Communicated on 28 August 2018
FIFTH SECTION
Application no. 55276/17
John Joseph GILLIGAN and Others against Ireland
and three other applications
(see list appended)
1. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
1. Gilligan and others v. Ireland (application no. 55276/17)
(a) The interim and interlocutory orders
3. In the period from 1967 to 1993 the first applicant had received sixteen convictions for offences including larceny and receiving stolen property. In November 1996, after the arrest of the first applicant at an airport with around £330,000 on his person in cash, the Criminal Assets Bureau (‘CAB’) made an application in respect of all four applicants for an “interim order” pursuant to section 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 (‘PoCA’) which was granted in November 1996 without notice to the applicants, and a list of properties and other assets owned by the applicants was appended to the interim order.
4. The CAB subsequently made an application in respect of all four applicants for an “interlocutory order” pursuant to section 3(1) PoCA, which was granted by the High Court on 5 December 1996. Further interlocutory orders were granted on 19 December 1996 and 16 July 1997.
5. After the interim order was made, the applicants made applications pursuant to section 6 PoCA for necessary expenses, which was granted in February 1997 by the High Court. The order was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal on 13 May 1997 and remitted the case to the High Court. The High Court made a fresh section 6 PoCA order in July 1997 in respect of the second, third and fourth applicants.
(b) Constitutional challenge to PoCA legislation and other applications
6. The first applicant brought proceedings before the High Court to challenge the constitutionality of the PoCA legislation in February 1997, which were dismissed on 26 June 1997. The Supreme Court dismissed his appeal on 18 October 2001.
7. The applicants’ solicitors sought various other orders relating to the proceedings which were refused in 1999 and 2000. The Supreme Court dismissed appeals against those decisions in April 2005.
8. In around 2005, the applicants made applications under section 3(3) PoCA seeking to discharge the third interlocutory order on procedural grounds. The High Court dismissed the applications in January 2006. The applicants appealed the decision, and also sought a (very lengthy) extension of time to appeal the interlocutory orders made by the High Court in 1996 and 1997. On 19 December 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and refused to extend the time limit to appeal (being twenty-one days from the passing and perfecting of the judgment or order appealed against, according to the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986).
(c) High Court decisions of January and December 2011
9. The applicants brought substantive section 3(3) PoCA applications to vary or discharge the third interlocutory order before the High Court. The applicants filed notices of motion to commence these proceedings separately on dates between 16 February 2009 and 7 April 2009. The applications were dismissed by the High Court on 27 January 2011 (the “first 2011 judgment”).
10. The CAB subsequently made an application for a section 4 PoCA disposal order. On 20 December 2011 the High Court granted the disposal order application in respect of all four applicants (the “second 2011 judgment”).
11. Finally, the first and second applicants (only) brought proceedings before the High Court in 2011 alleging a breach of the Convention in the orders made against them (with reference to Article 1 Protocol 1 to the Convention). The proceedings were dismissed on 20 December 2011 (the “third 2011 judgment”).
(d) Supreme Court decision of 1 February 2017
12. The applicants appealed all three High Court decisions. They also sought to set aside the Supreme Court judgment of 19 December 2008. The Supreme Court, by judgment dated 1 February 2017, dismissed the appeals against all three High Court decisions and the application to set aside the 2008 Supreme Court judgment.
2. Keaney v. Ireland (application no. 55276/17)
(a) The High Court proceedings
13. In February 2006, the applicant brought claims against some 18 defendants for negligence, breach of contract/duty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and/or undue influence arising out of the failure of a business venture. He was represented throughout the domestic proceedings.
14. In April 2006, the action was admitted to the Commercial List by the High Court. Notices of motion to strike out all or part of the statement of claim were issued on behalf of various defendants. The motions came before the High Court for a four day hearing in July 2006. In a judgment dated 16 January 2007, the case pleaded against a number of the defendants was struck out in all or in part by the High Court. Certain claims were allowed to proceed to trial.
