THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 59172/12
G.J.
against Spain
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 21 June 2016 as a Chamber composed of:
Helena Jäderblom, President,
Luis López Guerra,
Helen Keller,
Branko Lubarda,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Alena Poláčková,
Georgios A. Serghides, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 12 September 2012,
Having regard to the decision to grant anonymity to the applicant under Rules 33 § 2 and 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Ms G.J., is a Nigerian national who was born in 1985. According to the case file, she lives in Nigeria. She was represented before the Court by Ms G. Fernández Rodríguez de Liévana, a lawyer at the non‑governmental organisation Women’s Links Worldwide (hereafter “WLW”) based in Madrid.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. First set of asylum proceedings
3. In 2006 the applicant arrived in Spain and submitted an asylum request (also referred to hereafter as the first set of asylum proceedings). She alleged that she was a Catholic and had fled Sudan after her father’s assassination by a radical Muslim group.
4. On 12 July 2007 the Spanish authorities issued an expulsion order in respect of the applicant. According to the case file, the applicant did not seek judicial redress against that order.
5. Her first asylum request was dismissed on 13 July 2009. The administrative authorities found that the inconsistent and contradictory statement of facts provided by the applicant cast doubts on her current nationality and the existence of the alleged persecution. On 7 December 2009 Ms M.E. was appointed as the applicant’s legal aid lawyer.
6. The dismissal decision of 13 July 2009 was challenged on 22 March 2010 by means of an appeal introduced by Ms M.E. before the Audiencia Nacional (Court sitting in Madrid with jurisdiction in asylum cases).
7. On 15 October 2010 the Audiencia Nacional dismissed the appeal on its merits. It found that the applicant had not provided any documents proving her identity and nationality. Nor had the applicant provided a minimum of evidence to support her allegations. The court noted that she did not speak Arabic, the official language in Sudan, and that her mother tongues were English and Niala, the latter being a dialect which was not spoken anywhere in Sudan. Lastly, violent incidents similar to those recounted by the applicant had been reported as occurring in Dafur, but not in Yala, the applicant’s alleged city of origin.
2. Second set of asylum proceedings
8. In the meantime, on 19 February 2010 two police officers stopped the applicant on the street and asked her to prove her identity. She was detained and, with a view to enforcement of the 2007 expulsion order, placed in an aliens’ detention centre. At the time of her detention the applicant was pregnant.
9. On 25 February 2010 the applicant filed a new asylum request (hereafter referred to as the second set of asylum proceedings). She claimed that she was of Nigerian nationality and a Catholic and had fled Nigeria after her parents’ assassination, having been helped to flee by a man called V. Upon her arrival in Spain, however, V. had forced her into prostitution in order to repay her travel expenses, which amounted to 20,000 euros (EUR). After having sex with clients she had become pregnant and V. had suggested she should have an abortion, but she had been detained just a few days prior to her appointment at the abortion clinic. She wished to have the baby and feared being killed if returned to Nigeria as she had not managed to repay her debt.
The United Nations Refugee Agency (hereafter, the “UNHCR”) had supported the applicant’s request since it considered that, on the basis of the facts recounted by the applicant, she had been a victim of ‒ and might still be a victim of ‒ human trafficking. In the second set of asylum proceedings the applicant was represented by the lawyer Mr A.P.
10. On 26 February 2010 this second asylum request was declared inadmissible by the Deputy Director on Asylum. She found that the applicant’s account of facts as to the alleged persecution was incoherent and inconsistent and she had already presented similar submissions in her first asylum request, which had been rejected.
11. On 3 March 2010 the NGO Proyecto Esperanza ‒ an agency which specialises in the investigation of trafficking and which had been informed about the applicant’s case by the UNHCR ‒ interviewed the applicant at the aliens’ detention centre and submitted a report to the Asylum Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs supporting the applicant’s allegations.
12. On 4 March 2010 the applicant applied for a re-examination of the second asylum request. She departed from her initial claim alleging persecution on religious grounds, instead focussing exclusively on the fact that she had been trafficked to Spain for the purpose of being forced into prostitution, and provided a more detailed account of facts. The request for re-examination was dismissed on 5 March 2010, the applicant’s new submissions not being sufficient to alter the conclusions reached in the inadmissibility decision.
13. The applicant instituted administrative judicial proceedings (procedimiento contencioso administrativo) against the refusal decision. Additionally, the applicant requested the suspension of the expulsion order, arguing that she was a victim of trafficking and that she should not be removed from Spain until the identification procedure was completed.
14. On 10 March 2010 Madrid administrative judge no. 6 rejected the applicant’s request to have her expulsion suspended on the following grounds: the applicant had failed to demonstrate the existence of a risk to her life or physical integrity if returned to Nigeria; the applicant had submitted an international protection request only after having been detained and held in immigrant detention; the applicant had already sought asylum unsuccessfully in 2007; the reports compiled by the administrative authorities supporting rejection of the asylum request were better reasoned and more convincing than the report produced by the UNHCR office. According to the case file, the applicant did not appeal against the rejection of the suspension.
15. On 13 April 2010 Madrid administrative judge no. 6 ruled that he lacked jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s appeal, and relinquished the case to the Audiencia Nacional. It does not follow from the case file that either the applicant or the administrative courts have taken any further steps in pursuance of these proceedings.
3. The intervention of WLW
16. On 11 March 2010, while the above-mentioned judicial proceedings were pending before Madrid administrative judge no. 6, two lawyers from WLW visited the applicant in the detention centre. The applicant signed a written authority to act (hereafter referred to as “the authority dated 11 March 2010”), instructing Ms Fernández Rodríguez de Liébana, one of the lawyers, to apply for the granting of a “recovery and reflection period” under section 59 bis of Organic Law 4/2000 of 11 January on the rights and freedoms of aliens in Spain. In the application, which was introduced on 12 March 2010, WLW asked for a stay of the applicant’s expulsion.
17. WLW informed Mr. A.P., the applicant’s lawyer in the second set of asylum proceedings, that the organisation’s lawyers would represent the applicant from 11 March 2010 onwards. On an unknown date Mr. A.P. gave his consent thereto, but no power of attorney was signed by the applicant to formalise this.
18. On 15 March 2010 WLW applied to the Government Delegation in the Community of Madrid (Delegación del Gobierno en la Comunidad de Madrid) to have the applicant’s expulsion order revoked. It claimed that the applicant satisfied all the legal requirements to be granted a residence permit in view of her social integration in Spanish society.
19. On 17 March 2010 at 7 a.m. the applicant was expelled to Nigeria. WLW first learnt of the applicant’s expulsion on 18 March 2010, the date on which she was served with a decision by the Government Delegation dated 16 March 2010 rejecting the request for a recovery and reflection period. On the basis of an interview conducted by police officers, the Government Delegation found that there was no evidence to support the argument that the applicant was a victim of human trafficking. It was clear that she had not been forced into prostitution since she worked independently and voluntarily without being controlled, lived alone and had not been deprived of her freedom of movement. Furthermore, she had no relatives in Nigeria who might be threatened.
4. Judicial proceedings concerning the applicant’s expulsion
20. On 31 March 2010 WLW instituted administrative judicial proceedings for the protection of fundamental human rights (procedimiento contencioso administrativo para la defensa de los derechos fundamentales), claiming that the applicant had been expelled before the Spanish authorities had examined the substance of her request for a recovery and reflection period.
21. On 5 April 2010 Madrid administrative judge no. 14 asked WLW to submit a power of attorney signed by the applicant before a relevant authority, namely a notary, a judicial secretary or a consular authority. He stated that the application would be deemed valid if the applicant had signed it herself.
22. On 7 May 2010 WLW argued before the judge that the manner in which the applicant had been expelled had prevented the organisation from having a power of attorney signed by the applicant before a notary or a judicial secretary. WLW contended that it had not been informed about the expulsion beforehand and had not been able to contact the applicant since then. In its view, the written authority dated 11 March 2010 (see paragraph 16 above) should be regarded as valid for the purposes of representation before domestic courts.
23. On 7 June 2010 the administrative judge rejected WLW’s submissions. He referred to sections 23 and 45 (2) (a) of Law 29/1998 of 13 July on Administrative Judicial Procedure, which established the obligation to furnish a power of attorney in cases where applicants had instructed a lawyer to represent them before an administrative judge, and to section 24 of Law 1/2000 of 7 January on Civil Judicial Procedure, which provided that the power of attorney must be signed before a notary or a judicial secretary. The judge observed that the aim of these requirements was to demonstrate the genuine existence of the person intending to apply to the judicial authorities for the purpose of defending his or her individual rights.
24. On 19 July 2010, as a result of a claim lodged by WLW concerning the applicant’s case, the Spanish Ombudsman issued a recommendation to the Asylum Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the effect that the asylum authorities should automatically initiate a procedure aimed at determining whether the alleged victim should be granted a recovery and reflection period in cases where an international protection request has been supported by the UNHCR office because it is thought that the person concerned might be a victim of human trafficking.
25. On 3 August 2010, after holding a hearing in the presence of WLW, Madrid administrative judge no. 14 declared the appeal inadmissible as WLW had no locus standi to represent the applicant. The judge found that WLW had failed to substantiate its assertion that its lawyers had tried three times to procure the attendance of a notary at the aliens’ detention centre.
26. On 27 May 2011 the Madrid High Court of Justice upheld this decision, observing that WLW had not demonstrated that it had approached the professional association of notaries for the purpose of requesting the attendance of a duty notary at the aliens’ detention centre. The High Court also found that no evidence had been produced showing that the applicant was unable to avail herself of consular services in her country of origin as provided by section 65 (2) of Organic Law 4/2000 of 11 January on Rights and Freedoms of Aliens in Spain. In view of the above, the High Court declared that the written authority dated 11 March 2010, which was valid for the purposes of the applicant’s representation in administrative proceedings, was not sufficient to satisfy the representation requirements under section 24 of Law 1/2000. On 7 March 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s amparo appeal inadmissible for lack of any special constitutional significance.
B. Relevant domestic law
27. Section 59 bis of Organic Law 4/2000 of 11 January on the Rights and Freedoms of Aliens in Spain imposes on the competent domestic authorities the obligation to adopt the measures necessary for the identification of victims of trafficking in human beings. This provision reads:
Section 59 bis
“1. The competent authorities shall adopt the necessary measures for the identification of victims of trafficking in human beings in compliance with Article 10 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, of 16 May 2005.
2. Whenever they consider that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an illegal immigrant is a victim of trafficking in human beings, the competent administrative bodies shall inform the person concerned of the provisions of this section and shall submit, in accordance with the relevant procedure, a proposal to the competent authority for the adoption of a decision on whether a recovery and reflection period should be granted in the case.
The recovery and reflection period shall last at least thirty days and shall be sufficient for the victim to make a decision on cooperating with the authorities in the investigation of the crime and, if appropriate, in the criminal proceedings thereafter. During the victim identification period and the recovery and reflection period no infringement proceedings may be instituted for a violation of section 53 (1) (a). Any infringement proceedings that may have been instituted and any expulsion or deportation decisions adopted will be suspended. Likewise, during the recovery and reflection period, the person concerned shall be authorised to stay in the territory temporarily and the competent administrations will provide for his or her subsistence and, if necessary, for the security and protection of the victim and any of his or her children who are minors or disabled and were in Spain at the moment of identification ...
3. The recovery and reflection period may be denied or revoked for reasons of public order or if it is found that victim status has been claimed improperly. The denial or revocation shall be properly reasoned and can be appealed against as provided for by Law 30/1992 of 26 November on the Legal System of the Public Administration and on Common Administrative Procedure.
...”
28. The relevant Spanish legislation setting out the formal requirement to provide legal representation (in force on the date of the institution of the proceedings for the protection of fundamental rights) provides as follows:
1. Law 29/1998 of 13 July on Administrative Judicial Procedure
Section 23
“1. In proceedings before a single judge, the parties may choose to be represented by a procedural representative and shall, in any event, be advised by a legal counsel ...”
Section 45
“1. Claims for judicial review shall be initiated in the form of a written application that merely cites the decision, act, inaction or action constituting the challenged ultra vires operation and the petitum that the claim be held to have been filed, unless otherwise provided by this law.
2. This application shall be accompanied by:
a) The document ascertaining the capacity of the person appearing on behalf of the party, unless this document has been previously attached to the judicial file of a case pending before the same court, in which case a certificate may be requested, to be attached to the new judicial file.
...”
2. Law 1/2000 of 7 January on Civil Judicial Procedure
Section 24. Procedural representative’s authority to act
“1. The authority to act on behalf of a party shall be conferred through a notarial power of attorney witnessed by a public notary or through the party’s appearance in the office of a judicial secretary.
...”
3. Law 4/2000 of 11 January on Rights and Freedoms of Aliens in Spain
Section 65. Appealable nature of the decisions issued as regards aliens
“1. The administrative decisions imposing an administrative sanction may be appealed against as provided for in the relevant regulations. These decisions shall be enforced according to the relevant general legislation.
2. Where the alien is outside Spain, he or she may introduce administrative or judicial proceedings through the relevant diplomatic or consular services, which shall forward the appeal to the relevant body in Spain.”
COMPLAINTS
29. Women’s Links Worldwide, acting on behalf of the applicant, complained under Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an appropriate identification procedure and consequently had not assessed the risk that the applicant, who was pregnant, would face upon her return to Nigeria, where the authorities were not capable of effectively protecting victims.
30. Under Article 8 of the Convention, WLW complained that the applicant’s expulsion to Nigeria, where trafficking is a widespread phenomenon and victims thereof suffer violence, physiological pressure and exclusion by their family members, amounted to a violation of the applicant’s rights to family and private life.
31. Under Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 3, 4 and 8 of the Convention, WLW submitted that no effective remedy existed within the Spanish domestic legal system in respect of the identification of victims of trafficking. Specifically, it claimed that ‒ owing to the failure of the authorities to carry out a proper identification procedure ‒ no representative had been available to act on the applicant’s behalf before the national courts and the Court.
32. Under Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the Convention, WLW submitted that the actions taken by the domestic authorities had reduced the problem to one of mere migration, without taking account of the particular vulnerability of the applicant given her position as a victim of trafficking. It claimed that female victims of trafficking are subjected to intersectional discrimination by domestic authorities on account of their race, gender and social origin.
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT
33. The application was lodged with the Court on 12 September 2012 in the form of an introductory letter signed by Ms Waisman, Ms Soria Montañez, Ms Fernández Rodríguez de Liébana and Ms Fernández Paredes, who are the executive director and lawyers at WLW respectively.
34. On 2 February 2013 the Court received a completed application form signed by Ms W. Waisman and copies of supporting documents. These submissions did not include any written authority to represent the applicant. Instead, the application form was accompanied by the written authority dated 11 March 2010 (see paragraph 16 above) and a private written statement issued on 17 December 2012 by Ms H.M., who is an expert in trafficking and WLW’s external consultant. She stated that she had been instructed by the Spanish Ombudsman to travel to Nigeria to investigate the current situation of those female victims of trafficking whose removals had been reported to the Ombudsman’s office and she had managed to have a telephone conversation with the applicant. However, the people who were in control of the applicant had prevented her from meeting Ms H.M. in person. Ms H.M. had informed the applicant about WLW’s intention to bring her case before international courts, with which the applicant had expressed her agreement. In Ms H.M.’s view, the applicant had been recaptured by her traffickers upon her return to Nigeria. They exercised a strong hold over the applicant as a consequence of her having disclosed her situation to the Spanish authorities.
35. By letter of 23 June 2014 the Court asked WLW to complete the application by returning the forms stipulated in the Rules of Court, which were appended to the letter. It reiterated that the written authority dated 11 March 2010 did not confer authority to act before the Court.
36. On 22 July 2014 WLW sent a letter to the Court in which the organisation claimed that it had been prevented from obtaining a written authority from the applicant as a result of the way she had been removed from Spain. They further claimed that the applicant had been recaptured by her traffickers in Nigeria, which had rendered her unable to sign any authority after her expulsion. In view of the special circumstances of the case, the victim’s vulnerability and the relationship between the organisation lodging the application and the victim, it asked the Court to regard the application as compliant with the requirements for applicants’ representation. In this regard, it argued that Rule 47 (5) (1) (c) provided that the Court could, of its own motion or at the request of an applicant, allow the examination of an application not complying with the representation requirements.
37. By letter of 1 June 2015, WLW was asked to inform the Court of the current status of the second asylum proceedings.
38. On 10 June 2015 WLW sent a reply to the Court stating that they did not have additional information other than that which they had already provided, since they were not representing the applicant in those asylum proceedings.
39. On 19 June 2015 the Court addressed a letter to the Government informing them that the application had been lodged with the Court and asking them under Rule 49 § 3 (a) of the Rules of Court to inform the Court of the current status of the second asylum proceedings and to provide the Court with a copy of all the administrative and judicial files relating to the above-mentioned proceedings.
40. On 27 July 2015 the Government informed the Court that the proceedings were already completed since the applicant had not lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court. However, this information in fact referred to the first set of asylum proceedings, the administrative and judicial file about which accompanied the Government’s communication. The Government also sent the relinquishment decision (see paragraph 15 above), which was issued by Madrid administrative judge no. 6 in the course of the second asylum proceedings.
THE LAW
41. WLW claimed that its inability to supply a written authority was a direct consequence of the State’s action in expelling the applicant without any prior notice to that effect. The organisation claimed that it had re‑established contact with the applicant through Ms H.M. after the former’s expulsion and had found out that she had been recaptured by her traffickers. However, in that telephone conversation the applicant had confirmed to Ms H.M. that she wished WLW to bring her case before the international courts. In conclusion it argued that, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case and the serious nature of the allegations, the Court should regard the written authority dated 11 March 2010 (see paragraph 16 above) as sufficient.
42. Rule 36 of the Rules of Court reads, in the relevant part:
“1. Persons, non-governmental organisations or groups of individuals may initially present applications under Article 34 of the Convention themselves or through a representative. ...
4. (a) The representative of the applicant shall be an advocate authorised to practise in any of the Contracting Parties and resident in the territory of one of them, or any other person approved by the President of the Chamber.”
43. Rule 45 § 3 of the Rules of Court, in so far as relevant, reads:
“1. Any application made under Articles 33 or 34 of the Convention shall be submitted in writing and shall be signed by the applicant or by the applicant’s representative. ...
3. Where applicants are represented in accordance with Rule 36, a power of attorney or written authority to act shall be supplied by their representative or representatives.”
44. Where applicants choose to be represented under Rule 36 § 1 of the Rules of Court rather than lodging the application themselves, Rule 45 § 3 requires them to produce a written authority to act, duly signed. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim within the meaning of Article 34 on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court (see N. and M. v. Russia (dec.), no. 39496/14 and 39727/14, § 53, 26 April 2016, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 102, ECHR 2014, and Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 21727/08, 20 January 2009; as regards the validity of an authority to act, see Aliev v. Georgia, no. 522/04, §§ 44-49, 13 January 2009). What is important for the Court is that the written authority to act should clearly indicate that the applicant has entrusted his or her representation before the Court to a representative and that the representative has accepted that commission (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, § 53, ECHR 2012, and Ryabov v. Russia, no. 3896/04, § 40, 31 January 2008).
45. The Court reiterates that the presentation of a written authority to act is not the sole requirement indicated for the purposes of Article 36 § 1 of the Rules of Court. The applicant’s representative must also maintain contact with the applicant throughout the proceedings (see Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, no. 16643/09, § 124, 21 October 2014; see, conversely, Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, §§ 50 and 54, and Ali v. Switzerland, 5 August 1998, §§ 31 and 32, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V). Such contact is essential in order to foster a deeper knowledge of the factual elements concerning the applicant’s personal situation and to confirm the ability and willingness of applicants to maintain and support applications purportedly introduced on their behalf for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, which does not provide for the institution of an actio popularis (see Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, § 33, Series A no. 28; Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, § 72, ECHR 2008; and Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, § 33; ECHR 2008).
46. As argued by WLW, the Convention institutions have held that special consideration may be appropriate in the cases of victims of alleged breaches of Articles 2, 3 and 8 at the hands of national authorities. On this basis, applications lodged on behalf of such victim(s), have been declared admissible even though no valid written authority to act was presented (see conversely N. and M. v. Russia, cited above, § 63 and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu, cited above, § 103; İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 55, ECHR 2000‑VII; Y.F. v. Turkey, no. 24209/94, § 29, ECHR 2003‑IX; and S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. the United Kingdom, no. 23715/94, Commission decision of 20 May 1996).
47. In the present case, given the lack of a written authority as prescribed in the Rules of Court, it must be ascertained whether, in view of the circumstances of the case, it may be considered that the applicant wished to exercise her right of individual application under Article 34 of the Convention and, if so, whether she wished WLW to act as her legal representative.
48. In this respect it must firstly be noted that, at the time of the applicant’s expulsion, she had initiated two parallel sets of asylum proceedings, within whose framework she had been represented by two lawyers duly authorised to act on her behalf at domestic level (one of them a legal aid lawyer). In each set of proceedings, the lawyers had presented on the applicant’s behalf different and detailed submissions as to the applicant’s situation and had challenged the enforcement of the expulsion order issued in 2007. It must therefore be assumed that the applicant was in contact with her lawyers during the proceedings. However, according to the case file, she never instructed her lawyers to lodge an application on her behalf before the Court (see N. and M. v. Russia, cited above, § 61).
49. As regards WLW, the organisation first contacted the applicant on 11 March 2010, while she was in immigration detention pending her expulsion. The applicant signed the written authority dated 11 March 2011, which only conferred authority on WLW to represent her in the administrative proceedings seeking a recovery and reflection period (see, conversely, Diallo v. the Czech Republic, no. 20493/07, § 22, 23 June 2011). However, as admitted by WLW (see paragraph 38 above), the organisation did not represent the applicant at any stage of the asylum proceedings, nor ‒ as has been already stated ‒ did the applicant provide WLW with any written authority to act before the Court or produce any explicit instruction in this regard.
50. Furthermore, according to the communications sent by WLW to the Court on 22 July 2014 and on 10 and 19 June 2015, the organisation has had no direct contact with the applicant since her expulsion. Ms H.M.’s statement that the applicant had confirmed to her by phone in 2011 that she wanted WLW to bring her case before the international courts does not constitute an adequate basis for the Court to establish that the applicant was aware of and in agreement with the WLW’s intention to lodge an application before the Court on her behalf and with the approach that WLW would adopt in that application (see N. and M. v. Russia, cited above, § 57).
51. It is also important to note that the domestic courts withdrew the authority dated 11 March 2010 and found that WLW lacked legal standing to represent the applicant in judicial proceedings. The courts were not satisfied by WLW’s reasons as to why the applicant had been incapable of issuing a written authority to act through any of the means provided within the Spanish legal framework, such as the duty rota of the notaries’ professional association or the Spanish consular services available in Nigeria.
52. The Court finds that, contrary to what is suggested by WLW, the Court’s findings in the case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu (cited above) are not applicable to the present case. In Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu, the Court held that it was of considerable significance that neither the capacity of the Centre for Legal Resources (the organisation bringing the case before the Court) to act nor its representations on Mr Câmpeanu’s behalf before the domestic medical and judicial authorities were questioned or challenged in any way. The Court also pointed out other relevant circumstances as regards Mr Câmpeanu’s extreme vulnerability which were absent in the applicant’s case: he would have been incapable of initiating proceedings in the domestic courts without proper legal support and advice. The Centre for Legal Resources had become involved at a time when he was manifestly incapable of expressing any wishes or views regarding his own needs and interests, let alone whether or not to pursue any remedies. Lastly, the respondent Government had failed to comply with its statutory obligation to appoint a legal representative (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu, cited above, §§ 104-114).
53. In the view of the aforementioned, the Court cannot but conclude that WLW has no standing to lodge the application. Consequently, in the circumstances of the case the application must be rejected for being incompatible ratione personae, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 12 July 2016.
Fatoş AracıHelena Jäderblom
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy