SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 31480/96
by Annalisa GUGLIELMI
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 22 March 2001 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrG. Bonello,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 16 April 1996 and registered on 14 May 1996,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Italian national, born in 1964 and living in Rome. She is represented before the Court by Mr R. Andriani, a lawyer practising in Rome.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:
On 3 June 1982, the applicant became the owner of an apartment in Rome, which had been let to H.F.F.
In a registered letter of 2 February 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease and asked him to vacate the premises.
In a writ served on the tenant on 2 November 1983, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate.
By a decision of 6 December 1983, which was made enforceable on 6 December 1983, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1984.
On an unspecified date, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.
On an unspecified date, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 18 April 1986.
Between 18 April 1986 and 15 December 1989, the bailiff made 23 attempts to recover possession, on 18 April 1986, 28 May 1986, 2 July 1986, 18 September 1986, 10 October 1986, 13 November 1986, 14 April 1987, 19 May 1987, 22 June 1987, 22 September 1987, 26 October 1987, 22 September 1987, 26 October 1987, 30 November 1987, 29 January 1988, 3 March 1988, 21 October 1988, 8 February 1989, 26 May 1989, 30 June 1989, 22 September 1989, 7 November 1989 and 15 December 1989.
On 29 January 1990, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself.
Between 16 February 1990 and 4 September 1995, the bailiff made 33 attempts to recover possession, on 16 February 1990, 23 March 1990, 18 April 1990, 23 May 1990, 30 June 1990, 5 September 1990, 18 October 1990, 10 January 1991, 22 February 1991, 27 March 1991, 10 May 1991, 14 June 1991, 18 July 1991, 5 September 1991, 16 October 1991, 25 November 1991, 15 January 1992, 18 February 1992, 9 June 1992, 8 October 1992, 10 November 1992, 9 March 1993, 14 July 1993, 12 October 1993, 18 November 1993, 11 February 1994, 17 March 1994, 21 June 1994, 18 October 1994, 6 December 1994, 8 March 1995, 6 June 1995 and 4 September 1995.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.
On 17 October 1995, the tenant vacated the premises.
B. Relevant domestic law
The relevant domestic law is described in the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, 28.7.99, §§ 18-35, ECHR-V.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about her prolonged inability - through lack of police assistance - to recover possession of her apartment.
2. The applicant further complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings and about the denial of her right of access to a court.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that her inability to recover possession of her apartment amounted to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The applicant further complains about the duration of the eviction proceedings. Article 6 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate.
The applicant argues that the impossibility to repossess her apartment during 10 years from the issue of the order for possession amounts to a violation of her right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. She argues that in the Italian legal system, tenants are overprotected. Despite the fact that she had made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself, she could repossess the apartment only 11 years after the date set by the magistrate.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest.
The applicant argues that the delay in the enforcement of the order issued by the Rome Magistrate resulted in a denial of her right of access to a court. The applicant argues that the refusal of the administration to enforce the order issued by the magistrate has interfered with the power of the judiciary.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy