Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 149
February 2012
Gąsior v. Poland - 34472/07
Judgment 21.2.2012 [Section IV]
Article 10
Article 10-1
Freedom of expression
Conviction for defamation and order to publish apology in respect of unjustified allegations against a politician made in private correspondence with State-owned television: no violation
Facts – The applicant’s son-in-law, who owned a construction company, built a villa for a prominent Polish politician. In 2003 and 2004 the applicant sent two letters to Polish television alleging that the politician had refused to pay for the construction of the villa. Her letters were never made public. However, after he was asked for comments by the journalists, the politician lodged a private bill of indictment against the applicant. In 2004 the applicant’s son-in-law lodged a civil claim for payment against the politician. In 2006 the applicant was convicted of defamation and ordered to publish a written apology and to pay the costs of the proceedings (300 zlotys). The domestic courts held that the assertions contained in the applicant’s letters had been statements of fact and that she had failed to prove their veracity. In this respect, they referred to expert evidence which indicated that the villa was not a faultless construction as claimed by the applicant. The courts also considered that the applicant’s letters had formed an unjustified personal attack and that the expressions used, such as “liar”, “greedy and mendacious person” and “dishonest”, could have resulted in the politician losing public trust necessary for his political career. The criminal proceedings against the applicant were conditionally discontinued. In 2008 the courts dismissed the son-in-law’s claim as unsubstantiated since the construction works were faulty.
Law – Article 10: The applicant’s letters had contained quite serious allegations of fact which therefore required substantial justification. However, she had based them mainly on guess-work. Her remarks could have formed part of an open discussion of matters of public concern since she had informed the journalists about the politician’s alleged misconduct. While the limits of acceptable criticism as regards politicians were wider, this did not mean that politicians should not be given an opportunity to defend themselves. The reasons given by the domestic courts had been “relevant” and “sufficient” to justify the interference. In particular, the terms used by the applicant in her letters had a very pejorative connotation. In addition, as had been established by the courts, they had no justification on the facts. The applicant had only been ordered to publish an apology. The criminal proceedings had thereafter been discontinued. Moreover, the criminal proceedings against her had had their origin in a bill of indictment lodged by the politician himself, not by a public prosecutor. In view of the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States, a criminal measure as a response to defamation could not as such be considered disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In sum, the domestic courts had not overstepped their margin of appreciation and there had been a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the measures applied by them and the legitimate aim pursued.
Conclusion: no violation (six votes to one).
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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