SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 14093/06
by Krisztina FELCSER
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on
25 May 2010 as a Chamber composed of:
Françoise Tulkens, President,
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub Popović,
András Sajó,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Kristina Pardalos,
Guido Raimondi, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 March 2006,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Ms Krisztina Felcser, is a Hungarian national who was born in 1972 and lives in Budapest. She was represented before the Court by Mr I. Maklári, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 8 June 2001 an action was brought with a view to evicting the applicant from her service flat. A first-instance decision, requiring the applicant to vacate the flat and the plaintiff to arrange for alternative accommodation, was adopted on 11 June 2003. Part of this judgment was quashed and remitted on 16 March 2004. The Buda Central District Court gave judgment on 2 December 2004. On 14 June 2005 the Budapest Regional Court reversed this decision and established the fee payable by the applicant for the past use of the flat. On 27 March 2006 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's petition for review.
In the meantime, the applicant filed a motion for execution against the plaintiff in respect of her claim for alternative accommodation. On 10 May and 22 September 2005 the District and the Regional Court respectively rejected this motion, observing that this claim was not enforceable until the applicant vacated the flat.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings. Moreover, she complained under Article 13 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 about the fact that she could not claim alternative accommodation before vacating the flat in litigation.
THE LAW
The applicant's first complaint related to the length of the proceedings, which began on 8 June 2001 and ended on 27 March 2006 with the decision of the Supreme Court. The proceedings therefore lasted four years, nine months and nineteen days, before three levels of jurisdiction.
According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings was in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government rejected the allegation. They also submitted that the Supreme Court review had not been an effective remedy in the circumstances and that, therefore, the application had been introduced outside the six-month time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, calculated from the date of the Regional Court's decision on
14 June 2005 which had been the final domestic decision in the case.
The Court considers that the Government's latter argument need not be examined since this complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons. The proceedings lasted less than four years and ten months before three levels of jurisdiction. In the absence of any particular period of inactivity imputable to the authorities, the Court is satisfied that the overall length did not exceed a “reasonable time”.
Moreover, as regards the applicant's submissions about the failure of her motion for execution, the Court observes that her complaint under Article 13 concerns an alleged lack of effective domestic remedies. The aim of Article 13 being one of procedures, not of results, the Court notes that this complaint is wholly unsubstantiated since two court instances dealt with the merits of the applicant's motion (Csánics v. Hungary, no. 12188/06, § 49, 20 January 2009). Lastly, the Court considers that the applicant's submissions do not disclose any appearance of a violation of her rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Françoise Elens-PassosFrançoise Tulkens
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy