THE FACTS
A. Whereas the facts presented by the parties and apparently not in
dispute between them may be summarised as follows:
The applicant is a German citizen, born in 1925 and at present detained
in prison in Berlin-Tegel.
His present application concerns certain civil proceedings which took
place in the Regional Court (Landgericht) of Berlin following his
conviction and sentence in 1962.
I. As to the applicant's conviction and sentence
1. on 4th June, 1962, the applicant was convicted by the Regional Court
of Berlin on charges of having committed an indecent assault against
a child and of having inflicted serious bodily harm upon her. According
to the finding of the Court, the crime was committed on 23rd December,
1961, between 14.30 and 16.00 hours. The child suffered such serious
injuries that an immediate operation was necessary to save her life.
In his defence before the trial court the applicant stated that he had
been drinking alcohol at a public house and that he could not remember
what had happened after he had left about 14.00 hours. He also
submitted that an unknown person must have taken advantage of the child
in his, the applicant's flat.
The Court found these allegations to have been refuted and sentenced
the applicant to ten years' penal servitude. His appeal (Revision) was
dismissed by the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) as manifestly
ill-founded on 23rd October, 1962.
2. On 11th January, 1963, the applicant filed a petition for retrial
(Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens). He referred, inter alia, to the
Regional Court's finding that the crime had been committed between
14.30 and 16.00 hours and stated that, between 14.00 and 15.15 hours,
he had been in East Berlin. There he had visited his mother's flat and,
as she was not at home, he had left a note.
The applicant's above petition for retrial was refused by the Regional
Court on 5th March, 1963, on the ground that it did not disclose any
new facts or evidence which might be considered as sufficient to upset,
or put into doubt, the findings of the trial court on which his
conviction was based. His appeal (Beschwerde) against this decision was
dismissed by the Court of Appeal (Kammergericht) of Berlin on 17th May,
1963.
3. In his first application (No. 2081/63) which was declared
inadmissible by the Commission on 10th December, 1965, under Article
27, paragraphs (2) and (3), of the Convention, the applicant complained
of his conviction and sentence and of the above decisions refusing his
petition for retrial. The Commission held that, with regard to his
conviction an sentence, the applicant had failed to observe the six
months' time-limit laid down in Article 26 of the Convention and it
further found that his complaints relating to his petition for retrial
and the court proceedings concerned were incompatible with the
provisions of the Convention.
4. A second petition for retrial lodged by the applicant was rejected
by the Regional Court on 19th December, 1966, and, on appeal, by the
Court of Appeal on 22nd March, 1967.
II. As to the civil proceedings against the applicant
1. In August 1964, the child, who had been the victim of the
above-mentioned indecent assault, filed with the Regional Court a
petition for free legal aid in order to claim compensation for the
injuries suffered. Her representative referred to the case-file of the
criminal proceedings against the applicant and gave "23rd December,
1961, around 10.00 hours" as the time when the assault had been
committed.
In pursuance of Article 118a of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Zivilprozessordnung), this petition was communicated to the applicant
for any observations which he wished to make in reply. In his
submissions of 14th August and 11th September, 1964, he requested the
Court to refuse the child's petition or, alternatively, also to grant
him legal aid and to appoint Rechtsanwältin X. to represent him. Having
learned that Mrs. X. objected to her appointment, the applicant
proposed another barrister, Dr. Y. The latter declared himself prepared
to accept the brief provided the applicant's petition for free legal
aid was granted.
By a decision of 1st April, 1965, the Court granted free legal aid to
the child plaintiff and appointed a barrister to represent her. The
Court also invited Dr. Y. to state and substantiate the applicant's
defence and to offer supporting evidence.
Dr. Y. replied that he had agreed to act as counsel only if the
applicant were granted free legal aid. As this had not yet been the
case, he was unable to accept any service of process.
The writ was then served on the applicant personally who, in June 1965,
denied liability and renewed his petition for free legal aid and for
the appointment of Dr. Y.
On 12th July, 1965, this petition was refused by the Regional Court on
the ground that the applicant's defence failed to show a "sufficient
prospect of success" within the meaning of Article 114, paragraph (1),
of the Code of Civil Procedure. This provision states as follows:
"A party who is not in a position to meet the costs of an action
without sacrificing the necessary means of support for himself or his
family shall, on his application, be granted free legal aid, provided
that the proposed claim or defence offers sufficient prospects of
success ..."
("Einer Partei, die ausserstande ist, ohne Beeinträchtigung des für sie
und ihre Familie notwendigen Unterhalts die Kosten des Prozesses zu
bestreiten, ist auf Antrag das Armenrecht zu bewilligen, wenn die
beabsichtigte Rechtsverfolgung oder Rechtsverteidigung eine
hinreichende Aussicht auf Erfolg bietet ...")
In its decision, the Regional Court referred to the findings of the
criminal proceedings and stated that the submissions made by the
applicant in support of his petition for free legal aid did not contain
anything which might show that the plaintiff would not succeed in
proving the applicant's liability. As to the amount of compensation
claimed, it did not appear that the applicant intended to make any
observations.
The applicant lodged an appeal (Beschwerde) against this decision and
invoked Article 6, paragraph (1), of the Convention and Article 103,
paragraph (1), of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic
of Germany which states that, in the courts, everyone is entitled to
a hearing in accordance with the law ("Vor Gericht hat jedermann
Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör"). He also referred to the indication
in the statement of claim that the assault had been committed "around
10.00 hours" and pointed out that this differed from the finding of the
criminal judgment that it occurred "between 14.30 and 16.00 hours".
He further complained that the Regional Court had failed to examine his
alibi.
On 14th September, 1965, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
appeal. It considered the plaintiff's statement that the assault had
been committed "around 10.00 hours" as a "patent error"
("offensichtliches Versehen") and observed, with regard to the
applicant's alibi, that it had already been considered carefully by
courts of two instances in his unsuccessful proceedings for retrial
(see I 2 above). The Court of Appeal also quoted the jurisprudence of
the Federal Constitutional Court concerning Article 103, paragraph (1),
of the Basic Law in connection with the right to free legal aid as
defined in Article 114, paragraph (1), of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It followed from this jurisprudence that the refusal of legal aid could
not be considered to be unconstitutional where, as in the present case,
the proposed defence did not offer a sufficient prospect of success.
By letter of 21st September, the applicant lodged a new appeal against
the Regional Court's decision of 12th July, 1965, by which his petition
for free legal aid has been refused. He referred again to his alibi and
submitted an affidavit (Versicherung an Eides Statt) by his mother of
24th August, 1965. This appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on
9th December, 1965, as unfounded. The Court stated that the affidavit
could not be regarded as sufficient to upset, or to put into doubt, the
detailed findings in the criminal proceedings against the applicant as
these findings had been based on the comprehensive evidence which had
been before the trial court.
By a letter of 27th December the applicant lodged a third appeal
against the decision of the Regional Court of 12th July, 1965. This
appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal on 28th January, 1966, as
inadmissible.
2. In the meanwhile, the hearing concerning the plaintiff's claim for
damages had taken place before the Regional Court on 30th September,
1965. In these proceedings, Article 78, paragraph (1), of the Code of
Civil Procedure applied which states as follows:
"Before the Regional Courts .... the parties must be represented by
counsel authorised to act on their behalf; such counsel must be
entitled to practise before the court in question (Counsel's
proceedings)"
("Vor den Landgerichten ... müssen die Parteien sich durch einen bei
dem Prozessgericht zugelassenen Rechtsanwalt als Bevollmächtigten
vertreten lassen [Anwaltsprozess]")
In accordance with this provision, the child plaintiff was represented
by counsel at the hearing. The applicant, whose petition for free legal
aid had been refused, was present but not represented by counsel and,
consequently, he could not address the Court and had to be treated as
if he had failed to appear.
Counsel for the plaintiff referred to his written submissions and moved
that judgment by default should be given against the defendant and
present applicant in accordance with Article 331 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. This provision states as follows:
"(1) Where a plaintiff applies for judgment by default against a
defendant who has failed to appear at the hearing, the fact as stated
in Court by the plaintiff shall be deemed to have been admitted.
(2) Insofar as the fact stated by the plaintiff justify his statement
of claim, judgment shall be given in accordance with the statement of
claim ..."
("(1) Beantragt der Kläger gegen den im Termin zur mündlichen
Verhandlung nicht erschienenen Beklagten das Versäumnisurteil, so ist
das tatsächliche mündliche Vorbringen des Klägers als zugestanden
anzunehmen.
(2) Soweit es den Klageantrag rechtfertigt, ist nach dem Klageantrag
zu erkennen ....")
When making the above motion, counsel for the plaintiff did not state
the exact amount of damages claimed but left its determination to the
discretion of the Court.
In accordance with Article 331 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
Court gave a judgment by default on 30th September, 1965, ordering the
applicant to pay 12,000 DM to the plaintiff. When fixing the amount of
damages, the Court took into account the facts alleged by the plaintiff
and the financial situation of both parties. It also had regard to the
jurisprudence of the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) in similar
cases. The judgment was served on the applicant on 8th November. 1965.
Under Articles 338 and 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a party
against whom a judgment by default has been given may lodge an
objection (Einspruch) within a time-limit of two weeks. In proceedings
before the Regional Courts, objections must, in accordance with Article
78 of the Code, be lodged by counsel. Article 342 provides that, where
the objection is admissible, the proceedings shall recommence at the
stage in which they were before the default occurred.
On 12th November, 1965, the applicant lodged with the District Court
(Amtsgericht) of Berlin-Wedding an objection against the Regional
Court's above judgment by default. He was aware that his objection had
to be filed by counsel but he apparently did not find a barrister who
was prepared to act on his behalf. Pointing out that he was destitute,
he also made a new petition for free legal aid.
By a letter of 27th December, 1965, from the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Court, the applicant was informed that his objection could not
be taken into consideration because it had not been filed by counsel.
B. Whereas the arguments of the parties may be summarised as follows:
I. The applicant refers substantially to Article 6 and also to Article
14 of the Convention. He submits that, without the assistance of a
lawyer, he was unable properly to defend himself against the child
plaintiff's claim for compensation in the civil proceedings before the
Regional Court and that, consequently, he was not given a fair hearing
in the determination of his alleged civil obligation. He further
considers that the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal discriminated
against him by granting free legal aid only to the plaintiff.
1. With regard to the main proceedings before the Regional Court which
led to the judgment by default of 30th September, 1965, the applicant
complains that he was not heard at all. Indeed, in these proceedings,
the Court was bound under Articles 78 and 331 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to leave his submissions out of consideration and to treat
the facts alleged by the plaintiff as being admitted. This situation
was not altered by the fact that the defendant and present applicant
was present at the hearing, having in his written submissions expressly
contested his liability and offered to produce evidence to refute the
plaintiff's allegations.
2. In the applicant's opinion, it is irrelevant for the determination
of his above complaint which related to the main proceedings that his
defence against the plaintiff's claim was in fact considered by the
Regional Court, and by the Court of Appeal, in connection with his
petition for free legal aid. He states that, under German law,
proceedings concerning applications for legal aid are separate from the
main proceedings and argues that the summary character of the former,
in particular as regards the taking of evidence, excludes any
comparison with the latter. The summary character of legal aid
proceedings is clear, in particular, from Article 118a, paragraph (1),
of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:
"The Court may require the applicant to establish the probability of
his statements of fact. It shall, before granting free legal aid, hear
the opposing party unless, for special reasons, this should appear
inexpedient. The Court may also make enquiries, so far as this does not
entail serious delay, and, in particular, require the production of
documents and obtain information from public authorities. Witnesses and
experts shall only be heard where the facts, insofar as this is
necessary for the decision on the application for free legal aid,
cannot otherwise be sufficiently ascertained; they shall not be
examined on oath."
("Das Gericht kann verlangen, dass der Antragsteller seine Angaben
glaubhaft macht. Es soll, wenn dies nicht aus besonderen Gründen
unzweckmässig erscheint, vor der Bewilligung des Armenrechts den Gegner
hören. Es kann auch, soweit dies ohne erhebliche Verzögerung möglich
ist, Erhebungen anstellen, insbesondere die Vorlegung von Urkunden
anordnen und von Behörden Auskünfte einholen. Die Vernehmung von Zeugen
oder Sachverständigen ist nur zulässig, wenn der Sachverhalt, soweit
dies zur Entscheidung über das Armenrechtsgesuch erforderlich ist, auf
andere Weise nicht hinreichend geklärt werden kann; eine Beeidigung
findet nicht statt.")
3. In general, the applicant also points out that, under German law,
the civil courts are not bound by findings made in criminal
proceedings. He argues that, consequently, his defence against the
plaintiff's claim for compensation in the civil proceedings of 1965
should not have been rejected on the ground that his guilt had already
been established at his trial in 1962.
The applicant further submits that the provisions of the German Code
of Civil Procedure concerning judgments by default should be
interpreted in accordance with the requirements of Article 6, paragraph
(1), and Article 14 of the Convention. Such interpretation would
exclude a judgment by default where, as in the present case, the
defendant's default was due only to his lack of means to pay a
barrister's fees.
Finally, the applicant complains that the guarantee of a "public"
hearing in Article 6, paragraph (1), of the Convention was not observed
in the above civil proceedings against him before the Regional Court.
II. The respondent Government submits that neither Article 6 nor
Article 14 of the Convention was violated in the civil proceedings
against the applicant.
1. The Government argues generally that, in interpreting these
provisions, regard must be had to the legal systems of the Contracting
States. Such a comparison shows that both the obligation for parties
to be represented by counsel before certain courts and the possibility
of proceedings by default in the absence of such representation are a
common feature of several countries. Similarly, free legal aid is
granted in such cases to parties unable to pay a barrister's fees
provided that their case offers a reasonable chance of success.
Reference is made in this connection to:
- Articles 133, paragraph (1), 138, 153, 406, paragraph (4), 76 and
855 et sqq. of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van
Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering) and to the Dutch Law of 4th July, 1957;
- Articles 27, 396, 63, paragraph (1), and 73, paragraph (2), of the
Austrian Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung);
- Articles 61, No. 1, 75 and 150 of the Belgian Code of Civil
Procedure (Code de procédure civile) and to the Belgian Law of 29th
June, 1929.
In the Government's opinion, if follows from the above legal provisions
that such procedural rules are considered by more than one Contracting
Party to be in harmony with the Convention. Otherwise the states
concerned would have made a reservation in accordance with Article 64.
As regards the right to free legal aid in civil proceedings, the
Government further refers both to the Commission's jurisprudence
according to which this right is not as such guaranteed by the
Convention, and also to Article 6, paragraph (3), sub-paragraph (c).
It points out that this provision, which recognises expressly a right
to free legal aid in criminal proceedings, nevertheless limits this
right to cases where "the interests of justice so require". A fortiori
a limitation of the right to legal aid in civil proceedings, must be
considered compatible with Article 6, even if regarded under the
general "fair hearing" clause of paragraph 1.
2. The Government further refers to the concrete circumstances of the
present case and submits that, in any event, Article 6, paragraph (1),
of the Convention was not violated, the applicant's right to a "fair
hearing" in the determination of his civil obligation having been fully
observed by the German courts. In accordance with the relevant
provisions of German law, his submissions could not be considered in
the main proceedings. However, in the proceedings concerning his
petition for free legal aid, he was granted a full hearing at two
instances.
In this connection, the Government refers to the above provisions of
Articles 114 and 118a of the German Code of Civil Procedure setting out
the conditions in which legal aid may be granted and regulating the
procedure to be followed by the Court in order to ascertain whether
these conditions are fulfilled. Reference is further made to the
general rule of Article 139, paragraph (1), of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which states as follows:
"The President shall endeavour to ensure that the parties state their
case fully with respect to all material facts and make all applications
appropriate to their case and, in particular, that they complete any
inadequate statement of facts and indicate the evidence they propose
to adduce. For this purpose he shall, so far as necessary, discuss the
subject-matter and the issue with the parties, from the points of view
of the facts and the law, and put questions."
("Der Vorsitzende had dahin zu wirken, dass die Parteien über alle
erheblichen Tatsachen sich vollständig erklären und die sachdienlichen
Anträge stellen, insbesondere auch ungenügende Angaben der geltend
gemachten Tatsachen ergänzen und die Beweismittel bezeichnen. Er hat
zu diesem Zwecke, soweit erforderlich, das Sach- und Streitverhältnis
mit den Parteien nach der tatsächlichen und der rechtlichen Seite zu
erörtern und Fragen zu stellen.")
In the Government's opinion, if follows from these provisions that the
poor person's right to a "fair hearing" is fully observed as a result
of the thorough examination which has to be undertaken in the
proceedings concerning his petition for free legal aid; indeed, the
arguments submitted by the present applicant in his defence against the
plaintiff's claim for compensation were carefully considered by the
courts in these proceedings.
THE LAW
As to Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention
Whereas Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention provides
that, in the determination of his civil rights and obligations,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by a tribunal
established by law; whereas the applicant submits that, his petition
for free legal aid having been refused in the preliminary proceedings,
his right to a fair and public hearing was violated in the main
proceedings before the Regional Court when the Court determined the
question of his liability and his resultant obligation to compensate
the victim of the indecent assault of 23rd December, 1961; whereas the
Government argues that the applicant's right to a fair and public
hearing was fully observed by the competent German courts in the course
of the proceedings as a whole;
Whereas the Commission, in examining the applicant's above complaint,
has first had regard to its constant jurisprudence according to which
the right to free legal aid in civil cases, as opposed to criminal
cases, is not as such included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed
by the Convention; whereas, in this respect, reference is made to the
Commission's decision on the admissibility of Application No. 3011/67
(Collection of Decisions, Vol. 25, pages 70 [73-74]);
Whereas, however, it follows from the text of its above decision that
the Commission, when dealing with complaints concerning the refusal of
free legal aid in civil proceedings, also considers the general clause
of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention in order to
determine whether such refusal constituted, in the particular
circumstances of the case, a violation of the right of a person
concerned to be granted a fair hearing; whereas, indeed, the Commission
also regards this further aspect when examining the issue of legal aid
in criminal proceedings; and whereas the Commission has previously held
that the right to a fair hearing, both in civil and criminal
proceedings, contemplates that everyone who is a party to such
proceedings shall have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case
to the Court under conditions which do not place him at a substantial
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent; whereas, in this respect, the
Commission refers to its decisions on the admissibility of Applications
No. 434/58 and 1092/61, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human
Rights, Vol. 2, pages 354 (370, 372), and Vol. 5, pages 210 (212), and,
further, to its reports, and the decisions of the Committee of
Ministers, in the cases of Ofner, Hopfinger, Pataki and Dunshirn;
Whereas accordingly, with regard to the present complaint, the
Commission is called upon to consider whether the specific
circumstances of the proceedings against the applicant amounted to a
denial of his right to a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6,
paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; whereas, in this
connection, it is not the task of the Commission to examine in general
whether the relevant provisions of the German Code of Civil Procedure
are in conformity with the Convention;
Whereas the question to be determined is solely whether the application
of these provisions in the present case violated Article 6, paragraph
(1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; and whereas the Commission holds
that this question cannot properly be determined on the basis of an
isolated consideration of the main civil proceedings against the
applicant which led to the judgment by default of 20th September, 1965,
but that regard must be had to all the relevant proceedings;
Whereas, with respect to these proceedings, the Commission observes
that the civil proceedings of which the applicant complains were the
sequel to the criminal proceedings against him in which he had been
convicted and sentenced; whereas, following this conviction and
sentence, the applicant attempted on several occasions to obtain
retrial; and whereas he again contested the findings of the criminal
courts when applying for free legal aid and in the above civil
proceedings against him;
Whereas it is true that the applicant was not heard by the Regional
Court in the main civil proceedings on 30th September, 1965, when a
judgment by default was given against him; whereas, however, it is
clear, both from the decisions rendered by the criminal courts in the
proceedings concerning his petitions for retrial and from the decisions
of the civil courts regarding his petition for free legal aid, that the
arguments submitted by the applicant in the civil proceedings in his
defence against the plaintiff's claim for compensation were carefully
examined by these courts at two instances and found not to be
sufficient to upset, or to put into doubt, the findings of the criminal
courts that he had committed the assault in question; whereas, further,
as to the amount of damages, the applicant, although invited to do so,
did not make any submissions on this point in the proceedings
concerning his petition for free legal aid;
Whereas, in conclusion, having regard to the proceedings as a whole,
the Commission finds that the applicant was accorded an adequate
hearing by the Courts before the civil judgment of 30th September,
1965, was given against him; whereas, in particular, it does not appear
that he was placed at such a disadvantage vis-à-vis the infant
plaintiff as to have prejudiced him in the effective exercise of his
defence against the plaintiff's claim; whereas, therefore, the
applicant's right to a fair hearing in the determination of his civil
obligation to compensate the victim of his alleged assault was not
violated in the proceedings concerned;
Whereas, finally, the Commission has also considered the applicant's
further complaint under Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the
Convention, that he was not heard in public as to the child's claim for
compensation;
Whereas, in this respect, the Commission notes that the main
proceedings before the Regional Court were public; whereas, in
particular, the judgment of 30th September, 1965, was pronounced at a
public session of the Court; whereas, in conclusion, the Commission,
again having regard to the course of the proceedings as a whole, does
not find that the applicant's right to a public hearing was violated
by the German courts;
As to Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6, paragraph (1)
(Art. 14, 6-1), of the Convention
Whereas the applicant also alleges a violation of Article 14 (Art. 14)
of the Convention, complaining that the Regional Court granted free
legal aid only to the plaintiff and that consequently he himself, being
equally without means to pay a barrister's fees, was not represented
by counsel in the main proceedings before the Regional Court;
Whereas, according to Article 14 (Art. 14), the enjoyment of the rights
and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured without any
discrimination on the ground of property; whereas, in this respect, the
Commission has already stated above that the right to free legal aid
in civil cases is not as such guaranteed by the Convention; that,
nevertheless, the refusal of such aid may be considered under the "fair
hearing" clause of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1); but that there
was no violation of this clause in the present case; whereas, in
particular, it is clear from the decisions of the German courts that
the refusal of the applicant's petition for free legal aid was not
based on any consideration of property but solely on an appreciation
of the prospects of his defence against the plaintiff's claim;
Whereas, therefore, the decisions concerned do not as such violate
Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention;
Whereas, finally, it is true that, as a result of the decisions
refusing his petition for free legal aid on the ground that his defence
failed to show a sufficient prospect of success, the applicant, being
without means to pay a barrister's fees, was prevented from pleading
his case in the main proceedings before the Regional Court, while a
person with sufficient means could have done so irrespective of the
prospects of his case; whereas, however, the Commission holds that such
inequality does not violate the Convention; whereas, indeed, it follows
from Article 6 paragraph (3) sub-paragraph (c) (Art. 6-3-c), that even
in criminal proceedings, where a right to free legal aid is guaranteed
by the Convention, this right is limited to cases "where the interests
of justice so require";
Whereas this limitation has also been held by the Commission to apply
to its consideration under Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the
Convention, of complaints concerning the refusal of free legal aid in
criminal cases; whereas, consequently, a reasonable limitation of the
right to free legal aid in civil cases, which is itself not guaranteed
by the Convention, can a fortiori not be regarded as violating the
"fair hearing" clause of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1);
Whereas, similarly, such reasonable limitation cannot be considered as
being contrary to the provisions of Article 14 (Art. 14); and whereas,
in the present case, the limitation of the right to free legal aid
under Article 14 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, which led to
the above formal inequality, must nevertheless be considered as
reasonable;
Whereas, in conclusion, the Commission finds that an examination of the
applicant's complaints under Articles 6 and 14 (Art. 6, 14) does not
disclose the appearance of a violation of the Convention; whereas it
follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;
Now therefore the Commission declares this application inadmissible.