15. Following the judgment, the High Court ordered that a further statement of claim be delivered pleading the surviving causes of actions against the remaining defendants. A fresh statement of claim was the subject of further motions on the basis that it failed to comply with previous court orders. Ultimately, in June 2008 the High Court made an order directing that portions of the statement of claim be excised. The applicant delivered a fully compliant statement of claim in July 2008.
16. The surviving claims came before the High Court for a five day hearing in July 2008. Legal submissions were then heard over the course of two days in October 2008. In a written judgment dated 19 December 2008, the High Court dismissed the surviving claims.
(b) The Supreme Court proceedings
17. By way of a notice dated February 2007, the applicant appealed the judgment of the High Court dated January 2007. By way of a notice dated February 2009, the applicant appealed the judgment of the High Court dated December 2008.
18. In its judgment of 23 July 2015, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of the High Court dated January 2007. The Supreme Court observed that the applicant’s written submissions fell far short of the requirements of the Supreme Court Practice Direction to set out clearly and succinctly the issues of law to be argued on appeal.
19. In its judgment of 5 April 2017 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of the High Court dated December 2008.
3. Nash v. Ireland (application no. 1882/18)
20. In 1997, both the applicant and another individual D.L. confessed separately and independently to the brutal murder of two women. In July 1998, a decision was made by the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) to charge the applicant with the murders. The decision to charge the applicant was made on 1 July 1998 but the DPP directed that he should not be charged until the book of evidence was completed so that it could be served on him when charged. Those measures had not been finalised when D.L. died on 12 September 2000. Following D.L.’s death, the DPP decided that there was no longer sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. During this period, the applicant was imprisoned as a result of having been convicted of other serious crimes. In the years that followed a number of requests by the applicant for a prison transfer were refused. The reason given by the authorities for not acceding to the applicant’s requests for transfer was the fact that he remained under suspicion for the murders even though, as was made clear at the time in question, there was no then current intention to prosecute him as it was not considered that there was, at the time, sufficient evidence to warrant such a prosecution.
21. In 2007, forensic evidence was re-examined. DNA belonging to the victims were recovered from the applicant’s clothes. The applicant was formally charged in October 2009.
The criminal proceedings
22. In April 2010, the applicant brought proceedings by way of judicial review seeking a prohibition on prosecution on the basis of delay. He also sought a remedy in damages for same. In 2012, the High Court refused both applications. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. In January 2015, the Supreme Court rejected his appeal against the refusal to prohibit the prosecution on the basis of delay. As a result, the criminal trial proceeded before the Central Criminal Court and in April 2015 the applicant was convicted and sentenced to two life sentences.
23. On 24 October 2016, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the High Court’s refusal to award the applicant damages in respect of delay. The Supreme Court found that both the Convention and the Constitution guaranteed the right to an expeditious trial; and that there is a right at least in principle to damages for a breach of same. For the purposes of establishing delay, the applicant submitted that time began to run from the DPP’s decision to charge him in 1998. The Supreme Court concluded that even if this was the correct starting point there was no ‘culpable delay’ on the part of the state. In this regard, the case fell into the bracket of being a ‘cold case’, which was being looked at from time to time by the authorities. On one such occasion, the Supreme Court held, it proved possible to find some additional, very small and hidden, samples of blood which, in the light of improved forensic science, proved capable of yielding results. The Supreme Court noted that since the murders there had been an extremely reasonable basis for there being no prosecution due to the insufficient evidence to justify action being taken. Advances in science had made additional forensic analysis possible.
24. The applicant subsequently applied for rectification of alleged factual errors contained in the Supreme Court’s judgment. On 13 July 2017, the Supreme Court allowed certain factual corrections to be made, but otherwise dismissed what it treated as an application to set aside the October 2016 judgment. The applicant’s appeal against his April 2015 conviction for the two murders was rejected by the Court of Appeal on 8 May 2018.
4. Rooney v. Ireland (application no. 6870/18)
25. This application relates to separate civil actions brought by the applicant, broadly concerning the operation of a government scheme to eradicate bovine tuberculosis. Two of those civil actions were the subject of a judgment by the Court on 31 October 2013 (Rooney v. Ireland, no. 32614/10), in which the Court found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
(a) The 1987 proceedings
26. The complicated procedural history is fully outlined in the Court’s judgment of October 2013. The judgment noted that the applicant had a pending appeal to the Supreme Court at the time (appeals no. 111/1990) in respect of the High Court’s refusal to allow him to amend a statement of claim originally delivered in 1989.
27. In December 2015, the Supreme Court heard the applicant’s appeals in relation to the motion for amendment of the statement of claim (appeals no. 430/2010) and the motion for judgment in default of defence (appeals no. 111/1990). On 28 January 2016, the court dismissed both appeals. The remaining defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings. In May 2017, the High Court acceded to the motion. The applicant’s appeal of this decision was dismissed of consent by the Court of Appeal on 28 July 2017.
(b) The 2012 and 2015 proceedings
28. In December 2012, the applicant commenced a new set of proceedings raising complaints about the manner in which the Supreme Court had dealt with his previous appeals. In July 2013, the High Court dismissed the claim.
29. In 2015, the applicant commenced another set of proceedings, in which he sought declarations that he had been the victim of a miscarriage of justice committed by the judiciary. In May 2017, the High Court struck out the claim, considering that the claim constituted an attempt to re-litigate issues which had already been finally and conclusively determined. The court imposed a civil restraint order. The applicant’s appeal of this decision was dismissed of consent by the Court of Appeal on 28 July 2017.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. The Proceeds of Crime Act 1996
30. Section 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act permits a court to make an interim order in certain circumstances:
“2.—(1) Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court on application to it ex parte in that behalf by a member or an authorised officer—
(a) that a person is in possession or control of—
(i) specified property and that the property constitutes, directly or indirectly, proceeds of crime, or
(ii) specified property that was acquired, in whole or in part, with or in connection with property that, directly or indirectly, constitutes proceeds of crime,
and
(b) that the value of the property or, as the case may be, the total value of the property referred to in both subparagraphs (i) and (ii), of paragraph (a) is not less than £10,000,
the Court may make an order (“an interim order”) prohibiting the person or any other specified person or any other person having notice of the order from disposing of or otherwise dealing with the whole or, if appropriate, a specified part of the property or diminishing its value during the period of 21 days from the date of the making of the order.”
31. Section 3 of the Act permits a court to make an interlocutory order in certain circumstances:
“3.—(1) Where, on application to it in that behalf by the applicant, it appears to the Court, on evidence tendered by the applicant, consisting of or including evidence admissible by virtue of section 8 —
(a) that a person is in possession or control of—
(i) specified property and that the property constitutes, directly or indirectly, proceeds of crime, or
(ii) specified property that was acquired, in whole or in part, with or in connection with property that, directly or indirectly, constitutes proceeds of crime,
and
(b) that the value of the property or, as the case may be, the total value of the property referred to in both subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of paragraph (a) is not less than £10,000,
the Court shall make an order (“an interlocutory order”) prohibiting the respondent or any other specified person or any other person having notice of the order from disposing of or otherwise dealing with the whole or, if appropriate, a specified part of the property or diminishing its value ...
(2) ...
(3) Where an interlocutory order is in force, the Court, on application to it in that behalf at any time by the respondent or any other person claiming ownership of any of the property concerned, may, if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the property or a specified part of it is property to which paragraph (I) of subsection (1) applies, or that the order causes any other injustice, discharge or, as may be appropriate, vary the order.
(4) – (7) ...”
32. Section 4 of the Act permits a court to make a disposal order in certain circumstances:
“4.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), where an interlocutory order has been in force for not less than 7 years in relation to specified property, the Court, on application to it in that behalf by the applicant, may make an order (“a disposal order”) directing that the whole or, if appropriate, a specified part of the property be transferred, subject to such terms and conditions as the Court may specify, to the Minister or to such other person as the Court may determine.
(2) – (8) ...”
2. European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003
33. Article 1 of the Act includes the following definition:
“organ of the State” includes a tribunal or any other body (other than the President or the Oireachtas or either House of the Oireachtas or a Committee of either such House or a Joint Committee of both such Houses or a court) which is established by law or through which any of the legislative, executive or judicial powers of the State are exercised.”
34. Section 3 (1) of the Act provides:
“3.—(1) Subject to any statutory provision (other than this Act) or rule of law, every organ of the State shall perform its functions in a manner compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention provisions.”
35. In accordance with Section 3 (2):
“A person who has suffered injury, loss or damage as a result of a contravention of subsection (1), may, if no other remedy in damages is available, institute proceedings to recover damages in respect of the contravention in the High Court (or, subject to subsection (3), in the Circuit Court) and the Court may award to the person such damages (if any) as it considers appropriate.”
3. Relevant case-law
36. On 24 October 2016 the Supreme Court gave judgment in the case of Nash v. D.P.P. ([2016] IESC 60) in which the appellant claimed that there had been excessive delay in the criminal proceedings brought against him and sought an award of damages. While the Supreme Court rejected his claim on the facts of the case, the judgment also addressed in more general terms the possibility of claiming damages where legal proceedings, criminal or civil, are not completed within a reasonable time. The judgment referred first to the possibility of a claim under the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003:
“2.1 [I]t is clear that, at least at the level of principle and at least in many cases, a claim can be maintained in damages against an organ of the State (as defined in that Act) in respect of a breach of the rights conferred by the ECHR.”
37. However, since an award of damages under the 2003 Act may be sought only if no other remedy in damages is available (Section 3(2)), the judgment also considered the constitutional basis for such a claim. It recalled:
“[2.8] It is therefore clear that the constitutional right to a timely trial has been well established for many years. Given that it has also been clear that, in an appropriate case, damages can be awarded for the breach of a constitutional right, it has been clearly established for some time in our jurisprudence that there is, at least at the level of principle and in some circumstances, an entitlement to damages for breach of the constitutional right to a timely trial. However, just as in the case of a claim for damages for breach of the similar right guaranteed by the ECHR, there may well be questions as to the precise circumstances in which such an entitlement to damages may arise.
[2.9] It is also important to note at least the possibility that the appropriate approach to the calculation of the quantum of damages in such cases might not necessarily be the same as and between a claim for damages arising out of a breach of rights guaranteed by the ECHR and a claim for damages arising out of a breach of similar rights guaranteed by the Constitution. This is a matter which may require a definitive determination in the future. It certainly appears to be the case that the level of damages typically awarded by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) falls somewhat below the level of damages which might be awarded by an Irish court in respect of a claim for damages in similar circumstances arising in respect of a breach of rights under Irish law whether that law be the Constitution, an Irish statute or derived from the common law as it is understood in Ireland. It remains for determination whether, in a claim which was based solely on the breach of rights conferred by the ECHR, an Irish court should award damages broadly equivalent to those which it might be expected would be awarded by the ECtHR or should approach the question of damages by considering the quantum which would be awarded in a similar case involving a breach of rights under Irish law.
[2.10] Furthermore, as damages for breach of rights guaranteed by the ECHR can only be awarded under the 2003 Act where no other remedy in damages is available, it is necessary to ascertain if damages under the Constitution may be awarded before going on to consider a claim in damages under the 2003 Act.
...
[4.4] As I understand that jurisprudence, the ECtHR is concerned to ensure that, notwithstanding the differing systems which exist across contracting states, there is a common or autonomous approach to the time when the criminal process can be said to be in being even though the application of that common approach may give rise to questions of interpretation in the context of its application to the legal systems of any particular state. It seems clear that the question of when the process can be said to have begun cannot be definitively determined solely by reference to what might be considered the point at which a person is “charged” in the meaning of the law of the state concerned or when the Court which will conduct any trial is first seised of the case. For example in Deweer a person who was told that he was to be prosecuted but was given the option of paying a fixed fine for the purposes of avoiding prosecution was held to have been the subject of the criminal process from that point onwards so that an assessment of whether his right to a timely trial had been complied with was to be assessed by reference to that date. It seems clear that it does not necessarily follow that the date of charge, in the sense in which that term may be defined in the law of the state concerned, is necessarily decisive. Likewise, the date of an arrest leading to a charge seems to have been regarded as appropriate. However, in this jurisdiction, given the very limited periods for which a person can be held without charge, it would not seem that an arrest immediately leading to a charge at the end of a period of questioning would make any great difference to an overall assessment of the length of time involved for it could not extend the relevant period by more than a week or so at most.
[4.5] On the other hand there does not seem to me to be anything in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR which suggests that the process can be taken to have begun at a time when the person is simply a suspect who is no more than the subject of police investigation. The only complicating factor in the circumstances of this case is the fact that Mr. Nash, while in custody as a result of other offences, spent a brief period of time separately arrested for the purposes of questioning in respect of the Grangegorman murders. He was, however, released in the technical sense from that custody after a short period of time as a result of questioning which did not advance matters and returned to the custody from which he had come. I cannot see anything in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR which suggests that a short period of arrest for questioning followed by a release leads to the commencement of a process even in circumstances where, notwithstanding the questioning concerned, the prosecuting authorities formed the view that there was not, at that time, a sufficient basis for bringing a prosecution.
[4.6] There may be some doubt as to precisely how the established jurisprudence of the ECtHR can fit into an assessment of when the criminal process can be said to have begun in a common law system. In such a system there is no formal investigation in the sense either of the matter being formally under investigation through a public prosecutor or an investigating magistrate or other judicial or quasi judicial figure. In the common law system there is simply evidence gathering, a consideration of the evidence so gathered by the D.P.P., and a decision on whether the evidence so gathered is sufficient to warrant a charge. It will be necessary to comment further on this process in due course.
[4.7] For those reasons I am prepared to accept, simply for the purposes of argument and for a consideration of how such a principle might be applied on the facts of this case, that a delay on the part of investigating authorities might, in a suitably serious case, be taken into account even though that delay did not involve the arrest or imprisonment of the suspect or any other formal restraint being placed upon him and other than an arrest which pre-dated, by a material margin, the time at which the suspect was ultimately brought within the formal court process.
...
[4.10] However, even if there is a legitimate basis for considering that time began to run at some stage before Mr. Nash was formally charged, it is necessary that it is established that there was some culpable failure on the part of some element of the State apparatus which occurred during the relevant period and which could be said to have deprived Mr. Nash of his entitlement under Art. 6-1 to a reasonably expeditious or timely trial.
[4.11] For the reasons already advanced I am not satisfied that there is any basis for suggesting that there could have been any culpable delay on the part of the investigating authorities in this case at least until the time when there had been a sufficient advance in technology to enable smaller samples to produce usable DNA results. The evidence at the hearing in the High Court as to the time when that point was reached suggested, perhaps, that the relevant technology may have been available from 2005 or 2006 although there was some suggestion at the hearing of this appeal that the time in question may have been earlier. However, the availability of that technology was not, of itself, enough. It was also necessary to find a sufficient sample which was capable of analysis under that new technology. It is for that reason that I emphasised, in reviewing the facts, that no such sample had previously been identified and that it was only in the context of a potentially final review of the evidence, which arose in the light of Mr. Nash’s persistent requests for transfer, that the additional samples which proved productive were discovered.
[4.12] This case seems, therefore, to fit very neatly into the common term of “cold case”. From time to time investigating authorities may choose to take a fresh look at such cases and, occasionally, fresh evidence may emerge which indicates new lines of inquiry. While there may be a sense in which such cases are never formally closed (certainly in the Irish system) it is not reasonable to expect that the cases concerned should continue to be the subject of weekly or monthly consideration. It is also important to record that, under Irish law, there is no such thing as a formally open or closed investigation in the criminal context. The police force and the D.P.P. simply conduct whatever inquiries or investigations are considered appropriate and bring whatever cases are considered warranted before the courts. There is no formal, in any legal sense, opening of a criminal investigation and, likewise, no formal closing. Any potential crime which has come to the attention of the authorities can always be the subject of further review and, if that review throws up sufficient evidence, give rise to criminal proceedings although the courts will always have to consider whether the lapse of time between the events and the matter coming before the court renders the continuation of a prosecution unfair.”
38. The judgment later stated:
“5.1 ... For the reasons already addressed it has been clear for some time that, at the level of principle, a potential claim for damages for breach of a right to a timely trial arises under the Constitution. For the reasons identified in the case law to which reference has already been made, I am satisfied that the Constitution does guarantee a right to a timely trial. There may, of course, be questions as to whether there has been a breach of that right in the circumstances of a particular case and also as to what person or body may be regarded as having contributed to the breach of the right concerned. In the party led courts system which applies in common law countries, the principal obligation for progressing proceedings lies on the parties themselves. However, the courts system provides mechanisms to enable any party who is dissatisfied with the pace of litigation to seek an appropriate intervention by the court to ensure that the litigation progresses at an appropriate pace.”
C. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
39. In McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, 10 September 2010, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 6 and Article 13 in relation to the excessive length of criminal proceedings and lack of an effective remedy.
40. In its role under Article 46 of the Convention to supervise the execution of judgments of the Court, the Committee of Ministers has examined the measures proposed and taken by Ireland to execute McFarlane, cited above, on a number of occasions.
41. As its most recent examination of the case at its 1288th DH meeting of 6-7 June 2017, the Committee adopted the following decision:
“...
3. as concerns the violation of Article 13, noted with interest the work undertaken by the authorities so far, including the report and recommendations of the Expert Group established in 2011 in response to the judgments of the Court in the McFarlane group, to explore various alternatives for putting in place an effective remedy for excessive length of proceedings;
4. noted also the Supreme Court’s judgment of 24 October 2016 in the case of Nash v. DPP where it held that, in principle, damages may be awarded for excessive length of proceedings, but considered that this judgment alone does not demonstrate the existence of an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention;
5. regretted that the authorities have not yet established such an effective remedy, even though the oldest judgment in this group of cases has been pending before the Committee for more than six years;
6. strongly encouraged the authorities to take all necessary measures to finalise rapidly the adoption of an effective remedy for excessive length of proceedings in line with Convention principles as established in the Court’s case law ...”
42. Since then the Irish authorities submitted an updated action plan to the Committee on 5 April 2018 (DH-DD(2018)360) announcing their intention to introduce a non-court based compensation mechanism. Independent assessors will be responsible for awarding compensation where they consider there has been a breach of the reasonable time requirement under Article 6.
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complain that the domestic proceedings were incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and, under Article 13, that they had no effective domestic remedy in that regard.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Has there been a breach in these cases of the right to have one’s criminal or civil rights determined within a reasonable time pursuant to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?
2. Did the applicants have at their disposal an effective domestic remedy for their complaints under Article 6, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?
The parties’ attention is drawn to the Court’s findings in McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, § 120-124, 10 September 2010 and the Court’s conclusion that the constitutional remedy at issue could not amount to an effective remedy in particular due to the absence of a specific and streamlined procedure; the speed of the remedial action; and the legal costs and expenses burden the remedial action could impose. In this connection, the parties are also asked to comment on:
- how the Supreme Court judgment in Nash v. Director of Public Prosecutions, unreported, Supreme Court, Clarke J., 24th October 2016 and the related decision on an application to set aside that judgment due to factual errors in Nash v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESC 51 of 13 July 2017 addresses those findings;
- the decision of the Committee of Ministers at its 1288th meeting on 6‑7 June 2017 in which it found that the Nash judgment alone does not demonstrate the existence of an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention.
3. Has the applicant in Nash v. Ireland complied with the six-month time limit?
APPENDIX
No.
Application
no.
Lodged on
Applicant name
date of birth
place of residence
Represented by
55276/17*
26/07/2017
John Joseph GILLIGAN
29/03/1952
Dublin
Geraldine Gilligan
21/09/1956
Enfield
Tracey Gilligan
11/09/1974
Dublin
Darren Gilligan
13/09/1975
Dublin
STOKE PARTNERSHIP SOLICITORS
72060/17*
02/10/2017
Vincent KEANEY
19/07/1955
Cobh
Paul O’SULLIVAN
1882/18
04/01/2018
Mark NASH
16/04/1973
Portlaoise
MACGUILL & COMPANY SOLICITORS
6870/18*
29/01/2018
John ROONEY
21/03/1956
Scotstown
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy