FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 62242/14
Edward GUJA
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 4 February 2020 as a Committee composed of:
Armen Harutyunyan, President,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Pauliine Koskelo, judges,
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 30 August 2014,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Edward Guja, is a Polish national, who was born in 1951 and lives in Jaworzno.
2. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska and subsequently by Mr J. Sobczak, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.Civil proceedings
4. On 28 October 2008 the applicant instituted civil proceedings for payment against a court bailiff for an allegedly incorrect manner in which she had carried out execution of a judgment in the applicant’s favour.
5. On 6 November 2008 the court exempted the applicant from the court fees. Afterwards, the parties lodged further procedural requests.
6. On 5 January 2009 the court held the first hearing.
7. In March 2009 the court allowed the applicant’s request to appoint him a legal aid lawyer.
8. On 1 April 2009 the defendant informed the court that the claim should also be directed against her insurance company. Afterwards, the applicant extended his claim in respect to the second defendant, the insurance company. The latter submitted its pleadings at the request of the court.
9. The court held hearings at regular intervals at which it heard the applicant and experts and decided to take further evidence.
10. In March 2010 the applicant challenged a judge; the judge was removed from dealing with the case by the Katowice Regional Court on 19 April 2010.
11. On 29 April 2010 the applicant challenged impartiality of an expert and requested her exclusion; the request was finally dismissed on 26 August 2010.
12. In May 2010 the applicant was informed by the court that since he was represented, all official correspondence had been directed to his lawyer. On 27 May 2010 the applicant withdrew the power of attorney for his legal aid lawyer. Afterwards, he appointed a lawyer of his choice.
13. In October 2010 the applicant lodged formal complaints with the National Bar Association about the conduct of all the lawyers participating in the proceedings, as his representatives, and representing the defendants.
14. In November 2010 the applicant further extended his claim.
15. On 3 March 2011 the court allowed the applicant’s request to seek an expert opinion on, inter alia, accounting. Afterwards, an expert opinion was prepared and the court heard the expert. Following comments on the expert’s opinion submitted by the applicant and the defendants, the court requested the expert to further supplement the opinion. The parties commented on the supplemented opinion.
16. On several occasions the applicant lodged requests to supplement and correct the minutes of hearings and asked for further evidence to be admitted. On one more occasion he extended his claim and sought an interim ruling. During the proceedings the applicant on a regular basis submitted to the court lengthy procedural requests accompanied by a large number of attachments. The applicant also contested expert opinions and requested the court to appoint new experts. All procedural requests made by the applicant were dealt with by the court without apparent delays.
17. On 19 June 2012 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed; his appeal had formal shortcomings which had to be corrected by the applicant. He also withdrew the power of attorney for his lawyer and submitted further procedural requests challenging judges and experts. He appointed a new lawyer to represent him.
18. On 14 February 2013 the Katowice Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The applicant lodged a request for written reasons for the judgment.
19. Afterwards, the applicant withdrew the power of attorney given to his most recent lawyer and requested that amendments be made to the minutes of the appellate hearing.
20. On 28 March 2013 the court decided to exempt the applicant from the court fees and to appoint him a legal aid lawyer for the purpose of lodging a cassation appeal.
21. In May 2013 the applicant challenged a judge and lodged further procedural motions.
22. On 29 May 2014 the Supreme Court refused to admit the applicant’s cassation appeal for consideration.Proceedings under the 2004 Act
23. The applicant lodged a complaint under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaint about breach of the right to have a case examined in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor and in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki - “the 2004 Act”). On 12 February 2013 the Katowice Court of Appeal dismissed it. The court considered that the applicant had limited his complaint to the period after the judgment of the first-instance had been issued. In that period there was no period of inactivity attributable to the Regional Court as it dealt with the appeals and multiple procedural requests by the applicant.Relevant domestic law and practice
24. A detailed description of the relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for excessive length of judicial proceedings – in particular, the applicable provisions of the 2004 Act – is set out in the Court’s decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland ((dec.), no. 15212/03, §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V) and Ratajczyk v. Poland ((dec.), no. 11215/02, ECHR 2005-VIII), and in its judgments in the cases of Krasuski v. Poland (no. 61444/00, §§ 34-46, ECHR 2005-V (extracts)) and Rutkowski and Others v. Poland (nos. 72287/10 and 2 others, §§ 75-107, 7 July 2015).
COMPLAINTS
25. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the excessive length of proceedings in his case and under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of redress for the excessive length of proceedings.
THE LAWArticle 6 § 1 of the Convention
26. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings in his case had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
27. The period to be taken into consideration began on 28 October 2008 and ended on 29 May 2014. The proceedings thus lasted five years and seven months at three levels of jurisdiction.
28. The Government raised a preliminary objection arguing that the application should be considered inadmissible as an abuse of the right of application under Article 35 of the Convention. They submitted copies of numerous letters written by the applicant to various institutions in Poland which contained insulting and abusive expressions directed at the Government’s Agent, Polish judges and other domestic institutions.
29. The Government further submitted that the case should be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The proceedings were complex and necessitated expert evidence. The courts dealing with the case were diligent and there were no significant periods of inactivity attributable to the domestic authorities. Moreover, the applicant significantly contributed to the total length of proceedings by lodging multiple and unsubstantiated procedural requests. For instance in April 2009 the applicant submitted to the court in total 130 pages of various requests with attachments.
30. The applicant in general disagreed with the Government and submitted that “the Agent had been lying”. He also in general repeated his allegation that the proceedings in his case had been lengthy.
31. The Court firstly reiterates that an application may be rejected as an abuse of the right of application under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. The Court has applied that provision, in particular, in the following types of situations. Firstly, an application may be rejected it if was knowingly based on untrue facts (see, Varbanov v. Bulgaria, no. 31365/96, § 36, ECHR 2000-X; and Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810/10, § 28, ECHR 2014). Secondly, it may also be rejected in cases where an applicant had used particularly vexatious, contemptuous, threatening or provocative expressions in his communication with the Court (see, for example, Řehák v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 67208/01, 18 May 2004).
32. However, the notion of abuse of the right of application under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention is not limited to those two instances and other situations could also be considered as an abuse of that right. In principle any conduct on the part of an applicant that is manifestly contrary to the purpose of the right of individual application as provided for in the Convention and which impedes the proper functioning of the Court or the proper conduct of the proceedings before it can be considered as an abuse of the right of application (see Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, no. 798/05, § 65, 15 September 2009).
33. In the context of the instant case the Court notes that according to the Government, the letters which had allegedly contained offensive language had been send by the applicant to various national institutions (see paragraph 28 above). There is no allegation that the applicant had used insulting expressions in his correspondence with the Court. Moreover, the Government failed to advance any argument in what manner the applicant’s conduct had negative influence on the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court.
34. However, the Court does not find it necessary to reach a conclusion on the Government’s objection, the present case being in any event manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons.
35. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and taking into account the criteria laid down in the Court’s case‑law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities. On the latter point, account must also be taken of what is at stake for the applicant (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 124 ECHR 2000‑XI, for further case-law references see Rutkowski and Others, cited above, §§ 126‑128).
36. Considering the nature of the case, the Court accepts the Government’s arguments that it was of some complexity and expert evidence was necessary (see paragraph 29 above).
37. As to the conduct of the authorities, the Court observes that the first hearing took place on 5 January 2010 and afterwards the hearings were held at regular intervals (see paragraphs 6 and 9 above). There is no appearance of any period during which the domestic courts remained inactive. There is also no evidence that the court’s experts took excessive amount of time to prepare their opinions.
38. As regards the conduct of the applicant, the Court notes that the Government argued that he had contributed to the prolongation of the proceedings (see paragraph 29 above). The Court cannot but note that vast part of the domestic court’s procedural activity was generated by the applicant himself. He lodged countless procedural requests and motions to adduce new evidence. The applicant challenged court appointed experts and sought that fresh evidence be admitted (see paragraph 11 and 17 above). He extended his civil claim at least on three occasions (see paragraphs 8 and 16 above). On multiple occasions the applicant challenged judges (see paragraphs 10, 17, and 21 above). He also requested that minutes of the hearings be amended. On several occasions the applicant revoked power of attorney and at least on two occasions he was granted legal aid (see paragraphs 12 and 19 above). As submitted by the Government, most of his complaints were manifestly ill-founded and the requests were lodged with various procedural flaws which had to be corrected. It is to be observed that, although in principle the applicant cannot be reproached for having made use of his procedural rights, nevertheless he must have known that his motions would have led to delays, the consequences of which he would have to bear (see Malicka-Wąsowska v. Poland (dec) no. 41413/98, 5 April 2001).
39. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court concludes that in the particular circumstances of the instant case and taking the proceedings as a whole, their length did not exceed a reasonable time. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.Article 13 of the Convention
40. The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention, that he had no effective domestic remedy in respect of the protracted length of proceedings in his case. Article 13 reads:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
41. The Government contested a breach of this provision of the Convention.
42. The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time. However, the “effectiveness” of a “remedy” within the meaning of that provision does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 154 et seq., ECHR 2000-XI).
43. While the subsidiarity principle underlying the Convention system requires the Contracting States to introduce a mechanism addressing complaints about the excessive length of proceedings within the national legal system, they are afforded – subject to compliance with the requirements of the Convention – some discretion as to the manner in which they provide individuals with the relief required by Article 13 and thus conform to their Convention obligations under that provision.
44. The Court further reiterates that the word “remedy” within the meaning of Article 13 does not mean a remedy which is bound to succeed, but simply an accessible remedy before an authority competent to examine the merits of a complaint (see, for example, Šidlová v. Slovakia, no. 50224/99, § 77, 26 September 2006, and Figiel v. Poland (no. 2), no. 38206/05, § 33, 16 September 2008).
45. Having regard to its finding in respect of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the fact that the applicant had, and made use of, a length complaint under the 2004 Act, the Court concludes that this part of the application is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 27 February 2020.
Renata DegenerArmen Harutyunyan
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy