AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 22588/93
by Matti and Eliina FÖRSTI
against Finland
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 18 October 1995, the following members being present:
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS, President
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
G.B. REFFI
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
E. KONSTANTINOV
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 24 June 1993 by
Matti and Eliina Försti against Finland and registered on
7 September 1993 under file No. 22588/93;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are Finnish citizens residing in Espoo, Finland.
Matti Försti, hereinafter MF, a journalist by profession, was born in
1926 and Eliina Försti, hereinafter EF, the first applicant's wife, was
born in 1933.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be
summarised as follows.
A. The particular circumstances of the case
MF owns two pieces of real property in the municipality of Espoo,
namely Mattila 4:187 with an area of 803 m2 and Mattila I 4:185 with
an area of 93 m2 or 92 m2. On 25 November 1967 his title to the
property in question was registered. On the land there is a house in
which the applicants live and an outbuilding.
1. The present town plan and compulsory acquisition proceedings
It appears that in 1967, when the first applicant's title to the
relevant property was registered, the area in question was not subject
to any detailed plan but according to section 7 of the Building Act
(rakennuslaki), which came into force on 1 July 1959, new buildings
could not be constructed without permission.
A town plan for an area including the first applicant's real
property was drawn up in 1981. Appeals against the town plan were
finally dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein
hallinto-oikeus) on 22 December 1981.
According to section 42 subsection 1 of the Building Act, a new
building may not be constructed contrary to a town plan or plot
division (building restriction).
According to the relevant town plan, the area in question is a
block for residential multi-storey units with a maximum of three
storeys, the ratio of unit area to plot area being 0.55. The area
includes also recreation areas. The first applicant's property belongs
to block No. 40333, which, according to the plot division approved on
8 May 1984, forms one plot. On 11 January 1985 the plot was entered
in the directory of plots in the process of formation
(tontinmuodotusluettelo) as No. 1/40333.
However, since this plot consisted, and still consists, of parts
belonging to different owners, it could not be entered in the land
register (tonttirekisteri). The different owners are, inter alia, MF
and a housing association, V-S. The housing association V-S tried to
purchase the other parts of the plot. As this proved impossible, on
7 November 1985 V-S requested a compulsory purchase (lunastus) pursuant
to section 54 of the Building Act, which allows compulsory purchase in
certain circumstances. All the other owners of the parts of the plot
had an equal right to request a compulsory purchase.
On 20 January 1986 the Provincial Survey Office (maanmittaus-
toimisto) of Uusimaa gave an order on the execution of the compulsory
purchase. The order was signed by a county surveyor (lääninmaan-
mittausinsinööri) named L. Subsequently, a compulsory acquisition
committee (lunastustoimikunta), hereinafter "the committee" was
established to carry out the compulsory purchase proceedings. The chair
of the committee was an executive engineer (toimitusinsinööri) named H.
The compulsory purchase proceedings commenced on 9 April 1986.
Only V-S lodged a request to purchase the other parts of the plot. On
11 November 1986 the committee inspected the real property in question.
On 10 December 1986 the committee decided that V-S was, by virtue
of section 54 of the Building Act, entitled to purchase those parts of
plot No. 1/40333 which it did not already own, including the real
property owned by MF.
The payments for the compulsory purchase to the first applicant
MF were fixed at FIM 584,637 for Mattila and FIM 25,631 for Mattila I.
The second applicant was not mentioned in the committee's decision as
she is not the owner of the real property. The payments were ordered
to be made by 10 March 1987. However, as V-S did not make the payment
as provided, the compulsory purchase lapsed. After this the other
owners of the plot had a second opportunity to ask for a right to a
compulsory purchase.
Subsequently, on 24 May 1988 the committee rejected the second
applicant's claim for damages for the lapsed compulsory purchase
proceedings on the grounds that her claim was not directed at V-S,
which had applied for the compulsory purchase. On 6 April 1989 the Land
Court (maaoikeus) of Southern Finland rejected the second applicant's
appeal against the committee's decision concerning the claim for
damages. On 11 October 1989 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus) refused
her leave to appeal.
2. The building prohibition and the amendment of the town plan
According to section 42 subsection 2 point 2 of the Building Act
a building prohibition (rakennuskielto) applies to a plot that has not
been entered in the land register.
Since plot No. 1/40333, as mentioned above, still consists of
parts belonging to different owners it cannot be entered in the land
register. Because of this it is at present covered by a building
prohibition pursuant to section 42 subsection 2 point 2 of the Building
Act.
In 1991 a new planning process began in order to amend the town
plan relating to the relevant block. The City Board (kaupunginhallitus)
of Espoo decided on 25 October 1994 to keep the proposal for the town
plan amendment on public display. The purpose of the amendment is to
allow block No. 40333 to be divided into plots in a manner that would
reflect the current ownership situation. The process concerning this
amendment is still pending. A building prohibition also applies to an
area for which a town plan amendment has been approved until the
submission for ratification of this amendment has been considered
(section 42 subsection 2 point 4 of the Building Act).
3. Proceedings concerning claim for damages and offences in office
Regardless of the fact that no compulsory purchase of the first
applicant's property had taken place and of the fact that the second
applicant's claims for damages in this respect had been rejected
(cf. 1 above), in June 1990 the second applicant, EF, sued the county
surveyor L, who had given the order on execution of compulsory purchase
as well as the executive engineer H, who had been the chair of the
relevant committee, for damages. The claim, as specified during the
trial, was based on inconvenience, damage, mischief, unnecessary
packing and looking for a new residence which were allegedly caused by
the compulsory purchase proceedings.
The District Court (kihlakunnanoikeus) of Espoo heard the case
between 20 September 1990 and 31 January 1991. The District Court
consisted of a judge acting as the chair of the Court and of seven lay
judges. According to the District Court Lay Boards Act (laki kihla-
kunnanoikeuden lautakunnasta), as it stood until 1 December 1993, the
lay judges were to be appointed by the City Council (kaupunginval-
tuusto) for the same term as the City Council itself, i.e. for four
years. In the District Court of Espoo the lay judges were appointed by
the City Council of Espoo.
The second applicant, EF, appeared in person before the District
Court. On 20 September 1990 the District Court granted her legal aid
pursuant to the Act on Cost-free Legal Proceedings (laki maksuttomasta
oikeudenkäynnistä). However, the District Court found that she was
able, at least at that phase of the proceedings, to represent herself
without legal assistance and thus it did not ex officio appoint counsel
for her. The District Court decided to postpone the case to
29 November 1990 on the grounds that the applicant had asked for an
adjournment in order to instruct counsel herself. On 29 November 1990
there was another hearing, but the proceedings were adjourned on the
grounds of the late hour. The parties did not call any witnesses.
There was a further hearing on 31 January 1991. The second
applicant objected to the chair of the District Court. She stated that
the chair was biased on the grounds, inter alia, that he had on
6 November 1978, allegedly illegally, registered the City of Espoo's
title to the real property known as Armas 4:12, which lay in the
vicinity of the real property owned by the first applicant. The
registration of title to property does not confer ownership but raises
a presumption of ownership. The District Court dismissed her objection.
By judgment of 31 January 1991 the District Court rejected the
second applicant's claim for damages.
The second applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus)
of Helsinki. She stated, inter alia, that a compulsory purchase permit
granted by the Ministry of the Environment (ympäristöministeriö) would
have been necessary for the compulsory purchase. She requested an oral
hearing and an order concerning free legal assistance. She alleged that
her claim had not been dealt with, she had been interrupted and the
evidence of her witnesses had not been heard. She maintained further
that the District Court had wrongly stated that it had been she who had
asked for an adjournment, although she had declared that she was ready
for the case to be decided in her first written submission.
In her appeal to the Court of Appeal the second applicant also
submitted that two judges in the Land Court and the judge in the
District Court had committed offences in office when they were dealing
with her cases.
The Court of Appeal requested the prosecuting counsel of the
Court of Appeal (kanneviskaali) to give his opinion on the second
applicant's information concerning the three judges. The prosecuting
counsel stated that the information did not call for him to take
further measures. In the light of this opinion, the Court of Appeal
decided on 22 January 1992 that there were no grounds to render a
judicial pronouncement on the information concerning the three judges.
Further, on 22 January 1992 the Court of Appeal rejected the
second applicant's appeal concerning the claim for damages and the
request for an oral hearing and legal assistance.
On 8 January 1993 the Supreme Court refused the second applicant
leave to appeal in so far as her appeal concerned the claim for
damages.
In a separate judgment of the same day, the Supreme Court
referred the case back to the Court of Appeal to be heard on the issue
of the information about offences in office allegedly committed by the
three judges.
Subsequently, on 1 April 1993 the second applicant gave notice
that she was bringing a private prosecution, under section 93 of the
Constitution Act (Hallitusmuoto), against two judges in the Land Court,
the judge in the District Court and the Director General of the
National Survey Board (maanmittaushallitus) with offences in office.
On 23 December 1993 the Court of Appeal noted that the legal aid
granted by the District Court applied also to the case concerning
offences in office and appointed a lawyer to assist the second
applicant. However, the lawyer withdrew from the case on 17 March 1994.
The Court of Appeal held an oral hearing on 24 August 1994. It then
appointed a new lawyer to assist the second applicant. The second
applicant further claimed damages totalling FIM 1,500,000 and expenses.
By judgment of 31 January 1995 the Court of Appeal dismissed the
charges the second applicant had brought as well as rejecting her fresh
claim for damages.
The second applicant appealed against the Court of Appeal's
judgment to the Supreme Court, where the case is apparently still
pending.
4. The street tax
In 1992 the first applicant MF requested the City Board of Espoo
to adjust his assessment to street tax for the years 1983 to 1992. He
alleged that no street led to his property and therefore he could not
be obliged to contribute towards the construction and maintenance of
a street. It appears that the street tax was under FIM 200 per year.
The City Board rejected his claim partly without considering the
merits on the grounds that the request was lodged out of time in
respect of that part. According to the Act on Street Taxes (laki
kunnalle suoritettavasta katumaksusta), as it stood, the amount of a
street tax was based, on the one hand, on the taxable value of the
relevant property and, on the other hand, on the classification of the
relevant street. The streets were classified into three payment
categories. The City Board found that the street tax in question was
not based on an incorrect taxable value and that, furthermore, the
street tax was in the lowest payment category. The County
Administrative Court (lääninoikeus) of Uusimaa rejected the first
applicant's appeal on 12 October 1993, also partly without considering
the merits. On 25 May 1994 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the
first applicant leave to appeal.
B. Relevant domestic law
The Court of Appeal may, if it considers it necessary, hold an
oral hearing in a case in which an appeal against the judgment of the
court of first instance has been lodged. Such a judgment cannot, as
regards the charges brought against an accused, be amended by the Court
of Appeal following a re-evaluation of the evidence without a
re-hearing having been held, unless the sentence imposed by the Court
of Appeal amounts only to fines or unless a re-hearing would clearly
be unnecessary. In assessing the latter special regard shall be had
to the interests of the accused (chapter 26, sections 7 and 8 of the
Code of Judicial Procedure).
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants complain that their right to use their property
according to the town plan in force has been violated. They complain
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that their right
to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions has been violated on the
grounds that their real property has, allegedly, been subject to a
building prohibition since 13 November 1968. They allege that as their
real property cannot be entered in the land registry this prevents the
realization of the town plan and gives rise to a building prohibition.
2. The applicants further complain under Article 13 of the
Convention that they have been denied an effective remedy to end the
building prohibition.
3. As regards the compulsory purchase proceedings, the applicants
complain under Article 6 of the Convention that the proceedings were
not fair. They further complain under Article 8 of the Convention that
the inspection of the relevant real property on 11 November 1986
violated their private and family life. The second applicant complains,
under Article 14 of the Convention, that in the compulsory purchase
proceedings she was discriminated against on the grounds of her sex and
opinions, since she did not personally receive any compensation for the
compulsory purchase. She also invokes Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 to
the Convention in that she was not accepted as a party to the
compulsory purchase proceedings. Finally, the applicants complain that
they did not receive any compensation for the lapsed compulsory
purchase proceedings.
4. The applicants also complain that the present process concerning
the amendment of the town plan violates their private and family life.
They maintain that the amendment of the town plan has caused a new
building prohibition based on section 42 subsection 2 point 4 of the
Building Act.
5. The applicants complain, under Article 6 of the Convention, that
the trial concerning the second applicant's claim for damages was not
fair. The applicants maintain that since 9 April 1986, when the
compulsory purchase proceedings began, they have been forced to
institute proceedings against several authorities in order to be able
to use their real property according to the town plan in force.
They submit that the District Court was biased in the proceedings
against L and H. They maintain in this respect that the chair of the
District Court had in 1978, allegedly illegally, registered the City
of Espoo's title to a real property known as Armas 4:12 which lay in
the vicinity of the property owned by the first applicant. They further
allege that the lay judges were biased because they were appointed by
the City Council of Espoo. They further maintain that the proceedings
were secret, that an oral hearing and a hearing of witness evidence
were refused and that the second applicant was refused the assistance
of a lawyer. They further submit that the District Court's judgment as
well as the appellate courts' judgments concerning the second
applicant's claim for damages contain incorrect information and that
they are based on errors of law.
The applicants also complain that it took almost 10 months for
the Supreme Court to give its judgment in the case and that after such
a long period of deliberation the Supreme Court merely refused the
second applicant leave to appeal.
The applicants further complain that they have not had an
effective remedy in respect of the proceedings concerning the claim for
damages on the grounds that the alleged mistakes have been committed
by legally trained persons while the applicants, on the other hand, are
laymen. The applicants have not been able to bring a private
prosecution against the authorities and their claim for damages has not
been dealt with. They invoke in this respect Article 13 of the
Convention.
The applicants also complain that because the second applicant
was refused the assistance of a lawyer, she was discriminated against
on the grounds of property. They invoke Article 14 of the Convention.
6. The applicants complain that the proceedings concerning the
private prosecution the second applicant had brought against certain
officials have not been fair. They invoke in this respect Articles 6
and 13 of the Convention.
7. Finally, the applicants complain, under Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention, that they have been ordered to pay street tax
for a non-existent street.
8. The applicants further invoke Articles 1 and 17 of the
Convention.
THE LAW
The Commission first considers that the question whether the
second applicant can be considered to be a victim within the meaning
of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention as regards the use of the
real property and the street tax can be left open, as can the question
whether the first applicant can be considered to be a victim within the
meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention as regards the civil
and criminal proceedings the second applicant has instituted since it
considers that the application is in any event inadmissible for the
following reasons.
1. The applicants complain that their right to use their property
according to the town plan in force has been violated on the grounds
that their property is covered by a building prohibition. They invoke
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.
The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."
The Commission notes that the town plan in force was adopted in
1981, whereas the Convention entered into force with regard to Finland
on 10 May 1990. The Commission therefore finds that the application is
incompatible ratione temporis with the Convention in so far as concerns
the lawfulness, purpose and proportionality of the restrictions
resulting from the town plan as such. In so far as the effects
resulting from the town plan can be regarded as a continuous situation,
the plan and the other developments preceding 10 May 1990 can be taken
into account as a background to the issue whether the restrictions in
force after that date constitute a violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention. In this respect the Commission first
notes that the alleged restrictions fall to be considered under the
second paragraph of that Article (P1-2).
The Commission further notes that ever since the first applicant
has owned the real property in question, construction of a new building
on it has required a building permit. Further, the Commission notes
that there is a house on the real property in question.
The Commission further notes that according to Finnish law a new
building may not be constructed contrary to a town plan or plot
division. It is true that the relevant property is affected by a
building prohibition. This building prohibition is not, however,
decisive in the case. It is namely the town plan in force which
regulates the building in the relevant area. The Commission notes that
no absolute right to build on the relevant real property could be
deduced from the town plan.
In so far the application concerns the applicants ability to
construct new buildings on the relevant real property the Commission
does not find that the present town plan interferes with the applicants
property rights in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to
the Convention.
It follows that this part of application must be rejected under
Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicants further complain, under Article 13 (Art. 13) of
the Convention, that they have not had an effective remedy to end the
building prohibition.
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention reads:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
As regards Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention the Commission
notes that the building prohibition is based on the fact that the
relevant plot consists of parts belonging to different owners. The town
plan and the plot division were approved in 1981 and 1984,
respectively. The first applicant, as the landowner, had the right to
participate in the planning process. However, as the Convention entered
into force with regard to Finland in 1990, the Commission is not
competent to supervise these proceedings.
This part of the application is incompatible ratione temporis.
Furthermore, the Commission recalls that the town plan is in the
process of being amended. Nothing has emerged which could lead to the
conclusion that the applicants cannot take part in this process or
resort to remedies, including those provided by administrative courts,
available to them. In these circumstances the Commission finds no
appearance of a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected
under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicants further complain, under Articles 6, 8 and 14
(Art. 6, 8, 14) of the Convention and under Article 5 of Protocol
No. 7 (P7-5)to the Convention, about the compulsory purchase
proceedings and the subsequent proceedings in the Land Court and
Supreme Court.
The Commission notes, first, that the compulsory purchase
proceedings lapsed in 1987. Secondly, the Commission notes that the
final judgment concerning the compensation for the lapsed compulsory
purchase proceedings was given by the Supreme Court on 11 October 1989.
As the Convention entered into force with regard to Finland on
10 May 1990, this part of the application is outside the competence
ratione temporis of the Commission.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected
under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
4. The applicants complain that the present process concerning the
amendment of the town plan violates their private and family life. The
applicants have not, however, substantiated their claim under Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
5. The applicants complain of several infringements of Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention in connection with the civil proceedings the
second applicant has instituted against two officials, L and H. They
refer in this respect also to Articles 13 and 14 (Art. 13, 14) of the
Convention.
a) The applicants have raised the question of impartiality with
regard to the chair of the District Court as well as the lay judges of
the District Court. They maintain that the chair had in 1978 registered
the City of Espoo's title to a piece of real property in the vicinity
of the first applicant's real property. They allege that because of
this the chair as well as the lay judges were biased.
The Commission recalls that the existence of impartiality for the
purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) must be determined according
to a subjective test and also according to an objective test (cf. Eur.
Court H.R., Fey judgment of 24 February 1993, Series A no. 255, p. 12,
para. 28). As regards the subjective test, the Commission and the Court
of Human Rights have constantly held that the impartiality of a judge
must be presumed until the contrary is established (cf. for example,
Eur. Court H.R., Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of
23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, p. 25, para. 58).
The Commission notes that the chair of the District Court had in
1978 registered the City of Espoo's title to another piece of real
property. This registration does not preclude a decision on a possible
dispute over ownership. Furthermore, the City of Espoo was not a party
to the compulsory purchase proceedings or in the proceedings concerning
the claim for damages deriving from the compulsory purchase. The
registration of title in question does not give any reason to doubt the
chair's impartiality. As the second applicant's claims were not
directed at the City of Espoo and furthermore, as the lay judges do not
represent the City of Espoo, the relevant registration of title does
not give any reason to doubt the impartiality of the lay judges either.
The Commission further notes that no other evidence has been adduced
which could raise doubt as to the subjective or objective impartiality
of the chair of the District Court or of the lay judges of the same
court.
b) The applicants further claim that the proceedings concerning the
claim for damages were secret and that an oral hearing was refused.
They also maintain that a hearing of witnesses was refused.
The Commission recalls that in the District Court there was a
public oral hearing.
The Commission notes that the relevant case concerned a claim for
damages. The Commission furthermore notes that the second applicant had
the opportunity to call witnesses to the District Court, but she did
not call any witnesses. On the contrary, she had, according to her
appeal to the Court of Appeal, declared that she was ready for the case
to be decided.
c) The applicants also complain that the second applicant was not
assigned a legal representative. The Commission notes that the second
applicant was granted legal aid and that in the District Court the case
was adjourned in order to give the second applicant the opportunity to
instruct counsel herself.
d) The applicants further complain that the District Court's
judgment concerning the claim for damages contains incorrect
information. They further maintain that the District Court's and the
appellate courts' judgments thereupon are based on errors of law.
With regard to the judicial decision of which the applicants
complain, the Commission recalls that its task is to ensure the
observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the
Convention. In particular, it is not competent to deal with an
application alleging that errors of fact and law have been committed
by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might
have involved a possible violation of any of the rights of freedoms set
out in the Convention. The Commission refers, on this point, to its
constant case-law (cf., e.g., No. 21283/93, Dec. 5.4.94, D.R. 77-A,
p. 88). The Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention is this respect.
e) The applicants complain about the length of the proceedings in
the Supreme Court.
The proceedings began in June 1990 when the second applicant sued
L and H for damages and ended on 8 January 1993 when the Supreme Court
refused the second applicant leave to appeal. Thus the length of the
proceedings was approximately two years and six months.
The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of
proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the
case and having regard to the following criteria: the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the parties and that of the authorities dealing
with the case (Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of 20 February 1991,
Series A no. 198, p. 12, para. 30).
The Commission notes that the proceedings in the District Court
lasted approximately seven months. In her appeal to the Court of Appeal
the second applicant stated as a new fact that three judges had
committed offences in office. Because of this the Court of Appeal
requested an opinion from the prosecuting counsel of the Court of
Appeal. The second applicant also submitted a fresh claim for damages.
The proceedings in the Court of Appeal lasted approximately one year.
The proceedings in the Supreme Court, which also gave a separate
judgment concerning the alleged offences in office, lasted about eleven
months. Taking into account that the case contained not only the
original claim for damages against L and H but later also a separate
case concerning offences in office and a fresh claim for damages, the
Commission considers that a reasonable time was not exceeded.
f) The applicants also complain about the lack of an oral hearing
in the Court of Appeal in the proceedings concerning the claim for
damages.
In this respect the Commission notes Finland's reservation to
Article 6 (Art. 6) which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
"For the time being, Finland cannot guarantee a right to an
oral hearing in so far as the current Finnish laws do not
provide such a right. This applies to:
1. proceedings before the Courts of Appeal, ... in
accordance with Chapter 26 Sections 7 and 8, ... of the
Code of Judicial Procedure ... "
The Commission observes that chapter 26, section 7 of the Code
of Judicial Procedure does not provide a right to an oral hearing in
appeal proceedings in the Court of Appeal. Chapter 26, section 8 of the
Code of Judicial Procedure concerns only criminal cases. The Commission
finds that Finland's reservation covers this complaint.
g) The applicants complain that they did not have an effective
remedy before a national authority. They maintain in this respect that
the proceedings they instituted were aimed against judicially trained
authorities. They further complain that the second applicant was
discriminated against on the grounds of property because she did not
obtain legal assistance. They invoke Articles 13 and 14 (Art. 13, 14)
of the Convention.
As regards Articles 13 and 14 (Art. 13, 14) of the Convention the
Commission finds that the applicants' references to these provisions
amount in substance to the same complaints as those made under
Article 6 (Art. 6). The Commission, having regard to its findings
above, finds that no separate issue arises under Articles 13 or 14
(Art. 13, 14) of the Convention.
In sum, the Commission considers that the applicants' complaints
do not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of
the Convention or of Articles 13 or 14 (Art. 13, 14) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible
ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention in so far it concerns the oral
hearing in the Court of Appeal and the remainder of this part of the
application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
6. Finally, the applicants complain, under Articles 6 and 13
(Art. 6, 13) of the Convention, that the proceedings concerning the
private prosecution the second applicant has brought against certain
officials have not been fair.
In this respect the Commission notes that the case is apparently
still pending in the Supreme Court. Even assuming that Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention were to be applicable to these proceedings,
the application is nevertheless premature. The applicants have not, in
accordance with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, complied with
the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected
under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
7. The applicants complain, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)
to the Convention, about the street tax.
In this respect the Commission, taking into account the State's
right to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to secure the payment
of taxes, finds no appearance of a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
8. Finally, the Commission finds that no separate issue arises under
Articles 1 or 17 (Art. 1, 17) of the Convention. It follows that this
part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning
of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (C.L. ROZAKIS)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy