FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 31928/96
by F.F. and G.F.
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 17 January 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrG. Bonello,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrsS. Botoucharova,
MrV. Zagrebelsky,
MrsE. Steiner, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 5 December 1995 and registered on 17 June 1996,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are Italian nationals, born in 1943 and 1938, and living in Florence. They are represented before the Court by Mr L. Curradi, a lawyer practising in Florence.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicants are the owners of an apartment in Florence, which they had let to E.F.
In a writ served on the tenant on 2 November 1987, the applicants communicated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.
By a decision of 30 November 1987, which was made enforceable on 5 January 1988, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988.
On 20 May 1989, the applicants made a statutory declaration that they urgently required the premises as accommodation for themselves.
On 7 June 1989, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 22 June 1989, they served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 18 August 1989.
Between 18 August 1989 and 10 September 1998, the bailiff made twenty attempts to recover possession.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the enforcement proceedings were suspended.
The applicants have not recovered possession of their apartment.
THE LAW
The applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about their prolonged inability - through lack of police assistance - to recover possession of their apartment.
The applicants further complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
The Government argue that the arrangements for staggering the police assistance were an administrative issue, entirely separate from and independent of the judicial process and therefore outside the scope of Article 6.
The Court recalls that it has already held that Article 6 of the Convention is applicable to the tenants’ eviction proceedings (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 62-63, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This objection should therefore be rejected.
The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicants’ property rights was not disproportionate.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy