THIRD SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 18403/91
by Anna EVAGOROU CHRISTOU
against Turkey
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) sitting on 24 August 1999 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrJ.-P. Costa,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrW. Fuhrmann,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrK. Traja, Judges,
MrF. Gölcüklü, ad hoc Judge,
withMrsS. Dollé, Section Registrar;
Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 7 June 1991 by Anna Evagorou Christou against Turkey and registered on 14 June 1991 under file no. 18403/91;
Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;
Having regard to the fact that no observations have been submitted by the respondent Government in the time-limit fixed for that purpose;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Cypriot citizen born in 1925 and residing in Nicosia.
Before the Court she is represented by Mr Achilleas Demetriades a lawyer practising in Nicosia.
The facts of the case as they have been submitted by the applicant can be summarised as follows:
The applicant lived with her family in Kalogrea, a village in the District of Kyrenia. During the invasion in 1974, the Turkish military troops evicted the applicant and her family from their home, forced them to leave Kyrenia and flee to the south. Since 1974 both Kyrenia and Kallogrea are under Turkish military occupation.
The applicant has been prevented from returning to her home and property because the Turkish military authorities have continuously occupied and used them.
On 9 December 1990 the applicant made an attempt to return to her home and property in Kyrenia and the Kalogrea Village by participating in a convoy of cars of fellow refugees of the same area which is under Turkish occupation. The convoy of cars were advancing to their respective villages in the Turkish occupied part of Cyprus. The demonstration organisers had notified the Commander of the United Nations forces in Cyprus about their intention to return home during a peaceful march towards their villages.
The applicant and her fellow refugees stopped at the check point on the "buffer zone", on the main road which links Nicosia and Famagusta. There, the applicant and other refugees asked the United Nations Force officer on duty to be allowed to return to their homes, property and villages. They requested the same officer to transfer to the Turkish military authorities their demand to return to their homes. The officer announced to the applicant and her fellow refugees that the Turkish military authorities had rejected their request to drive through the check point and enter the Turkish controlled part of Cyprus.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant alleges violations of Articles 1, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
She complains that, since the invasion of the northern part of Cyprus in 1974, and in particular on 9 December 1990, when she was prevented from returning to her home and property, Turkey prevented her, because of her religion and national origin, from exercising her right to respect for her home and to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions.
PROCEDURE
The application was introduced on 7 June 1991 and registered on 14 June 1991.
On 29 November 1993, the European Commission of Human Rights decided to communicate the complaints under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the respondent Government and invited them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application before 18 March 1994.
On 16 March 1994, the Government requested the Commission to adjourn the proceedings until the Court completed its consideration of the case of Loizidou v. Turkey. On 8 April 1994 the Commission granted the request.
Following the Court’s judgment in the case of Loizidou (Eur. Court HR, Loizidou judgment of 18 December 1996 (merits), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI), the Commission examined, on 23 January 1997, the state of proceedings in the present application. It decided to invite the respondent Government to submit supplementary observations by 4 April 1997 and, in the light of the above-mentioned judgment, on Articles 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
On 18 April 1997, the Commission decided to suspend the request for the submission of supplementary observations by the Government until 5 September 1997. On 13 September 1997, it laid down a new time-limit for that purpose by 8 December 1997. At the request of the Government, the President of the Commission agreed to four extensions of that time-limit until 7 July 1998. On 30 November 1998, and after the expiry of the above-mentioned time-limit, the Government again requested a further extension. No observations were submitted.
On 1 November 1998, by operation of Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the case fell to be examined by the Court in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that since the invasion of the northern part of Cyprus in 1974, and in particular on 9 December 1990, when she was prevented from returning to her home and property, Turkey prevented her, because of her religion and national origin, from exercising her right to respect for her home and to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions in breach of Articles 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
Article 1 of the Convention creates a general obligation upon High Contracting Parties to respect human rights. Article 8 ensures respect for private and family life, the home and correspondence. Article 13 provides for an effective remedy before the national authorities. Article 14 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees property rights.
The Court notes that the respondent Government have not provided any observations on the admissibility of the case, although they have been given ample opportunity to do so. It must, therefore, be assumed that they do not contest the admissibility of the application.
The Court considers that the application raises serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits. It cannot, therefore, be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case.
S. DolléN. Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy