GROF v. AUSTRIA



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 25046/94

                      by Erika GROF

                      against Austria

     The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

14 April 1998, the following members being present:

           MM    S. TRECHSEL, President

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs   G.H. THUNE

           MM    F. MARTINEZ

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

           Mrs   J. LIDDY

           MM    L. LOUCAIDES

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 P. LORENZEN

                 K. HERNDL

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mrs   M. HION

           MM    R. NICOLINI

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Mr    M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 21 February 1994

by Erika GROF against Austria and registered on 14 September 1994 under

file No. 25046/94;

     Having regard to :

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

     12 July 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the

     applicant on 17 September 1996;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1959 and residing

in Linz.  Before the Commission she is represented by Mr. G. Schmid,

a lawyer practising in Linz.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

A.   Particular circumstances of the case

     On 21 May 1991 the applicant's son was born and she went on

maternity leave.  On 19 August 1991 she requested the granting of

maternity leave payments (Karenzurlaubsgeld).  Thereupon the Linz

Labour Office (Arbeitsamt) granted the requested payments for the

period from 27 July 1991 to 21 May 1993 in the amount of some AS 160

per day.

     On 16 December 1992 the Labour Office withdrew maternity leave

payments for the periods from 1 October 1991 to 31 January 1992,

1 March 1992 to 30 June 1992 and from 1 October 1992 onwards.  It found

that under the Unemployment Insurance Act (Arbeitslosenversicherungs-

gesetz) mothers were only entitled to maternity leave payments if they

were unemployed.  The applicant, however, had a teaching appointment

as lecturer at University.  Her income from this appointment, even if

it was not a full-time employment, exceeded the minimum income level

(Geringfügigkeitsgrenze).  From 1 February 1993 onwards the applicant

again received maternity leave payments.  However, on 9 March 1993

maternity leave payments were withdrawn as from 1 March 1993 onwards

because the applicant had a further teaching appointment.

     On 26 February and 23 March 1993 the applicant appealed.  She

submitted that maternity leave payments could only be revoked for the

periods in which she actually had held her lectures but not for the

whole academic year.  Thus, it should have been taken into account that

she had held her lectures in a concentrated form during a few weeks.

     On 23 August 1993 the Upper Austrian Regional Labour Office

(Landesarbeitsamt) dismissed the applicant's appeals. It noted that

during the periods for which the maternity leave payments had been

withdrawn she had received as income from the University payments

between ATS 12,000 and 20,000 per month.  These payments had been

considerably above the minimum income level of AS 2,772 for 1991,

AS 2,924 for 1992 and AS 3,102 for 1993.

     On 6 October 1993 the applicant, represented by a lawyer,

introduced a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungs-

gerichtshof) against the above decision and, in case the Constitutional

Court would decline to deal with the case, requested the transfer of

the case to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof).  She

submitted that the labour authorities had, in an arbitrary manner,

misinterpreted the law, that it had not been clear which officials of

the Regional Labour Office had taken the impugned decision as the

decision had not been properly signed and that, in any event, the

Regional Labour Office could not be considered a tribunal within the

meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

     On 30 November 1993 the Constitutional Court declined to deal

with the applicant's complaint for lack of prospect of success and

transferred the case to the Administrative Court.

     On 24 January 1994 the Administrative Court requested the

applicant's lawyer to remedy procedural defects of her complaint,

namely, pursuant to S. 24 para. 1 and 29 of the Administrative Court

Act (Verwaltungsgerichtshofgesetz), to submit a further copy for

service (Ausfertigung) of the complaint.

     Thereupon, the applicant's lawyer sent a photocopy of the

complaint.  This photocopy was not signed by the applicant's lawyer.

     On 22 March 1994 the Administrative Court decided to discontinue

the proceedings (Verfahrenseinstellung) on the ground that the

applicant had failed to comply with its request of 24 January 1994, as

the document submitted by the applicant's lawyer was merely a photocopy

but not a proper copy for service since it did not bear the lawyer's

signature.  Under S. 34 para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act

complaints which were not in compliance with the procedural

requirements as to the form and contents had to be considered as having

been withdrawn if the complainant did not remedy the defect within the

time-limit fixed by the Court.  The Administrative Court pointed out

that in accordance with its constant jurisprudence this provision also

applied in cases such as the one at issue where the complainant had

complied in an incomplete manner with the Court's order to remedy the

defect.

B.   Relevant domestic law

1.   The relevant provisions of the Administrative Court Act, as in

force at the relevant time, read as follows:

     S. 21 para. 1:

     "Parteien im Verfahren vor dem Verwaltungsgerichtshof sind der

Beschwerdeführer, die belangte Behörde und die Personen, die durch den

Erfolg der Anfechtung des Verwaltungsaktes in ihren rechtlichen

Interessen berührt werden (Mitbeteiligte)."

     "The parties in the proceedings before the Administrative Court

are the applicant, the respondent authority and any person who will be

affected in its legal interests if the complaint would be successful."

     S. 22:

     "In Angelegenheiten der Bundesverwaltung kann der zuständige

Bundesminister, in Angelegenheiten der Landesverwaltung die zuständige

Landesregierung, an Stelle eines anderen beschwerdeführenden

staatlichen Organs oder einer anderen belangten Behörde jederzeit in

das Verfahren eintreten."

     "The competent Federal Minister in matters of federal

administration and the competent Regional Government in matters of

regional administration, may at any time enter into the proceedings

replacing as party the public authority which has lodged the complaint

or which is acting as respondent authority."

     S. 24:

     "(1) Die Beschwerden und sonstigen Schriftsätze sind unmittelbar

beim Verwaltungsgerichtshof einzubringen.  Von jedem Schriftsatz samt

Beilagen sind so viele gleichlautenden Ausfertigungen beizubringen, daß

jeder vom Verwaltungsgerichtshof zu verständigenden Partei oder Behörde

eine Ausfertigung zugestellt und überdies eine für die Akten des

Gerichtshofes zurückbehalten werden kann.  Sind die Beilagen sehr

umfangreich, so kann die Beigabe von Abschriften unterbleiben.

     (2) Die Beschwerden und die Anträge auf Wiedereinsetzung in den

vorigen Stand ... müssen mit der Unterschrift eines Rechtsanwaltes

versehen sein."

     (1) The complaint and any other writ shall be filed with the

Administrative Court. Every writ, accompanied by its supporting

documents, must be filed in so many identical copies for service that

the Administrative Court is enabled to serve on all parties or

authorities one authentic copy and that one can be retained for the

file.  If the supporting documents are very voluminous it is not

necessary to submit copies.

     (2) The complaints and applications for proceedings to be

reinstituted ... must bear the signature of a lawyer.

     S. 29:

     "Ist die belangte Behörde in einer Angelegenheit der

Bundesverwaltung nicht ein Bundesminister, in einer Angelegenheit der

Landesverwaltung nicht die Landesregierung, so ist außer den sonst

erforderlichen Ausfertigungen der Beschwerde samt Beilagen noch eine

weitere Ausfertigung für den zuständigen Bundesminister oder die

zuständige Landesregierung beizubringen."

     "If, in matters of federal administration, the respondent

authority is not a Federal Minister or in matters of regional

administration not the Regional Government a further copy for service

together with the supporting documents for the competent Federal

Minister or the competent Regional Government has to be submitted."

     S. 34:

     "(1) Beschwerden die sich wegen Versäumung der Einbringungsfrist

oder wegen offenbarer Unzuständigkeit des Verwaltungsgerichtshofes

nicht zur Verhandlung eignen oder denen offenbar die Einwendung der

entschiedenen Sache oder der Mangel der Berechtigung zur Erhebung der

Beschwerde entgegensteht, sind ohne weiteres Verfahren in

nichtöffentlicher Sitzung mit Beschluß zurückzuweisen.

     (2) Beschwerden, denen keiner der im Abs. 1 bezeichneten Umstände

entgegensteht, bei denen jedoch die Vorschriften über die Form und den

Inhalt (§§ 23, 24, 28, 29) nicht eingehalten wurden, sind zur Behebung

der Mängel unter Anberaumung einer kurzen Frist zurückzustellen; die

Versäumung dieser Frist gilt als Zurückziehung."

     "(1) Complaints which have been lodged out of time or which are

not fit for consideration because the Administrative Court is

manifestly incompetent to deal with the matter as well as applications

which concern a matter already dealt with by the Administrative Court

or which have been lodged by a person not entitled to do so shall be

rejected without any further procedure by a decision taken in camera.

     (2) A complaint which is not in conformity with the provisions

on form and contents of a complaint (SS. 23, 24, 28, 29) but which

nevertheless is not suffering from the defects mentioned under

paragraph 1 shall be returned for the purpose of remedying the defect

and a short time-limit shall be set for doing so;  if the defect is not

remedied within the time-limit the complaint shall be considered as

withdrawn."

2.   With regard to S. 24 of the Administrative Court Act the

Administrative Court has repeatedly found as follows:

     "Unter Ausfertigung der Beschwerde (im Sinne des § 29 VwGG) ist

nur ein mit der Unterschrift eines Rechtsanwaltes versehenes

Geschäftsstück zu verstehen. Die Nachreichung der Ablichtung des

ursprünglichen Beschwerdeschriftsatzes, auf welcher keine Unterschrift

des einschreitenden Rechtsanwaltes - auch nicht in Ablichtung -

aufscheint, kann nicht als Befolgung des Mängelbehebungsauftrages

angesehen werden."  (B. 17.12.1982, 82/04/0219; B. 12.9.1983,

83/10/212; B. 11.12.1984, 84/04/0188, 0189) quoted after DOLP, Die

Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, 3rd Edition, Vienna 1987, p. 175.

     "Only a document bearing the signature of a lawyer may be

considered a copy for service (within the meaning of S. 24 of the

Administrative Court Act).  The mere submission of a photocopy of the

writ of complaint, which does not bear the signature of the intervening

lawyer - not even in photocopy - cannot be considered as compliance

with the court's order to remedy procedural defects." (Decision

17.12.1982, 82/04/0219; Decision 12.9.1983, 83/10/212, 11.12.1984,

84/04/0188, 0189) quoted after DOLP, Die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit,

3rd Edition, Vienna 1987, p. 175.

3.   By Federal Act of 13 August 1997 the Constitutional Court Act

(Verfassungsgerichtshofgesetz), the Administrative Court Act and the

Administration Fees Act (Gebührengesetz) were amended (Federal Gazette-

I 88/1997).  This amendment, inter alia, introduced the obligation to

pay court fees for complaints to the Constitutional Court and the

Administrative Court by means of stamps to be added to one of the

copies for service and amended the rules on public hearings.

Furthermore, a new paragraph 4 was added to S. 34 according to which

further copies for service need not bear the signature of a lawyer.

This amendment entered into force on 1 September 1997.

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant complains that she was arbitrarily denied access

to the Administrative Court and that consequently she had no

possibility to have her claim to maternity leave payments, which in her

submissions is a civil right, determined by a tribunal within the

meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.  She also invokes

Article 13 of the Convention.

     In her observations of 17 September 1996 the applicant also

complains that Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention has been violated

because the Constitutional Court had refused to deal with her

complaint.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 21 February 1994 and registered

on 14 September 1994.

     On 15 April 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the

application.

     The Government's written observations were submitted on

12 July 1996.  The applicant replied on 17 September 1996.

     On 18 August 1997 the applicant made further submissions.  The

Government did not reply thereto.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains that she was denied access to the

Administrative Court and thereby arbitrarily denied a fair hearing of

her complaint relating to the withdrawing of maternity leave payments.

     The applicant has invoked Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) and

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention but the Commission considers

that in the circumstances of the present case the complaint has to be

examined exclusively under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention which in its relevant part reads as follows:

     "In the determination of his civil rights and

     obligations...everyone is entitled to a fair and public

     hearing....by an independent and impartial tribunal..."

     The Government submit that in the proceedings before the

Administrative Court the applicant was represented by a lawyer.  It

must have been known to the applicant's lawyer that the Administrative

Court applies rather strict criteria as regards its interpretation of

the formal conditions applicable to the procedure of lodging a

complaint and that, therefore, compliance with these formal conditions

is imperative.  According to the Administrative Court's case-law

non-compliance with an order to submit the required number of copies

for service of a complaint will result in the discontinuation of the

proceedings.  Nevertheless, the applicant's lawyer failed to comply

properly with the Administrative Court's order of 24 January 1994

because he submitted the copy of an unsigned document instead of a

further copy for service of the applicant's complaint.  The applicant

therefore has failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.  In any event, in view of the

above considerations, there is no violation of the applicant's right

of access to a court under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

     This is disputed by the applicant.  In her view the requirement

to submit a further copy for the Ministry of Social Affairs was an

outdated anachronism, as it would have been much easier for the

Administrative Court to make a photocopy and send it to the Ministry

concerned.  Her lawyer nevertheless submitted a copy to the

Administrative Court.  To discontinue proceedings merely because the

signature of the lawyer was missing was an excessive formalism.  Since

on the document at issue there was the name and address of the lawyer

there could have been no doubts as to his identity.  In any event the

applicant's right of access to a court under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention has been violated because the

Administrative Court cannot be considered a tribunal within the meaning

of this provision.

     The Commission observes that the proceedings before the

Administrative Court were discontinued by the latter because it

considered that the applicant had failed to comply fully with an order

to remedy procedural defects.  The Commission recalls in this respect

that there is no exhaustion of domestic remedies as required by

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention when an appeal has been rejected

because of a procedural mistake by the applicant (see No. 13467/87,

Dec. 10.7.89, D.R. 62, p. 269; No. 18079/91, Dec. 4.12.91, D.R. 72,

p. 263).  The Commission finds, however, that in the present case the

question whether or not the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies

within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention is so

closely related to the substantive issues of the application that it

cannot be determined separately.

     The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to

his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal.

In this way the Article embodies the "right to a court", of which the

right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before

courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect only (Eur. Court HR,

Golder v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no.

18-A, p. 18, para. 36; Fayed v. the United Kingdom judgment of

21 September 1994, Series A no. 294-B, p. 49, para. 65).

     As to whether the proceedings at issue concerned a determination

of the applicant's civil rights and obligations, the Commission recalls

that it is today the general rule that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

applies in the field of social insurance, including even welfare

assistance, insofar as the person concerned claims an individual

economic right flowing from specific rules laid down in a statute (Eur.

Court HR, Salesi v. Italy judgment of 26 February 1993, Series A no.

257-E, p. 59, para. 19; Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland judgment of 24

June 1993, Series A no. 263, p. 17, para. 46).

     In the present case the applicant wished to have established that

during certain periods she had been entitled to maternity leave

payments and that the refusal of payments was not in accordance with

the law.  The Commission therefore finds that the outcome of these

proceedings was decisive for private rights and obligations and hence

for "civil rights and obligations" within the meaning of Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1).  Accordingly, Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies.

     The applicant was therefore entitled to a determination of her

claims by a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

of the Convention.  The Labour Office and the Regional Labour Office,

being administrative bodies, cannot be considered as such tribunals.

As regards the Administrative Court the Commission recalls that the

Convention organs have repeatedly found that this Court fulfils the

requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in

matters which are not exclusively within the discretion of

administrative authorities and where the Administrative Court considers

the submissions on their merits, point by point, without ever having

to decline jurisdiction in replying to them or ascertaining various

facts (Eur. Court HR, Zumtobel v. Austria judgment of 21 September

1993, Series A no. 266-A, pp. 12-13, paras. 31-32; Ortenberg v. Austria

judgment of 25 November 1994, Series A no. 295-B, p. 50, paras. 33-34).

     In the present case the Administrative Court did not consider the

merits of the applicant's complaint.  However, there is nothing to

suggest that in case the Administrative Court would have admitted the

applicant's complaint for examination it would have declined

jurisdiction or that its review would have been too narrow.

     The  Commission has therefore to examine whether the

Administrative Court's decision to discontinue proceedings on the

applicant's complaint respected her right of access to a court.

     In this respect the Commission recalls that the right to a court,

of which the right of access is one aspect, is not absolute; it is

subject to limitations permitted by implication, since by its very

nature it calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain

margin of appreciation in this regard.  However, these limitations must

not restrict or reduce a person's access in such a way or to such an

extent that the very essence of the right is impaired; lastly, such

limitations will not be compatible with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

if they do not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable

relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim

sought to be achieved (see Eur. Court HR, Levages Prestations Services

v. France judgment of 23 October 1996, Reports 1996-V, p. 1543,

para. 40; Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain judgment of

19 December 1997, para. 33, to be published in Reports 1997).

     Furthermore the Commission has repeatedly recognised the right

of the High Contracting States to make access to courts dependent on

the respect by the parties of formal rules relating in particular to

the form of their submissions to a court and to time-limits

(No. 8407/78, Dec. 6.5.80, D.R. 20, p. 179 with further references).

The Commission has found in particular that decisions by the Austrian

Administrative Court to discontinue proceedings after a request for

remedying procedural defects had not properly been complied with

because a further copy for service submitted had not been identical

with the original writ of complaint did not constitute an undue

restriction of the right of access to a tribunal under Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (No. 13202/87, Dec. 15.3.90, unpublished; No.

14452/88, Dec. 3.9.90, unpublished).

     In the present case the applicant, who was represented by a

lawyer, introduced a complaint with the Administrative Court against

the Regional Labour Office's decision of 23 August 1993.  Since the

Regional Labour Office is not a Federal Ministry or a Regional

Government, she had to file her complaint in three copies for service,

according to S. 24 and S. 29 of the Administrative Court Act.  The

complaint had, however, only been submitted in two copies for service.

On 24 January 1994 the Administrative Court requested the applicant's

lawyer to remedy this procedural defect by submitting a further copy

for service within a short time-limit.  Thereupon, the applicant's

lawyer sent a photocopy of the complaint.  This photocopy was not

signed by the applicant's lawyer.  On 22 March 1994 the Administrative

Court discontinued the proceedings according to S. 34 para. 2 of the

Administrative Court Act on the ground that the applicant had failed

to comply with the above request as the document submitted by her

lawyer did not bear his signature.

     In order to satisfy itself that the very essence of the

applicant's "right to a tribunal" was not impaired by the

discontinuation of the proceedings in the Administrative Court, the

Commission will first examine whether the procedure to be followed for

a complaint, in particular with respect to the production of documents,

could be regarded as foreseeable from the point of view of a litigant

and whether, therefore, the penalty for failure to follow that

procedure did not infringe the proportionality principle (see Levages

Prestations Services v. France judgment, op. cit., p. 1543, para. 42).

     As regards the foreseeability of the Administrative Court's

decision the Commission observes that on the basis of S. 24 para. 1 and

S. 29 of the Administrative Court Act the necessary number of copies

for service of a complaint can be calculated without difficulty as

these provisions are not couched in ambiguous terms. Also the

requirement that all copies for service must bear the signature of a

lawyer can be derived from S. 24 of the Administrative Court Act, which

distinguishes between "copies" (Abschriften) and "copies for service"

(Ausfertigungen), and has been clarified in the extensive case-law of

the Administrative Court.  The applicant's lawyer could therefore

reasonably have foreseen what number of copies for service in the

proceedings on her complaint was necessary and that all such copies had

to bear his signature.

     As regards the proportionality of the sanction, the Commission

finds that the requirement that an important procedural document bears

the signature of the person who submits it and that the same

requirement is laid down for copies of this document which have to be

brought to the notice of the other parties to the proceedings

constitutes a formal condition established for the purpose of ensuring

the proper administration of justice.

     In this respect the Commission observes that pursuant to S. 24

para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act a person filing a complaint

with the Administrative Court need not necessarily be represented by

a lawyer but that, more specifically, the complaint must bear the

signature of a lawyer.  This shows that in this procedural framework

specific attention is paid to the element whether or not a complaint

is signed by a lawyer.

     The Commission also observes that the Administrative Court is one

of the highest judicial organs in the Austrian judiciary.  In this

respect the Commission recalls that the manner in which Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies to courts of appeal or of cassation must

clearly depend on the special features of the proceedings concerned and

account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings conducted in

the domestic legal order and the role of these courts in them (Brualla

Gómez de la Torre v. Spain judgment, op. cit., para. 38).  The

procedure followed in such courts may be more formal.  It is precisely

for ensuring that a higher level of formality does not unduly hinder

access to these courts that representation or assistance by a lawyer

is normally required.  In the present case the applicant was

represented by a lawyer.

     The Commission also notes that the Administrative Court did not

immediately reject the applicant's complaint on the ground that the

necessary number of copies for service had not been submitted.  Rather,

pursuant to S. 34 para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act, it issued

a request to remedy the procedural defects and asked the applicant's

lawyer to submit a further copy for service of the complaint.  The

Administrative Court also informed the applicant's lawyer that failure

to comply with this request would result in the discontinuation of the

proceedings.  The Commission therefore finds that the Administrative

Court made the applicant's lawyer aware of the procedural defect, gave

him the possibility to remedy it and warned him of the possible

consequences (see Eur. Court HR, Vacher v. France judgment of

17 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, p. 2149, para. 30).

     It is true that as part of an amendment of the Administrative

Court Act (see above "Relevant domestic law", point 3) further copies

for service no longer need to bear the signature of a lawyer.  However

this subsequent change of the law as such cannot lead to the conclusion

that the legal situation in force previously had unduly restricted the

applicant in her right of access to a court.

     In these circumstances the Commission cannot find that the

applicant was unduly hindered in her right of access to a court by the

Administrative Court's decision to discontinue the proceedings.

Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.   The applicant also complains that the Constitutional Court's

refusal to deal with her complaint constituted a violation of Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     However, the Commission need not determine whether or not the

facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation

of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention as, under Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter within a

period of six months from the date on which the final decision was

taken.

     The Commission observes that the applicant for the first time

raised this complaint in her observations of 17 September 1996, while

the last domestic decision in her case had been taken by the

Administrative Court on 22 March 1994.  The applicant has, therefore,

not complied with the time-limit laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of

the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected

under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

        M. de SALVIA                        S. TRECHSEL

         Secretary                            President

      to the Commission                   of the Commission

 

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