FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 32558/96
by Boris GONTJAROW
against Finland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) sitting on 3 February 2000 as a Chamber composed of
MrG. Ress, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrA. Pastor Ridruejo,
MrI. Cabral Barreto,
MrV. Butkevych,
MrJ. Hedigan,
MrsS. Botoucharova, judges,
andMrV. Berger, Section Registrar;
Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 5 June 1996 by Boris Gontjarow against Finland and registered on 7 August 1996 under file no. 32558/96;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants is a Finnish national born in 1915. He resides in Lieto.
He is represented before the Court by Mr Kai Kaituri, a lawyer in Paattinen.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
In 1991 the applicant signed certain employment contracts on behalf of a group of companies. In decisions of 14 October 1992 the relevant pension insurance company found that as the applicant’s companies had not been registered as legal persons the applicant himself had to be regarded as the employer. As a result the applicant was obliged to pay over FIM 114,000 (approximately the same in FF) in employer’s contributions. According to the attached notice of appeal, an appeal was to be signed by the appellant himself or any other author. If the appeal was not signed by the appellant, it should include a power-of-attorney and indicate the representative’s profession and address.
The applicant contested the decisions of the pension insurance company in appeals to the Pension Board (eläkelautakunta, pensionsnämnden). The appeals were signed by the applicant himself but indicated Mr Kaituri as their author. The addresses of both were stated.
In decisions of 17 October 1994 the Pension Board refused the applicant’s appeals. The decisions were dispatched to the applicant’s address by regular mail on 26 October 1994. The applicant allegedly received the decisions on 5 December 1994 and on 16 December 1994 he appealed to the Insurance Court (vakuutusoikeus, försäkringsdomstolen).
On 21 December 1995 the Insurance Court declined to examine the merits of the applicant’s appeals, considering that they had been lodged out of time. The Insurance Court noted that the appeals to the Pension Board had been signed by the applicant himself and that he had been “assisted” by Mr Kaituri. In his appeal to the Insurance Court the applicant had explained that the letters from the Pension Board had arrived in a post box which he did not empty every day, inter alia due to his disability. Having been invited to explain this point further, the applicant had stated to the Insurance Court that in November 1994 he had not been expecting any mail which would have required action. As for the Pension Board’s forthcoming decisions, he had expected to be notified thereof through his “representative” Mr Kaituri. The Insurance Court found that the applicant had not submitted sufficient evidence, inter alia of his allegation that he had received the Pension Board’s decisions only on 5 December 1994. The Insurance Court concluded therefore that the applicant should be deemed to have received them on 2 November 1994, in accordance with the presumption stated in the relevant notice of appeal. Consequently, the applicant’s further appeals should have been lodged at the latest on 2 December 1994.
The applicant applied to the Supreme Court for restoration of the time-limit for appealing against the Pension Board’s decisions. He further sought to have the Insurance Court’s decision nullified (poistaa, undanröja) and applied for cost-free proceedings with Mr Kaituri as his representative. Mr Kaituri was indicated as the drafter of the application to have the time-limit restored.
On 23 May 1996 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the applicant’s request for cost-free proceedings, noting that under law a grant to this effect was not possible in matters before the Insurance Court. The Supreme Court found no grounds for nullifying the Insurance Court’s decision or reinstating the proceedings.
COMPLAINTS
1.The applicant complains that the proceedings did not meet the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. As the Pension Board’s decisions imposed a significant financial obligation on him he should not have been notified thereof merely through a regular letter. The decisions should have been sent either to his representative alone or to both himself and his representative. In a case involving the applicant’s own social security and where Mr Kaituri had equally been indicated as the author of the appeal the Board for Accident Compensation (tapaturmalautakunta, olycksfallsnämnden) had, in 1992, notified the latter of its decision.
2.The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention that he was refused cost-free proceedings despite the importance of the matter at stake.
THE LAW
1.The applicant has first complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the Pension Board’s decisions should have been sent either to his representative or both to himself and his representative but in any case not only to the applicant himself.
The Court has examined the application under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing before (a) .... tribunal ... ”
Article 6 § 1 guarantees litigants an effective right of access to the courts for the determination of their civil rights and obligations. Regulations concerning time-limits to be observed when lodging an appeal undoubtedly serve the purpose of ensuring the proper administration of justice.
The Court finds that the applicant has not shown that he had attached to his appeals to the Pension Board, as required in the relevant notice of appeal, a power-of-attorney authorising Mr Kaituri to act as his representative. Nor has he shown that he requested, for the reasons later stated to the Insurance Court, that the Pension Board’s decisions be sent to Mr Kaituri rather than to himself.
In these circumstances and noting the Insurance Court’s detailed examination of the reasons underlying the applicant’s belated appeals, the Court cannot find that the applicant was denied his right of access to the Insurance Court.
The Court therefore finds this part of the application manifestly ill-founded and rejects it pursuant to Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
2.The applicant has further complained under the above-cited Article 6 of the refusal to grant him cost-free proceedings.
The Court notes that the Convention does not guarantee legal aid in proceedings involving the determination of someone’s civil rights. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention leaves to the State a free choice of the means to be used towards ensuring to litigants an effective right of access to court. Although the institution of a legal aid scheme constitutes one of those there are others such as, for example, simplification of the procedure. Nonetheless, Article 6 § 1 may sometimes compel the State to provide for the assistance of a lawyer when such assistance provides indispensable for an effective access to the court either because legal representation is rendered compulsory or by reason of the complexity of the procedure or of the case.
In the present case, the Court notes that the procedure before the Supreme Court was relatively simple and that legal representation was at the relevant time not compulsory before any court in Finland. In any case the applicant’s application to the Supreme Court was drafted by a lawyer. In the circumstances of the case the Court finds that the applicant had sufficient opportunity to present his arguments to the Supreme Court through his representative.
The Court therefore concludes that the applicant was not denied an effective right of access to the Supreme Court for the purpose of challenging the Insurance Court’s decision.
The Court therefore finds that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded and rejects it pursuant to Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Vincent BergerGeorg Ress
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy