼B
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 580
DSC_58 The DSRC-VU, when receiving the ECHO request, sends an
ECHO response of 100 octets of data by reflecting the
received command, according to ISO 14906, with no
specific settings for RTM. Table 14.16 shows a bit level
encoding example.
Table 14.16
ACTION, ECHO response frame example
O
ct
et
#

Attribute/Field Bits in octet Description
1 FLAG Start flag
2 Private LID Link address of the
specific VU
3
4
5
6 MAC Control field Response PDU
7 LLC Control field ACn command n bit
8 LLC status field Response available
9 Fragmentation header No fragmentation
10 ACTION.response
SEQUENCE {
ACTION
response (ECHO)
OPTION indicator IID not present
OPTION indicator Response parameter
present
OPTION indicator Return status not present
Fill BIT STRING (SIZE (1)) Not used
11 EID INTEGER (0..127,…) No extension, EID = 0
(System)
12 ResponseParameter CONTAINER { No extension, Container
Choice = 2
13 No extension. String
length = 100 octets
14 Echoed data
… …
113 }}
114 FCS Frame check sequence
115
116 Flag End Flag
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5.5 Reserved for future use
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__________
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5.6 Data transfer between the DSRC-VU and VU
5.6.1 Physical Connection and interfaces
DSC_66 The connection between the VU and the DSRC-VU can be
either by physical cable or short range wireless communi­
cation based on Bluetooth v4.0 BLE.
DSC_67 Regardless of the choice of the physical connection and
interface, the following requirements shall be satisfied:
DSC_68 ►M1 a) In order that different suppliers may be contracted
to supply the VU and the DSRC-VU, and indeed
different batches of DSRC-VU, the connection
between the VU and the DSRC-VU not internal
to the VU shall be an open standard connection.
The VU shall connect with the DSRC-VU
either ◄
i) using fixed cable of at least 2 meters, using a
Straight DIN 41612 H11 Connector — 11 pin
approved male connector from the DSRC-VU
to match a similar DIN/ISO approved female
connector from the VU device,
ii) using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
iii) using a standard ISO 11898 or SAE J1939
connection
DSC_69 b) the definition of the interfaces and connection between the
VU and DSRC-VU must support the application protocol
commands defined in 5.6.2. and
DSC_70 c) the VU and DSRC-VU must support the operation of the
data transfer via the connection in regard to performance
and power supply.
5.6.2 Application Protocol
DSC_71 The application protocol between the VU Remote Communi­
cation facility and DSRC-VU is responsible for periodically
transferring the remote communication data from the VU to
the DSRC.
DSC_72 The following main commands are identified:
1. Initialisation of the communication link — Request
2. Initialisation of the communication link — Response
3. Send Data with Identifier of the RTM application and
Payload defined by RTM Data
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4. Acknowledgment of the data
5. Termination of the communication link — Request
6. Termination of the communication link — Response
DSC_73 In ASN1.0, the previous commands may be defined as:
DSC_74 The description of the commands and parameters is
following:
— is
used to initialize the communication link. The command
is sent by the VU to the DSRC-VU. The LinkIdentifier is
set by the VU and communicated to the DSRC-VU to
track a specific communication link.
(Note: this is to support future links and other application/
modules like Weighing on board).
— is
used by the DSRC-VU to provide the response of the
request to initialize the communication link. The
command is sent by the DSRC-VU to the VU. The
command provides the result of the initialisation as
answer = 1 (Success) or =0 (Failure).
DSC_75 The initialization of the communication link shall be done
only after installation, calibration, and start of the
engine/VU is switched on.
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— is used to by the VU to send the
signed RCDTData (i.e., the remote communication
Data) to the DSRC-VU. The data will be sent every 60
seconds. The DataTransactionId parameter identifies the
specific transmission of data. The LinkIdentifier is also
used to ensure that the appropriate link is correct.
— is sent by the
DSRC-VU to provide the feedback to the VU on the
reception of the data from a
command identified by the DataTransactionId parameter.
The Answer parameter is 1 (Success) or =0 (Failure). If a
VU receives more than three answers equal to 0 or if the
VU does not receive a RCDT Data Acknowledgment for a
specific previously sent RCDT- Send Data with a specific
DataTransactionId, the VU will generate and record an
event.
— is sent by
the VU to DSRC-VU to terminate a link for a specific
LinkIdentifier.
DSC_76 At the restart of the DSRC-VU or a VU, all the existing
Communication Links should be removed as there could be
‘dangling’ Links due to the sudden shutdown of a VU.
— is sent by
the DSRC-VU to the VU to confirm the request of termin­
ation of the link by the VU for the specific LinkIdentifier.
5.7 Error handling
5.7.1 Recording and communication of the Data in the DSRC-VU
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DSC_77 The Data shall be provided, already secured, by the VUSM
function to the DSRC-VU. The VUSM shall verify that data
recorded in the DSRC-VU has been transmitted successfully
to the DSRC-VU. The recording and reporting of any errors
in the transfer of data from the VU to the memory of the
DSRC-VU shall be recorded with type EventFaultType and
enum value set to ‘0C’H Communication error with the
remote communication facility event together with the
timestamp. The VUSM shall verify that the data has been
transmitted successfully to the DSRC-VU.
DSC_78 Reserved for future use.
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DSC_79 If the VUPM attempts to obtain VU data from the security
module (to pass to the VU-DSRC), but fails to do so, it shall
record that failure with type EventFaultType and enum value set
to ‘62’H Remote Communication Facility' communication fault
together with the timestamp. The failure of the communication is
detected when a message
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is not received for the related (i.e., with the same DataTrans­
actionId
messages) for more than three
consecutive times.
5.7.2 Wireless Communication errors
DSC_80 Communication error handling shall be consistent with the
related DSRC standards, namely EN 300 674-1, EN 12253,
EN 12795, EN 12834 and the appropriate parameters of EN
13372.
5.7.2.1 Encryption and signature errors
DSC_81 Encryption and signature errors shall be handled as defined in
Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms and are not
present in any error messages associated with the DSRC
transfer of data.
5.7.2.2 Recording of errors
The DSRC medium is a dynamic wireless communication in an envi­
ronment of uncertain atmospheric and interference conditions, particu­
larly in the ‘portable REDCR’ and ‘moving vehicle’ combinations
involved in this application. It is therefore necessary to ascertain the
difference between a ‘read failure’ and an ‘error’ condition. In a trans­
action across a wireless interface, read failure is common and the conse­
quence is usually to retry, i.e. rebroadcast the BST and reattempt the
sequence, which will in most circumstances lead to a successful
communication connection and transfer of data, unless the target
vehicle moves out of range during the time required to retransmit. (A
‘successful’ instance of a ‘read’ may have involved several attempts and
retries).
Read failure may be because the antennas were not paired properly
(failure of ‘aiming’); because one of the antennas is shielded — this
may be deliberate, but also can be caused by the physical presence of
another vehicle; radio interference, especially from circa 5.8 GHz WIFI
or other public access wireless communications, or may be caused by
radar interference, or difficult atmospheric conditions (e.g. during a
thunderstorm); or simply by moving out of the range of the DSRC
communication. Individual instances of read failures, by their nature,
cannot be recorded, simply because the communication simply did not
occur.
