The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
13 October 1986, the following members being present:
MM. J. A. FROWEIN, Acting President
C. A. NØRGAARD
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
G. TENEKIDES
S. TRECHSEL
B. KIERNAN
A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J. C. SOYER
H. G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
G. BATLINER
Mrs G. H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. H. C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 (art. 25) of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 28 June 1983 by
M.G. against Denmark and registered on 17 October 1984
under file No. 11207/84;
Having regard to:
- the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure
of the Commission;
- the Commission's partial decision of 7 October 1985;
- the Commission's decision of the same day to bring the
remainder of the application to the notice of the respondent
Government and invite them to submit written observations on its
admissibility and merits;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
17 January 1986.
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised
as follows.
The applicant is a Danish citizen, born in 1926. He is an advocate by
profession and lives at Virum, Denmark. From 1973 and until his
conviction by the Supreme Court in 1983 the applicant was a member of
the Danish Parliament. He is the founder of the Progress Party
(Fremskridtspartiet).
On 30 January 1971 the applicant was interviewed on the Danish
television. In this interview he heavily attacked the Danish
income-tax legislation. The applicant maintains that from the day of
the television transmission, he has been subjected to constant
persecution by the authorities and those in power in Denmark who hold
opposite views to his on matters of taxation. He states that the mass
media in Denmark have supported his opponents.
The police started investigating the applicant's activities on
6 March 1972 when the General Council of the Bar Association
(Advokatrådet) filed a report with the Ministry of Justice, stating as
its point of view that the applicant was systematically violating
corporation laws in several, specified areas. On 13 April 1972 the
police obtained from the Copenhagen City Court (Københavns byret) a
decision allowing them to search the applicant's office and home. The
search was carried out on 17 April 1972 and the applicant maintains
that from that day his office and every piece of paper in it have been
under surveillance by the police and the tax authorities. In the
beginning of July 1973 the Minister of Justice furthermore stopped
granting the applicant leave to administer estates. This situation,
he states, scared away his clients and seriously affected his law
business, causing a loss of approximately 200 million Danish crowns.
Due to the persecution by the authorities he is today bankrupt,
deprived of his right to exercise his profession and is living in a
house put at his disposal through contributions from members of the
party of which he is the founder.
The police investigation into the applicant's activities continued
inter alia by questioning many of the applicant's clients. He
submits, however, that he was never himself at this stage of the
proceedings in any noticeable way questioned about the charges brought
forward and thus never got the chance to correct the distorted picture
of the case, which was the basis for the subsequent indictment.
On 12 June 1974 the Danish Parliament lifted the applicant's immunity
according to Article 57 of the Danish Constitution, enabling the
prosecution to carry on with the case. On 17 June 1974 the public
prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant in which he was
charged inter alia with tax evasion, fraud and usury.
The proceedings commenced before the Copenhagen City Court on
7 October 1974. Two lawyers, the advocate Philip Ingerslev and
Professor Dr. Jur. Thøger Nielsen, were appointed by the Court to
defend the applicant. To the applicant's regret the latter was later
"bullied from the case", as he puts it, to be replaced by
Mr. Ebbe Suenson, advocate to the Supreme Court of Denmark.
The applicant requested a jury trial in accordance with Article 687
para. 2 sub-para. 3 of the Administration of Justice Act
(retsplejeloven) as he maintained that the charges brought against him
were of a political nature. He requested in this respect that several
ex-ministers and public officials be summoned to appear before the
Court to give evidence. The City Court, however, rejected the request
on 21 October 1974 since the above persons' statements, in its
opinion, would be irrelevant to the matter at issue. The City Court
furthermore rejected the applicant's request for a jury trial. This
decision was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court (Højesteret) on
2 December 1974.
The trial before the City Court involved 202 court sessions.
Originally 274 court sessions were scheduled but 72 were subsequently
cancelled; one at the request of the defence lawyers, 23 by the Court
and 48 at the request of the applicant pleading lawful absence on
account of his duties in parliament and as chairman of the Progress
Party. Of the 202 court sessions the applicant attended, some were
discontinued at his request and a large number were rescheduled to
take place outside the usual working hours of the court. Thousands of
pages of documentation were produced. However in spite of this the
applicant maintains that nothing could hide the fact that this trial
was merely a political persecution, staged by his political
adversaries to obstruct his political work within Parliament and
ultimately to bring about his political downfall.
On 17 February 1978 the City Court pronounced its judgment in the
case. From the more than 1200-page judgment, it appears that the
applicant was convicted of having violated Article 13 para. 1 of the
Tax Control Act (skattekontrolloven) in conjunction with Article 21 of
the Penal Code (straffeloven), Article 75 No. 2 in conjunction with
Article 74 para. 2 of the Income Tax Act (kildeskatteloven) and
Arts. 163 and 296 para. 1 sub-para. 2 of the Penal Code. He was fined
1.5 million Danish crowns and ordered to pay 1,986,712.65 Danish
crowns in taxes as well as certain specified costs which exceeded
2.1 million Danish crowns. On the other hand, he was acquitted of the
fraud charges and certain charges based on Article 296 of the Penal
Code. The Court did not comply with the prosecutor's request to revoke
the applicant's licence to practise law.
On 24 February 1978 the prosecution appealed against the judgment to
the Court of Appeal (Østre Landsret) demanding conviction in
accordance with the indictment and a more severe sentence including
the revocation of the applicant's licence to practise law. The
prosecution at a later stage changed the appeal so as only to concern
a more severe punishment and the revocation of the licence whereas the
charges of which the applicant had been acquitted by the City Court
were dropped. The applicant appealed against the judgment on
28 February 1978 requesting his acquittal on all counts.
The hearings before the Court of Appeal were set to commence on
4 September 1978. In the meantime the applicant asked the President of
the Court to appoint two new defence lawyers since he was not at all
satisfied with the way they had conducted his defence so far. In
particular the applicant pointed out that the prosecution had used the
time from the start of the trial before the City Court in 1974 until
9 May 1977 to produce evidence to the detriment of the applicant whereas
his defence lawyers finished the case of the defence in one hour.
Furthermore the applicant referred to the fact that the prosecution
had found it necessary to appoint new prosecutors.
The President rejected the request and on 24 April 1978 appointed the
same lawyers for the defence, as he found it unnecessary to burden new
lawyers with getting acquainted with this bulky and complicated case
and since the present ones were perfectly capable.
On 26 May 1978 the Ministry of Justice granted leave to bring the
question of new lawyers before the Supreme Court which, however, on
6 June 1978 upheld the Appeal Court President's decision.
The hearings of the case before the Court of Appeal began on
4 September 1978 and were scheduled as a rule to be continued every
Monday, Wednesday and Friday. The applicant found that these court
sessions interfered considerably with his work in Parliament. While
working in Parliament he maintained he was legally excused (lovligt
forfald) from appearing in court. This caused controversies between
the prosecution and the defence, which led to court decisions as to
the fixing of the hearings. The Court in its decisions pointed out
that due to its nature and size the case would in all probability be
very lengthy and therefore a general postponement could not be
granted. Sometimes, however, the Court granted the defence
postponement of fixed hearings, depending on the importance of matters
being dealt with in Parliament and on the applicant's connection with
them.
The applicant nevertheless failed to appear at a number of the fixed
hearings before the Court which again made the prosecution request the
Court to dismiss the applicant's full appeal (bevisanke) and only
consider the question of sentence. This request, however, was
rejected by the Court on 27 October 1978.
On 9 November 1978 the applicant lodged an appeal with the European
Commission of Human Rights and therefore on 27 November 1978 requested
before the national court that the hearings be postponed until the
Commission had dealt with the case or at least be postponed for a
period of 3 months. The applicant's defence lawyer,
Mr. Ebbe Suenson, pleaded this request before the Court and the
applicant himself also wished to expound upon the documentation that
he had submitted to the Commission (113 documents). The applicant
states that the Court gave him 30 minutes to do that.
The Court of Appeal did not grant the above request for a postponement
but the applicant nevertheless continued to ask for postponements of
the listing of his case for hearing when it clashed with his political
work in Parliament. When the Court did not honour such requests it
seems that the applicant did not appear. This led to a very difficult
situation from a procedural point of view and the Court therefore
decided on 14 February 1979 inter alia that further explanations and
production of evidence concerning count No. 1 of the indictment should
be submitted in the subsequent court sessions. Otherwise the
applicant would be barred from giving further explanations concerning
the charges dealt with therein.
After leave to appeal had been granted by the Ministry of Justice on
28 February 1979 the Supreme Court was asked to settle the disputes
concerning the constant postponements and the subsequent decisions to
bar the applicant from producing evidence if he did not appear in
court.
In its decision of 6 April 1979 the Supreme Court stated:
"The Supreme Court has noted that the Court of Appeal has held
14 hearings between 14 February and 29 March 1979 whereas 3 hearings
have been postponed. The accused has appeared in 6 hearings and has
left one before it finished. The Court of Appeal has hereafter ...
considered the accused barred from submitting further statements
concerning Count 1 of the indictment. ...
The political work of a Member of Parliament must be respected during
a criminal trial against him insofar as it is possible without
delaying the case. In this case, which in view of its size and
complicated nature is quite extraordinary, the accused should
contribute to the accomplishment of the case as swiftly as possible
even if this interferes with his political work. The accused has,
however, as can be seen from the decision,
completely ignored the Court's decision as to the procedure of the
case. He has for example failed to appear in court on a Monday when
no meetings were scheduled in Parliament because he should give a
speech on the pension policy of the Progress Party. ... He has
furthermore failed to appear - also on a Monday - in order to
participate in meetings of the Austrian sister party.
In relation to Parliament and the common conception of justice, it is
unacceptable and offensive that the accused through his attitude
delays and tries to evade legal proceedings in an extensive and
serious criminal case, which has been brought against him with the
permission of Parliament, the result of which may be of importance for
the question whether he fulfils the requirement set out in Article 30
para. 1 of the Constitution concerning eligibility to Parliament and
thus his staying there. The accused tries through his political work
to arrogate to himself procedural privileges, which cannot be obtained
by any other person against whom a criminal case is being conducted.
Interference with the course of the trial - through postponements or
permission to stay away - should therefore, even if political
considerations are invoked, only be accepted on very exceptional
occasions. ...
The fairness of the above is strengthened by the circumstances of the
appeals. As the case now lies before the Court of Appeal, the
prosecution has dropped the charges concerning fraud and requests only
an increase of the sentence by referring certain counts to Article 289
of the Penal Code and a revocation of the accused's right to practise
law. The evaluation of the evidence cannot therefore be changed to
the detriment of the accused. In this regard the case could be dealt
with without the presence of the accused. The accused, however, has
appealed in order to be acquitted and should therefore appear and
through the necessary production of evidence look after his
interests."
The Supreme Court thereafter decided by three votes to two (who wanted
to dismiss totally the applicant's appeal for acquittal) to uphold the
Court of Appeal decision as follows:
"the decision as to the rejection of the defendant's appeal is upheld.
The court hearings shall be conducted with the greatest possible speed
and so,
that the accused's requests for postponements or to be excused from
appearing in court shall only be granted on very exceptional
occasions,
that this also applies when the accused invokes his political work,
that if the accused fails to appear at a court hearing without being
legally excused (lovligt forfald) he shall become barred from later
submitting evidence that should have been produced at that hearing,
that the accused is barred from giving further explanations on Count 1
of the indictment."
On 3 December 1979 the European Commission of Human Rights declared
the applicant's complaints inadmissible while stating as follows:
"The applicant's main complaint is under Article 6 (art. 6) of
the Convention which, inter alia, secures to everyone charged with a
criminal offence the right to 'a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established
by law'. He alleges that on account of a hostile publicity campaign
against him from the highest quarters, he will not get a fair trial by
an independent and impartial tribunal in the criminal proceedings
instituted against him.
However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not the
facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation
of this provision as, under Article 26 (art. 26) of the Convention, it
may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been
exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international
law.
The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending
before the Court of Appeal in Copenhagen.
It follows that the applicant has not complied with the condition as
to the exhaustion of domestic remedies so this part of his application
must be rejected under Article 27, para. 3 (art. 27-3) of the Convention.
As to the applicant's complaint that he was not given a jury trial as
he maintains he was entitled to under Article 687 C of the Danish
Judicature Act, the Commission notes that the final decision on this
point was given by the Supreme Court on 3 December 1974, and since the
applicant did not lodge his application with the Commission until
9 November 1978, the Commission is not competent to deal with this part
of his complaint as, according to Article 26 (art. 26) of the
Convention, it may only deal with a matter within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision was taken. Hence
this part of the application must be declared inadmissible under
Article 27 para. 3 (art. 27-3) of the Convention.
The applicant has also complained that he was refused new lawyers to
defend his case, since he considered his lawyers deficient in
defending his case. The lawyers appointed ex officio by the court
were well reputed and the applicant has not given any particulars as
to the way in which they did not correctly handle the case.
The applicant has not substantiated this complaint and the Commission
therefore finds that it is manifestly ill-founded and has to be
declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2)
of the Convention.
The Commission has also examined the applicant's complaints under
Arts. 7, 10, and 11 (art. 7, art. 10, art. 11) of the Convention but
cannot in the present stage of the file find any violation of these
Articles."
The case had in the meantime continued in the Court of Appeal but the
applicant continued to request cancellations of hearings fixed,
pleading mainly work in parliament. Except in a few special
instances, e.g. in respect of a two-month period after a general
election had been called for, the Court did not grant the requests.
Nevertheless the applicant stayed away on several occasions. Out of
the 258 court sessions to be held by the Court of Appeal, four were
cancelled by the Court. The applicant left 19 sessions before they
were adjourned and failed to appear altogether for 133 sessions. When
the applicant failed to appear the Court of Appeal with reference to
the above Supreme Court decision barred the applicant from
subsequently producing further evidence concerning a particular point.
On 18 August 1980 the prosecution had finished the production of
evidence. The applicant thereafter requested a postponement of the
case in order that he prepare his production of counter evidence. On
25 August 1980 the Court of Appeal refused to postpone the case and
refused the applicant permission to produce further evidence. In its
decision the Court stated inter alia:
"When deciding the present question regard must be had to the fact
that the accused, through the legally served notice of appeal during
the case, has been informed of the possibility, according to
Article 836 of the Administration of Justice Act, to submit a list of
evidence within a certain time-limit, that through the whole case, he
has been aware of the list of evidence submitted by the prosecution
and that regardless of these circumstances, and assuming that he ought
to be considered familiar with usual criminal procedural practice, he
nevertheless has not until now asked the Court for individual
production of evidence. Furthermore regard must be had to the fact
that on several occasions it has been stated in the court transcripts,
during hearings where the accused has been present, that the
production of evidence concerning a particular point has been
terminated, without this giving rise to comments from the accused.
The Court must finally consider the views expressed in the Court's
decision of 14 February 1979 and the principles of the Supreme Court
decision of 6 April 1979, namely that it was found necessary due to
the proceedings until these dates to decide on such procedural
measures as could ensure the necessary concentration and continuity in
the proceedings and thereby to avoid obstructions from the applicant
and to get through the case in a reasonable way.
On the basis of these views and the above-mentioned circumstances the
Court of Appeal decides to refuse the accused permission to produce
further evidence in the case. In this respect the Court has had
particular regard to the fact that the accused has been aware of the
possibility of producing evidence and has made use of this possibility
during the case to a considerable extent, and to the fact that his
present request concerning further production of evidence has been
brought forward only after the appeal proceedings have been pending
for more than 2 years and therefore must be considered as an attempt
to delay the case."
Thereafter, on 18 September 1980, the applicant requested the
re-opening of the production of evidence. In particular he requested
permission to submit 97 letters with enclosures, 130 documents
previously submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights as
well as permission to request an expert opinion (syn og skøn) on the
financial and other opinions produced in the case.
On 20 October 1980 the Court of Appeal refused to re-open the
production of evidence stating as follows:
"With regard to the question of re-opening the Court of Appeal must
consider that the production of evidence, which the accused now
requests, relates mainly to questions which have been subjected to
thorough and detailed examination during the appeal hearings and on
which the accused has had full opportunity to express himself and
otherwise arrange for evidence ... In particular with regard to the
very extensive request for expert opinions it is pointed out that it
should also be taken into consideration that the accused must have
been aware of the fact that such a request not only could have but
also should have been made at a much earlier stage of the appeal
proceedings and that it would in itself mean a considerable extension
of the proceedings if it was to be granted now. In these
circumstances the Court finds it neither necessary nor desirable that
further production of evidence is started."
A further request to re-open the production of evidence was similarly
rejected on 10 November 1980.
With regard to his defence the applicant submits that his defence
lawyers failed to act as expected of them when the prosecution had
finished producing evidence to his detriment. In particular he refers
to an incident where the President of the Court of Appeal asked the
defence what kind of evidence it would submit and the answer was: ask
Glistrup. Due to the fact that the applicant in his opinion
constantly had tried, unsuccessfully, however, to activate his
defence, he again asked the President of the Court of Appeal to
relieve his lawyers of their duties. The President, however,
rejected the request on 7 November 1980. This question was then again
brought before the Supreme Court which on 21 January 1981 upheld the
decision since the Court did not find that the defence had acted
negligently.
The case thereafter continued before the Court of Appeal until
1 May 1981 when the parties had finished their summing-up of the case.
The applicant asked for the floor and for a postponement in order to
prepare his speech. A postponement was granted until 11 May 1981 when
the applicant started his statement. He continued on 13 May 1981 but
was warned that he should confine his speech to the relevant parts and
not repeat what his defence had already said. The applicant's speech
continued on 18 May and 20 May 1981 when he was stopped by the Court
which subsequently, by a decision of the same day, barred him from
submitting further comments, stating inter alia:
"With regard to the question concerning the accused's right to
continue his statement the Court refers to the fact that the case has
been subject to particularly extensive oral pleadings on behalf of the
defence. The prosecution's first pleading lasted 12 full court days
whereas the defence used 27 full court days for its pleadings. The
following pleadings lasted 1/2 - 1 day.
When deciding the Court must also take into consideration that the
defence's initial pleadings - as stated in the Court's decisions of
23 March, 27 March and 1 May 1981 - as submitted, were based, to a
considerable extent, on co-operation between the defence and the
accused, who, as stated by the defence to the Court on 27 March, until
that date had sent to the defence approximately 1500 typewritten
pages, which had been used in the pleading.
The accused has now had the floor approximately 3 1/2 court days and
has - notwithstanding the warning of 13 May and the subsequent
repetitions of this warning - used the major part of this time to
repeat the points mentioned by the defence and used the remaining part
for a lengthy explanation of details without real importance for the
case.
Against this background the Court must reach the conclusion that the
accused has now had the opportunity to express himself fully in
accordance with Arts. 738 para. 1 and 882 of the Administration of
Justice Act. Therefore the accused is barred from submitting further
comments, so that the case hereafter will be ready for judgment."
The Court of Appeal pronounced its judgment on 23 November 1981. The
applicant was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment and a fine of
4 million Danish crowns. Furthermore he was ordered to pay the costs
which exceeded 1.6 million Danish crowns. Finally, the Court revoked
the applicant's licence to practise law for good.
The applicant applied for and was granted by the Ministry of Justice
leave to appeal against the judgment to the Supreme Court. Before this
court the applicant maintained that his whole case was based primarily
on one particular point, namely that the authorities as well as the
lower instance courts had come to the conclusion that the many
transactions and agreements between himself and his thousands of
clients were only fiction without any legal foundation. Since he
maintained that this was in fact not so, it would seem obvious that he
should be acquitted. Secondly, he maintained that the Court of Appeal
had committed a number of procedural errors, in particular by leaving
to him the burden of proof, by barring him from producing further
evidence in October 1980 and by barring him from finishing his final
speech in May 1981. Finally he requested a milder sentence than the
one imposed by the Court of Appeal.
After 25 court sessions the Supreme Court, on 22 June 1983, sentenced
the applicant to 3 years' imprisonment and a fine of 1 million Danish
crowns. He was ordered to pay 941,029 Danish crowns in taxes as well
as costs before the City Court and the Court of Appeal. Finally the
decision to revoke his licence was upheld but only until further
notice.
With regard to the applicant's allegations of procedural errors before
the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court stated simply that it did not
find that such errors had occurred. Therefore the case could not be
referred back to the Court of Appeal.
The applicant has now been released on parole and is, as mentioned
above, at present living at Virum in a house put at his disposal by
his fellow party members.
COMPLAINTS
Following the Commission's partial decision as to the admissibility of
7 October 1985 (see below) the only remaining complaint is whether the
applicant's trial was concluded within a reasonable time in the
meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 28 June 1983 and registered on
17 October 1984.
On 7 October 1985 the Commission decided to adjourn the examination of
the application as far as it concerned the length of the criminal
proceedings and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the
application. It was furthermore decided to bring the adjourned part
of the application to the notice of the respondent Government and
invite them to submit written observations on the admissibility and
merits of this question.
On 10 December 1985 the applicant applied for legal aid and he was
requested to submit the necessary information in this respect by
17 January 1986. This request remained unanswered.
After the grant of an extension, the respondent Government's
observations were submitted on 17 January 1986. A copy of the
observations was forwarded to the applicant on 23 January 1986. He
was requested to submit his observations in reply before 6 March 1986.
On 31 January 1986 the applicant asked for an extension to the
time-limit for an indefinite period. By letter of 11 February 1986 he
was requested to indicate the date to which he requested the
time-limit extended and was informed that the Acting President or the
Commission would then decide whether or not to grant the extension
requested.
The applicant did not reply to this letter. Neither has he submitted
a reply to the observations of the respondent Government. The
Commission's Secretariat's reminders of 20 March, 23 April (registered
post), 29 May and 15 July 1986 remained unanswered.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
In the light of the above situation the following is a summary of the
Government's observations only.*
_______________
* The Government have submitted, in addition to their
observations, a 178 page document setting out the procedural
steps taken from 30 January 1971 to 11 March 1985.
_______________
The respondent Government submit that the applicant's case was quite
exceptional by Danish standards. It was an extremely bulky case
requiring the checking of the applicant's fiscal affairs over a period
of approximately ten years. This in turn called for a review of his
counselling services to and transactions with a very large number of
persons. The case made it necessary to arrive at a stance concerning
the exceedingly complex points of fiscal and corporation law and the
principles governing them. Also the applicant's position per se as a
member of Parliament and party leader added constitutional problems.
The clash between the applicant's political office and the hearing of
the trial became another delaying factor.
Referring to the facts of this case the respondent Government point
out that while the case was pending before the courts, documentary
evidence in excess of 100,000 pages was presented and approximately
50 witnesses were heard by both the City Court and the Court of
Appeal. The court records kept of the two proceedings took up 2235 and
785 pages respectively and the judgments 1226 and 238 pages
respectively.
The Government submit that account must be taken of the extent to
which the applicant himself was instrumental in the procrastination of
the case and against this background conclude that the duration of the
applicant's trial is attributable to the exceptionally large scope and
complex legal problems of the case and the applicant's own conduct.
REASONS FOR THE DECISION
The Commission recalls that the only complaint left for the Commission
to examine is whether the applicant's trial was concluded within a
reasonable time as required under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
of the Convention.
However, the Commission observes that despite reminders sent to him on
20 March, 23 April, 29 May and 15 July 1986 the applicant has not
resumed contact with the Commission after 31 January 1986. Thus he
has failed to observe the time-limits set and also failed to provide
information requested by the Commission. Neither has he submitted a
reply to the observations of the respondent Government forwarded to
him on 23 January 1986.
In these circumstances the Commission considers that he must be
regarded as having lost interest in his application. Furthermore the
Commission finds that there are no reasons of a general character
affecting the observance of the Convention which necessitate a further
examination of the case.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECIDES TO STRIKE THE APPLICATION OFF ITS LIST OF CASES
Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission
(H. C. KRÜGER) (J. A. FROWEIN)