AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 13613/88
by D. T. W. FORSYTH
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 8 September 1988, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
G. BATLINER
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 11 June 1987
by D. T. W. Forsyth against the United Kingdom and registered
on 15 February 1988 under file No. 13613/88;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Douglas T. W. Forsyth, is a citizen of the
United Kingdom who was born in Reading in 1919. He is a retired farmer
and resides in the United Kingdom. The facts of the case, as
submitted by him, may be summarised as follows:
In 1930, the applicant's father had purchased a villa in
Heliopolis, near Cairo. This property was forcibly taken over and
occupied by the Egyptian army in 1956 as part of a series of reprisals
for the British military attack at Suez. On 28 February 1959, an
Agreement was entered into between the Governments of the United
Kingdom and Egypt (United Arab Republic) with a view to
re-establishing normal commercial relations which included in its
Article III an undertaking by the Government of Egypt to "return all
British Property ... to the owners thereof in accordance with the
provisions of Annex B" of the said Agreement. Annex B referred
specifically to the "handing over" of property by the Sequestrator
General to the owner or his agents.
The British Foreign Office subsequently encouraged British
nationals whose property had been sequestrated to reassume possession
of such property and the applicant's father returned to Cairo for this
purpose in 1960. However, the Egyptian occupants, who had entered
into a monthly tenancy contract with the Sequestrator General for a
"peppercorn" rent in 1957, declined to vacate the property. At this
time, the applicant's father was informed by both the Egyptian and
British authorities that, notwithstanding the terms of the 1959
Agreement, the restoration of vacant possession of the property to him
was impossible.
In 1963, following advice from a lawyer of professed
experience in such matters in both Egypt and the United Kingdom, the
applicant's father accepted a payment in the sum of £2434 under the
Foreign Compensation (Egypt)(Determination and Registration of Claims)
Order 1962 and renounced all further claims in respect of his
property. This sum, described as a payment for capital depreciation
in the value of his property occasioned by the fact that it had
remained subject to a lease at a low rent and had not been returned to
him with vacant possession, was paid out of monies (£27.5 million)
provided by the Egyptian Government under Article IV of the 1959
Agreement in full and final discharge of certain property claims.
The applicant is the heir to his father's Egyptian estate.
In 1974, no rent having been paid in respect of the property since
1960, the applicant applied to the Egyptian courts for an Eviction
Order against the remaining occupants. The case was finally decided
against him, after undergoing some sixty adjournments, on 29 March
1986. An appeal is still pending. An appeal is also pending before
the Supreme Court of Appeal in respect of an inheritance tax of
approximately £E 50,000 which the applicant alleges was unjustly
levied by the Egyptian authorities on his father's private bank
account following his death.
In response to protests by the applicant at the repeated
delays and alleged obstruction and bias of the Egyptian authorities,
the respondent Government commenced diplomatic representations to the
Government of Egypt in late 1975 with the purpose of hastening a
setlement of the dispute. The applicant accepts that the respondent
Government have been kept closely informed with regard to the said
proceedings in Egypt and that they have made diplomatic
representations at various times in respect of his claims. He
nevertheless maintains that these approaches have always been of a
superficial and token nature.
Since 1985 the applicant has therefore sought to be further
compensated by the respondent Government for the loss of possession
and enjoyment of his property in Egypt. In this respect, he has
argued that the compensation paid to his father in 1963 related
solely to capital depreciation of the property, and that the
reununciation of all further claims signed by his father at that time
did not have the effect of exonerating the Government from its
obligation to recover vacant possession of the villa in accordance
with the terms of the 1959 Agreement. The respondent Government
dispute this contention, and have replied to the applicant that should
he fail in his current action before the Egyptian courts, he retains
the option to sell the property without vacant possession.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains that the United Kingdom Government
have failed to discharge their international obligations to protect
his property rights:
a) in respect of his villa under the 1959 Agreement, and
b) in respect of the inheritance tax levied by the Egyptian
authorities under general international law.
As a result, he has been deprived of the peaceful enjoyment of
his property in a manner contrary to Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1.
2. The applicant also complains that his grievances are not
justiciable within the courts of the United Kingdom and that he is
therefore being denied a fair and public hearing of his claims,
contrary to Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant has complained under Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 (P1-1) that the Untied Kingdom have failed to perform their
international obligations under the 1959 Agreement and under general
international law to protect his property rights. He submits that the
diplomatic representations made by the respondent Government were of a
token nature.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) states, inter alia, that
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions ..."
The Commission notes that there has been no direct
interference with the applicant's possessions by the United Kingdom
authorities. The alleged expropriation of his property in Egypt is
attributed to the Egyptian authorities and therefore, in itself, is
not a matter for which the United Kingdom is responsible under the
Convention. The applicant maintains however that the United Kingdom
is obliged to take measures against Egypt to assert and protect his
property rights.
The Commission recalls that the Convention does not contain a
right which requires a High Contracting Party to espouse the
applicant's complaints under international law or otherwise intervene
with the authorities of another State on his behalf (Bertrand Russell
Peace Foundation Limited v. United Kingdom, No. 7597/76, Dec. 2.5.78,
D.R. 14 p. 117 at 123, 124; see also Kapas v. United Kingdom, No.
12822/87, Dec. 9.12.87, to be published in D.R.). The Commission has
also held that there is no such right which can be inferred from
Article 1 (Art. 1) of the Convention (ibid.).
In the present case the Commission notes that there is no
indication that the 1959 Agreement relied on by the applicant extends
the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for purposes of Article 1
(Art. 1) of the Convention or creates an individual property right
vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. In any event the Commission notes that
diplomatic representations have been made in respect of the property
in question and compensation for capital depreciation of the property
was made in 1963 following which the applicant's father renounced all
further claims under the 1962 Order.
The Commission therefore considers that the applicant's
complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) must be rejected as
incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant has also complained that the United Kingdom
courts will not entertain an action to enforce either the 1959
Agreement or the applicant's other claims to entitlement to protection
under international law, and that he is therefore being denied a fair
and public hearing of his claims, contrary to Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) states, inter alia, that:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law ..."
The Commission recalls that this provision only applies where
there exists a "contestation" (dispute) over such civil rights and
obligations. In this connection, it is well established that the
expression "contestations sur (des) droits et obligations de caractère
civil" (disputes over civil rights and obligations) covers all
proceedings the result of which is decisive for such rights and
obligations. However, a tenuous connection or remote consequences do
not suffice for Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1): civil rights and
obligations must be the object - or one of the objects - of the
"contestation" (dispute) and the result of the proceedings must be
directly decisive for such a right (e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Pudas
judgment of 22 October 1987, Series A no. 125, pp. 9-10, at para. 31).
In the present case the applicant seeks to enforce what he
claims to be the obligations of the respondent State under the 1959
Agreement or otherwise to compel the United Kingdom to make diplomatic
representations concerning his property in Egypt.
However, the Commission considers that such proceedings,
although they would have as their object his alleged property rights,
could not be described as being directly decisive for these rights. At
best they could only give rise to official representations in respect
of his property interests. The Commission therefore finds that the
"contestation" (dispute) in the present case is not such as to bring
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention into application.
In these circumstances, it follows that the applicant's
complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) must also be rejected as
incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Deputy Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(J. RAYMOND) (C. A. NØRGAARD)