However, if the agent of the competent control authority targets a
vehicle and attempts to interrogate its DSRC-VU, but no successful
transfer of data ensues, this failure could have occurred because of
deliberate tampering, and therefore the agent of the competent control
authority needs a means to log the failure, and alert colleagues down­
stream that there may be a violation. The colleagues can then stop the
vehicle and carry out a physical inspection. However, as no successful
communication has taken place, the DSRC-VU cannot provide data
concerning the failure. Such reporting shall therefore be a function of
REDCR equipment design.
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‘Failure to read’ is technically different to an ‘error’. In this context an
‘error’ is the acquisition of a wrong value.
Data transferred to the DSRC-VU is supplied already secured, therefore
must be verified by the supplier of the data (see 5.4).
Data subsequently transferred across the air interface is checked by
cyclic redundancy checks at the communications level. If the CRC
validates, then the data is correct. If the CRC does not validate, the
data is retransmitted. The probability that data could successfully pass
through a CRC incorrectly is statistically so highly improbable that it
may be discounted.
If the CRC does not validate and there is no time to retransmit and
receive the correct data, then the result will not be an error, but an
instantiation of a specific type of read failure.
The only meaningful ‘failure’ data that can be recorded is that of the
number of successful initiations of transactions that occur, that do not
result in a successful transfer of data to the REDCR.
DSC_82 The REDCR shall therefore record, time-stamped, the number
of occasions where the ‘initialisation’ phase of a DSRC inter­
rogation is successful, but the transaction terminated before
the Data was successfully retrieved by the REDCR. This data
shall be available to agent of the competent control authority
and shall be stored in the memory of the REDCR equipment.
The means by which this is achieved shall be a matter of
product design or the specification of a competent control
authority.
The only meaningful ‘error’ data that can be recorded is the
number of occasions where the REDCR fails to decrypt the
Data received. However, it should be noted that this will only
relate to the efficiency of the REDCR software. Data may be
technically decrypted, but make no semantic sense.
DSC_83 The REDCR shall therefore record, time-stamped, the number
of occasions where it has attempted but failed to decipher data
received across the DSRC interface.
6. COMMISSIONING AND PERIODIC INSPECTION TESTS FOR THE
REMOTE COMMUNICATION FUNCTION
6.1 General
DSC_84 Two type of tests are foreseen for the remote communication
function:
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1) An ECHO test to validate the DSRC-REDCR
>>-:-
2) A End-to-end security test to ensure that a workshop card
is able to access the encrypted and signed data content
created by the VU and transmitted over the wireless
communication channel.
6.2 ECHO
This clause contains provisions specifically made to test only that the
DSRC-REDCR >>-:-
The objective of the ECHO command is to enable workshops or type
approval test facilities to test that the DSRC link is working without
needing access to security credentials. The tester's equipment therefore
only needs to be able to initialise a DSRC communication (sending a
BST with AID=2) and then send the ECHO command, and, assuming
the DSRC is working, will receive the ECHO response. See 5.4.8 for
details. Assuming it receives this response correctly, the DSRC link
(DSRC-REDCR >>-:-
correctly.
6.3 Tests to validate the secure data content
DSC_85 This test is execute to validate the end-to-end security flow of
data. A DSRC test reader is needed for such test. The DSRC
test reader performs the same functionality and it is im­
plemented with the same specifications of the reader used
by the law enforcers, with the difference that a workshop
card shall be used to authenticate the user of the DSRC test
reader rather than a control card. The test can be executed
after the initial activation of a Smart Tachograph or at the end
of the calibration procedure. After the activation, the vehicle
unit shall generate and communicate to the DSRC-VU the
secured early detection data.
DSC_86 The workshop personnel must position the DSRC test reader
at a distance between 2 and 10 metres in front of the vehicle.
DSC_87 Then the workshop personnel will insert a workshop card in
the DSRC test reader to request the interrogation of the early
detection data to the vehicle unit. After a successful inter­
rogation, the workshop personnel will access the received
data to ensure that it has been successfully validated for
integrity and decrypted.
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Addendum
Rules for the computation of daily, weekly and fortnightly driving time
1. Basic computation rules
The VU shall compute the daily driving time, the weekly driving time and the
fortnightly driving time using relevant data stored in a driver (or workshop)
card inserted in the driver slot (slot 1, card reader #1) of the Vehicle Unit, and
selected driver’s activities while this card is inserted in the VU.
The driving times shall not be calculated while no driver (or workshop) card
is inserted.
UNKNOWN period(s) found during the time period needed for computations
shall be assimilated to BREAK/REST.
UNKNOWN periods and activities of negative duration (i.e. start of the
activity occurs later than the end of the activity) due to time overlaps
between two different VUs or due to time adjustment, are not taken into
account.
Activities recorded in the driver card corresponding to ‘OUT OF SCOPE’
periods in accordance with definition (gg) of Annex IC, shall be interpreted as
follows:
— BREAK/REST shall be computed as ‘BREAK’ or ‘REST’
— WORK and DRIVING shall be considered as ‘WORK’
— AVAILABILITY shall be considered as ‘AVAILABILITY’
In the context of this Addendum, the VU shall assume to have a daily rest
period at the beginning of the card activities records.
2. Concepts
The following concepts apply exclusively to this appendix, and are intended
to specify the computation of driving times by the VU and its later trans­
mission by the remote communication facility.
(a) ‘RTM-shift’ is the period between the end of a daily rest period and the
end of the directly following daily rest period.
The VU shall start a new RTM-shift after a daily rest period has finished.
The ongoing RTM-shift is the period since the end of last daily rest
period;
(b) ‘accumulated driving time’ is the sum of the duration of all DRIVING
activities of the driver within a period while not in OUT OF SCOPE;
(c) ‘daily driving time’ is the accumulated driving time within a RTM-shift;
(d) ‘weekly driving time’ is the accumulated driving time for the ongoing
week;
(e) ‘continuous rest period’ is any uninterrupted period of BREAK/REST;
(f) ‘fortnightly driving time’ is the accumulated driving time for the previous
and the ongoing week;
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(g) ‘daily rest period’ is a period of BREAK/REST, which can be either
— a regular daily rest period,
— a split daily rest period or
— a reduced daily rest period
In the context of Appendix 14, when a VU is computing weekly rest
periods, those weekly rest periods shall be considered as daily rest
periods;
(h) ‘regular daily rest period’ is a continuous rest period of at least 11 hours.
As a matter of exception, when a FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING condition
is active the regular daily rest period may be interrupted a maximum of
two times by activities other than rest, with a maximal accumulated
duration of one hour, i.e. the regular daily rest period containing
ferry/train crossing period(s) may be split into two or three parts. The
VU shall then compute a regular daily rest period when the accumulated
rest time computed according to point 3 is at least 11 hours.
When a regular daily rest period has been interrupted the VU:
— shall not incorporate the driving activity encountered during those
interruptions to the computation of the daily driving time, and
— shall start a new RTM-shift at the end of the regular daily rest period
that has been interrupted.
Figure 1.
Example of daily rest period interrupted due to ferry/train crossing
(i) ‘reduced daily rest period’ is a continuous rest period of at least 9 hours
and less than 11 hours;
(j) ‘split daily rest period’ is a daily rest period taken in two parts:
— the first part shall be a continuous rest period of at least 3 hours and
less than 9,
— the second part shall be a continuous rest period of at least 9 hours.
As a matter of exception, when a FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING condition
is active during one or both of the parts of a split daily rest period, the
split daily rest period may be interrupted a maximum of two times by
other activities with the accumulated duration of maximal one hour, i.e.:
— the first part of the split daily rest period may be interrupted one or
two times, or
— the second part of the split daily rest period may be interrupted one or
two times, or
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— the first part of the split daily rest period may be interrupted one time
and the second part of the split daily rest period may be interrupted
one time.
The VU shall then compute a split daily rest period when the accumulated
rest time computed according to point 3 is:
— at least three hours and less than 11 hours for the first rest period and
at least 9 hours for the second rest period, when the first rest period
has been interrupted by FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING.
— at least three hours and less than 9 hours for the first rest period and at
least 9 hours for the second rest period, when the first rest period has
not been interrupted by FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING.
Figure 2.
Example of split daily rest period interrupted due to ferry/train crossing
When the split daily rest period is interrupted, the VU:
— shall not incorporate the driving activity encountered during those
interruptions to the computation of the daily driving time, and
— shall start a new RTM-shift at the end of the split daily rest period that
has been interrupted;
(k) ‘week’ is the period in UTC time between 00:00 hours on Monday
and 24:00 hours on Sunday;
3. Computation of the rest period when it has been interrupted due to ferry/train
crossing
For the computation of the rest period when it has been interrupted due to
ferry/train crossing, the VU shall calculate the accumulated rest time
according to the following steps:
a) Step 1
The VU shall detect interruptions to the rest time occurring before the
activation of the FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING (BEGIN) flag, according
to figure 3 and in its case figure 4, and shall evaluate for each interruption
detected if the following conditions are met:
— the interruption makes the total duration of the interruptions detected,
including in its case interruptions occurring during the first part of a
split daily rest period due to ferry/train crossing, to exceed more than
one hour in total,
— the interruption makes the total number of interruptions detected,
including in its case interruptions occurring during the first part of a
split daily rest period due to ferry/train crossing, to be bigger than two,
— there is an ‘Entry of place where daily work periods end’ stored after
the interruption ended.
If none of the above conditions are met, the continuous rest period im­
mediately preceding the interruption shall be added to the accumulated rest
time.
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If at least one of the above conditions is met, the VU shall either stop the
computation of the accumulated rest time according to step 2 or detect
interruptions to the rest time occurring after the FERRY/TRAIN
CROSSING (BEGIN) flag according to step 3.
b) Step 2
For each interruption detected according to step 1, the VU shall evaluate
whether the computation of the accumulated rest time should stop. The VU
shall stop the computation process when two continuous rest periods
occurring before the activation of the FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING
(BEGIN) flag have been added to the accumulated rest time, including
in its case rest periods added in the first part of a split daily rest period
also interrupted by ferry/train crossing. Otherwise, the VU shall proceed
according to step 3.
c) Step 3
If after performance of step 2 the VU continues the computation of the
accumulated rest time, the VU shall detect interruptions occurring after the
deactivation of the FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING condition according to
figure 3 and in its case figure 4.
For each interruption found, the VU shall evaluate if the interruption
makes the accumulated time of all the interruptions detected to exceed
more than one hour in total, in which case the computation of the
accumulated rest period shall finish at the end of the continuous rest
period previous to the interruption. Otherwise, the continuous rest
periods occurring after the respective interruptions shall be added to the
computation of the daily rest period until the condition in step 4 is
fulfilled.
d) Step 4
The computation of the accumulated rest time shall stop when the VU has
added, as result of steps 1 and 3, a maximum of two continuous rest
periods to the rest period for which the FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING
condition is activated, including in its case interruptions occurring during
the first part of a split daily rest period due to ferry/train crossing.
Figure 3.
Processing of rest times by the VU in order to determine whether an interrupted rest period shall compute
as regular daily rest period or as the first part of a split daily rest period
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Figure 4.
Processing of rest times by the VU in order to determine whether an interrupted rest period shall compute
as the second part of a split daily rest period
Figure 5.
Example of a daily rest period interrupted more than twice causing rest period H not to be included in the
computation
Figure 6.
Example of a daily rest period where Ferry/Train Calculation period is commenced at end of work period
Figure 7.
Example of a daily rest period interrupted more than twice causing rest period B not to be included in the
computation
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Figure 8.
Example of a split daily rest period interrupted once during the first rest period and once during 2 nd rest
period
4. Computation of daily, weekly and fortnightly- driving times
The VU shall compute the daily driving time(s) for the ongoing and previous
RTM-shifts. The driving time occurring during the interruptions of the daily
rest periods shall not be added to the computation of the daily driving time,
when such interruptions are due to ferry/train crossing and the requirements
provided for in paragraphs (h) and (j) of point 2 and in point 3 have been
fulfilled. Nevertheless, insofar as a complete regular or split daily rest period
has not been computed by the VU according to point 3, the driving times
occurring during the interruptions shall be added to the daily driving time for
the ongoing RTM-shift.
The VU shall also compute the weekly and the fortnightly driving times. The
driving time occurring during the interruptions of the daily rest periods due to
ferry/train crossing shall be added to the computation of the weekly and the
fortnightly driving times.
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Appendix 15
MIGRATION: MANAGING THE CO-EXISTENCE OF EQUIPMENT
GENERATIONS AND VERSIONS
▼B
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. DEFINITIONS
2. GENERAL PROVISIONS
2.1. Overview of the transition
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2.2. Interoperability between VU and cards
▼B
2.3. Interoperability between VU and MS
2.4. Interoperability between vehicle units, tachograph cards and equipment
for data download
2.4.1 Direct card download by IDE
2.4.2 Card download through a vehicle unit
2.4.3 Vehicle unit download
2.5. Interoperability between VU and calibration equipment
3. MAIN STEPS DURING THE PERIOD BEFORE THE INTRO­
DUCTION DATE
4. PROVISIONS FOR THE PERIOD AFTER THE INTRODUCTION
DATE
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5. RECORDING OF BORDER CROSSINGS IN FIRST GENERATION
AND FIRST VERSION OF SECOND GENERATION TACHOGRAPHS
▼B
1. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Appendix, the following definitions are used.
smart tachograph system as defined by this Annex (chapter 1: definition
bbb);
first generation tachograph system as defined by this Regulation
(article 2: definition 1);
second generation tachograph system as defined by this Regulation
(article 2: definition 7);
introduction date as defined by this Annex (chapter 1: definition ccc);
Intelligent Dedicated Equipment (IDE) equipment used to perform data
downloading, as defined in Appendix 7 of this Annex.
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2. GENERAL PROVISIONS
2.1. Overview of the transition
The introduction of this Annex provides an overview of the transition
between the first and the second generation tachograph systems, and of
the introduction of the second version of second generation recording
equipment and tachograph cards.
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In addition to the provisions of this introduction, the following
information can be reminded:
— first generation motion sensors are not interoperable with any version
of second generation vehicle units,
— only second generation motion sensors can be installed in vehicles
equipped with any version of second generation vehicle units,
— data download and calibration equipment need to support use of both
generations or versions of recording equipment and tachograph cards.
2.2. Interoperability between VU and cards
It is understood that first generation tachograph cards are interoperable
with first generation vehicle units (in compliance with Annex IB of
Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85), any version of second generation
tachograph cards are interoperable with any version of second generation
vehicle units (in compliance with Annex IC of this Regulation). In
addition, the requirements below shall apply.
MIG_001 Except as provided for in requirement MIG_004 and
MIG_005, first generation tachograph cards may continue to
be used in any version of second generation vehicle units until
their end of validity date. Their holders may however ask for
their replacement by second generation tachograph cards as
soon as they are available.
MIG_002 Any version of second generation vehicle units shall be able
to use any valid first generation driver, control and company
card inserted.
MIG_003 This capability may be suppressed once and forever in such
vehicle units by workshops, so that first generation tachograph
cards cannot be accepted anymore. This may only be done
after the European Commission has launched a procedure
aiming to request workshops to do so, for example during
each periodic inspection of tachograph.
MIG_004 Second generation vehicle units shall only be able to use
second generation workshop cards.
MIG_005 For determining the mode of operation, any version of second
generation vehicle units shall only consider the types of the
valid cards inserted, regardless of their generations or
versions.
MIG_006 Any version of valid second generation tachograph card shall
be able to be used in first generation vehicle units exactly the
same manner as a first generation tachograph card of the same
type.
2.3. Interoperability between VU and MS
It is understood that first generation motion sensors are interoperable with
first generation vehicle units, while second generation motion sensors are
interoperable with any version of second generation vehicle units. In
addition, the requirements below shall apply.
MIG_007 Any version of second generation vehicle units shall not be
able to be paired and used with first generation motion
sensors.
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MIG_008 Second generation motion sensors may be paired and used
with second generation vehicle units only, whichever the
version, or with both generations of vehicle units.
2.4. Interoperability between vehicle units, tachograph cards and
equipment for data download
MIG_009 Equipment for data download may be compatible with all
generations and versions of vehicle units and tachograph
cards.
2.4.1 Direct card download by IDE
MIG_010 Data shall be downloaded by IDE from tachograph cards of
one generation inserted in their card readers, using the
security mechanisms and the data download protocol of this
generation, and downloaded data shall have the format
defined for this generation and version.
MIG_011 To allow drivers’ control by non EU control authorities, it
shall also be possible to download second generation driver
(and workshop) cards, whichever the version, in exactly the
same manner as first generation drivers (and workshop) cards.
Such download shall include:
— non signed EFs IC and ICC (optional),
— non signed EFs (first generation) Card_Certificate and
CA_Certificate,
— the other application data EFs (within DF Tachograph)
requested by the first generation card download protocol.
This information shall be secured with a digital signature,
according to the first generation security mechanisms.
Such download shall not include application data EFs only
present in version 1 or version 2 second generation driver
(and workshop) cards (application data EFs within DF
Tachograph_G2).
2.4.2 Card download through a vehicle unit
MIG_012 Data shall be downloaded from any version of second
generation card, inserted in a first generation vehicle unit
using the first generation data download protocol. The card
shall answer to the vehicle unit commands exactly the same
manner as a first generation card and downloaded data shall
have the same format as data downloaded from a first
generation card.
MIG_013 Data shall be downloaded from a first generation card inserted
in any version of second generation vehicle unit using the
data download protocol defined in Appendix 7 of this
Annex. The vehicle unit shall send commands to the card
exactly the same manner as a first generation vehicle unit,
and downloaded data shall respect the format defined for
first generation cards.
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2.4.3 Vehicle unit download
MIG_014 Outside of the frame of drivers' control by non EU control
authorities, data shall be downloaded from second generation
vehicle units using the second generation security
mechanisms, and the data download protocol specified in
Appendix 7 of this Annex for the relevant version.
MIG_015 To allow drivers' control by non EU control authorities, it
may optionally also be possible to download data from any
version of second generation vehicle units using the first
generation security mechanisms. Downloaded data shall then
have the same format as data downloaded from a first
generation vehicle unit. This capability may be selected
through commands in the menu.
2.5. Interoperability between VU and calibration equipment
MIG_016 Calibration equipment shall be able to perform calibration of
each generation or version of tachograph, using the calibration
protocol of this generation or version. Calibration equipment
may be compatible with all generations and versions of
vehicle units.
3. MAIN STEPS DURING THE PERIOD BEFORE THE INTRODUCTION
DATE
MIG_017 Test keys and certificates shall be available to manufacturers
at the publication date of this Annex.
MIG_018 Interoperability tests shall be ready to start with version 2 of
vehicle units and version 2 of tachograph cards if requested
by manufacturers at the latest 15 months before the intro­
duction date.
MIG_019 For version 2 of generation 2 tachographs, tachograph cards
and motion sensors, the same keys and certificates are used as
for generation 2 version 1 equipment.
MIG_020 Member States shall be able to issue version 2 of second
generation workshop cards at the latest 1 month before the
introduction date.
MIG_021 Member States shall be able to issue all other types of version
2 of second generation tachograph cards at the latest 1 month
before the introduction date.
4. PROVISIONS FOR THE PERIOD AFTER THE INTRODUCTION
DATE
MIG_022 With effect from the introduction date, Member States shall
only issue version 2 of second generation tachograph cards.
MIG_023 Vehicle units / motion sensors manufacturers shall be allowed
to produce first generation vehicle units / motion sensors as
long as they are used in the field, so that malfunctioning
components can be replaced.
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MIG_023a With effect from the introduction date, malfunctioning version
1 of second generation vehicle units or external GNSS
facilities shall be replaced with version 2 of second generation
vehicle units or external GNSS facilities.
MIG_024 Vehicle units / motion sensors manufacturers shall be allowed
to request and obtain type approval maintenance of first
generation vehicle units / motion sensors types or version 1
of second generation vehicle units already type approved.
5. RECORDING OF BORDER CROSSINGS IN FIRST GENERATION
AND FIRST VERSION OF SECOND GENERATION TACHOGRAPHS
MIG_025 The symbol of the country and, if applicable, the region that
the driver enters after crossing a border of a Member State in
application of Article 34(7) of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014,
shall be entered as a place where the daily work period begins
in accordance with the manual entry of places set out in
requirements 60 of Annex IC to Regulation (EU) No 165/2014
and 50 of Annex IB to Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85.
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Appendix 16
ADAPTOR FOR M1 AND N1 CATEGORY VEHICLES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
1.1. Abbreviations
1.2. Reference standards
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
ADAPTOR
2.1. Adaptor general description
2.2. Functions
2.3. Security
3. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN
ADAPTOR IS INSTALLED
4. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
ADAPTOR
4.1. Interfacing and adapting incoming speed pulses
4.2. Inducing the incoming pulses to the embedded motion sensor
4.3. Embedded motion sensor
4.4. Security requirements
4.5. Performance characteristics
4.6. Materials
4.7. Markings
5. INSTALLATION OF THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN
ADAPTOR IS USED
5.1. Installation
5.2. Sealing
6. CHECKS, INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS
6.1. Periodic inspections
7. TYPE APPROVAL OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN
ADAPTOR IS USED
7.1. General points
7.2. Functional certificate
1. ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
1.1. Abbreviations
TBD To Be Defined
VU Vehicle Unit
1.2. Reference standards
ISO16844-3 Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 3: Motion
sensor interface
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
ADAPTOR
2.1. Adaptor general description
ADA_001 The adaptor shall provide a connected VU with secured motion
data permanently representative of vehicle speed and distance
travelled.
The adaptor is only intended for those vehicles that are
required to be equipped with recording equipment in
compliance with this Regulation.
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It shall be installed and used only in those types of vehicle
defined in definition yy) ‘adaptor’ of Annex IC where it is not
mechanically possible to install any other type of existing
motion sensor which is otherwise compliant with the
provisions of this Annex and its Appendixes 1 to 16.
The adaptor shall not be mechanically interfaced to a moving
part of the vehicle, but connected to the speed/distance
impulses which are generated by integrated sensors or alter­
native interfaces.
ADA_002 A type approved motion sensor (according to the provisions of
this Annex IC, section 8, Type approval of recording
equipment and tachograph cards) shall be fitted into the
adaptor housing, which shall also include a pulse converter
device inducing the incoming pulses to the embedded motion
sensor. The embedded motion sensor itself shall be connected
to the VU, so that the interface between the VU and the
adaptor shall be compliant with the requirements set out in
ISO16844-3.
2.2. Functions
ADA_003 The adaptor shall include the following functions:
— interfacing and adapting the incoming speed pulses,
— inducing the incoming pulses to the embedded motion
sensor,
— all functions of the embedded motion sensor, providing
secured motion data to the VU.
2.3. Security
ADA_004 The adaptor shall not be security certified according to the
motion sensor generic security target defined in Appendix 10
of this Annex. Security related requirements specified in
section 4.4 of this Appendix shall apply instead.
3. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN
ADAPTOR IS INSTALLED
The requirements in the following Chapters indicate how the requirements
of this Annex shall be understood when an adaptor is used. The related
requirement numbers of Annex IC are provided between brackets.
ADA_005 The recording equipment of any vehicle fitted with an adaptor
must comply with all the provisions of this Annex, except
otherwise specified in this Appendix.
ADA_006 When an adaptor is installed, the recording equipment includes
cables, the adaptor (including a motion sensor), and a VU [01].
ADA_007 The detection of events and/or faults function of the recording
equipment is modified as follows:
— the ‘power supply interruption’ event shall be triggered by
the VU, while not in calibration mode, in case of any
interruption exceeding 200 milliseconds of the power
supply of the embedded motion sensor [79]
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— the ‘motion data error’ event shall be triggered by the VU
in case of interruption of the normal data flow between the
embedded motion sensor and the VU and/or in case of data
integrity or data authentication error during data exchange
between the embedded motion sensor and the VU [83]
— the ‘security breach attempt’ event shall be triggered by the
VU for any other event affecting the security of the
embedded motion sensor, while not in calibration mode
[85]
— the ‘recording equipment’ fault shall be triggered by the
VU, while not in calibration mode, for any fault of the
embedded motion sensor [88]
ADA_008 The adaptor faults detectable by the recording equipment shall
be those related with the embedded motion sensor [88].
ADA_009 The VU calibration function shall allow to automatically pair
the embedded motion sensor with the VU [202, 204].
4. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
ADAPTOR
4.1. Interfacing and adapting incoming speed pulses
ADA_011 The adaptor input interface shall accept frequency pulses rep­
resentative of the vehicle speed and distance travelled. Elec­
trical characteristics of the incoming pulses are: TBD by the
manufacturer. Adjustments accessible to only the adaptor
manufacturer, and to the approved workshop performing the
adaptor installation shall allow the correct interfacing of the
adaptor input to the vehicle, if applicable.
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ADA_012 The adaptor input interface shall be able, if applicable, to
multiply or divide the frequency pulses of the incoming
speed pulses by a fixed factor, to adapt the signal to the k
factor range defined by this Annex (2 400 to 25 000
pulses/km). This fixed factor may only be programmed by
the adaptor manufacturer, and the approved workshop
performing the adaptor installation.
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4.2. Inducing the incoming pulses to the embedded motion sensor
ADA_013 The incoming pulses, possibly adapted as specified above, shall
be induced to the embedded motion sensor, so that each
incoming pulse shall be detected by the motion sensor.
4.3. Embedded motion sensor
ADA_014 The embedded motion sensor shall be stimulated by the
induced pulses, thus allowing it to generate motion data
accurately representing the vehicle movement, as if it was
mechanically interfaced to a moving part of the vehicle.
ADA_015 The identification data of the embedded motion sensor shall be
used by the VU to identify the adaptor [95].
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ADA_016 The installation data stored in the embedded motion sensor
shall be considered to represent the adaptor installation data
[122].
4.4. Security requirements
ADA_017 The adaptor housing shall be designed so that it cannot be
opened. It shall be sealed, so that physical tampering
attempts can be easily detected (e.g. through visual inspection,
see ADA_035). Seals shall follow the same requirements of
motion sensor seals [398 to 406]
ADA_018 It shall not be possible to remove the embedded motion sensor
from the adaptor without breaking the seal(s) of the adaptor
housing, or breaking the seal between the sensor and the
adaptor housing (see ADA_034).
ADA_019 The adaptor shall ensure that motion data may only been
processed and derived from the adaptor input.
4.5. Performance characteristics
ADA_020 The adaptor shall be fully operational in the temperature range
defined by the manufacturer.
ADA_021 The adaptor shall be fully operational in the humidity range
10 % to 90 % [214].
ADA_022 The adaptor shall be protected against over-voltage, inversion
of its power supply polarity, and short circuits [216].
ADA_023 The adaptor shall either:
— react to a magnetic field disturbing vehicle motion
detection. In such circumstances, the vehicle unit will
record and store a sensor fault [88] or,
— have a sensing element that is protected from, or immune
to, magnetic fields [217].
ADA_024 The adaptor shall conform to international regulation UN ECE
R10, related to electromagnetic compatibility, and shall be
protected against electrostatic discharges and transients [218].
4.6. Materials
ADA_025 The adaptor shall meet the protection grade (TBD by the manu­
facturer, depending on the installation position) [220, 221].
ADA_026 The colour of the adaptor housing shall be yellow.
4.7. Markings
ADA_027 A descriptive plaque shall be affixed to the adaptor and shall
show the following details:
— name and address of the manufacturer of the adaptor,
— manufacturer's part number and year of manufacture of the
adaptor,
— approval mark of the adaptor type or of the recording
equipment type including the adaptor,
— the date on which the adaptor has been installed,
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— the vehicle identification number of the vehicle on which it
has been installed.
ADA_028 The descriptive plaque shall also show the following details (if
not directly readable from the outside on the embedded motion
sensor):
— name of the manufacturer of the embedded motion sensor,
— manufacturer's part number and year of manufacture of the
embedded motion sensor,
— approval mark for the embedded motion sensor.
5. INSTALLATION OF THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN
ADAPTOR IS USED
5.1. Installation
ADA_029 Adaptors to be installed in vehicles shall only be installed by
vehicle manufacturers, or by approved workshops, authorised
to install, activate and calibrate digital and smart tachographs.
ADA_030 Such approved workshop installing the adaptor shall adjust the
input interface and select the division ratio of the input signal
(if applicable).
ADA_031 Such approved workshop installing the adaptor shall seal the
adaptor housing.
ADA_032 The adaptor shall be fitted as close as possible to that part of
the vehicle which provides its incoming pulses.
ADA_033 The cables for providing the adaptor power supply shall be red
(positive supply) and black (ground).
5.2. Sealing
ADA_034 The following sealing requirements shall apply:
— the adaptor housing shall be sealed (see ADA_017),
— the housing of the embedded sensor shall be sealed to the
adaptor housing, unless it is not possible to remove the
sensor from the adaptor housing without breaking the
seal(s) of the adaptor housing (see ADA_018),
— the adaptor housing shall be sealed to the vehicle,
— the connection between the adaptor and the equipment
which provides its incoming pulses shall be sealed on
both ends (to the extent of what is reasonably possible).
6. CHECKS, INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS
6.1. Periodic inspections
ADA_035 When an adaptor is used, each periodic inspection (periodic
inspections means in compliance with Requirement [409]
through to Requirement [413] of Annex 1C) of the recording
equipment shall include the following checks:
— that the adaptor carries the appropriate type approval
markings,
— that the seals on the adaptor and its connections are intact,
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— that the adaptor is installed as indicated on the installation
plaque,
— that the adaptor is installed as specified by the adapter
and/or vehicle manufacturer,
— that mounting an adaptor is authorised for the inspected
vehicle.
ADA_036 These inspections shall include a calibration and a replacement
of all seals, whatever their state.
7. TYPE APPROVAL OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT WHEN AN
ADAPTOR IS USED
7.1. General points
ADA_037 Recording equipment shall be submitted for type approval
complete, with the adaptor [425].
ADA_038 Any adaptor may be submitted for its own type approval, or
for type approval as a component of a recording equipment.
ADA_039 Such type approval shall include functional tests involving the
adaptor. Positive results to each of these tests are stated by an
appropriate certificate [426].
7.2. Functional certificate
ADA_040 A functional certificate of an adaptor or of recording equipment
including an adaptor shall be delivered to the adaptor manu­
facturer only after all the following minimum functional tests
have been successfully passed.
No Test Description Related requirements
1. Administrative examination
1.1 Documentation Correctness of
documentation of
the adaptor
2. Visual inspection
2.1. Compliance of the adaptor with documentation
2.2. Identification / markings of the adaptor ADA_027,
ADA_028
2.3 Materials of the adaptor [219] to [223]
ADA_026
2.4. Sealing ADA_017,
ADA_018,
ADA_034
3. Functional tests
3.1 Inducing the speed pulses to the embedded
motion sensor
ADA_013
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No Test Description Related requirements
3.2 Interfacing and adapting incoming speed pulses ADA_011,
ADA_012
3.3 Motion measurement accuracy [30] to [35], [217]
4. Environmental tests
4.1 Manufacturer test results Results of manu­
facturer environ­
ment tests.
ADA_020,
ADA_021,
ADA_022,
ADA_024
5. EMC
5.1 radiated emissions and
susceptibility
Verify compliance
with Directive
2006/28/EC
ADA_024
5.2 Manufacturer test results Results of manu­
facturer environ­
ment tests.
ADA_024
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Appendix 17
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE USE OF OSNMA
BY TACHOGRAPHS
1. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS
1.1. Definitions
Service Declaration of Galileo Open Service Navigation Message
Authentication (OSNMA) means the declaration of the European
Commission that Galileo OSNMA enters its operational phase.
Transitional vehicle unit: Vehicle unit complying with the provisions of
this Appendix.
Transitional vehicle units are constructed in accordance with the SIS ICD
and the OSNMA receiver guidelines applicable to the OSNMA public test
phase. They contain a GNSS receiver which is capable of using OSNMA
available during its public test phase.
Transitional vehicle units are however unable to authenticate the navi­
gation messages available after the Service Declaration of OSNMA, due
to a necessary update of the cryptographic material in the vehicle unit. An
appropriate software update needs to be applied, so that they can start to
use OSNMA, and comply with all the requirements of Annex IC and its
Appendixes 1 to 16. Before being updated, transitional vehicle units
implement the OSNMA related functionalities as specified in this
Appendix. Functionalities unrelated to OSNMA remain unchanged.
If the appropriate software update is applied, transitional vehicle units
implement the SIS ICD and the OSNMA receiver guidelines applicable
to the OSNMA operational phase, and comply with all the requirements of
Annex IC and its Appendixes 1 to 16, using OSNMA available during the
operational phase.
Transitional tachograph: tachograph including a transitional vehicle unit.
1.2. Acronyms
ICD Interface Control Document
OSNMA Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Auth­
entication
SIS Signal in Space
VU Vehicle Unit
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2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO OSNMA
In order to allow vehicles registered for the first time to be fitted with
version 2 of second generation tachographs, starting from the requested
introduction date as defined in point (ccc) of Section 1 of Annex I C to
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799, there is a need to type-approve,
produce and commercialize vehicle units before the Service Declaration of
OSNMA. For these vehicle units, referred to as transitional vehicle units,
OSNMA-related requirements of Annex IC and its Appendixes 1 to 16
need to be adapted, so that they can be type approved and used in the
field.
The provisions laid down in this Appendix define the specific
requirements applicable to transitional vehicle units. They only apply to
vehicle units with an internal GNSS receiver.
3. REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE GNSS RECEIVER OF
TRANSITIONAL TACHOGRAPHS
TRA_001 Transitional vehicle units shall include a GNSS receiver
capable of using OSNMA available during its public test phase.
TRA_002 Appendix 12 requirements apply to the GNSS receiver
included in transitional vehicle units, with the following interpretations:
— SIS ICD and OSNMA Receiver Guidelines referred to are the
documents available for the public test phase:
— Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication
(OSNMA) User ICD for the Test Phase, Issue 1.0, November
2021,
— Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication
(OSNMA) Receiver Guidelines for the Test Phase, Issue 1.0,
November 2021,
— OSNMA is the service available during the public test phase,
— SIS is the Signal In Space available during the public test phase.
TRA_003 The GNSS receiver included in transitional vehicle units shall
be so designed that after an update of its software, applied through a
vehicle unit software update, it fully complies with Annex 12
requirements, using OSNMA available during its operational phase.
4. REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TRANSITIONAL VEHICLE
UNITS
Transitional vehicle units may process the OSNMA signal available during
its public test phase, but are not able to report the Navigation Messages
Authentication Status from the SIS available during OSNMA operational
phase, until an appropriate software update is applied. They therefore
assume that the standard positions provided by the GNSS receiver are
always authenticated.
The requirements of Annex IC and its Appendixes 1 to 16 apply, with the
following interpretations.
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TRA_004 Annex IC, 3.9.15 ‘Time conflict’ event, requirement 86, shall
be understood as:
This event shall be triggered, while not in calibration mode, when the VU
detects a discrepancy between the time of the vehicle unit’s time
measurement function and the time originating from the standard
positions transmitted by the GNSS receiver or the external GNSS
facility. A ‘time discrepancy’ is detected if the time difference exceeds ± 3
seconds corresponding to the time accuracy set out in requirement 41a,
the latter increased by the maximal time drift per day. This event shall be
recorded together with the internal clock value of the recording
equipment. The VU shall perform the check for triggering the ‘time
conflict’ event right before the VU automatically re-adjusts the VU
internal clock, in accordance with requirement 211.
TRA_005 Annex IC, 3.9.18 ‘GNSS anomaly’ event, requirement 88a,
shall be understood as:
This event shall be triggered, while not in calibration mode, when the
GNSS receiver detects an attack , as specified in Appendix 12. After a
GNSS anomaly event has been triggered, the VU shall not generate other
GNSS anomaly events for the next 10 minutes.
TRA_006 Annex IC, 3.12.5 Recording and storing in the data memory,
Places and positions where daily work periods begin, end, and/or where
3 hours accumulated driving time is reached, requirement 110, shall be
understood as:
Together with each place or position, the recording equipment shall
record and store in its data memory:
— the driver and/or co-driver card number and card issuing Member
State,
— the card generation,
— the date and time of the entry,
— the type of entry (begin, end or 3 hours accumulated driving time),
— the related GNSS accuracy, date and time if applicable,
— the vehicle odometer value,
— a flag indicating that the position has been assumed as authenticated.
TRA_007 Annex IC, 3.12.17 Recording and storing in the data memory,
Border crossings, requirement 133b, shall be understood as:
Together with countries and position, the recording equipment shall
record and store in its data memory:
— the driver and/or co-driver card number and card issuing Member
State,
— the card generation,
— the related GNSS accuracy, date and time,
— a flag indicating that the position has been assumed as authenticated,
— the vehicle odometer value at the time of border crossing detection.
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TRA_008 Annex IC, 3.12.18 Recording and storing in the data memory,
Load/unload operations, requirement 133g, shall be understood as:
Together with the type of operation and position, the recording equipment
shall record and store in its data memory:
— the driver and/or co-driver card number and card issuing Member
State,
— the card generation,
— the date and time of the load/unload operation,
— the related GNSS accuracy, date and time if applicable,
— a flag indicating that the position has been assumed as authenticated,
— the vehicle odometer value.
TRA_009 Annex IC, 3.23 Time adjustment, requirement 211, shall be
understood as:
The time setting of the VU internal clock shall be automatically
re-adjusted, at variable time intervals. The next automatic time
re-adjustment shall be triggered between 72h and 168h after the
previous one, and after the VU can access to GNSS time through a
valid standard position message in accordance with Appendix 12. Never­
theless, the time adjustment shall never be bigger than the accumulated
maximal time drift per day, as calculated by the VU manufacturer in
accordance with requirement 41b. If the difference between internal VU
clock time and GNSS receiver time is bigger than the accumulated
maximum time drift per day, then the time adjustment shall bring the
VU internal clock as close as possible to the GNSS receiver time. The
time setting may only be done if the time provided by the GNSS receiver is
obtained using standard position messages as set out in Appendix 12. The
time reference for the automatic time setting of the VU internal clock shall
be the time provided in the standard position message.
TRA_010 Annex IC, 3.23 Time adjustment, requirement 212, shall be
understood as:
The time adjustment function shall also allow for triggered adjustment of
the current time, in calibration mode.
Workshops may adjust time:
— either by writing a time value in the VU, using the WriteDataByI­
dentifier service in accordance with section 6.2 of Appendix 8,
— or by requesting an alignment of the VU clock to the time provided by
the GNSS receiver. This may only be done if the time provided by the
GNSS receiver is obtained using standard position messages. In this
latter case, the RoutineControl service shall be used in accordance
with section 8 of Appendix 8.
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TRA_011 Appendix 4, 2. Data blocks specification, first paragraph,
seventh indent, shall be understood as:
When printed after the longitude and the latitude of a recorded position,
or after the timestamp when the position was determined, the
pictogram indicates that this position has been assumed as authentic.
TRA_012 Appendix 8, 8.1 RoutineControl service (Time adjustment),
Message description, requirement CPR_065a, shall be understood as:
The service RoutineControl (TimeAdjustment) provides the ability to
trigger an alignment of the VU clock to the time provided by the GNSS
receiver.
For the service RoutineControl (TimeAdjustment) execution the VU must
be in CALIBRATION mode.
Precondition: it is ensured that the VU is able to receive standard position
messages from the GNSS receiver.
As long the time adjustment is ongoing, the VU shall respond to the
request RoutineControl, subfunction requestRoutineResults, with routi­
neInfo = 0x78.
Note: the time adjustment may take some time. The diagnostic tester shall
request the time adjustment status by using the sub-function requestRouti­
neResults.
TRA_013 In Appendix 12, 3 Sentences provided by the GNSS receiver,
requirement GNS_4a:
Data contained in the AMC sentences provided by the GNSS receiver, if
any, shall not be used by the vehicle unit, except for the following values
of the Status:
J = jamming or O = other GNSS attack (by implemented consistency
checks according to GNS_3a),
V = Void (authenticated position is not available for any other reason).
TRA_014 In Appendix 12, 3 Sentences provided by the GNSS receiver,
requirement GNS_5:
Data contained in the ASA sentences provided by the GNSS receiver, if
any, shall not be used by the vehicle unit.
TRA_015 In Appendix 12, 5.2 Vehicle Unit without an external GNSS
facility, Transfer of information from the GNSS receiver to the VU,
requirements GNS_34 and 36:
The VU processor shall not use information extracted from the AMC
sentence, except for the following values of the Status:
J = jamming or O = other GNSS attack (by implemented consistency
checks according to GNS_3a),
V = Void (authenticated position is not available for any other reason).
The VU processor shall not use information extracted from the ASA
sentence.
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TRA_016 Appendix 12, 6 Position data processing and recording by the
VU, requirement GNS_39, shall be understood as:
Position data shall be stored in the VU, together with a flag indicating if
the position has been assumed as authenticated. When position data need
to be recorded in the VU, the following rule shall apply:
(a) If the standard position is valid, the standard position and its
accuracy shall be recorded in the VU and the flag shall be set to
‘authenticated’.
TRA_017 Appendix 12, 6 Position data processing and recording by the
VU, requirement GNS_40, shall be understood as:
When the value of the Status in a received AMC sentence is set to ‘J’ or
‘O’ in accordance with requirement GNS_4a, the VU shall generate and
record a GNSS anomaly event, as defined in requirement 88a of Annex IC
and Appendix 1 (EventFaultType), The vehicle unit may perform ad­
ditional checks before storing a GNSS anomaly event following the
reception of a ‘J’ or ‘O’ setting.
TRA_018 Appendix 12, 8 Vehicle motion conflict, requirement GNS_42,
Trigger condition 2, the first and second indents after the formula shall be
understood as:
— GnssDistance is the distance between the current position of the
vehicle and the previous one, both obtained from valid standard
position messages, without considering the height,
— OdometerDifference is the difference between the current odometer
value and the odometer value corresponding to the previous valid
standard position message.
TRA_019 Appendix 14, 5.4.5 DSRC Protocol requirements for
RTMElements of RtmData, actions performed and definitions, requirement
DSC_41, Table 14.3, second cell in the RTM20 row, shall be understood
as:
The VU shall generate an integer value (timeReal from Appendix 1) for
data element RTM20.
The VU shall set the value of RTM20 to the time at which the latest
standard vehicle position was available from the GNSS receiver.
If no standard vehicle position was available ever from the GNSS receiver
the VU shall set the value of RTM20 to 0.
TRA_020 The manufacturer of a type approved transitional vehicle unit
shall inform the Commission of its software versions. The Commission
shall publish these software versions on a publicly available website.
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5. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR TYPE APPROVAL AND USE OF
TRANSITIONAL TACHOGRAPHS
TRA_021 Transitional vehicle units shall be type approved according to
the requirements of Annex IC and its Annexes 1 to 16, supplemented by
the provisions of this Appendix.
TRA_022 Type approval certificates of transitional vehicle units and tran­
sitional tachographs may only be requested until 31 December 2023 or the
Service Declaration date of OSNMA, whichever is the latest.
TRA_023 Transitional vehicle units may be fitted in vehicles registered
for the first time only until 31 May 2024 or 5 months after the Service
Declaration date of OSNMA, whichever is the latest.
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ANNEX II
APPROVAL MARK AND CERTIFICATE
I. APPROVAL MARK
1. The approval mark shall be made up of:
(a) a rectangle, within which shall be placed the letter ‘e’ followed by a
distinguishing number or letter for the country which has issued the
approval in accordance with the following conventional signs:
Belgium 6,
Bulgaria 34,
Czech Republic 8,
Denmark 18,
Germany 1,
Estonia 29,
Ireland 24,
Greece 23,
Spain 9,
France 2,
Croatia 25,
Italy 3,
Cyprus CY,
Latvia 32,
Lithuania 36,
Luxembourg 13,
Hungary 7,
Malta MT,
Netherlands 4,
Austria 12,
Poland 20,
Portugal 21,
Romania 19,
Slovenia 26,
Slovakia 27,
Finland 17,
Sweden 5,
United Kingdom 11,
and
▼M1
(b) an approval number corresponding to the number of the approval certifi­
cate drawn up for the prototype of the recording equipment or the record
sheet or the tachograph card, placed at any point within the immediate
proximity of that rectangle.
▼C1
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 613
2. The approval mark shall be shown on the descriptive plaque of each set of
equipment and on each record sheet and on each tachograph card. It must be
indelible and must always remain clearly legible.
3. The dimensions of the approval mark drawn below ( 1 ) are expressed in milli­
metres, these dimensions being minima. The ratios between the dimensions
must be maintained.
▼C1
( 1 ) These figures are shown for guidance only.
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 614
II. APPROVAL CERTIFICATE FOR ANALOGUE TACHOGRAPHS
A Member State which has granted approval shall issue the applicant with an
approval certificate, the model of which is given below. When informing other
Member States of approvals issued or, if the occasion should arise, withdrawn, a
Member State shall use copies of that certificate.
APPROVAL CERTIFICATE
Name of competent administration
Notification concerning ( 1 ):
— approval of a type of recording equipment
— withdrawal of approval of a type of recording equipment
— approval of a model record sheet
— withdrawal of approval of a model record sheet
Approval No:
...................................
1. Trade mark or name
2. Name of type or model
3. Name of manufacturer
4. Address of manufacturer
5. Submitted for approval on
6. Tested at
7. Date and number of the test(s)
8. Date of approval
9. Date of withdrawal of approval
10. Type or types of recording equipment in which sheet is designed to be used
11. Place
12. Date
13. Descriptive documents annexed
14. Remarks (including the position of seals if applicable)
(Signature)
▼C1
( 1 ) Delete items not applicable.
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 615
III. APPROVAL CERTIFICATE FOR DIGITAL TACHOGRAPHS
A Member State which has granted approval shall issue the applicant with an
approval certificate, the model of which is given below. When informing other
Member States of approvals issued or, if the occasion should arise, withdrawn, a
Member State shall use copies of that certificate.
APPROVAL CERTIFICATE FOR DIGITAL TACHOGRAPHS
Name of competent administration
Notification concerning ( 1 ):
□ approval of: □ withdrawal of approval of:
□ recording equipment model
□ recording equipment component ( 2 )
□ a driver's card
□ a workshop card
□ a company card
□ a controller's card
Approval No:
1. Manufacturing brand or trademark
2. Name of model
3. Name of manufacturer
4. Address of manufacturer
▼M1
5. Submitted for approval on
▼C1
6. Laboratory(-ies)
7. Date and number of test report
8. Date of approval
9. Date of withdrawal of approval
10. Model of recording equipment(s) with which the component is designed to
be used
11. Place
12. Date
13. Descriptive documents annexed
14. Remarks (including the position of seals if applicable)
(Signature)
▼C1
( 1 ) Tick the relevant boxes.
( 2 ) Specify the component dealt with in the notification.
02016R0799 — EN — 21.08.2023 — 003.002 — 616
IV. APPROVAL CERTIFICATE FOR SMART TACHOGRAPHS
A Member State which has granted approval shall issue the applicant with an
approval certificate, the model of which is given below. When informing other
Member States of approvals issued or, if the occasion should arise, withdrawn, a
Member State shall use copies of that certificate.
APPROVAL CERTIFICATE FOR SMART TACHOGRAPHS
Name of competent administration
Notification concerning ( 1 ):
□ approval of: □ withdrawal of approval of:
□ recording equipment model
□ recording equipment component ( 2 )
□ a driver's card
□ a workshop card
□ a company card
□ a controller's card
Approval No:
1. Manufacturing brand or trademark
2. Name of model
3. Name of manufacturer
4. Address of manufacturer
▼M1
5. Submitted for approval on
▼C1
6. (a) Test laboratory for functional certification
(b) Test laboratory for security certification
(c) Test laboratory for interoperability certification
7. (a) Date and number of functional certificate
(b) Date and number of security certificate
(c) Date and number of interoperability certificate
8. Date of approval
9. Date of withdrawal of approval
10. Model of recording equipment(s) with which the component is designed to
be used
11. Place
12. Date
13. Descriptive documents annexed
14. Remarks (including the position of seals if applicable)
(Signature)
▼C1
( 1 ) Tick the relevant boxes.
( 2 ) Specify the component dealt with in the notification.


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