Published on 12 July 2021
THIRD SECTION
Application no. 11519/20
Nikolay Sergeyevich GLUKHIN
against Russia
lodged on 31 January 2020
communicated on 23 June 2021
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The applicant was arrested by the police on a train in Moscow metro. The police told him that his name was on the wanted persons’ list and he had been identified by the facial recognition cameras installed in the metro. He was subsequently convicted of an administrative offence of a breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events for displaying in Moscow metro a life-size cardboard human figure with an inscription. The evidence against him submitted by the police included screenshots from a video published on a public Telegram channel and screenshots of recordings made by the metro surveillance cameras. The domestic courts found that the applicant had held a solo demonstration with recourse to a “quickly (de)assembled object” and should have therefore submitted a prior notification to the local authorities.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Did the lack of a prosecuting party and the allegedly excessively active role of the trial court in the administrative-offence proceedings against the applicant entail violations of the principles of the equality of arms, adversarial procedure and impartiality under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Karelin v. Russia, no. 926/08, 20 September 2016)?
2. Did the Internet monitoring by the police, the applicant’s filming by the metro surveillance cameras, the storage of the video recordings, their collection by the police, the use of facial recognition technic to examine them and to arrest the applicant and the use of the recordings and/or screenshots thereof in the administrative offence proceedings against the applicant amount to an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention (see Peck v. the United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, §§ 57-59, ECHR 2003‑I, and Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, no. 45245/15, §§ 66-70, 13 February 2020)? If so, was that interference compatible with the requirements of Article 8 § 2? In particular:
(i) Was the interference prescribed by law? Does the legal framework governing the Internet monitoring by the police, the filming by the metro surveillance cameras, the procedures for the storing, accessing, examining, communicating, using and destroying the video recordings made by such cameras and of screenshots thereof, and the use of facial recognition technic meet the “quality of law” requirements by providing for adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse (see S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, § 99 and 103, ECHR 2008, and Gardel v. France, no. 16428/05, § 62, ECHR 2009)?
(ii) Did the interference pursue a legitimate aim?
(iii) Was the interference “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention? Did the domestic courts adduce “relevant” and “sufficient” reasons for the interference?
The Government are requested to produce a copy of the decision to put the applicant’s name on the wanted persons’ list and authorising the use of facial recognition technic to discover him, copies of the decisions authorising the collection by the police of the video recordings of the applicant made by the metro surveillance cameras and other operational‑search activities against the applicant, if any, as well as copies of all procedural decisions concerning the storing, accessing, communicating, using and destroying those recordings and/or screenshots thereof. What were the reasons for putting the applicant’s name on the wanted persons’ list?
3. Did the applicant’s administrative arrest and the administrative offence proceedings against him for a failure to notify a solo demonstration with recourse to a “quickly (de)assembled object” violate his right to freedom of expression, contrary to Article 10 of the Convention (compare Novikova and Others v. Russia, nos. 25501/07 and 4 others, 26 April 2016)? Taking account of paragraph 33 of Ruling No. 28 of 26 June 2018 by the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia, was the applicant’s conviction under Article 20.2 § 5 of the Code of Administrative Procedure “prescribed by law”? In particular, was it proved that he had violated statutory duties or bans prescribed by paragraphs 3 and 4 of section 6 of the Public Events Act? Which of the legitimate aims listed in Article 10 § 2 were pursued by both the statutory requirement to notify a solo demonstration and the imposition of the fine on the applicant? Was there any “pressing social need” for such statutory requirement and for prosecuting the applicant? Did the domestic courts perform a careful balancing exercise between the need to punish a breach of the prior notification requirement and the applicant’s right to freedom of expression?
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