Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 152
May 2012
Fernández Martínez v. Spain - 56030/07
Judgment 15.5.2012 [Section III]
Article 8
Article 8-1
Respect for private life
Refusal to renew teacher of Catholic religion and morals’ contract after he publicly revealed his position as a “married priest”: no violation
[This case was referred to the Grand Chamber on 24 September 2012]
Facts – The applicant is a secularised Catholic priest. In 1984 he applied to the Vatican for dispensation from the requirement of celibacy. He married the following year and he and his wife had five children. From 1991 he worked as a teacher of religion and morals at a State high school, his contract of employment being renewed annually on the basis of the opinion of the local bishop, which was binding on the Ministry of Education. In 1996 the applicant attended a meeting of the “Movement for Optional Celibacy”. The participants expressed their disagreement with the Church’s position on various matters, including abortion, divorce, sexuality and birth control. An article was published in a regional newspaper, together with a photograph of the applicant and his family. It mentioned the applicant’s name and reported a number of comments he had made. In 1997 the applicant was granted a dispensation from celibacy. His teaching contract was not renewed, on the ground that he had breached his duty to teach “without creating a risk of scandal” by publicising his status as a “married priest”. The applicant challenged that decision in the domestic courts, but to no avail. The Constitutional Court observed, in particular, that the diocese had been aware of his status as a “married priest” but had only stopped renewing his contract after the article was published – at the applicant’s own instigation – in the press.
Law – Article 8: The decision not to renew the applicant’s contract had affected his prospects of pursuing a professional activity and had had a consequential impact on his enjoyment of the right to respect for his private life. Article 8 was therefore applicable. The main question was accordingly whether, in discharging its positive obligations, the State was required to give precedence to the applicant’s right to respect for his private life over the right of the Catholic Church to refuse to renew his contract. Religious communities traditionally and universally existed in the form of organised structures, and where their organisation was at issue, Article 9 of the Convention was to be interpreted in the light of Article 11, which protected participation in associations from unjustified State interference. Under Spanish law, the concept of autonomy of religious communities was accompanied by the principle of State religious neutrality, which prevented the State from expressing a position on matters such as scandal or celibacy for priests. However, this obligation of neutrality was limited in that the bishop’s decision was subject to judicial review. The bishop could not put forward candidates who did not possess the professional qualifications required for the post and was also required to respect fundamental rights and freedoms. Furthermore, although the definition of the religious or moral criteria serving as a basis for not renewing a candidate’s contract was the exclusive prerogative of the religious authorities, the domestic courts could nevertheless weigh up the competing fundamental rights and also had jurisdiction to examine whether the decision not to appoint the candidate concerned had been based on any grounds other than strictly religious ones, those being the sole aspects protected by religious freedom. The applicant had had the opportunity to bring his case before the appropriate courts. Since the grounds on which he had not had his contract of employment renewed were of a strictly religious nature, the Court confined itself to ensuring that neither the fundamental principles of the domestic system nor the applicant’s dignity had been impaired.
In the present case, the publication of the article in question had led the bishop to consider that the requisite bond of trust had been breached. This bond necessarily entailed certain characteristics which set teachers of Catholic religion and morals apart from other teachers. In not renewing the applicant’s contract, the ecclesiastical authorities had simply been discharging their obligations in accordance with canon law and the principle of religious autonomy. On signing his contract, the applicant had been, or should have been, aware of the particular features of the employment relationship for a post of that nature. As a result, the Court considered that the applicant had been bound by duties of loyalty and observed in that connection that he had not left the meeting in question, even after noticing the presence of media representatives, and that he had been among those who had openly expressed their disagreement with Church policy on various matters. The appropriate courts had, moreover, shown on the basis of sufficiently detailed reasoning that such duties of loyalty were acceptable in that their purpose was to protect the sensitivities of the public and of the parents of pupils at the school. Furthermore, the duty of discretion and circumspection was all the more important because the direct beneficiaries of the applicant’s teaching were minor children, who were vulnerable and impressionable by nature. Regard being had to the State’s margin of appreciation, the appropriate courts had struck a fair balance between various private interests.
Conclusion: no violation (six votes to one).
(See Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy, 39128/05, 20 October 2009, Information Note 123; Obst v. Germany, 425/03, et Schüth v. Germany, 1620/03, 23 September 2010, Information Note 133; and Siedenhaar v. Germany, 18136/02, 3 February 2011)
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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