Application No. 11224/84
Terence EWING
against
the UNITED KINGDOM
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 6 October 1987)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION
(paras. 1 - 19) ...................................... 1 - 3
A. The application (paras. 2 - 6) ............... 1
B. The proceedings (paras. 7 - 14) .............. 1 - 2
C. The present Report (paras. 15 - 19) .......... 3
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
(paras. 20 - 94) ..................................... 4 - 13
A. Relevant domestic law and practice
(paras. 20 - 36) ............................. 4 - 7
a. The charge (para. 21) .................... 4
b. The committal for trial
(paras. 22 - 23) ......................... 4
c. The bill of indictment
(paras. 24 - 26) ......................... 5
d. The trial (paras. 27 - 29) ............... 5
e. Appeal to the Court of Appeal
(paras. 30 - 34) ......................... 6
f. Appeal to the House of Lords
(paras. 35 - 36) ......................... 6 - 7
B. The particular circumstances of the case
(paras. 37 - 94) ............................. 7 - 13
III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
(paras. 95 - 138) ..................................... 14 - 21
A. The applicant (paras. 95 - 116) .............. 14 - 17
a. Relevant domestic law and practice
(paras. 95 - 97) ......................... 14
b. The merits of the case
(paras. 98 - 116) ........................ 14 - 17
aa. General
(paras. 98 - 100) ................... 14 - 15
bb. The complexity of the case
(paras. 101 - 102) .................. 15
cc. The conduct of the applicant
(paras. 103 - 108) .................. 15 - 16
dd. The conduct of the judicial
authorities (paras. 109 - 116) ...... 16 - 17
B. The Government
(paras. 117 - 138) ........................... 17 - 21
a. General
(paras. 117 - 119) ....................... 17 - 18
b. The pre-trial period
(paras. 120 - 127) ....................... 18 - 19
c. The appeal period before the Court of Appeal
(paras. 128 - 134) ....................... 19 - 20
d. The appeal period before the House of Lords
(paras. 135 - 136) ....................... 21
e. The length of the proceedings as a whole
(paras. 137 - 138) ....................... 21
IV. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
(paras. 139 - 160) ................................... 22 - 26
A. Point at issue
(para. 139) .................................. 22
B. Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention
(paras. 140 - 141) ........................... 22
C. The length of the proceedings and the relevant
periods to be taken into account
(paras. 142 - 145) ........................... 22 - 23
D. The reasonableness of the length of
proceedings (paras. 146 - 159) ............... 23 - 26
a. The complexity of the case
(paras. 146 - 149) ....................... 23 - 24
b. The conduct of the parties
(paras. 150 - 159) ....................... 24 - 26
aa. The pre-trial period
(paras. 150 - 152) .............. 24 - 25
bb. The appeal period
(paras. 153 - 157) .............. 25 - 26
cc. The length of the proceedings as a
whole (paras. 158 - 159) ........ 26
E. Conclusion (para. 160) ....................... 26
APPENDIX I - History of the proceedings before the
Commission .................................... 27 - 28
APPENDIX II - Second decision on the admissibility of the
application ................................... 29 - 41
APPENDIX III - First decision on the admissibility of the
application ................................... 42 - 43
APPENDIX IV - Decision to re-open the examination of part of the
application ................................... 44 - 46
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the
European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the
Commission.
A. The application
2. The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen, born in 1952 and
living in London.
3. He is represented before the Commission by Mr. David M.
Greene, Solicitor, Messrs. Edwin Coe and Calder Woods, Solicitors,
London.
4. The Government of the United Kingdom are represented by their
Agents MM. Ian D. Hendry and Michael C. Wood, both of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office.
5. The applicant was arrested on 3 December 1979 and charged with
criminal offences on 5 December 1979. He was remanded in custody for
two weeks and then released on bail. He was finally arrested on 13
March 1980 and remanded in custody until his trial. He faced charges
for offences committed before 5 December 1979 and charges for offences
committed during the bail period. His trial lasted over a month and
resulted in his conviction on 20 May 1981 for 24 offences and a total
sentence of seven years' imprisonment. Appeal proceedings up to the
House of Lords terminated on 24 October 1983 with the dismissal of his
petition for leave to appeal, although in the meantime the Court of
Appeal had reduced the applicant's sentence to a total of 5 years'
imprisonment. The applicant was therefore released from prison on 12
August 1983, before the House of Lords' decision.
6. The applicant complains to the Commission of the length of the
proceedings as a whole (5 December 1979 to 24 October 1983), as well
as the length of proceedings prior to his trial and on appeal. He
claims to be a victim of a breach of the reasonable time requirement
laid down in Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
B. The proceedings
7. The application was introduced on 9 September 1983 and
registered on 26 October 1984. It concerned various complaints about
the criminal proceedings described above, including the complaint
relating to the length of criminal proceedings, both as a whole and at
each jurisdictional stage.
8. On 15 March 1985 the Commission declared the whole application
inadmissible. By letter of 12 June 1985 the applicant drew the
Commission's attention to the fact that the Commission's rejection of
the length complaint for non-observance of the six months' rule was
based on facts which were shown to be untrue. Therefore, on
18 October 1985 the Commission decided to re-open its proceedings
concerning that part of the application relating to the length of the
criminal proceedings in question. It also decided to invite the
applicant to re-submit an application form and certain essential
documents.
9. On 12 December 1985 the Commission decided to give notice of
the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 42
para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure and to invite them to present
before 27 March 1986 their observations in writing on the admissibility
and merits of the application. These observations were submitted on
24 March 1986, to which the applicant replied on 9 April 1986 in
person, and on 2 July 1986 through his legal representative. The
applicant had been granted legal aid by the Commission on 16 May 1986.
10. On 3 December 1986 the Commission declared the application
admissible, limited to the issue of length of proceedings under
Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
11. On 7 March 1987 the Commission decided to hold a hearing of
the parties on the merits of the case. This hearing was held on
6 May 1987. The applicant attended, represented by Mr. D.M. Greene,
Solicitor, and Ms. J. Eales, Adviser. The Government were represented
by Mr. M.C. Wood, Agent, the Rt. Hon. Sir Patrick Mayhew QC, MP, then
Solicitor General, Counsel, Mr. T.F.H. Cassel, Counsel, Miss E.S.
Wilmshurst, Law Officers' Department, Adviser, Mr. C.M.L. Osborne,
Home Office, Adviser, and Mr. M. McKenzie, Criminal Appeal Office,
Adviser.
12. On 26 June 1987 the applicant submitted supplementary written
observations on the merits of the case, upon which the Government made
no written comments in reply.
13. On 6 October 1987 the Commission considered the merits of the
application and took their final votes on the case. On the same date
the Commission adopted the text of the Report.
14. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in
accordance with Article 28 para. b of the Convention, placed itself
at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly
settlement of the case. In the light of the parties' reaction, the
Commission now finds that there is no basis upon which a settlement
can be reached.
C. The present Report
15. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in
pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and
votes in plenary session, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD
J.A. FROWEIN
E. BUSUTTIL
B. KIERNAN
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
H. DANELIUS
G. BATLINER
H. VANDENBERGHE
Sir Basil HALL
16. The text of the Report was adopted by the Commission on
6 October 1987 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers
in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.
17. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of
the Convention, is
1) to establish the facts, and
2) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found
disclose a breach by the State concerned of its
obligations under the Convention.
18. A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before
the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's
second decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.
The Commission's first decision on admissibility forms Appendix III,
and its decision to re-open its examination of part of the application
forms Appendix IV.
19. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the
documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the
Commission.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Relevant domestic law and practice
20. In criminal proceedings for serious offences there may be up
to six procedural stages:
a. charging of the suspect by the police with an offence;
b. examination of the evidence by a magistrate and
committal for trial;
c. signing of the bill of indictment;
d. trial;
e. appeal against conviction or sentence, or both,
to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division);
f. appeal to the House of Lords on a certified point of
law of public importance.
a. The charge
----------
21. The investigation of a criminal case is ordinarily conducted by
the police in the United Kingdom, either on their own initiative or at
the instance of the prosecuting authorities. The charging of the
suspect with an offence is done by the police in culmination of the
investigatory process if they consider that sufficient evidence exists
to commence a prosecution.
b. The committal for trial
-----------------------
22. An examining magistrate considers the sufficiency of the
evidence before committing the suspect to the Crown Court for trial.
23. These proceedings are not part of the investigation. The
purpose of committal proceedings is to decide whether a prima facie
case has been made out against the accused. Committal proceedings are
a safeguard against the improper or unjustifiable committal of an
accused person to stand trial. The magistrate will examine the
evidence presented to him, will listen to any argument and will then
decide whether there is enough evidence on which a reasonable jury if
properly directed could find him guilty. If the magistrate finds the
evidence insufficient, he will discharge the accused person. (See also
point d., para. 27 below.)
c. The bill of indictment
----------------------
24. The bill of indictment (the formal document embodying the
charge or charges brought by the Crown against the accused person) is
drawn up from the committal papers by the Crown Court authorities.
25. Several charges may be joined in one indictment (Section 4
Indictments Act 1915), particularly where they concern the same facts
or a series of similar offences (Rule 9 Indictment Rules 1971). Where
the Crown Court judge orders, inter alia, that two or more offences
charged against that person be tried together, a voluntary bill of
indictment is made.
26. Where it is considered desirable to have separate trials for
any one or more offences charged in an indictment, the Crown Court may
so order (Section 5(3) Indictments Act 1915).
d. The trial
---------
27. It is an important discretionary judicial function of both
magistrates and trial judges to fix the respective dates of committal
proceedings and of the trial, and to deal with the parties'
applications for directions. In fixing dates the judicial authorities
are required to consider the representations made to them by both the
prosecution and the defence. A balance has to be struck between the
interests of the accused, whose liberty may be at stake, and that of
the efficient administration of justice and the avoidance of
unreasonable delays. All courts, including the Central Criminal Court
by which the applicant was tried, regularly review cases which are
awaiting trial in order to reduce protracted delays. If the judicial
authorities have doubts as to the merits of an application for an
adjournment it is proper for them to give the accused the benefit of
the doubt and ensure that sufficient time is allowed for the
preparation of the defence.
28. The prosecution or the defence may concede certain facts,
which admission will be taken as conclusive evidence of the point
(Section 10 (1) Criminal Justice Act 1967). The prosecution is
obliged to prove every material allegation beyond reasonable doubt.
The defence are entitled to put the prosecution to strict proof of
purported evidence and to object to the admissibility of evidence.
However, it is common for facts which cannot be seriously disputed to
be conceded by the defence, thus avoiding the necessity of oral
evidence on them. Use of this procedure results in considerable
savings in both time and money.
29. Proceedings before the Central Criminal Court, where the
applicant was tried, are marginally longer than elsewhere, because it
hears the more serious, complex cases. In 1980/81 the period from
remand to trial was normally about a year.
e. Appeal to the Court of Appeal
-----------------------------
30. Appeal against conviction or sentence, or both, lies to the
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The accused may appeal as of
right on a point of law, but only with the leave of the Court of
Appeal on other matters. Whether to grant leave to appeal is usually
decided by a single judge where any element of fact is involved. He
considers the grounds of appeal drafted by Counsel for the appellant,
together with any transcript from the shorthand notes of relevant parts
of the trial that may be put before him.
31. As to this, Counsel for the appellant has the responsibility
of informing the Criminal Appeal Office as to which parts of the trial
proceedings he wants transcribed for the purposes of the appeal. In
order to reduce time and cost, particularly in a case like the
applicant's where the trial lasted some 22 working days, only those
parts of the trial shorthand notes which are relevant to the grounds
of appeal will be ordered to be transcribed by the Criminal Appeal
Office. Counsel will then be supplied with the transcript and be given
an opportunity to finalise the appellant's grounds of appeal. Until
Counsel does this, the papers cannot be placed before the single judge
for his decision and the case cannot proceed to a hearing before the
Full Court of Appeal. The single judge's decision whether to grant
leave or not is usually made without hearing oral argument. An
appellant may apply to the Full Court against any decision of the
single judge.
32. The appeal courts perform the same discretionary judicial
function as the lower courts in fixing hearing dates (see point d,
para. 27 above).
33. If the Full Court of Appeal, made up of three judges,
dismisses an appeal, the appellant (or the prosecution) may request
the court to certify that the case involves a point of law of general
public importance and to grant leave to appeal to the House of Lords.
If this question cannot be decided immediately the matter must be
adjourned until it is possible to reassemble the same judges. The
Court of Appeal may issue such a certificate, but nevertheless refuse
leave to appeal to the House of Lords.
34. Proceedings before the Court of Appeal in 1980/81 normally
took about a year, the Court of Appeal having received 6097 leave to
appeal applications in 1981. Appeals may be expedited if the prisoner
would complete his sentence before the appeal hearing.
f. Appeal to the House of Lords
----------------------------
35. An appeal lies to the House of Lords against certain decisions
of the Court of Appeal. The appeal is available to both parties to
the proceedings provided that the Court of Appeal has certified that
the case involves a point of law of public importance and either the
leave of the Court of Appeal has been given or the House of Lords
itself grants leave.
36. Applications for leave to appeal to the House of Lords are
made by way of a petition, which must be lodged within 14 days of the
refusal of leave by the court below, although an application may be
made by a defendant to extend that time limit when the petition is
lodged out of time. The petition is then referred to an Appeal
Committee, which will consider whether it is fit for an oral hearing.
Where a petition is not considered fit, the Clerk of the Parliaments
will notify the parties of its dismissal.
B. The particular circumstances of the case
37. On 3 December 1979¹ the applicant was arrested and two days
later was charged with procuring the execution of a valuable security
by deception and with obtaining property by deception (hereafter
referred to as Case A). These offences had allegedly been committed
in October 1979. He was remanded in custody by a magistrate and
released on bail on 19 December.
38. On 13 March 1980 the applicant was again arrested and charged
on 19 March with five counts of forgery, five counts of uttering a
forged document and five counts of theft (hereafter referred to as
Case B). These offences were allegedly committed during the bail
period. He was remanded in custody on 20 March until his trial.
39. The applicant was subsequently charged with three counts of
forgery, two counts of uttering a forged document and three counts of
theft, offences allegedly committed between June 1979 and January 1980
(hereafter referred to as Case C).
40. The offences charged arose out of separate incidents involving
the theft and forgery of cheques and investigations by two police
forces.
41. On 10 April 1980 the applicant was committed for trial by the
Mansion House Justices to the Central Criminal Court in respect of
Case A. On 13 June 1980 he was committed for trial by the Highbury
Corner Magistrates' Court to the Inner London Crown Court in respect
of Case B.
42. On 7 July 1980 the indictment in Case A was preferred. On
6 August and 9 September 1980 the applicant made successful
applications to change his solicitors in this case.
43. On 19 September 1980 the Inner London Crown Court ordered the
hearing in Case B to be listed for the week commencing 24 November
1980.
________________
¹ Since the Commission's decision on admissibility (Appendix II hereto,
p. 39), the parties have now agreed that the applicant was arrested on
3 December 1979 and not 5 December 1979, as stated in the decision.
In his supplementary written observations on the merits (26.6.87) the
applicant included a chronology of events with which the Government
had no disagreement, and which gave 3 December 1979 as the arrest date.
44. On 5 November 1980 the applicant instructed his solicitors to
delay the hearing of Case A at their discretion.
45. The next day the defence applied to the Inner London Crown
Court for an adjournment of the proposed hearing in Case B fixed for
24 November 1980, as more time was required to obtain handwriting
evidence. The application was granted and the prison authorities were
instructed to prepare a medical report on the applicant. The hearing
date was fixed for 5 January 1981 after the judge had expressed his
concern about the adjournment because of the applicant's remand in
custody.
46. On 10 November 1980 the defence requested an independent
psychiatric report in the context of Case A. On 25 November the trial
date in this case was fixed for 9 February 1981.
47. On 28 November 1980 Case B was transferred to the Central
Criminal Court.
48. The applicant was committed for trial by the Highbury Corner
Magistrates' Court to the Central Criminal Court in respect of Case C
on 4 December 1980.
49. On 17 December 1980 the Central Criminal Court contacted the
parties by telephone to confirm the hearing date in Case B for
5 January 1981. Two days later the prosecution successfully applied
for an adjournment and the hearing date was then fixed for 6 April
1981. The defence also made an application for second Counsel to hold
a "noting brief". On 29 December 1980 the defence applied for the
appointment of a handwriting expert in this case.
50. On 5 January 1981 the Central Criminal Court confirmed with
both parties that Case C would be listed for hearing with Case B on
6 April 1981.
51. On 9 January 1981 the defence applied for the appointment of a
handwriting expert in Case A also.
52. On 19 January 1981 the defence requested medical reports on
the applicant in respect of Case B.
53. On 2 February 1981 the Central Criminal Court fixed the
hearing date in Case A for 6 April 1981 (along with Cases B and C).
All parties agreed on the change of fixture and that the Metropolitan
Police solicitor should take over the whole prosecution.
54. On 10 February 1981 Mr. Justice Russell gave the prosecution
leave to prefer a voluntary bill of indictment to amalgamate the three
indictments into one, because the offences charged were of a similar
kind and criminal pattern, and it was deemed desirable in the interests
of justice, and the economy of time and expense, to hold a joint trial
before the same court. The resultant indictment contained 25 counts,
relating to eleven different sets of circumstances, but only three
criminal offences, namely theft, forgery and uttering a forged
document. The applicant was given notice of the voluntary bill of
indictment on 19 February.
55. On 13 March 1981 the defence applied for legal aid for second
Counsel to hold a full brief, the prosecution having instructed a
Leading Junior Counsel. The application was granted on 27 March 1981.
56. The applicant's trial opened on 6 April 1981 and closed on
20 May 1981 with his conviction on 24 out of the 25 counts. It lasted
22 working days. The first eight days of the trial were occupied with
legal submissions (voir dire). The Court adjourned for Easter on
15 April, the trial resuming on 22 April when the jury was sworn. The
prosecution case lasted 14 working days and finished on 13 May. During
that time the jury went out on 27 occasions whilst submissions in law
were made to the judge. The applicant had instructed his solicitors
that no admissions whatsoever were to be made under Section 10 of the
Criminal Justice Act 1967 and that the prosecution were to be put to
strict proof of every ingredient of every single count. For Case A
there were 12 witnesses and 17 exhibits; for Case B, 31 witneses and
50 exhibits; for Case C, 21 witnesses and 21 exhibits.
57. On 22 April 1981, 16 days after the opening of the case, on
the day the jury was empanelled, the applicant's Counsel applied to
the trial judge to release the case for trial by another judge, on the
ground that he was prejudiced. The applicant also applied for
severance of the indictment with an order for five separate trials.
These applications were refused.
58. After the normal submissions at the end of the prosecution
case, the applicant did not give evidence, but made a statement from
the dock. The judge's summing up lasted just over a day. The jury
took 4 hours and 15 minutes to reach their verdict as to the
applicant's guilt.
59. On conviction, the applicant was sentenced to a total of seven
years' imprisonment, and ordered to pay compensation of £11,701.85p
and to make a contribution of up to £5,000 towards prosecution costs.
60. The applicant lodged his Notice of Appeal against conviction
and sentence with the Criminal Appeal Office on 17 June 1981. The
grounds of appeal against conviction, settled by Counsel, contained
29 separate allegations of errors of law made by the trial judge.
61. On 18 June 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office requested the trial
documents from the Central Criminal Court.
62. On 24 June 1981 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal,
inter alia, to deal with his appeal urgently.
63. On 30 June 1981 the trial documents were received from the
Central Criminal Court, but found to be incomplete.
64. On 1 July 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office replied to the
applicant's request of 24 June 1981 that his appeal had to await the
transcription of the relevant parts of the trial. The Criminal Appeal
Office also requested the missing documents from the Central Criminal
Court.
65. On 7 July 1981 the applicant wrote to the Criminal Appeal
Office drawing their attention to relevant parts of the Criminal
Appeal Act 1968 in respect of his appeal.
66. On 23 July 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office received the
documents requested from the Central Criminal Court. The next day the
Assistant Registrar of the Criminal Appeal Office wrote to Defence
Counsel asking him to specify which parts of the trial proceedings he
wished to have transcribed. The Office also replied to the
applicant's letter of 7 July 1981.
67. On 30 July 1981 Defence Counsel replied to the Assistant
Registrar's inquiry, but his letter was not received by the lawyer
dealing with the case in the Criminal Appeal Office until early
September because the letter omitted the case reference number.
68. On 5 August 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office requested a reply
from Counsel to their letter of 24 July. The next day they received
an inquiry from the applicant as to whether the relevant transcript
had been ordered and whether it was to include the judge's summing up,
to which inquiry the Office replied that the transcript had not yet
been ordered because Defence Counsel's reply was awaited.
69. On 12 August 1981 the applicant's solicitors requested that
the single judge grant legal aid for two Counsel.
70. On or about 10 September 1981 Defence Counsel's letter of
30 July 1981 was received by the case lawyer in the Criminal Appeal
Office, which on 24 September wrote to Counsel asking him to
reconsider his transcript requirements.
71. On 6 October 1981 the Assistant Registrar ordered part of the
transcript from the shorthand writers, i.e. the list of witnesses, the
judge's summing up and the proceedings after the verdict had been
given.
72. On 18 October 1981 Counsel sent a holding reply (an
acknowledgement) to the Criminal Appeal Office's letter of
24 September.
73. On 27 October 1981 the Assistant Registrar wrote to Defence
Counsel expressing concern over the fact that the applicant had been
convicted 5 months before and the need to submit the applicant's leave
to appeal application to a single judge of the Court of Appeal as soon
as possible. He requested Counsel to deal urgently with the question
of his transcript requirements and informed him of the partial
transcript already ordered on 6 October.
74. On 31 October 1981 Defence Counsel replied about the
transcript.
75. On 3 November 1981 the applicant wrote to the Criminal Appeal
Office about the progress of his case and the question of legal aid.
76. On 12 November 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office received
Prosecuting Counsel's transcript requirements.
77. On 1 December 1981 the applicant again wrote to the Criminal
Appeal Office asking, inter alia, if the appeal would now proceed.
78. On 9 December 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office wrote to
Defence Counsel enclosing a copy of Prosecuting Counsel's letter of
12 November. In the former letter, Defence Counsel was informed of
the Office's several unsuccessful attempts to contact him and he was
asked to contact the Office as soon as possible. A further pressing
reminder was sent to Defence Counsel on 15 December, followed by a
letter dated 8 January 1982 warning that, unless he clarified his
transcript requirements before 15 January, the case would go before
the Court in its present state. Counsel replied on 12 January 1982.
79. In the meantime the applicant had again written to the
Criminal Appeal Office on 22 December 1981 asking about the progress
of the transcript and for information concerning his Counsel.
80. On 15 January 1982 the Criminal Appeal Office ordered a
further transcript. However, as it later transpired, the order was
partly defective because the principal evidence of two witnesses was
requested, whereas what was required was a transcript of those
witnesses' evidence during the preliminary voir dire proceedings.
81. On 5 March 1982 the Criminal Appeal Office forwarded the
transcript to Defence Counsel, to which he replied on 16 March that it
was partly defective. The next day the Criminal Appeal Office ordered
the correct transcript to be provided no later than 7 April. In fact
it was received on 29 March 1982 and forwarded on 30 March to Defence
Counsel with the request that he finalise his grounds of appeal.
82. On 6 April 1982 the Criminal Appeal Office contacted Defence
Counsel as to when the finalised grounds of appeal might be expected,
and were told to expect them by 27 April. Defence Counsel was
reminded by the Office on 28 April 1982 and he sent the perfected
grounds of appeal on 4 May 1982.
83. On 5 May 1982 the Assistant Registrar granted legal aid for
one Defence Counsel for the submission of the applicant's case
directly to the Full Court, thus avoiding the single judge stage. The
case papers were then referred to the case lawyer in the Criminal
Appeal Office for a summary of them to be made for the members of the
Court.
84. On 11 May 1982 the applicant wrote to the Criminal Appeal
Office about the progress of his case and followed this with a letter
dated 21 June 1982 about the legal aid order and asking the Registrar
to instruct Counsel.
85. On 7 July 1982 the Assistant Registrar signed the legal aid
order.
86. On 30 July 1982 the applicant was informed by the Criminal
Appeal Office that his appeal would be heard on 21 October 1982 and
Defence Counsel was asked to provide his estimate of the length of the
appeal hearing.
87. On 24 September 1982 Defence Counsel's estimate that the
case would take one-and-a-half to two days was received by the
Criminal Appeal Office. The case had, however, been listed on the
basis that it would only take one day and, as the Court was to be
differently constituted on 22 October, the case could not be allowed
to overrun. Lord Justice Lawton directed that a new hearing date be
fixed. This was done on 1 October 1982, with the hearing date fixed for
16 and 17 December 1982.
88. The applicant's appeal was heard during four whole days,
between 16 and 21 December 1982. The Court allowed the appeal against
conviction on three counts in the indictment and quashed those
convictions. The total sentence of imprisonment was reduced from
seven to five years. Judgment was reserved until a later date.
89. On 29 and 30 December 1982 the applicant wrote to the Criminal
Appeal Office requesting information and leave to appeal to the House
of Lords respectively. He sent a reminder on 10 January 1983 and
received a reply dated 20 January. He again wrote on 7 February 1983
enquiring about the progress in his case, to which the Criminal
Appeal Office replied on 17 February that the Court of Appeal would
deliver its judgment on 11 March 1983.
90. When judgment (consisting of 41 pages) was given on 11 March
1983 Defence Counsel reserved his position in relation to the
possibility of applying to the Court of Appeal to certify that a point
of law of general public importance was raised by the case. As Mr.
Justice Staughton had only returned to London to give the Court's
reasons and was not further available, the certificate question was
adjourned "to a date to be fixed some time at the beginning of next
term".
91. On 15 June 1983 the Criminal Appeal Office informed the
applicant that his application to certify a point of law would be
heard on 29 June, on which day the Court of Appeal issued such a
certificate, but refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords. The
point of law certified by the Court of Appeal concerned the
admissibility, under the Criminal Evidence Act 1965, of bank
statements prepared by a computer.
92. The applicant then lodged a direct petition for leave to
appeal in the Judicial Office of the House of Lords on 13 July 1983.
The petition was presented to the House on 18 July after the expiry of
the two clear days required by the relevant Practice Directions. The
petition was in fact lodged out of time, but the House extended the
time limit. Having been presented to the House, the petition was
referred to an Appeal Committee for a decision as to whether it should
receive an oral hearing.
93. On 10 October 1983 the Committee reported to the House that
the petition was fit for an oral hearing; and on 24 October the
petition was heard and dismissed. The report of the Appeal Committee
was agreed to by the House on the same day. The delay between the
date of presentation and the date of determination was largely caused
by the summer recess: the House rose on 28 July 1983 and judicial
business was resumed on 4 October 1983. During the recess the
applicant could have requested the matter to be expedited. However, he
did not do this for, having just been released from prison on
12 August 1983, he was then in the process of re-organising his life.
94. On 16 February 1984 the applicant requested the Home Office to
pay him compensation for the time taken to dispose of his criminal
case. This was refused on 31 August 1984.
III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. The applicant
a. Relevant domestic law and practice
----------------------------------
95. As regards his appeal to the Court of Appeal, the applicant
contends that, as his appeal related to points of law alone, it should
have been dealt with immediately by the Full Court of Appeal. However,
despite the consistent efforts of Defence Counsel to point this out to
the Criminal Appeal Office the latter continued to treat the appeal as
if it required the leave of the single judge.
96. The Registrar of Criminal Appeals and his Office have the
statutory obligation to deal with the administration of appeals and
the Registrar is empowered to make certain decisions of a judicial
nature including decisions as to whether legal aid should be granted
to appellants or not. Legal aid is available to appellants but it is
limited in its nature to accord with the limited work to be done for
an appeal. Accordingly legal aid is granted for Counsel only. By
Section 21 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 the Registrar has the
statutory duty to take all necessary steps for obtaining a hearing of
any appeal or application. The Registrar has the duty to ensure that
matters proceed as quickly as possible. In the case of the applicant
he remained in prison throughout the proceedings before the Court of
Appeal and therefore his ability to communicate was limited. The
Registrar and Defence Counsel are intended to be in constant contact
about various aspects arising during the course of the proceedings,
including the settlement of the transcript for the Court of Appeal
and, for instance, questions of whether a conference with Counsel is
necessary. The Registrar is the only person in direct contact with
Counsel and able to ensure that Counsel deals with matters
expeditiously. To this extent the Registrar acts as a solicitor would
do were legal aid extended for such representation.
97. The applicant contends that the Criminal Appeal Office failed
in its duties in his case.
b. The merits of the case
----------------------
aa. General
98. The applicant submits that the length of the criminal
proceedings against him from 5 December 1979 until 24 October 1983 (a
total of 3 years, 10 months and 19 days) contravened the reasonable
time requirement of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
99. In criminal cases the test of reasonable time should be
strict, particularly when the accused person is imprisoned. It is
widely accepted that there is an unacceptable delay in criminal
proceedings in England and Wales, compared with other jurisidictions,
such as that of Scotland which requires that the trials of persons
remanded in custody must come on within 110 days of committal.
100. The applicant points out that he had already been released
from prison, having served his sentence, by the time the final
decision of the House of Lords was given on 24 October 1983.
bb. The complexity of the case
101. As to the complexity of the case, the applicant relies on the
assessment of Lord Justice O'Connor in the Court of Appeal who said:
"The nature of the offences was very simple".
102. The 24 counts of which the applicant was convicted related to
only 11 different sets of circumstances and only three offences:
theft, forgery and uttering a forged document. It would have been
appropriate to have taken up specimen charges. As to the 29 grounds
of appeal, they related only to seven general areas of appeal.
cc. The conduct of the applicant
103. The applicant submits that his various applications in no way
delayed the proceedings, for there is no reason to assume that the
Central Criminal Court would have fixed earlier hearing dates if such
applications had not been made. In particular, the changes of
solicitors did not delay the hearing date in Case A and the authority
given on 5 November 1980 to the applicant's solicitors to delay Case A
if necessary was merely standard practice and did not in fact lead to
any prolongation of the proceedings.
104. The only conduct of the applicant which should be considered
is in relation to Case B where the defence applied for an adjournment
on 6 November 1980 to collect handwriting evidence. This caused a
delay of six weeks in Case B which should then have been heard on
5 January 1981. However the prosecution then applied for an
adjournment and the trial was postponed until April 1981. The
applicant, therefore, submits that in relation to Cases A and C his
conduct did not in any way interfere with the length of the period up
to the trial. In relation to Case B his conduct induced a six week
delay only.
105. During the whole appeal period the applicant was imprisoned
and it is alleged that his communications with his representatives
were restricted. With the legal aid limitations for Counsel only,
communications between the appellant in prison and Counsel tend
largely, as in this case, to go through the Criminal Appeal Office.
The appellant, as in this case, is able to exert only very limited
pressure on Counsel. His main method of trying to accelerate matters
is to pressure the Criminal Appeal Office, who in turn may pressure
Counsel by, for instance, fixing the hearing date. Counsel's delays
can only therefore be attributed to the failure of the Criminal Appeal
Office in its duties and not to the applicant. The applicant's
correspondence with the Criminal Appeal Office indicates his concern
that the appeal should be heard as soon as possible.
106. Defence Counsel cannot be held responsible for the six week
delay of the Criminal Appeal Office to ensure that the case lawyer
received his letter of 30 July 1981, merely because he had omitted an
appropriate reference. Defence counsel also denies responsibility for
the ordering of the wrong transcript in January 1982, and claims that
his requirements were clearly specified. The applicant concludes that
this latter delay, from 15 January 1982 until 29 March 1982, was
caused by the Criminal Appeal Office.
107. The applicant also criticises the practice of the Criminal
Appeal Office in fixing the appeal hearing date: The Registrar first
estimates how long the hearing will take and fixes a date. He then
asks Counsel to estimate the length of the hearing, and if Counsel
considers that it will take longer than the Registrar has estimated
the hearing is fixed for a later date. It is submitted that the time
wasted with this procedure cannot be deemed to be Counsel's
responsibility.
108. As regards the proceedings before the House of Lords the
applicant did not apply for an expedited hearing during the summer
vacation for he had just been released from prison in August 1983 and
was re-organising his life. However, the applicant challenges the
availability of such an application, for their Lordships sit in only
the very rarest of cases during the summer recess, at their
discretion. The Judicial Office apparently have confirmed to the
applicant that there has been no such sitting in the last four years.
dd. The conduct of the judicial authorities
109. The applicant contends that the conduct of the judicial
authorities in his case caused unreasonable delay in the proceedings.
110. As regards the period up to trial, the applicant submits that
the offences against him were not of such a serious nature as to
require a trial before the Central Criminal Court. Putting cases like
his before this Court only contributes to further delays in the
handling of the most serious trials.
111. The joining of the charges provoked unnecessary delays. In
particular, the adjournment of the hearing in Case B, fixed for
5 January 1981, was crucial in inducing the further delay until
6 April 1981, for all the charges were then held back until that
date. However, the three cases against him were entirely separate and
there was no reason why events in one case should have delayed the
others.
112. The applicant claims that the authorities took no action to
ensure a trial within a reasonable period even though the applicant
had been remanded in custody.
113. As regards the appeal proceedings, the applicant contends that
the Criminal Appeal Office mishandled them by failing, inter alia, to
put the appropriate pressure on Defence Counsel, by ordering the wrong
transcript, by refusing to accept at the outset the appellant's
contention that leave to appeal did not have to be obtained from the
single judge (because the appeal was on points of law only) and by
operating an inefficient method of estimating and fixing appeal
hearing dates.
114. He concludes that the delays in the appeal proceedings arose
only from the conduct of the judicial authorities and were wholly
unreasonable.
115. As to the House of Lords proceedings, the applicant points out
that his petition for leave was lodged only two days outside the
14 day time limit. It was then heard some three-and-a-half months
later, some two-and-a-half months after his release. This
three-and-a-half months' delay was unreasonable.
116. To sum up, the applicant submits that the length of the
proceedings as a whole, 3 years, 10 months and 19 days, was
unreasonable, particularly for someone in custody. Of that period the
only "contribution" the applicant made to the delay was a six week
adjournment prior to the trial, leaving a delay of 3 years and 9
months because of the Government's inaction for which no satisfactory
reasons have been given. Accordingly the applicant claims to have
suffered a breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
B. The Government
a. General
-------
117. The Government submit, for the reasons given by the Commission
in its decision on admissibility of 3 December 1986 (Appendix II,
pp. 39 - 40 below) that the period to be taken into consideration
began on 5 December 1979, when the applicant was first charged, and
ended on 24 October 1983, when the House of Lords refused his petition
for leave to appeal.
118. Pursuant to the approach adopted by the Court in the Eckle
judgment, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings for the
purposes of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention must be assessed in
the light of the particular circumstances of the individual case. In
particular, three factors must be taken into account: the complexity
of the case as a whole, the manner in which the case has been handled
by the national judicial authorities and the courts and the
applicant's own conduct (Eur. Court H.R., Eckle judgment of 15 July
1982, Series A No. 51, para. 80).
119. The Government contend that in the present case the total
period under consideration was reasonable. Such delays as occurred
were in large part caused by the conduct of the applicant himself or
of those representing him, and not by the conduct of the national
authorities. Indeed the judicial authorities were at pains to
curtail the delays which arose. Morever such delays which may be
attributable to the authorities themselves were not sufficiently
serious to involve a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
b. The pre-trial period (5 December 1979 - 6 April 1981)
-----------------------------------------------------
120. The voluntary bill of indictment was a necessary and classic
procedural step to join three groups of charges revealing a similar
pattern of criminal activity by the applicant. The prosecution
considered, and the highly experienced judge, Mr. Justice Russell,
agreed, that it was desirable in the interests of justice that the
same tribunal should determine all the issues involved and that a
joint trial would save time and avoid unnecessary expense. It would
be improper to view the progress in each individual case on its own,
for it was apparent during the individual preparation of the three
cases that they were developing a pattern of similarity and it was
foreseeable that at a particular point it would be necessary to ask
for a voluntary bill of indictment so that they might all be brought
together under one single indictment. This was not an appropriate
case for specimen charges to be taken up, given the difficulties
juries often experience in determining the facts of the matter in
fraud cases, and the need in the applicant's case to prove that he had
a system in his criminal activities. The prosecution may prove a
system by providing the facts of other cases of a similar character
bearing the same pattern.
121. It is not contended that the nature of the offences was
complex. However, the proliferation of the applicant's criminal
activities imposed considerable demands upon the investigating and
judicial authorities and resulted in 25 charges being laid against
him. Two police forces were involved and the events under
investigation took place over a considerable period (from June 1979 to
March 1980). The trial reflects the substantial and detailed nature
of the case: it lasted 22 days, including 8 days of legal argument.
It involved numerous witnesses and exhibits, the applicant insisting
on all of them being subject to strict proof, including the proof of
the origin of documents (as was his right).
122. The causes for delay at this stage were the applicant's own
requirements for time to prepare his defence and the continued
necessity for investigations by the police and prosecuting authorities
of fresh offences committed by the applicant after his first arrest
and remand in custody in December 1979.
123. The Government contend that the applicant was not ready for
trial in Cases A and B in late 1980 and early 1981, given his
application on 6 November 1980 for a later hearing date in Case B, his
letter of authority of 5 November 1980 to his solicitors to delay
Case A, his application on 19 December 1980 for handwriting expertise
in Case B, followed by a similar application in Case A on 9 January
1981, and his application on 19 January 1981 for medical reports in
Case B. Thus on 2 February 1981, with the applicant's agreement, the
cases were ordered to be heard together on 6 April 1981, which was the
actual date on which the trial began.
124. In all these applications the applicant was, of course,
exercising his rights. However, he cannot complain about delays which
arose from his own applications.
125. Nearly the whole of the period from 13 June 1980 to
10 February 1981 was required by the applicant in order to prepare his
defence and this period was also used by the authorities to conduct
the third investigation and prosecution in Case C.
126. The period of two months which elapsed between the committal
of Case C for trial and the grant of the voluntary bill of indictment on
10 February 1981 is not unreasonable, in the Government's opinion,
particularly bearing in mind its similarity with Cases A and B, for
which a hearing day had been fixed for 6 April 1981 by consent.
127. Thus in respect of the three factors enunciated above
(para. 118), the Government submit that the pre-trial period clearly
discloses no breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
c. The appeal period before the Court of Appeal (17 June 1981 -
------------------------------------------------------------
29 June 1983)
-------------
128. The Government submit that the delays during the Court of
Appeal proceedings may be attributed to the applicant's Counsel who
was tardy in making clear which part of the transcript he wanted
transcribed and in finalising the applicant's grounds of appeal.
The facts of the case clearly show the efforts made by the Criminal
Appeal Office to accelerate matters. However, it was proper for that
Office to await the transcript requirements and the perfected grounds
of appeal rather than setting the hearing date earlier, otherwise the
applicant would have complained to the Commission of an unfair
hearing.
129. It was regrettable that it took the Court of Appeal Office six
weeks to ensure that Defence Counsel's letter of 30 July 1981 reached
the competent case lawyer, but that Office's reminder to Counsel on
5 August 1981 should have alerted him to the fact that his letter had
not been received. He did not, however, respond to the reminder.
Nevertheless, this incident involved only a six week delay in the
overall length of the proceedings. Similarly, the misunderstanding
of the Criminal Appeal Office concerning Defence Counsel's transcript
requirements, and the ordering of the wrong transcript, involved no
more than a 25 day delay in the proceedings.
130. The Criminal Appeal Office did not receive the finalised
grounds of appeal from Counsel until 4 May 1982, although the
supplementary transcript had been sent on 5 March 1982.
131. The single judge procedure was dispensed with in order to save
time in view of the delays which had occurred, although the Criminal
Appeal Office held the view that the case might well have been an
appeal in which matters of fact would fall to be considered, and
which, therefore, would normally have required leave to appeal from
the single judge first. This view is substantiated by an examination
of the perfected grounds of appeal. They confirm that the appeal
might well have related to matters of fact as well as law.
132. There were 29 grounds of appeal. Legal aid was granted on
5 May 1982, the signing of the legal aid order on 7 July 1982 being a
mere formality and having no incidence on the length of proceedings.
On 30 July 1982 Defence Counsel was informed that the hearing would be
held on 21 October 1982. However, Counsel did not indicate until
24 September 1982 that he thought the hearing would take longer than
a day. The Court of Appeal, as constituted for 21 October, could not
sit longer than one day on the case, so a new date had to be found.
133. Thus from 17 June 1981 until 5 May 1982 the facts show that
the Criminal Appeal Office was endeavouring to press Defence Counsel
to expedite matters. In the end, the authorities decided to cut short
the normal procedure (the single judge's leave) so that the case could
be brought on for hearing as soon as possible.
134. The Government submit that the next period from 5 May 1982
until 21 October 1982 did not involve an unreasonable delay, bearing
in mind, in particular, that a full summary of the case had to be
prepared for the use of the members of the Court. Nor was it
unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to delay giving its reasons for
dismissing the appeal on 21 December 1982, until 11 March 1983, in the
light of the length of the judgment (41 pages). Finally, the
Government contend that the delay until 29 June 1983 for deciding the
application to certify that the case raised a point of law of general
public importance was not unreasonable, given the fact that Counsel
had originally reserved his position on this matter, and the same
three judges had to be reassembled at a time that was consistent with
their other judicial commitments.
d. The appeal period before the House of Lords (13 July 1983 -
-----------------------------------------------------------
24 October 1983)
----------------
135. The Government state that the delay in this stage of the
proceedings was partly caused by the summer recess (cf. Eur. Court
H.R., Corigliano judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A No. 57,
para. 48). The Government also point out that the applicant himself
applied out of time and he could have also applied for an expedited
hearing during the summer recess. If such an application had been
made it would have been treated sympathetically, by the prosecution at
least. The applicant did not, however, make such an application.
136. The Government conclude, therefore, that this period also did
not amount to unreasonable delay, contrary to Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention.
e. The length of proceedings as a whole (5 December 1979 -
-------------------------------------------------------
24 October 1983)
----------------
137. The Government concede that every extra week that an accused
is left in a state of uncertainty as to his fate is to be regretted.
However, such delays as occurred were in large part the responsibility
of the applicant or those representing him.
138. The Government contend that no particular period of the
proceedings involved undue delay for which the national authorities
were responsible. It follows that the total period did not involve
such delay and that there was no infringement of the applicant's right
to a hearing within a reasonable time, ensured by Article 6 para. 1 of
the Convention.
IV. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Point at issue
139. The point at issue in the present application is whether there
has been a determination of the criminal charges against the applicant
within a reasonable time, as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention.
B. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention
140. The relevant part of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) provides as follows:
"In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law ..."
141. There is no dispute between the parties as to the
applicability of this provision in the present case. The Commission
must therefore first identify the periods which are to be taken into
account, and then it must evaluate the reasonableness of the duration
of the proceedings.
C. The length of the proceedings and the relevant periods to
be taken into account
142. The Commission established in its decision on admissibility of
3 December 1986, and it was subsequently agreed by the parties at the
hearing on the merits on 6 May 1987, that the periods under
consideration in the present case are as follows:
- as regards the proceedings as a whole, from 5 December 1979
until 24 October 1983 (three years, 10 months and 19 days);
- as regards the pre-trial period, from 5 December 1979 until
the first day of the applicant's trial on 6 April 1981
(one year, four months and one day);
- as regards the appeal period, from 17 June 1981 until
24 October 1983 (two years, four months and seven days).
(See decision on admissibility, Appendix II, pp. 39 - 40.)
143. However, the Commission notes that in the proceedings on the
merits the parties have since agreed that the applicant was arrested on
3 December 1979, not 5 December 1979, as it appeared at the time when
the Commission took the admissibility decision (see footnote to para. 37
above).
144. The Commission refers to the case-law of the Court as regards
the commencement of the period to be taken into account:
"In criminal matters the 'reasonable time' referred to in
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) begins to run as soon as a person is
'charged'; this may occur on a date prior to the case coming
before the trial court ..., such as the date of arrest, the
date when the person concerned was officially notified that he
would be prosecuted or the date when preliminary investigations
were opened ... 'Charge' for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
may be defined as 'the official notification given to an
individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he
has committed a criminal offence', a definition that also
corresponds to the test whether 'the situation of the
has been substantially affected'." (Eur. Court H.R.,
Eckle judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A No. 51, para. 73).
145. Applying these considerations to the present case, the
Commission finds that the criminal proceedings against the applicant
commenced on 3 December 1979 when he was arrested and when the police
must have informed him that he was suspected of having committed fraud
offences and that he risked a criminal prosecution. He was thus
"substantially affected" by this measure, which also deprived him of
his liberty for a short period at that stage. The length of the
proceedings as a whole and that of the pre-trial period are therefore
extended by two days as follows:
- as regards the proceedings as a whole, from 3 December 1979
until 24 October 1983 (three years, 10 months and 21 days);
- as regards the pre-trial period, from 3 December 1979 until
6 April 1981 (one year, four months and three days).
The appeal period is as previously established: from 17 June 1981 until
24 October 1983 (two years, four months and seven days).
D. The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
146. The Commission refers to its constant case-law and that of the
Court, summarised in the Eckle judgment:
"The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must be
assessed in each instance according to the particular
circumstances. In this exercise the
regard to, among other things, the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicants and the conduct of the judicial
authorities." (Eur. Court H.R., Eckle judgment of 15 July 1982,
Series A No. 51, para. 80).
a. The complexity of the case
--------------------------
147. The Commission notes the parties' agreement that the criminal
proceedings in this case did not involve complex issues of law and
fact. However, the applicant draws from that the conclusion that the
proceedings were simple, whereas the Government contend that the
proceedings were nevertheless substantial and detailed.
148. The Commission has examined the facts of the case and finds
that the proceedings were indeed substantial and detailed. They
involved, inter alia,
- 25 offences of fraud, allegedly committed over a 10 month
period (June 1979 to March 1980);
- 11 different sets of factual circumstances;
- investigations by two different police forces;
- 64 witnesses and 88 exhibits at the 22 day trial, eight days
of which were taken up by legal arguments alone;
- 29 grounds of appeal before the Court of Appeal covering
seven general areas of complaint;
- a certifiable point of law of general public importance for an
appeal to the House of Lords.
149. In these circumstances, the Commission concludes that the
proceedings against the applicant were complex and would have required
careful preparation by both the prosecution and the defence.
b. The conduct of the parties
--------------------------
aa. The pre-trial period
150. The applicant's principal criticism of the handling of the
proceedings by the judicial authorities at the pre-trial stage
concerns the delays caused by the amalgamation of the three different
sets of proceedings against him with one voluntary bill of indictment
and a joint trial. The Government contend that this measure was
necessary, particularly in view of the fraudulent nature of the
offences, because the prosecution wished to prove that the applicant
had established a system. To do this it was essential to group the
offences which showed a similar pattern of criminal activity by the
applicant.
151. The Commission considers that the joining of the three cases
against the applicant has not been shown to be arbitrary or
unreasonable or to have caused undue delay, account being taken of the
need to ensure the efficient administration of justice. Moreover, the
Commission notes that in late 1980 and early 1981 the applicant was
not ready to proceed with the trial of Cases A and B as is shown by
the following applications to the Court in these cases:-
i) his application on 6 November 1980 for an adjournment of Case
B to enable expert evidence as to handwriting to be obtained,
ii) his application on 29 December 1980 for the appointment in
Case B of a handwriting expert,
iii) his application in Case B on 19 January 1981 for medical reports,
iv) his application on 9 January 1981 in Case A for the
appointment of a handwriting expert.
It does not appear to the Commission that at the material time
the applicant was prejudiced by the postponement of the joint trial
until 6 April 1981, as he required time to prepare his defence fully,
as was his right.
152. In these circumstances, the Commission concludes that the
pre-trial period from the applicant's arrest on 3 December 1979 until
the commencement of his trial on 6 April 1981 (one year, four months
and three days) did not amount to an unreasonable length of time.
bb. The appeal period
153. The applicant submits that the Criminal Appeal Office
mishandled his appeal to the Court of Appeal and failed in its
statutory duty to ensure that his appeal hearing was dealt with
expeditiously. The Government deny the responsibility of the Criminal
Appeal Office for the delays, which they attribute largely to the
conduct of Defence Counsel. The applicant disclaims responsibility
for Defence Counsel, because he alleges that his communications whilst
in prison were restricted, and he claims that it was not his duty but
that of the Criminal Appeal Office to put pressure on his Counsel.
154. The Commission has examined the facts of the case and finds
that there were a few mistakes made and misunderstandings between the
Criminal Appeal Office and Defence Counsel. However, although the
appeal proceedings were unusually long for such cases at the material
time, it cannot be said that the Criminal Appeal Office neglected the
applicant's appeal. It took frequent steps to ensure the progress of
the applicant's case, which involved the preparation of a transcript
from the shorthand notes of a substantial part of a long trial, 29
grounds of appeal and a certifiable point of law of general public
importance.
155. The applicant has not substantiated his claim that whilst in
prison he was prevented from writing to his Counsel. The Criminal
Appeal Office had informed him of the progress of his case and some of
its difficulties with his Counsel. It is not clear, therefore, that
the applicant is discharged of all liability for the conduct of his
appeal by Counsel. Be that as it may, the Commission finds that the
Criminal Appeal Office did press Defence Counsel to expedite matters,
but on occasions their communications went unanswered. Whilst courts may have
some responsibilities under Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) to ensure
effective legal assistance for the accused, the Commission finds that the
Criminal Appeal Office acted with the necessary diligence in the present case
(cf. Eur. Court, H.R. Artico judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, para.
33).
156. As regards the appeal before the House of Lords, the Commission notes
that these proceedings took three months and eleven days. This period does not
seem unduly long, especially in view of the fact that it was interrupted by the
legal vacation (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Corigliano judgment of 10 December 1982,
Series A no. 57, para. 48). Moreover, the applicant could have applied for an
expedited hearing of his appeal if he had considered the matter urgent at that
stage.
157. In the light of the aforementioned circumstances, the Commission
concludes that the appeal period from the lodging of the appeal before the
Court of Appeal on 17 June 1981 until the dismissal of the applicant's appeal
to the House of Lords on 24 October 1983 (two years, four months and seven
days), although long, did not amount to an unreasonble length of time.
cc. The length of the proceedings as a whole
158. It appears that the length of the criminal proceedings in the present
case (three years, 10 months and 21 days), and in particular the length of the
appeal proceedings, was unusually long, the average length of criminal
proceedings up to the Court of Appeal being about two years at the material
time (see paras. 29 and 34 above).
159. However, an examination of the facts of this complex case reveals that
at no stage did the proceedings lie dormant. In general, the judicial
authorities conducted the case diligently and the applicant fully exercised his
rights to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence
and appeals. The Commission finds, therefore, that the overall length of the
criminal proceedings against the applicant was not unreasonable.
E. Conclusion
160. The Commission concludes by a unanimous vote that there has been no
violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, because the
criminal charges against the applicant were determined within a reasonable
time.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)
APPENDIX I
History of the proceedings before the Commission
Date Item
--------------------------------------------------------------------
9 September 1983 Introduction of application
26 October 1984 Registration of application
Examination of admissibility
15 March 1985 Commission's decision to declare application
inadmissible
12 June 1985 Information from applicant
18 October 1985 Commission's decision to re-open its
examination concerning that part of application
relating to the length of criminal proceedings
and to invite the applicant to re-submit an
application form and certain essential
documents
24 October 1985 Receipt of documents from applicant
12 December 1985 Commission's decision to give notice to the
respondent Government of the re-opened
application and to invite them to submit
written observations on admissibility and merits
24 March 1986 Submission of Government's observations
9 April 1986 Submission of applicant's observations in person
2 July 1986 Submission of applicant's observations by his
legal representative
3 December 1986 Commission's deliberations and decision to
declare application admissible
Appendix I
Examination of the merits
7 March 1987 Commission's decision to hold a hearing of
the parties on the merits of the case
6 May 1987 Hearing on the merits of the case and
Commission's deliberations
For the applicant
-----------------
Mr. Greene
Ms. Eales
The applicant in person
For the Government
------------------
Mr. Wood
Sir Patrick Mayhew
Mr. Cassel
Miss Wilmshurst
Mr. Osborne
Mr. McKenzie
26 June 1987 Submission of applicant's supplementary
written observations on the merits
** October 1987 Commission's further deliberations on the
merits, vote and adoption of the present
Report