SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 27350/19
Gísli REYNISSON
against Iceland
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 7 October 2025 as a Committee composed of:
Péter Paczolay, President,
Gediminas Sagatys,
Stéphane Pisani, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 27350/19) against the Republic of Iceland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 16 May 2019 by an Icelandic national, Mr Gísli Reynisson (“the applicant”), who was born in 1972, lives in Reykjavik and was represented by Mr R. Petursson, a lawyer practising in Reykjavik;
the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention about the lack of a “tribunal established by law” to the Icelandic Government (“the Government”), represented by Mr Einar Karl Hallvarðsson, Attorney General, Agent of the Government of Iceland, and Ms Guðrún Sesselja Arnardóttir, Supreme Court Attorney, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the parties’ observations;
the withdrawal of Ms Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, the judge elected in respect of Iceland, from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3 of the Rules of Court);
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The present case concerns the refusal of the Icelandic authorities to criminally prosecute certain officials of the Central Bank of Iceland (the Central Bank) following the applicant’s request. Allegedly the Court of Appeal, while considering the case, was not a “tribunal established by law”, contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, due to irregularities in the appointment of one of three judges who had sat on the bench.
2. The end of 2008 marked the beginning of a major financial crisis in Iceland. Among the measures taken to tackle it was an amendment to Act No. 87/1992 on Foreign Exchange, which allowed the Central Bank, subject to the approval of the Minister of Commerce, to enact rules restricting or suspending capital movements and foreign exchange transactions.
3. On 15 December 2008 the Central Bank issued new Rules No. 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange (the Rules). The news announcement stated that the Rules were issued following ministerial approval, but it is undisputed now that there was no such approval.
4. In November 2009 the Central Bank officials notified the Financial Supervisory Authority of suspected violations of the above Rules by certain persons, including the applicant in the present case, and the matter was transferred for investigation. After the investigation was taken over by the Special Prosecutor in 2011, the Central Bank officials stated in meetings with him that the ministerial approval had been duly obtained and was available at the bank.
5. In March 2013 an indictment was issued against the applicant and three other persons, concerning, inter alia, alleged violations of the Rules. However, it was subsequently discovered that no ministerial approval had been received and the relevant charges were dropped.
6. On 18 December 2014 the Reykjanes District Court acquitted the applicant and the other accused of the remaining charges and this judgment was ultimately upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Iceland on 19 February 2016.
7. In October 2016 the applicant filed a criminal complaint requesting an inquiry into whether the senior Central Bank officials had committed the offence of false accusation. He argued that the officials had been aware of the lack of the requisite ministerial approval of the Rules and, therefore, had facilitated the time-consuming criminal investigation, coercive sanctions and indictment without a lawful basis against him.
8. The applicant’s complaint was first dismissed by the Capital District Police and subsequently by the State Prosecutor on 11 November 2016 and 21 February 2017 respectively. Both the police and the prosecutor concluded that the officials’ acts (see paragraph 4 above) lacked the constitutive element of intent to falsely accuse a person of a criminal act. The State Prosecutor further concluded that the breach of the Rules also had not qualified as such as a “criminal act” within the meaning of domestic criminal law. Lastly, the State Prosecutor noted that the statute of limitations precluded any potential prosecution of the Central Bank officials for negligence of a public employee or for providing false information in connection with the missing ministerial approval of the Rules.
9. While the applicant’s complaint against the above decisions was allowed by the Reykjavik District Court on 5 March 2018, it was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court on 16 November and 20 December 2018 respectively. The higher courts found that due to the principle of prosecutorial independence and the separation of powers doctrine, the courts could not substantively review a decision not to pursue an investigation. The judicial review of such decisions was limited to procedural flaws in the decision-making, such as, for example, the lack of impartiality, which had not been present here.
10. In parallel with the above proceedings, in January 2017 the applicant filed a civil action against the Icelandic State claiming damages in connection with his criminal prosecution. By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Iceland of 25 May 2020 he was awarded approximately 3,700 euros in damages.
11. The applicant complained before the Court that the Court of Appeal that was reviewing his appeal concerning the refusal to prosecute the Central Bank officials (see paragraph 9 above) was not a “tribunal established by law” due to irregularities in the appointment of one of three judges who had sat on the bench, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
12. In the applicant’s submission, the Court of Appeal which decided on his appeal concerning the decision of the State Prosecutor not to prosecute the Central Bank officials was not a “tribunal established by law” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as a result of irregularities in the appointment of one of three judges on the bench.
13. The Government in their observations maintained that the applicant’s complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention as Article 6 of the Convention in its civil limb was not applicable. They argued that under Icelandic domestic law no right existed to have a third party prosecuted and that consistent case-law of the Icelandic Supreme Court safeguarded prosecutorial independence in taking discretionary decisions on whether or not to pursue criminal proceedings. Furthermore, in the absence of an arguable right of a civil nature and the limited scope of judicial review, the relevant judicial proceedings could not have amounted to a genuine and serious dispute.
14. The applicant disagreed, alleging, with reference to Boulois v. Luxembourg [GC] (no. 37575/04, §§ 90-94, ECHR 2012), that there had been a genuine and serious dispute about the legality of the decision not to prosecute. Referring to opinions expressed by the ombudsperson, in academic writings and parliamentary proceedings he claimed that the decision not to prosecute concerned his rights and duties. He further asserted that he had suffered direct consequences of the investigation against him and that prosecutorial discretion did not extend to taking illegal decisions.
15. The Court reiterates that for Article 6 § 1 in its civil limb to be applicable, there must be a “dispute” (“contestation” in French) regarding a “right” which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, irrespective of whether it is protected under the Convention. The dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise; and, finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring Article 6 § 1 into play (see Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, § 44, 25 September 2018; Grzęda v. Poland [GC], no. 43572/18, § 257, 15 March 2022; and Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, § 108, 1 June 2023, all with further references). Lastly, the right must be a “civil” right (see Grzęda, cited above, § 257, and Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], nos. 6319/21 and 2 others, § 76, 24 September 2024).
16. It is further a consistent position of the Court that the Convention does not guarantee the right to institute criminal proceedings or secure the conviction of a third party (see Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 70, ECHR 2004‑I; Irene Wilson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 10601/09, § 29, 23 October 2012; and Bakoyanni v. Greece, no. 31012/19, § 65, 20 December 2022). The right to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence cannot be asserted independently, pursuance of criminal proceedings with purely punitive purposes or when such proceedings are unrelated to an alleged victim’s right to bring an action for compensation cannot bring the relevant proceedings within the scope of Article 6 (compare Perez, cited above, §§ 67 and 70; Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, § 218, 14 April 2015; and Fabbri, cited above, § 88).
17. Turning to the present case the Court notes at the outset that it is not disputed by the parties that following the dropping of the charges and acquittal (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above) the applicant could initiate a civil action seeking compensation for damage caused by the investigation, criminal prosecution and indictment. In fact, he precisely had recourse to that remedy and obtained an award of damages (see paragraph 10 above). The use of this civil remedy had not been dependent on or interrelated with initiating or pursuing criminal proceedings against any third party (see paragraph 16 above and compare and contrast Fabbri and Others, cited above, §§ 77-93).
18. The Court observes that the parties in their observations devoted significant attention to the extent of prosecutorial discretion to pursue criminal proceedings and the scope of judicial review of the respective decisions. However, in the present case none of these aspects appear to be decisive as to whether the proceedings in question fall under the civil limb of Article 6 of the Convention.
19. While it is beyond doubt that the decision not to prosecute the officials of the Central Bank had a potential impact on the applicant’s rights, this fact alone is not warranting recognition that these proceedings determined a right which was civil in its nature. Nothing in the available material convincingly demonstrates that a “civil” right to have a third party criminally prosecuted exists in Icelandic law or that the ability of a person to obtain compensation after charges are dropped is dependent on it. Essentially the criminal prosecution of the Central Bank officials in the present case would serve no other function but punitive and, potentially, preventive. Neither of these aims of criminal proceedings is having a direct impact, or is decisive for, the existence or exercise of any of the applicant’s civil rights.
20. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the proceedings concerning the refusal to prosecute the Central Bank officials had not concerned the applicant’s civil rights or obligations within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. Therefore, the application is inadmissible for being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 6 November 2025.
Dorothee von Arnim Péter Paczolay
Deputy Registrar President