Published on 16 June 2025
FIFTH SECTION
Application no. 45705/18
Larysa Petrivna GERASYMCHUK
against Ukraine
lodged on 11 September 2018
communicated on 27 May 2025
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The application concerns the refusal to pay a statutory death grant to the widow of a deceased member of the Ukrainian Parliament.
According to the applicant, following her husband’s death, she became entitled to a statutory death grant payable under an insurance policy that the Parliament’s administration (“the Administration”) was required to maintain for its serving members. However, she could not obtain the grant due to the Administration’s failure to arrange life insurance for her husband during his term of office.
In May 2015 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings against the Administration seeking compensation for its failure to contract an insurance company, as required by law. By a final ruling of 14 March 2018, the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed the applicant’s claim. The domestic courts found, inter alia, that the Administration could not be held liable as the lack of insurance cover resulted from insufficient State funding, and that the applicant had not shown any pecuniary loss directly attributable to the Administration’s failure to insure her husband.
Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant mainly complains that she was unlawfully denied the statutory grant as the absence of insurance cover was entirely caused by the Administration’s failure to act in appropriate manner. She also complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the ensuing compensation proceedings were unfair.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Did the applicant have a “legitimate expectation” to obtain a statutory grant in connection with the death of her husband, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no. 53080/13, §§ 80-86, 13 December 2016, and compare with Volovik v. Ukraine, no. 15123/03, § 68, 6 December 2007)?
2. If so, has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1? Has that interference been in the public interest, and in accordance with the conditions provided for by law, and, if so, did it impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant (see Moskal v. Poland, no. 10373/05, § 64, 15 September 2009; Suk v. Ukraine, no. 10972/05, §§ 22-24, 10 March 2011; Sukhanov and Ilchenko v. Ukraine, nos. 68385/10 and 71378/10, § 55, 26 June 2014)? In particular, did the competent authorities act in good time, in an appropriate manner and with utmost consistency (see, for example, Grobelny v. Poland, no. 60477/12, § 68, 5 March 2020)?
3. Was there a breach of the applicant’s right to a fair hearing, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?