Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 79
October 2005
Gunnarsson v. Iceland (dec.) - 4591/04
Decision 20.10.2005 [Section III]
Article 8
Article 8-1
Respect for private life
Defamation proceedings brought in vain by leading political and bank figure suggested to have conducted himself unethically (scope of Article 8 with regard to professional reputation and situation): inadmissible
The applicant unsuccessfully brought defamation proceedings against the author of a newspaper article suggesting that he, at the relevant time Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Icelandic Investment Bank, Secretary General of the Independence Party as well as Chairperson of the Broadcasting Licensing Committee, had been instrumental in the bank’s decision to withdraw a loan offer to, and break off with the Icelandic Broadcasting Company, due to his animosity towards one of its new majority shareholders, J.O. No reasons had been provided by the bank. In rejecting the applicant’s appeal the Supreme Court held that the respondent could not be required to prove the truth of the disputed remarks as this would have been unreasonably difficult for him to do. Considering the applicant’ prominent position within the Independence Party and given that he had served on the bank’s Board of Directors while also chairing the Broadcasting Licensing Committee, as well as the requirement that his work in these areas be independent from his role as Secretary General of the Independence Party, the applicant had to accept public discussion on the connections between his different functions.
Before the European Court the applicant alleged that the national courts had failed to provide an adequate protection of his honour and reputation, in violation of Article 8. Even as a “public figure” he should have been able to enjoy protection against accusations of conduct which, if true, would have been illegal and morally repugnant. The impugned allegations were unsubstantiated factual allegations, not value judgments, and exceeded even the very wide limits of free speech protection afforded by Article 10.
The Court observed at the outset that it had not been argued that the contested news coverage had affected the applicant’s “private life” as such, only his professional reputation and situation. Unlike Article 17 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 8 of the Convention does not expressly guarantee a right to protection of honour and reputation. The concept of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 was a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition, covering the physical and psychological or moral integrity of a person as well as aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity. In no case brought under Article 8 so far had the Court ruled that this provision embodies a right to protection of reputation and honour as such, albeit that these are interests that may be taken into account in the determination of a complaint about a State’s failure to ensure the right to respect for private life. Meanwhile, in a case brought under Article 10, the Court had verified whether the authorities had struck a fair balance when protecting on the one hand, freedom of expression as guaranteed by that provision and, on the other, attacked persons' right to protect their reputation, a right held to be protected by Article 8 as part of the right to respect for private life.
Even assuming that the matter in the applicant’s case fell within the scope of Article 8, the Court considered that the Icelandic Supreme Court could reasonably conclude that the interests in protecting freedom of speech had been preponderant. It was an undisputed fact that the bank had refused to have any financial dealings with the Icelandic Broadcasting Company and had omitted to state any formal reasons. While the applicant had denied any involvement in that decision and could adduce witness evidence in support thereof, the author of the article had relied on anonymous sources (employees of the bank) stating that the applicant had been opposed to it doing any business with a company in which J.O. took part. The respondent author of the article could only be called to prove that this was indeed what the Bank’s employees had told him. In the circumstances, the applicant’s interests were not found to warrant placing that burden on the respondent author. The latter had refused to embarrass his sources by asking them to give evidence and they were probably reluctant anyway to give evidence about conduct regarded as inappropriate or unlawful by a member of the bank’s Board of Directors.
The European Court noted that the impugned statements in question indisputably had concerned a matter of genuine public interest, namely the motives of a major bank for refusing to have any business dealings with a particular national media company. The article had been published in the context of a public debate in which the Icelandic Prime Minister and other Independence Party leaders had criticised the acquisition of shares by a foreign group in the Icelandic Investment Bank. The purpose was to counter that criticism by highlighting an opinion about the conduct of affairs in the past by leaders of that party. The subject matter of the disputed speech was therefore of a political nature, in the context of which Article 10 § 2 provided little scope for restrictions. The critical allegations addressed the applicant as a “public figure” with dual roles as Chairperson of the bank’s Board of Directors and as Secretary General of the Independence Party. Having laid himself open to close scrutiny by both journalists and the public at large, he could reasonably be expected to display a greater degree of tolerance towards criticism with regard to his performance of these roles than a private individual. In sum, the applicant’s complaint that the standards of evidence applied by the Supreme Court, regarding the extent to which the author of the article should be required to prove the veracity of his allegations as to the motives for the bank’s refusal, was not capable of raising an arguable issue of failure to comply with the applicant’s right to respect for private life under Article 8. Manifestly ill-founded.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy