Galstyan v. Armenia

Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 102

November 2007

Galstyan v. Armenia - 26986/03

Judgment 15.11.2007 [Section III]

Article 6

Article 6-3-b

Adequate facilities

Adequate time

Applicant allowed only a few hours, without contact with the outside world, for the preparation of his defence: violation

Article 11

Article 11-1

Freedom of peaceful assembly

Imposition of administrative detention for participating in a peaceful demonstration: violation

Article 2 of Protocol No. 7

No clear and accessible right to appeal against a sentence to administrative detention: violation

Facts: In April 2003, while on his way home from a demonstration by some 30,000 people (mostly women) that had been organised to protest against the Government and the conduct of the presidential elections, the applicant was arrested for “obstructing traffic and behaving in an anti-social way at a demonstration” and taken to the local police station for questioning. He argued that he and most of the other men present had not participated in the demonstration; but were there to support and protect the women and prevent trouble from breaking out. At the police station the applicant was charged with “minor hooliganism”. He signed the relevant police record certifying that he had been made aware of his rights to legal representation and added “I do not wish to have a lawyer”. The applicant alleged that he had initially refused to sign the record and requested a lawyer, but had been kept at the police station for five-and-a-half hours, during which time police officers had pressured him into signing the record and refusing legal assistance. At 11 p.m. that day he was presented before a judge,. After a brief hearing the judge sentenced him to three days' administrative detention for “obstruction of street traffic” and “making a loud noise”. The applicant alleged, and the Government did not explicitly dispute, that the record of the hearing had been drafted at some point after the hearing and that in reality there had been no clerk present and the hearing had not been recorded. According to the applicant, the hearing had lasted only about five minutes and been held in the judge's office. Only the judge and applicant (with the accompanying police officer) were present. The Government contested the applicant's allegations in this respect. According to the court records, the hearing was held in public with the participation of the judge, a clerk and the applicant; the applicant was kept at the police station for only two hours and taken to the judge at 7.30 p.m; the police had explained to him his right to have a lawyer; and the applicant had signed the record voluntarily, without objections. The applicant subsequently complained to a local human rights NGO that police officers had persuaded him to sign the document refusing a lawyer. The NGO's request to have criminal proceedings brought against the police officers and judge was rejected by the prosecutor.

Law: Article 6 § 1 – The fact that the only evidence in the proceedings was the witness testimony of an arresting police officer was not in itself contrary to Article 6, because the applicant – even if only at a very brief hearing – had been able to make submissions in defence of his position. Although none of the arresting police officers had been called and examined in court, the applicant had not asked for them to be called. As to the applicant's allegation that the trial judge was politically biased, although the period surrounding the presidential election of 2003 had seen increased political sensitivity, it was not possible to conclude from that alone that the trial judge was personally biased. Nor was there sufficient evidence to conclude that the hearing in question was not held in public as the applicant had cited only the alleged time and location of the hearing in support of his allegation: no violation.

Article 6 § 3 (b) – The mere fact that the applicant had signed a paper stating that he did not wish to have a lawyer did not mean that he did not need adequate time and facilities to prepare himself effectively for trial. Nor did the applicant's failure to lodge any specific requests during the short pre-trial period necessarily imply that no further time was needed to enable him – in adequate conditions – to properly assess the charge against him and consider his defence. Nothing suggested that his decision to sign the police record pursued any other purpose than to confirm that he was familiar with it and aware of his rights and the charge against him. The parties could not agree on the exact length of the pre-trial period but it had clearly not lasted more than a few hours. During that time the applicant had either been in transit to the court or was being held at the police station without contact with the outside world. Furthermore, during his short stay at the police station, he was also questioned and searched. The Court doubted that the circumstances in which the applicant's trial was conducted enabled him to familiarise himself properly with and to assess adequately the charge and evidence against him, or to develop a viable legal strategy for his defence: violation.

Article 6 § 3 (c) – All the materials before the Court indicated that the applicant had expressly waived his right to be represented by a lawyer both before and during the court hearing. There was no evidence to support his allegation that he had been “tricked” into refusing a lawyer. Noting that the applicant was accused of a minor offence and the maximum possible sentence could not have exceeded 15 days' detention; mandatory legal representation was not required in the interests of justice: no violation.

Article 11 – The interference with the applicant's right of freedom of association was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim, the prevention of disorder. As to whether it was necessary in a democratic society, the Court reiterated that freedom to take part in a peaceful assembly was of such importance that a person could not be subjected to a sanction – even one at the lower end of the scale of disciplinary penalties – for participation in a demonstration which had not been prohibited, so long as he or she had not committed a reprehensible act. The applicant had been subjected to three days' deprivation of liberty for “obstruction of street traffic” and “making a loud noise”. It was apparent from the police report that the street where the demonstration took place had been packed with people and the Government did not dispute that the traffic had been suspended by the traffic police prior to the demonstration. Nor had the authorities made any attempt to disperse the participants on account of the unlawful obstruction of traffic. It followed that the offence of “obstructing street traffic” of which the applicant was found guilty consisted merely of his physical presence at a demonstration in a street where the flow of traffic had already been suspended. As to the “loud noise” he had made, there was no suggestion that it involved any obscenity or incitement to violence and it was hard to imagine a huge political demonstration of people expressing their opinions not generating a certain amount of noise. Accordingly, the applicant had been sanctioned merely for being present and proactive at the demonstration: violation.

Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 – The review procedure prescribed by domestic law did not provide a clear and accessible right to appeal and lacked any clearly-defined procedure or time-limits and any consistent application in practice: violation.

(This is the first in a series of cases dealing with the imposition of administrative sanctions on persons found guilty of participation in demonstrations or other minor offences in Armenia.)

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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