SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 46259/99
by Glyfada Municipal Council
against Greece
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section) sitting on 27 January 2000 as a Chamber composed of
MrM. Fischbach, President,
MrC.L. Rozakis,
MrG. Bonello,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrA. Kovler, judges,
andMrE. Fribergh, Section Registrar;
Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 21 December 1998 by Glyfada Municipal Council against Greece and registered on 17 February 1999 under file no. 46259/99;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Municipal Council of a suburb of Athens. It is represented before the Court by Mr N. Frangakis, a lawyer practising in Athens.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
In 1985, the Municipal Council constructed five tennis courts, a warehouse, a dressing-room and a small bar in an area owned by it. In 1992, it enlarged the site and transferred it to the Tennis Club of Glyfada.
By decision no. 406/1992 which altered the development plan in this area, the Municipal Council invited the Pireus Prefecture to designate the area as a green and sports area. The Pireus Prefecture did so by decision no. 10976/1993 of 9 August 1993.
On 1 October 1993, a number of residents of Glyfada applied to the Supreme Administrative Court for judicial review of decisions nos.406/1992 and 10976/1993. The application was directed against the Minister of Environment, Town Planning and Public Works. On 11 September 1995, the Municipal Council intervened in the proceedings in favour of the Minister. The hearing took place on 5 June 1996 and the judgment delivered on 29 June 1998.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, about the length of proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court.
THE LAW
The Glyfada Municipal Council complains of the length of the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court. It invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, according to which :
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
In the first place, the Municipal Council maintains that it validly applied to the Court, as it is a non-governmental organisation within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. It alleges that Municipal Councils in general form constitutionally established bodies of local authorities with proper legal personality. As a result of the autonomy of Municipal councils, the local affairs, in particular those relating to the promotion of the social, economic and cultural interests of the City, come under their exclusive competence. The interests of the Municipal Council and those of the citizens of the City largely overlap. The public authority exercised by Municipal Councils is attenuated by the fact that the State supervises the decisions adopted by them and controls not only the legality but, also in some cases, the expediency of these decisions. In the present case, the Pireus Prefecture adopted its decision on the basis of the Glyfada Municipal Council’s initiative in relation to the sports and leisure needs of the population of the City of Glyfada, which prompted the said initiative.
The Court notes that according to Article 34 of the Convention, it may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals. It considers that local authorities are public law bodies which perform official duties assigned to them by the Constitution and by substantive law. They are therefore quite clearly governmental organisations. In this connection, the Court recalls that in international law the expression “governmental organisation” cannot be held to refer only to the Government or the central organs of the State. Where powers are distributed along decentralised lines, it refers to any national authority which exercises public authority.
The Court also considers that the applicant cannot be regarded as a person or a group of individuals within the meaning of Article 34. Such a construction would not be compatible with the distinction drawn in that provision between non-governmental organisations, on the one hand, and persons or groups of individuals on the other.
Consequently, the applicant is not entitled to lodge an application under Article 34 of the Convention.
It follows that the application is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and must therefore be rejected under Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Erik FriberghMarc Fischbach
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy