SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 26015/13
Maxim GRUMEZA
against the Republic of Moldova
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 11 February 2020 as a Committee composed of:
Arnfinn Bårdsen, President,
Valeriu Griţco,
Peeter Roosma, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 23 March 2013,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Maxim Grumeza, is a Moldovan national, who was born in 1987 and lives in Chișinău. He was represented before the Court by Mr I. Dodon, a lawyer practising in Chișinău.
The Moldovan Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr O. Rotari.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 14 August 2011 the applicant was driving his motorbike on a public road and was involved in a serious accident with a car. In particular, the other vehicle entered a main road from a secondary road, without yielding priority to the applicant. As a result of the accident, the applicant suffered serious injuries.
On 18 August 2011 the Ialoveni Prosecutor’s Office initiated a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the case on the basis of Article 264 (3)(a) of the Criminal Code, i.e. for failure to observe traffic regulations resulting in serious bodily injuries. The initial version of the investigators was that the driver of the car failed to yield priority to the motorbike.
During the investigation, the prosecutors heard several witnesses, including the occupants of a vehicle driving behind the car involved in the accident. They stated, inter alia, that the car involved in the accident stopped before entering the main road to make sure that no other vehicles came from both directions. After making a left turn, a motorbike circulating at a very high speed appeared and smashed into the rear back side of the car. The witnesses stated that due to the motorcycle’s extremely high speed and of the configuration of the road, it was impossible for the driver of the car involved in the accident to see it coming and to react. They assumed that the motorcycle’s speed was around 170-180 km/h.
The prosecutor also obtained an expert opinion, which stated that the exact speed of the motorbike could not be determined, but that it had surely been above the speed limit of 90 km/h and that there had been a direct causal link between the motorcycle’s speeding and the accident.
The applicant also admitted to having been riding at approximately 100‑110 km/h. Moreover, it was found out that during the past years he had been sanctioned on several occasions for failure to observe traffic regulations.
On 19 July 2012 the Ialoveni Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings after concluding that it had been the applicant who had been responsible for the accident as a result of his speeding. The prosecutor also concluded that the applicant had committed a speeding contravention, but that he could not be sanctioned for it because it had been time-barred.
The applicant challenged the above decision before the superior prosecutor’s office, but without success. He then unsuccessfully challenged it before an investigation judge from the Ialoveni District Court, who dismissed his appeal on points of law by a decision dated 25 September 2012.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings had not been fair because as a result of them he had, in fact, been found guilty of the traffic accident without having had the possibility to plead his case before the courts.
THE LAW
The applicant complained that the criminal proceedings in question had not been fair and that his rights under Articles 6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
The Government submitted that the statement by the prosecutor of the fact that the applicant had been responsible for the accident due to his speeding had been inevitable in the circumstances of the case.
The Court has consistently held in its case-law that the Convention does not provide for the institution of an actio popularis and that its task is not normally to review the relevant law and practice in abstracto, but rather to determine whether the manner in which they were applied to, or affected, the applicant gave rise to a violation of the Convention. Accordingly, in order to be able to lodge an application in accordance with Article 34 an individual must be able to show that he or she was “directly affected” by the measure complained of. This is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion, although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way throughout the proceedings (see Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no. 47143/06, § 164, ECHR 2015, with further references).
The Court notes that the applicant did not have the status of a suspect or accused in the criminal investigation but that of victim. It is true, however, that the prosecutor discontinued the proceedings after coming to the conclusion that the applicant’s speeding had been at the origin of the accident. Nevertheless, no new criminal or administrative proceedings have been initiated against the applicant. Moreover, the applicant did not pretend that the above finding by the prosecutor in the order of discontinuation of the criminal proceedings had adverse repercussions in any civil proceedings, if such proceedings ever took place. In such circumstances, even assuming that Article 6 of the Convention was applicable in the present case, the Court cannot but observe that the applicant was not directly affected by the impugned finding made by the prosecutor. Thus, the applicant did not show that he was a “victim” of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. The application must therefore be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 19 March 2020.
Hasan BakırcıArnfinn Bårdsen
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy