THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 26147/15
Zlatica GREŇOVÁ
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 7 May 2019 as a Committee composed of:
Dmitry Dedov, President,
Alena Poláčková,
Jolien Schukking, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 May 2015,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Ms Zlatica Greňová, is a Slovak national, who was born in 1953 and lives in Krupina. She was represented before the Court by Mr E. Bárány, a lawyer practising in Bratislava.
The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
3. In 2005 an individual sued the applicant for payment of what would later be established as some 20,250 euros (EUR) on the basis of a loan arrangement between them.
4. After a payment order and two first-instance judgments were quashed following a protest and appeals by the respective parties, the action was granted by the Zvolen District Court on 18 March 2010. That judgment was upheld by the Banská Bystrica Regional Court on 23 September 2010 and it thereby became final, binding and enforceable.
5. The applicant challenged the judgments of 18 March and 23 September 2010 by way of an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court. She argued that her procedural rights had been curtailed in that there had been no hearing of her appeal against the judgment of 18 March 2010 and that the impugned judgments had been arbitrary.
6. On 25 February 2014 the applicant received from the Supreme Court a copy of the observations filed previously by the claimant in response to her appeal on points of law. A copy of these observations has not been made available to the Court. However, from their summary in the Supreme Court’s decision on that appeal (see below), it transpires that the claimant contended that, in so far as the applicant had complained of the absence of a hearing of her appeal against the judgment of 18 March 2010, she had failed to specify the statutory grounds on which this would make her appeal on points of law admissible. The claimant also contended that the applicant’s remaining arguments were unfounded and that the legal assessment of the case by the appellate court was correct.
7. On 17 April 2014 the applicant received a written version of the Supreme Court’s decision declaring her appeal inadmissible. The Supreme Court had taken it in camera on 26 February 2014.
In so far as relevant, it found that, neither the applicant’s disagreement with the lower courts’ assessment of the evidence taken, nor her complaint that they had refused to take some of the evidence she had proposed, constituted grounds on which the appeal on points of law could be admitted for an examination on the merits.
8. The applicant then turned to the Constitutional Court with a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution. In so far as relevant, she directed the complaint against the Supreme Court and alleged a violation of her rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, she argued that by having a copy of the claimant’s observations served on her one day before deciding her appeal, the Supreme Court had effectively deprived her of the possibility of responding to those observations.
9. On 1 October 2014 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible. In relation to its part specified above, it observed that there had been nothing in the claimant’s observations other than matters on which the applicant had previously already had an opportunity to comment. It held that, accordingly, the relevant part of the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.
The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant on 29 December 2014 and it not amenable to appeal.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
10. Relevant domestic practice in respect of communication for comment of the observations of one party to the proceedings in response to any legal remedy to which the opposing party has recourse has been summarised in the Court’s judgment in the case of Trančíková v. Slovakia (no. 17127/12, § 23, 13 January 2015).
COMPLAINT
11. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the observations filed by the claimant in reply to her appeal on points of law had not been communicated to her early enough before the decision on that appeal and that, as a result, she had in reality been deprived of the possibility of responding to them.
THE LAW
12. The applicant complained that she had effectively been prevented from responding to the claimant’s observations in reply to her appeal on points of law, in violation of her rights protected under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
13. The Government replied by pointing out that the Supreme Court’s examination of the applicant’s appeal on points of law had been limited to the question of its admissibility under the applicable statutory requirements and that, therefore, the outcome of that examination had not been decisive for the outcome of the applicant’s action before the ordinary courts. On the basis of that premise, they questioned the applicability of the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to the proceedings before the Supreme Court.
Moreover, and in any event, they were of the view that, since the applicant’s appeal on points of law had not been admissible on any of the statutory grounds, any response on her part to the claimant’s observations could not have had any impact on the outcome of the proceedings. Therefore, and relying on the Court’s decisions in Stepinska v. France (no. 1814/02, 15 June 2004) and Sale v. France (no. 39765/04, 21 March 2006), the Government contended that the application was manifestly ill-founded.
14. The applicant retorted by disagreeing and reiterating her complaint. She added that the fact that the Supreme Court had transmitted a copy of the claimant’s observations to her was indicative of their relevance and that it had been incoherent with this premise for the Supreme Court to decide on her appeal the very next day without giving her an opportunity to comment. She argued that her appeal had been admissible and that the Supreme Court’s conclusion to the contrary had been erroneous. In her submission, the claimant’s observations had to do with the admissibility of her appeal and having an opportunity to comment could have had a real impact on the assessment of that question by the Supreme Court.
15. The Court notes that the Government have not raised any objection under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention. It is nevertheless not prevented from examining the admissibility of this application under that provision by its own motion (see, for example, Magomedov and Others v. Russia, nos. 33636/09 and 9 others, § 49, 28 March 2017; with further references). The provision in question reads as follows:
“The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that:
[...] the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as de-fined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.”
16. The Court notes that complaints similar to that in the present case have been examined and declared inadmissible in the past under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention (see, for example, Holub v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 24880/05, 14 December 2010; Hanzl and Špadrna v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 30073/06, 15 January 2013; Kiliç and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 33162/10, 3 December 2013 and, recently, Pfurtscheller v. Switzerland (dec.) [Committee], nos. 13568/17 and 13583/17, 18 September 2018).
17. In the present case it has not been disputed between the parties that the claimant’s observations in reply to the applicant’s appeal on points of law were transmitted to her on 25 February 2014 whereas the Supreme Court determined the admissibility of that appeal on 26 February 2014.
18. However, the Court finds it of relevance that there is no indication that the applicant had any knowledge of the Supreme Court’s decision until the service of its copy on her on 17 April 2014. This is more than one and a half month after the service of those observations on her, in which time she made no attempt to comment on those observations. In the Court’s view, this may only be seen as indicative of no real interest in commenting on those observations. This assessment may be seen as further strengthened by the fact that neither before the Constitutional Court and nor in her application to the Court did the applicant substantiate in any way at all what consequence did the alleged inability to comment on the claimant’s observations have on her ability to assert her civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. As a copy of those observations has not been made available to the Court, it is unable to form an independent view of their content and nature. However, it notes the Constitutional Court’s finding, undisputed by the applicant in any way, that there had been nothing in the claimant’s observations other than matters on which the applicant had previously already had an opportunity to comment.
19. In these circumstances, even assuming that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was applicable (see Valchev and Others (dec.), no. 47450/11 and 2 others, §§ 68-73, 21 January 2014; and Hansen v. Norway, no. 15319/09, §§ 55-56, 2 October 2014) and that the timing of the communication of the claimant’s observations to the applicant raises an issue of fairness of the proceedings under that provision, it may not be seen as having caused any significant disadvantage to the applicant in terms of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention.
20. It must next be ascertained whether respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits. In the assessment of this “safeguard clause” the Court takes into account, in particular, the developments in domestic law and practice and whether the legal problem in question has already been sufficiently addressed in its case-law (see, for example, Hanzl and Špadrna, cited above, and Kiliç and Others, cited above, § 26).
21. With regard to Slovakia, the problem of non-communication of observations of another party to judicial proceedings to the applicant has been identified in relation to the proceedings before a court of appeal (see Trančíková, cited above, §§ 37-49), a court of cassation (see Hudáková and Others v. Slovakia, no. 23083/05, §§ 25-32, 27 April 2010), as well as the Constitutional Court (see Čičmanec v. Slovakia, no. 65302/11, §§ 59-65, 28 June 2016). The implementation of the Court’s judgments in these cases was concluded by resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe no. CM/ResDH(2016)18 of 24 February 2016, no. CM/ResDH(2012)57 of 27 July 2010 and no. CM/ResDH(2017)371 of 25 October 2017. The general measures adopted by the respondent State in the course of the implementation of these judgments involved their translation, publishing and dissemination and, as appropriate, changes in the relevant domestic judicial practice.
22. In these circumstances, and given that the Court has already had several opportunities to rule on the issue raised in this case, it cannot be argued that the application raises serious questions of application or interpretation of the Convention, or important questions of national law.
Respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto therefore cannot be said to require an examination of the application on the merits.
23. Finally, the Court must ensure that the case has been “duly considered by a domestic tribunal”, the term “case” referring to the applicant’s action, claim or request that was submitted to the domestic courts, rather than his or her “application” or “complaint” as later submitted to the Court. It is the “case” understood in that way that has to be “duly considered by a domestic tribunal” for the purposes of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention (see, for example, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v. Portugal (dec.), no. 49639/09, 3 April 2012).
24. That being so, the Court notes that the applicant’s arguments in relation to the the claim against her were examined once by the first‑instance court in summary proceedings and three times by that court and the court of appeal in ordinary proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Valchev and Others, cited above, § 78). In addition, her arguments on points of law were examined by the cassation court and her constitutional complaint, including the issue of the timing of the transmission of the claimant’s observations to her, was examined by the Constitutional Court.
In these circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant’s case has been duly considered by a domestic tribunal within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention.
25. All three conditions of the relevant inadmissibility criterion having been satisfied, the Court finds that the application must be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (b) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 28 May 2019.
Stephen PhillipsDmitry Dedov
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy