GÖZÜTOK v. TÜRKİYE

SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 41412/21
Mevlüt GÖZÜTOK
against Türkiye

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 18 March 2025 as a Chamber composed of:

 Arnfinn Bårdsen, President,
 Saadet Yüksel,
 Jovan Ilievski,
 Anja Seibert-Fohr,
 Davor Derenčinović,
 Gediminas Sagatys,
 Juha Lavapuro, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 5 August 2021,

Having regard to the decision to give notice of the application to the Turkish Government (“the Government”),

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1.  The applicant, Mr Mevlüt Gözütok, is a Turkish national who was born in 1981 and lives in Yalova.

2.  The Government were represented by their Agent at the time, Mr Hacı Ali Açıkgül, former Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Türkiye.

3.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4.  On an unspecified date the applicant was convicted by the Istanbul Assize Court of membership of an illegal organisation, the Fetullahist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması). That judgment became final on 25 February 2020. At the time of the disputed events, he was in detention following conviction in Kocaeli T-Type Prison (“Kocaeli Prison”).

5.  On 26 August 2020 the applicant was transferred to the Kocaeli University Research and Training Hospital (“the Kocaeli University Hospital”). According to the gendarmerie’s records of the transfer, several prisoners including the applicant, who presented an escape risk, were escorted to the hospital, where body searches were carried out. Masks, gloves and disinfectants were used, and it was observed that various COVID-19 measures were taken both inside and outside the hospital. The records also showed that the applicant was returned to the prison after the completion of his examination and that the transfer had been uneventful.

6.  On his return to prison, the applicant was placed in a cell which was designated as the “quarantine ward”.

7.  On 1 September 2020 the applicant was taken to the cardiology clinic of the same hospital. According to him, the doctor listened to him briefly without approaching him to carry out any medical examination. His handcuffs were not removed. The notes taken by the doctor for the information of the Kocaeli Prison administration stated that the applicant had been asked to undergo blood and cardiac stress tests and that he had been invited to come back to the hospital for a check the following month. The tests the doctor had asked for were carried out on the same day.

8.  On his return to the prison, the applicant was once again placed in the same quarantine ward, which he stated started the fourteen-day quarantine period running again.

9.  On 18 September 2020 the applicant complained to the Kocaeli enforcement judge that the conditions of the quarantine ward were putting his health and physical well-being at risk. He claimed that it was crowded, with one of the prisoners smoking in the ward, and that the administration’s practice was to place other people in the ward without testing them for COVID-19 or without waiting for the results of the tests. He also claimed that the way his transfer between the prison and the hospital had been carried out was in contravention of hygiene and physical distancing rules because the gendarmerie officers escorting him had remained in close proximity to him and touched him with their hands. Lastly, he complained that the doctor who had examined him at the Kocaeli University Hospital had failed to request the removal of his handcuffs.

10.  On 22 September 2020 the applicant was transferred to his usual cell where he remained until he was taken to the hospital once again on 5 October 2020. He was placed in another quarantine ward on his return to the prison.

11.  On 12 October 2020 the Kocaeli enforcement judge rejected his complaint, finding that the prison administration had taken all the measures required to ensure the health of all the prisoners and to provide for their immediate transfer to the prison doctor or the nearest health institution in case of necessity. Taking into account the substantial number of prisoners in Kocaeli Prison and the risks caused by the pandemic, the applicant’s placement in the quarantine ward and other appropriate measures taken within the context of COVID-19 were not unlawful. The applicant brought a challenge to that decision which was rejected by the Kocaeli Assize Court.

12.  On 22 October 2020 the applicant was allowed to leave the quarantine ward and was transferred back to his usual cell.

13.  On 4 December 2020 he lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court, raising the same complaints as those submitted to the enforcement judge. In particular, he argued that the conditions in the quarantine wards, where he had been held for a period of one and a half months, and the medical examination carried out on him when he was handcuffed were in violation of his right to life and of the prohibition of ill‑treatment.

14.  On 5 February 2021 the Constitutional Court decided to treat the applicant’s complaints as being about a violation of the prohibition of ill‑treatment and rejected them as being manifestly ill-founded, finding that he had failed to substantiate his claims.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

15.  Section 50 of Law no. 5275 on the enforcement of sentences and preventive measures (“Law no. 5275”) provides that handcuffs and restraints may be used for, inter alia, medical reasons, subject to the instructions of doctors and supervision by them.

16.  Article 116 of Regulation No. 26131 on the management of prisons and the enforcement of sentences and preventive measures provides that if there is no ward reserved for prisoners in a State or university hospital where inpatient treatment of a prisoner is carried out, the prisoner may be treated in other units of the hospital after all requisite precautions have been taken by security officers. Article 155 provides that handcuffs may be used during the medical examination, diagnosis and treatment of a prisoner if considered necessary by the physician for safety reasons.

17.  As a preliminary measure, given the number of emerging COVID-19 cases, on 10 January 2020 the Turkish Ministry of Health established a Scientific Advisory Board. Following the declaration by the World Health Organisation that COVID-19 constituted a pandemic, on 13 March 2020 the Ministry of Justice Action Plan for Combating Dangerous Infectious Diseases (“the Action Plan”), which had been prepared on the basis of the Advisory Board’s proposals, entered into force.

The preventive measures in the Action Plan included the disinfection of common areas; the distribution of masks, gloves, bleach and liquid soap free of charge; the setting up of thermal imaging cameras in prisons with high numbers of prisoners and staff; and the isolation of prisoners who were transferred to hospitals for fourteen days on their return to prison. The Action Plan also set out measures for the admission of new prisoners and staff, including PCR (polymerase chain reaction) tests and the isolation of individuals; the suspension of all visits and additional rights to telephone calls; and specific measures regarding the isolation and treatment of those who showed symptoms of COVID-19.

18.  On 15 April 2020 Law no. 7242 amending certain provisions of Law no. 5275 entered into force, granting detainees who fulfilled certain conditions special leave for COVID-19 and easing the terms for conditional release.

19.  The administration of Kocaeli Prison reported on the measures taken during the COVID-19 pandemic, which had followed the recommendations of the Action Plan of the Ministry of Justice.

Before they were admitted to the prison, new prisoners went through a medical examination at the hospital. They were tested for COVID-19 and asked to provide information about any recent travel. All prisoners were regularly given supplies of soap, bleach and masks. Staff who were in contact with the prisoners were obliged to wear masks and gloves. The quarantine wards and all common areas were regularly disinfected and no new admissions were made to the quarantine wards before disinfection. All areas that people touched with their hands were cleaned daily with detergent and all wet surfaces were cleaned with bleach. The body temperatures of all persons entering the prison, including staff, were taken and staff were obliged to undergo PCR tests. The health of all the detainees was monitored using applications such as the Filiation Monitoring System, which deals with isolation and tracking, and anyone suspected of having COVID-19 was recorded and monitored in cooperation with the Ministry of Health. An additional doctor was requested from the Ministry of Health so prisoners could be medically examined without being transferred to hospital, and their access to medicine was facilitated through cooperation with pharmacies.

The report also noted other measures taken to reduce human circulation in the prison, such as the suspension of visits and the imposition of quarantine periods, which were also applied to staff. Awareness of precautions was raised among both staff and prisoners, and further measures were also taken with regard to those subject to conditional release or special COVID-19 leave pursuant to Law no. 7242.

20.  The Standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) concerning health care services in prisons (see the CPT standards, document no. CPT/Inf/(93)12) provide as follows:

“... The direct support of a fully-equipped hospital service should be available, in either a civil or prison hospital.

If recourse is had to a civil hospital, the question of security arrangements will arise. In this respect, the CPT wishes to stress that prisoners sent to hospital to receive treatment should not be physically attached to their hospital beds or other items of furniture for custodial reasons. Other means of meeting security needs satisfactorily can and should be found; the creation of a custodial unit in such hospitals is one possible solution.”

21.  The relevant international material regarding protection against and prevention of COVID-19 in prisons was set out in Fenech v. Malta (no. 19090/20, §§ 19-24, 1 March 2022) and S.M. v. Italy (no. 16310/20, §§ 32-37, 10 October 2024).

22.  In particular, the interim guidance document issued by the World Health Organisation (“the WHO”) on 15 March 2020 entitled “Preparedness, prevention and control of COVID-19 in prisons and other places of detention” set out detailed measures that should be adopted in prisons, including making staff and detainees alike aware of prevention strategies and bringing in hygiene precautions, physical distancing, cleaning and disinfection procedures, and the isolation and quarantining of people at risk (ibid., § 36).

23.  The statement of principles relating to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic issued on 20 March 2020 by the CPT set out a number of principles that should be applied in respect of persons deprived of their liberty. These included, among other things, the use of alternatives to deprivation of liberty, especially in situations of overcrowding, and the provision of medical care with special attention to the needs of vulnerable groups, such as persons with pre-existing medical conditions (ibid., § 34).

COMPLAINTS

24.  The applicant complained under Articles 2, 3 and 18 of the Convention about the conditions of the quarantine ward in which he had been placed on his return from hospital, arguing that it had been overcrowded, that one of the prisoners had smoked, and that the prison administration had failed to test everyone that had been placed in the ward, all of which, in view of his heart condition, had put his health at risk. He also claimed that the gendarmerie officers had violated the physical distancing rules while escorting him to the hospital and that the doctor had examined him without removing his handcuffs.

THE LAW

25.  The applicant complained about the conditions of his detention in the quarantine ward and of his transfer to the hospital during the COVID-19 pandemic, and about being medically examined whilst allegedly handcuffed. He relied on Articles 2, 3 and 18 of the Convention. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see, Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 110-26, 20 March 2018, and Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, § 90, 1 June 2023) considers that the applicant’s complaint falls to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

26.  The Government argued that there was no evidence to support the applicant’s claim that his handcuffs had not been removed during his medical examination, as the doctor who had carried out the examination had not made any note on the point. Nor had the applicant requested the removal of his handcuffs. The applicant had been convicted of a terrorism-related offence and the risk of him escaping or causing harm to others had to be taken into account by officers at all times. The handcuffing of the applicant had been in accordance with the law, had had no effect on his health, and had in no way disrupted the treatment he had received. Given that the event had taken place in a civil hospital and that the cardiology clinic had not been designed to prevent prisoners escaping, it had been necessary to handcuff the applicant. They invited the Court to declare that part of the applicant’s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention as being manifestly ill-founded.

27.  As for the conditions of the applicant’s detention during the COVID‑19 pandemic, the Government argued that the applicant had failed to lodge an action for a full remedy in the administrative courts and had therefore failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In that respect, they pointed to administrative court decisions where claimants had been awarded compensation for the failure of authorities to provide prisoners with necessary medical treatment.

28.  Alternatively, the Government argued that the applicant’s allegations had not attained the minimum level of severity and, in any case, remained unsubstantiated. In that connection, they referred to the measures taken by the domestic authorities in prisons during the COVID-19 pandemic. While he was detained in Kocaeli Prison between 2016 and 2022, the applicant had undergone seventeen COVID-19 PCR tests, had received two doses of the BioNTech vaccine in 2021, and had regularly been provided with hygiene products, such as soap, masks, gloves and disinfectant. He had never been infected with COVID-19 during his detention. The applicant had received all the medical examinations and treatment necessary for his health condition and had been transferred to either the outpatient clinic of the prison or the hospital a total of 137 times. As for the claim that a prisoner had been smoking in the quarantine ward, the Government maintained that it was strictly forbidden to smoke in those wards, which were classified as infirmaries. Moreover, the applicant had changed cell thirty times during the course of his detention, but he had never asked to be placed in a non-smoking cell, although such cells were available at Kocaeli Prison.

29.  The applicant argued that his placement in a quarantine ward on his return from hospital and the conditions during his transfer had put his physical and mental health at risk, and that having him undergo a medical examination without the removal of his handcuffs had been unlawful.

(a)   General principles

30.  The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (see Henaf v. France, no. 65436/01, § 47, ECHR 2003-XI). The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, § 97, ECHR 2016).

31.  The Court has held that the use of handcuffs or other instruments of restraint does not normally give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where the measure has been imposed in connection with lawful detention and does not entail the use of force or public exposure exceeding what is reasonably considered necessary. The Court must always have regard to the specific facts of the case (see Shlykov and Others v. Russia, nos. 78638/11 and 3 others, § 72, 19 January 2021, with further references).

32.  When assessing the level of severity where there is a claim of unlawful handcuffing, the Court has taken into account the gravity of an applicant’s conviction, his criminal record and his history of violence (see A.J.P. v. France, no. 17020/05, § 95, 29 October 2009, and Kaverzin v. Ukraine, no. 23893/03, § 156, 15 May 2012); whether the measure complied with domestic law (see Julin v. Estonia, nos. 16563/08 and 3 others, § 130, 29 May 2012); the proportionality of the measure to the prisoner’s conduct (see Goriunov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 14466/12, § 33, 29 May 2018); the lawfulness of the detention, the public nature of the treatment, and any consequences for the applicant’s health (see Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, §§ 57-58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII); the applicant’s state of health and other security arrangements used, such as wardens and dogs (see Kaverzin, cited above, §§ 159-60); and how long the applicant was handcuffed for (see Kashavelov v. Bulgaria, no. 891/05, § 39, 20 January 2011).

(b)   Application of those principles to the present case

33.  The Court notes that while the Government initially argued that in the absence of any note by the doctor there was no evidence to show that the applicant had been handcuffed during his medical examination on 1 September 2020, they then went on to claim that his handcuffing during that examination had been necessary. Taking into account the applicant’s consistent submissions both before the domestic courts and before the Court that he had been handcuffed during the examination, and in view of the Government’s contention that the alleged handcuffing had been required in the particular circumstances of the case, the Court will carry out its assessment of the case on the premise that the applicant remained handcuffed while he was in the cardiology clinic of the Kocaeli University Hospital on that day.

34.  The Court held in A.J.P. v. France (cited above, § 94) that the use of restraint measures during medical examinations raises a more important issue than, for example, their use during transfers to hospitals. However, in the present case, the Court notes that – as the applicant himself has stated – the disputed encounter with the doctor at the cardiology clinic was not a detailed medical examination but a brief consultation, during which the doctor listened to the applicant from the other end of the room and asked him to undergo certain tests and to come back the following month (see paragraph 7 above) (compare and contrast Henaf, cited above, § 49, and Avcı and Others v. Turkey, no. 70417/01, § 39, 27 June 2006, in which the applicants were chained to their beds; also Filiz Uyan v. Turkey, no. 7496/03, § 32, 8 January 2009, which concerned the use of handcuffs during a gynaecological examination).

35.  The event took place in a civil hospital, which – as pointed out by the CPT standards concerning health care services in prisons (see paragraph 20 above) – generated security concerns, in particular in view of the lack of any specific arrangements made with regard to prisoners in the clinic (compare Filiz Uyan, cited above, § 32). Neither the documents in the case file nor the submissions of the applicant allow the Court to conclude that any additional security measures were taken during the applicant’s consultation with the doctor, such as his being accompanied by a reinforced team of gendarmerie officers (contrast Kaverzin, cited above, § 160).

36.  Nor is there anything in the case file to demonstrate that the applicant, who had been transferred to the hospital for a follow-up examination of his heart condition and to schedule an endoscopy, was in a particularly vulnerable state which would have made the use of handcuffs excessive or meant that handcuffing was contraindicated (compare A.T. v. Estonia, no. 23183/15, § 64, 13 November 2018, and contrast Avcı, cited above, § 41). The applicant’s handcuffing in a civil hospital was permissible under domestic law (see paragraph 15 above) (see Julin, cited above, § 130). More importantly, in the absence of any submissions by the applicant or supporting documents, there is nothing that would lead the Court to conclude that the disputed handcuffing had any physical or mental effects on the applicant or was aimed at debasing or humiliating him (see Raninen, cited above, § 58).

37.  According to the gendarmerie records of his transfer to the hospital, the applicant was classified as a prisoner deemed a flight risk (see paragraph 5 above). Given his conviction for a terrorism-related offence and the nature of the contested handcuffing, the Court finds that, while not elaborately detailed, this assessment provided adequate justification for the security measure in question (compare A.T. v. Estonia, cited above, §§ 62-63).

38.  Consequently, and taking into account in particular the absence of any impact on the applicant’s physical or mental well-being, the Court concludes that the treatment at issue did not entail the use of force or any public exposure beyond what could reasonably be considered necessary (compare Julin, cited above, § 166, and A.T. v. Estonia, cited above, § 67).

39.  It follows that the applicant’s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention concerning his handcuffing during his medical consultation is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

40.  The Court does not find it necessary to examine the Government’s objection regarding non-exhaustion of domestic remedies on account of the applicant’s alleged failure to take his case to the administrative courts, as the applicant’s complaint under this head is in any event inadmissible for the reasons set out below.

(a)   General principles

41.  The Court refers to the general principles concerning States’ positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention as to health care for prisoners, as set out in the case of Fenech (cited above, §§ 125-28).

42.  In particular, under Article 3 of the Convention the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 93-94, ECHR 2000‑XI).

43.  Although this provision cannot be construed as laying down a general obligation to release detainees on health grounds, it nonetheless imposes an obligation on States to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty, for example by providing them with any requisite medical assistance (see Mouisel v. France, no. 67263/01, §§ 38‑40, ECHR 2002-IX).

44.  In addition to the positive obligation to preserve the health and well‑being of a prisoner, in particular by the administration of any medical care required, Article 3 imposes on the State a positive obligation to put in place effective methods to prevent and detect contagious diseases in prisons. First and foremost is the State’s obligation to screen detainees early, on their arrival in prison, to identify carriers of germs or contagious diseases, isolate them and treat them effectively. This is all the more important since prison authorities must not ignore any infections that break out among prisoners and expose others to the real risk of contracting serious illnesses (see Dobri v. Romania, no. 25153/04, § 51, 14 December 2010, and Fűlöp v. Romania, no. 18999/04, § 38, 24 July 2012).

(b)   Application of those principles to the present case

45.  The Court notes that the applicant specifically complained about the conditions of detention in the quarantine wards where he was detained for a total of forty-four days (see paragraphs 6, 10 and 12 above), as well as the conditions of his transfer to hospital. As he did not contest the conditions in the other cells in which he was held in Kocaeli Prison or the quality of the medical treatment he received during his detention, the Court will limit its examination of the case to the conditions in the quarantine wards and during the applicant’s transfer to the hospital, and the alleged health risk to which he was exposed.

46.  The Court notes that the applicant’s placement in a quarantine ward, following his transfer to the hospital as part of the measures taken by the Kocaeli Prison administration, was in line with the Action Plan of the Ministry of Health, which required a quarantine period of fourteen days for prisoners who had been transferred to hospitals (see paragraph 17 above). According to the Kocaeli Prison administration’s report on the COVID-19 measures taken by the prison, the authorities required all staff and prisoners entering the prison to complete a quarantine period and they accepted admission of new prisoners only on the condition that they underwent prior medical examination and testing (see paragraph 19 above). The report also noted that staff were required to wear masks and gloves when in contact with the prisoners, that all common areas were cleaned with detergent, that prisoners were provided with sanitary supplies, and that quarantine wards were regularly disinfected. The Court finds those measures to have been in line with the principles set out by the WHO and CPT (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above) and to have been adequate and proportionate to prevent and limit the spread of the virus (see Fenech, cited above, § 140).

47.  The implementation of those measures was not called into question by the applicant except for his contention that new prisoners were admitted into the quarantine ward without being tested and that the gendarmerie officers escorting him to the hospital had sat in close proximity to him in the transfer vehicle and carried out a body search of him with their hands, in breach of the physical distancing rules. The Court observes that Kocaeli Prison required all new admissions to have undergone a medical examination and testing and that staff were obliged to wear masks and gloves while interacting with the prisoners (compare Ünsal and Timtik v. Turkey (dec.), no. 36331/20, § 38, 8 June 2021). The records drawn up by the gendarmerie also stated that body searches of prisoners being escorted to the hospital, including the applicant, were carried out by using masks, gloves and disinfectant (see paragraph 5 above). Given the aforementioned measures implemented by the prison administration, and in the absence of detailed submissions from the applicant regarding the extent of the authorities’ alleged failure to test new inmates or whether the manual body search was conducted with or without gloves, the Court finds his claims concerning the factors that purportedly heightened his risk of contracting the virus to be insufficiently substantiated. The Court also reiterates that it has previously found in Fenech (cited above, § 129) that preventive measures have to be proportionate to the risk at issue; however, they should not put an excessive burden on the authorities in view of the practical demands of imprisonment, especially in the context of a global pandemic of a novel disease. Accordingly, given the precautionary measures taken by the domestic authorities, such as the disinfection of the wards and the availability of masks and sanitary material to both the prisoners and staff, the authorities could not be criticised for the applicant’s detention in the disputed wards following his transfers to the hospital, in order to prevent the possible spread of the virus to other parts of the prison. Nor could they be criticised for the conditions of his transfer to the hospital, which required the gendarmerie officers to carry out certain security measures, including a body search, and to stay close to him at all times.

48.  The Court reiterates that a violation of Article 3 due to inadequate preventive measures in prison has typically been found in cases where detainees actually contracted the disease in question (see S.M. v. Italy, cited above, §§ 79 and 99, with further references). In the present case, the applicant did not contract COVID-19 during his detention.

49.  That being so, the Court considers that given the nature of COVID‑19, its well-documented effects, as well as the fact that it can easily be transmitted, the applicant’s fears for his health should he contract the virus, were not insignificant (see Fenech, cited above, § 129). In this regard, it acknowledges the applicant’s concerns about his heart condition and, based on the hospital tests he underwent, considers it established that he was experiencing some degree of the condition. Nevertheless, in the absence of any medical reports on whether his detention together with other prisoners exacerbated the risks to his health from his condition or any submissions by the applicant regarding the specific nature of his condition, the Court cannot definitively conclude that he fell within the category of the most vulnerable or that he suffered from a cardiovascular disease which would require the authorities to separate him from other prisoners (compare Fenech, cited above, § 137). Moreover, given the practical demands of imprisonment and the novelty of the situation, the Court can accept that it may not have been possible to make arrangements for each vulnerable individual to be moved to safer quarters before any contamination occurred in the prison (ibid.). In that connection, the Court also observes that the applicant did not submit that he had been exposed to any COVID-19-positive individual during his detention in the quarantine ward (ibid., § 138).

50.  In so far as the applicant argued that one of the prisoners had smoked in the quarantine ward and that this presented an additional risk to his health, the Court observes that that complaint was challenged by the Government, who stated that smoking was strictly prohibited in quarantine wards, which were classified as infirmaries. In any event, the applicant’s claim pertained solely to the first quarantine ward, where he was held for a period of twenty-seven days – between 26 August and 22 September 2020 (see paragraphs 6 and 10 above). The Court takes note of the Government’s submission that the applicant did not ask to be placed in a non-smoking cell at any point during his detention (see paragraph 28 above). Nor did he claim that the prison authorities had not accommodated any such requests (compare Stoine Hristov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 36244/02, §§ 43-46, 16 October 2008, and contrast Elefteriadis v. Romania, no. 38427/05, § 49, 25 January 2011). Given the brevity of the period concerned and the absence of any medical reports regarding his health condition, the Court finds that the applicant’s alleged exposure to cigarette smoke cannot, in itself, have had an adverse effect on his health or aggravated the conditions of his detention in the quarantine ward so as to attain the minimum level of severity required by Article 3 of the Convention (contrast Sylla and Nollomont v. Belgium, nos. 37768/13 and 36467/14, § 41, 16 May 2017).

51.  Lastly, the Court acknowledges the applicant’s fears and heightened anxiety due to his medical condition, but such fears were widespread among both prisoners and the general population during the pandemic (see S.M. v. Italy, cited above, § 101).

52.  In view of the foregoing, and having regard to the measures taken by the authorities in Kocaeli Prison, the Court concludes that neither the applicant’s placement in a quarantine ward together with others nor the conditions there, nor the alleged conditions during his transfer to the hospital caused him such anxiety and fear as to amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (compare Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696/00, §§ 95-96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts), and Epure v. Romania, no. 73731/17, § 80, 11 May 2021).

53.  Accordingly, the applicant’s complaints under this head must also be rejected as being manifestly ill‑founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 10 April 2025.

 Hasan Bakırcı Arnfinn Bårdsen
 Registrar President