FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 58761/00
by Eino Kalevi FASTA
against Finland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 24 August 2004 as a Chamber composed of:
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrS. Pavlovschi,
MrJ. Borrego Borrego,
MrsE. Fura-Sandström,
MsL. Mijović, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 26 June 2000,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Eino Fasta, is a Finnish national, who was born in 1927 and lives in Helsinki. He is represented before the Court by Mr Pertti Virolainen, a lawyer practising in Helsinki.
The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant and as they appear from the documents, may be summarised as follows.
1. Civil proceedings during which assets were seized
The applicant’s company and another company (“T”) were business partners. Following an application by the applicant’s company to that effect, T’s assets were seized by the Helsinki District Registry’s (maistraatti, magistraten) decision in 1989. T appealed. The seizures were upheld by the Helsinki Court of Appeal’s (hovioikeus, hovrätten) decision of 12 April 1990.
However, in separate civil proceedings, the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) of Helsinki, by its decision of 3 May 1990, lifted one of the seizures. By its judgment of 6 May 1991, the District Court ruled in favour of the applicant’s company, ordering T to pay compensation.
On 27 May 1992 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment and overturned the District Court’s decision of 3 May 1990, i.e. it ordered that T’s assets be seized.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused leave to appeal. The date of the decision is unspecified, but the decision was referred to in a judgment of 3 March 1997 by the District Court of Espoo.
2. Winding-up proceedings
Following an application of 3 October 1989 by a company (“TM”), owned by the owner of T, winding-up proceedings were instituted against the applicant’s company before the District Court of Helsinki. As TM did not pursue its application, the case was removed from the docket on 17 October 1989. This data allegedly remained in the credit information index.
The business of the applicant’s company dropped, allegedly due to the fact that winding-up proceedings had been instituted against it. Subsequently, on 15 February 1990, the applicant himself lodged an application with the District Court that his company be wound-up.
3. Compensation proceedings
On 15 June 1995 the applicant and others commenced an action for damages against two counsel, among others, who had represented T and TM in the above-mentioned proceedings.
By its judgment of 3 March 1997 the District Court of Espoo, having held several hearings and heard witnesses, rejected the action.
The applicant appealed. According to the Helsinki Court of Appeal’s judgment, he filed ten supplementary submissions during the period from 9 March 1998 to 28 June 1999. He also requested that the Court of Appeal hold an oral hearing. On 1 September 1999 the Court of Appeal, without an oral hearing, rejected the applicant’s appeal.
On 20 April 2000 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.
COMPLAINTS
1. In respect of the seizure, the applicant complains that the domestic legislation on seizure of a debtor’s assets failed to protect the applicant’s claims and about the fact that one of the seizures was lifted by the District Court although the Court of Appeal, upon appeal against the District Registry’s decision, had decided that it remain in force. As a result, the applicant has lost his property. He does not invoke any Article.
2. In respect of the winding-up proceedings, the applicant complains that the law is inadequate, as it is possible to institute winding-up proceedings with the sole purpose of causing harm to the debtor in question. As a result, the applicant has lost his property. He does not invoke any Article.
3. In respect of the compensation proceedings, the applicant complains that he was denied a fair trial in that the domestic courts did not pay adequate regard to the contents of the existing contracts between the applicant’s company and T. He also complains about the length of the proceedings and that the excessive length has prevented him from commencing an action against the respondent State due to the fact that the period of limitation on the right to bring an action has lapsed. He invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
THE LAW
A. Seizure and winding-up proceedings
The applicant complains about proceedings during which assets were seized and about winding-up proceedings. He lodged his application to the Court on 26 June 2000.
The Court recalls that Article 35 § 1 of the Convention provides that it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted and where it has been introduced within six months from the date of the final decision.
According to the file, the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal in the first-mentioned proceedings on a date unspecified but in any event before 3 March 1997 and thus, more than six months prior to 26 June 2000.
The winding-up proceedings were instituted before the District Court, which subsequently removed the case from the docket in 1989. The applicant, who basically challenges the relevant legislation as such, has not appealed against the decision to remove the case from the docket. The Court notes that the winding-up proceedings ended in 1989, whereas this complaint was raised on 26 June 2000.
It follows that these complaints have been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
B. Compensation proceedings
The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he was denied a fair trial within a reasonable time in the compensation proceedings.
Article 6 § 1 provides, in relevant part:
“ In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
1. The applicant alleges that he was denied a fair trial in that the domestic courts did not pay adequate regard to the contents of the existing contracts between the applicant and T.
The Court notes that it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them and to apply national law. Its task is not to examine whether the evidence was correctly assessed or whether the outcome of the proceedings was correct, but rather to ascertain whether the proceedings considered as a whole were fair. In light of the facts of the case and the material submitted by the applicant, the Court finds that the domestic courts did not exceed their margin of appreciation in assessing the evidence and examining the case before it. There is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. The applicant argues that the length of the compensation proceedings was excessive.
The Court considers that the period to be taken into consideration began on 15 June 1995, when the action was instituted before the District Court and ended on 20 April 2000, when the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. This amounts to a total length of four years, ten months and five days.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the criteria established by its case-law, particularly the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Kroenitz v. Poland, no. 77746/01, § 30, 25 February 2003).
As to the complexity of the case and the conduct of the authorities and the parties, the Court observes the following.
The applicant’s compensation claim against the two counsel was divided into and examined in three main parts. The claim was based on actions taken during the proceedings in which assets were seized, during the compensation proceedings and during the winding-up proceedings. The facts were to some extent inter-related.
It appears from the District Court judgment that it had repeatedly invited the applicant to supplement and particularise the claim. Due to his failure to do so, the case had been adjourned. The District Court held several hearings and heard over a dozen witnesses, but the case file does not disclose the dates or the number of the hearings. However, according to the District Court’s judgment, the hearings before that instance lasted over one hundred hours in total. The District Court’s judgment itself ran to 84 pages. Having regard to these facts, the Court concludes that the case was somewhat complex.
The case became pending before the District Court on 15 June 1995 and judgment was delivered on 3 March 1997. Thus, the District Court proceedings lasted one year, eight months and sixteen days. Having regard to the fact that the applicant had repeatedly been invited to supplement his submissions, which had resulted in adjournments, the Court does not find any significant period of inactivity attributable to the first instance court.
While considerable time - two and a half years – elapsed before the Court of Appeal, the Court observes that, according to the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the applicant filed ten supplementary submissions between 9 March 1998 and 28 June 1999. Those submissions were subsequently not taken into account as they had been filed after the time-limit for the appeal had elapsed. On 1 September 1999 the Court of Appeal, without an oral hearing, rejected the applicant’s appeal. The Court considers that the applicant, having filed a multitude of submissions after the time-limit for the appeal had elapsed, bore some responsibility for the length of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal.
The subsequent period of some seven months until, on 20 April 2000, the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal, is unexceptional.
Although, therefore, the impugned proceedings took four years ten months and five days, they involved no less than three judicial levels. The Court cannot detect any significant period of inactivity for which the authorities alone could be held responsible and does not find that the delay could warrant the conclusion that the procedure, seen as a whole, notwithstanding what was at stake, exceeded a reasonable time (see Kroenitz v. Poland, § 22, cited above).
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Michael O’BoyleNicolas BRATZA
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy