FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Applications nos. 14781/07, 39824/09, 41361/09, 42875/09
H-Ł. against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 15 September 2015 as a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi, President,
Päivi Hirvelä,
George Nicolaou,
Ledi Bianku,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Faris Vehabović,
Yonko Grozev, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above applications lodged on 26 February 2007, 1 June, 25 June and 29 July 2009,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Piotr H-Ł, is a Polish national, who was born in 1959 and is detained in Wrocław.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
1. The background of the case
3. The applicant is a recidivist offender. Prior to 2000 he had served in total about 15 years in prison for various offences.
4. On 8 May 2000 he obtained a leave from prison for a period of two months. On 6 July 2000 he failed to return to the Cieszyn Prison.
5. During subsequent four years the applicant was hiding using several different names and surnames. He rented few apartments using a forged ID and used 17 mobile phone numbers. For some period of time he also lived with his common‑law wife with whom he had a child in 2001.
6. During this period the applicant dated or attempted to date a great number of women met on the internet or by other means. He advertised in printed and online dating magazines. The applicant kept record of names, telephone numbers and addresses of some 80 women. With some of those women he entered into relationships and on many occasions he received from them sums of money under various pretences.
7. At that time the applicant’s name was Lucjan H. On 14 December 2006 the applicant changed his name to Piotr K. On 8 November 2013 he again changed his name to Piotr H-Ł.
2. The criminal case against the applicant
8. On 8 March 2004 the body of Ms W.K. was found in her apartment in Łódź by her two brothers. Ms W.K. was 57 years old, single, and owner of an advertisement agency.
9. The victim’s brothers were alerted by her girlfriend who could not reach her as previously arranged. Ms W.K. informed her girlfriend that she would spend the weekend with a man from Wrocław called Dariusz whom she had met on the internet.
10. The applicant was arrested in the course of the investigation into the crime on 14 April 2004. The police officers placed a false advertisement with an online dating agency and the applicant was one of many persons who replied to it. The police was able to examine several SIM cards he had used, his computers from which he had sent e‑mails and had chatted with his victim, and DNA samples. Also the victim’s computer was examined. On an unspecified date the applicant was charged with murder.
11. The Łódź District Court opened the trial on 3 April 2006 and held 55 hearings. The trial court heard over 150 witnesses including almost 30 women who admitted to having dated the applicant and dozen others who denied it. The court also heard many other witnesses and examined expert evidence.
12. The trial was the first of the kind in Poland where the victim met her alleged murderer on the internet. It attracted great media and public attention.
13. On 8 December 2008 the Łódź Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment. The court considered that his guilt had been unequivocally established. The court relied on the DNA evidence as the applicant’s sperm was found on the bed in which the victim had been stabbed to death. Also his fingerprints were found on a bottle of wine. The court accepted the version of events proposed by the experts who considered that during the sexual intercourse with the victim the applicant had had a premature ejaculation thus his sperm had been found on the bedsheets but not inside the victim. The experts, having examined the applicant psychiatrically, considered that a possible critical and ridiculing reaction of the victim to the situation could have pushed him to a violent outburst. Ms W.K. was stabbed three times on her back reaching her lungs, twice on the chest reaching her heart, and once on her stomach. The experts concluded that the applicant had psychopathic personality, however he had not had any mental illness. The court considered that he can be held criminally liable for the offence.
14. During the investigation and the trial the applicant gave a different version of events at every examination. He maintained that he had not known Ms W.K.; that he had known her and had met her on 6 March 2004; that he had known her but only talked to her on the phone; that he had never been in Łódź; and that he had been in Łódź but only on 22 March 2004. The applicant admitted to having used a forged ID card which served for renting two flats in Wrocław.
15. The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment.
16. On 28 January 2010 the Łódź Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case. The court noticed a procedural error in that one witness had not been heard in the applicant’s presence in breach of the domestic law.
17. After a retrial, during which the Łódź Regional Court held 32 hearings, on 9 March 2012, the applicant was again convicted of homicide. He was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. The court re‑examined all evidence against the applicant and found him guilty of the murder of Ms W.K.
The judgment became final on 22 August 2012.
3. The civil proceedings against Angora magazine
18. It appears that in 2006 the applicant lodged several civil claims for protection of his personal rights against various publishers. Those claims were first rejected for failure to pay the basic fee of 30 Polish zlotys. When the basic fee was abolished in March 2007 the applicant lodged his claims again.
19. On 5 March 2007 the applicant instituted civil proceedings for protection of his personal rights against the printing house Westa Druk publisher of the weekly magazine Angora. The applicant claimed compensation for a cycle of nine articles reporting on his trial which had been published between 16 April 2006 and 13 May 2007.
20. The applicant claimed that the publications contained untrue statements, negative assessments of him and critical opinions. In particular, the applicant challenged the following statements:
“His is telling bare-facing lies. During his interrogations before the prosecutor he has been giving each time a new version of events. Today, some of it he is confirming and some denying.”
“It turns out that during his stay in the remand centre Lucjan H. changed his forename. His other data remains the same. A divorcee with two children living in Wrocław. By profession he is a gardener. He had no stable employment but declared making about 1,000 zlotys monthly from small jobs.”
“The prosecutor established that since 1980, at that time as Lucjan H., he had been convicted six times. In May 2000 he left the prison for a two-month leave”.
21. Some other statements contested by the applicant underlined him changing his name and forename a few times and other referred to “the police officers thinking that he made living out of dating many women”. He contested the parts of the articles which quoted the testimonies made by his former girlfriends at his trial and the court’s questions. The witnesses were asked by the court, inter alia, to describe “what kind of lover [the applicant] had been”.
22. On 20 January 2009 the Łódź Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action.
23. The court noted that in 2004 the applicant was arrested in connection with the murder of Ms W.K. and on 16 November 2005 he was indicted. The trial court held many public hearings. It agreed to admitting media at the hearings and allowed recording of the sessions. The main justification for it was the public character of the trial, the important public interest at stake and the interest of justice in having more witnesses approaching the authorities.
24. In particular, at the hearing of 3 April 2006 the trial court agreed for the press to record the hearing and to take photographs of the applicant except publishing his personal data. Similar decisions were taken on 29 November and 1 December 2008. On 9 August 2006 the trial court did not allow the press to take pictures of the witnesses. The magazine therefore had a right to publish the photograph of the accused as it had been allowed by the trial court.
25. The court further examined the content of the cycle of nine articles under the common title “The accused has more than one name”. It noted that the applicant’s trial was reported in other national and local publications.
26. The court considered that the author of the articles showed due diligence in preparing and writing them. She was present at most of the hearings and had a right to comment on the basis of her own observations. The journalist relied on official sources and documents from the prosecution service and the trial court. Such documents could rightly be considered as reliable and not requiring further confirmation. The articles had an informative and educational purpose as they showed possible dangers of meeting people on the internet. The court further reminded that the criminal proceedings had been public and the journalists had had a right to report on them. The journalist was not obliged to contact the applicant in order to discover his version of events.
27. The court further considered that the articles in question were truthful and their form or style could not have been criticised. The facts were true and included information about the trial and the charges against the applicant brought by the public prosecutor. The court examined all value judgments contained in the articles and challenged by the applicant. It considered that they had been overall balanced and had not overstepped the boundaries of diligent reporting. The court observed that the applicant had been recently convicted of murder of Ms W.K. thus the charges against him described in the articles had been confirmed by an impartial criminal court - albeit at the first‑instance.
28. The court finally noted that publishing of a forename and the first letter of the surname could not be considered as divulging the personal data of a person.
29. The civil court concluded that the applicant had not sustained any damage to his good name or to any other protected right. The court dismissed as unfounded and unsubstantiated the applicant’s allegation that he felt persecuted by other inmates in the remand centre and that following the publications he had lost contacts with his family.
30. The applicant’s appeal against the judgment was dismissed by the Łódź Court of Appeal on 15 May 2009. The court agreed with the lower court’s assessment of facts and law. It noted that the prosecutor already in the course of the investigation allowed for the publishing of the applicant’s photograph. It was justified by the general interest as it had been possible that the defendant had committed other offences against other victims. The appellate court also agreed with the Regional Court that at no point the articles in question suggested the future outcome of the criminal trial against the applicant.
31. On 22 January 2010 the Supreme Court refused to entertain the cassation appeal lodged on the applicant’s behalf.
4. The civil proceedings against CM Cash Media
32. On 27 May 2004 an internet portal published an article about the murder of Ms W.K. under the title “A murderer from internet” (“internetowy zabojca”).
33. On 25 June 2008 the applicant filed a civil action for protection of his personal rights against the portal and its owner Mr T.A from CM Cash Media. The applicant complained about, in particular, the following statement:
“From the beginning Lucjan H. became known as the first Polish murderer from the internet.”
34. At the hearing on 15 January 2009 the Opole Regional Court gave a judgment and dismissed the applicant’s action. The applicant’s court-appointed lawyer was present at the hearing but the defendant was absent. The court considered that the press had a right and even an obligation to express an opinion about matters of high public interest. The journalists had to follow rules of diligent journalism, in particular by carefully collecting materials relied on. The court considered that those conditions had been fulfilled in the present case. It underlined that the author of the article had relied on the bill of indictment and that the applicant had been convicted as charged albeit the conviction had not been final yet. There had clearly been a legitimate interest to inform the public about such a dangerous crime. The court also considered that the applicant’s name had not been disclosed and the eventuality that he had been identified in his environment (the detention centre) had not been illegal given the gravity of the offences in question. The court concluded that the applicant should not be protected from a critical opinion about him made on the basis of facts and on the matter of high public interest.
35. On 31 March 2009 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court agreed with the lower court’s findings, in particular regarding existence of the legitimate public interest in publishing information about the murder of Ms W.K. The statements published by the defendant did not allow identifying the applicant as the perpetrator. In balancing of competing interests in the instant case the freedom of expression had to be given prevalence over the applicant’s right to protection of his personal rights. Finally, the court did not consider that the first‑instance court’s failure to hear the applicant in person amounted to a breach of his procedural rights.
36. On 12 May 2009 the legal aid lawyer informed the applicant that he saw no grounds for filing a cassation appeal on his behalf.
5. The civil proceedings against Polskapresse
37. On 8 August 2007 the applicant lodged a civil action for the protection of personal rights against the Polskapresse company, owner of the magazine Expres Ilustrowany. The applicant complained about a cycle of six articles published in Expres Ilustowany between 16 March 2006 and 17 May 2007 which reported on the murder of Ms M.K. and the applicant’s trial.
38. The applicant complained inter alia about the titles of three first articles: “murderer from the internet” and the following statement:
“The murderer met his victim on the internet and the police officers caught his trace thanks to the internet too. The officers put an announcement on one dating website starting with the words: ‘a calm girl is looking for a supportive [man]’. Among 600 replies there was one offer from a Dariusz”.
39. On two occasions his photograph was published. According to the applicant, the photograph along with his first name, the first letter of the surname, information about his former convictions, profession, and of him changing names and surnames, allowed his identification.
40. On 3 July 2008 the Łódź Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action. The court examined all impugned articles and considered that they had not breached the applicant’s personal rights. The journalist had acquired herself with the bill of indictment against the applicant which had served as a factual basis for her articles. The court at the first hearing in the trial against the applicant allowed for the publication of his picture without disclosing his full surname. The journalist was also present at the hearings so she could offer her opinion regarding the applicant’s behaviour during his trial. In those circumstances the court established that the journalist had acted with due diligence and according to ethics of good journalism. She based herself on official documents and information obtained from prosecution service. The defendant was authorised by the prosecutor and the court to publish the picture of the applicant. The applicant’s name was not disclosed and he could not be identified also because he had been using several false names and had twice changed officially his name. Moreover, there existed a clear public interest in publishing information about the crime and the trial. Finally, the court noted that the journalist when using the word “murderer” had meant that this was what the prosecutor had been advancing.
41. On 14 October 2008 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
42. On 19 December 2008 the applicant’s court appointed lawyer informed him that he saw no grounds for lodging a cassation appeal on his behalf.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
43. Article 23 of the Civil Code contains a non‑exhaustive list of the rights known as “personal rights” (dobra osobiste). This provision states:
“The personal rights of an individual, such as, in particular, health, liberty, reputation (cześć), freedom of conscience, name or pseudonym, image, secrecy of correspondence, inviolability of the home, scientific or artistic work, [as well as] inventions and improvements shall be protected by the civil law regardless of the protection laid down in other legal provisions.”
44. Article 24 of the Civil Code provides for ways of redressing infringements of personal rights. According to that provision, a person facing the danger of an infringement may demand that the prospective perpetrator refrain from the wrongful activity, unless it is not unlawful. Where an infringement has taken place, the person affected may, inter alia, request that the wrongdoer make a relevant statement in an appropriate form, or claim just satisfaction from him or her. If an infringement of a personal right causes financial loss, the person concerned may seek damages.
COMPLAINTS
45. On 26 February 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. He complained that the magazine had published his photographs next to titles and texts which had suggested that he had been a murderer in breach of the principle of presumption of innocence. The articles also divulged personal information about his private life and his family. The applicant later complained about the outcome of the civil proceedings for compensation against the magazine Angora (no. 14781/07).
46. On 25 June 2009 the applicant complained about the unreasonable length of the civil proceedings against Angora (no. 39824/09).
47. On 1 June 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention about the outcome of the civil proceedings against CM Cash Media (41361/09). He complained that the website had disclosed his personal data, details from his intimate life and had disseminated untrue information. The media convicted him in breach of the principle of presumption of innocence. The applicant complained that the court had failed to hear him and the defendant in person.
48. On 29 July 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention about the outcome and length of the civil proceedings against Polskapress (no. 42875/09). He complained that the publication had breached his right to respect for his private and family life.
THE LAW
A. Joinder of the applications
49. The Court notes that all the above applications contain similar grievances and raise similar issues under the Convention. It finds it appropriate, in the interests of the proper administration of justice, that the applications be joined in accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.
B. Complaint under Article 8 of the Convention
50. The applicant complained about a violation of his right to respect for his private life. Article 8 reads:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
51. The Court considers that the publications in Angora, Expres Ilustrowany and on the website relating to the applicant fall within the scope of his private life, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. The Court will examine the facts of those three sets of civil proceedings together.
52. The Court does not find it necessary to examine whether on the date of lodging his applications the applicant exhausted domestic remedies, as his complaint is in any event inadmissible for the reasons set out below.
53. The Court reiterates that, although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in the effective respect for private life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of relations between individuals. The boundary between the State’s positive and negative obligations under this provision does not lend itself to precise definition. The applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation (see Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, § 88, 7 February 2012 and Von Hannover v. Germany, no. 59320/00, § 57, ECHR 2004-VI, with further references).
54. The Court reiterates that the right to protection of reputation is a right which is protected by Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life (see Axel Springer AG, cited above, §§ 82‑85).
In order for Article 8 to come into play, however, an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (see A. v. Norway, no. 28070/06, § 64, 9 April 2009). The Court has held, moreover, that Article 8 cannot be relied on in order to complain of a loss of reputation which is the foreseeable consequence of one’s own actions such as, for example, the commission of a criminal offence (see Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, § 49, ECHR 2004‑VIII).
55. The core of the applicant’s complaint was that the Polish courts failed to give sufficient weight to his rights under Article 8. The Court reiterates that the concept of private life includes elements relating to a person’s right to their image and that the publication of a photograph falls within the scope of private life (see Von Hannover, cited above, §§ 50‑53). In the instant case the applicant’s status as an “ordinary person” enlarges the zone of interaction which may fall within the scope of private life, and the fact that he was the subject of criminal proceedings cannot remove from him the protection of Article 8 (see Sciacca v. Italy, no. 50774/99, § 28‑29, ECHR 2005‑I). In the present case the protection of private life had to be balanced against the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.
56. Freedom of expression is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. This freedom under Article 10 is subject to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly. Moreover, a constant thread running through the Court’s case‑law is the insistence on the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society. Although the press must not overstep certain bounds, regarding in particular the protection of the reputation and rights of others and the need to prevent the disclosure of confidential information, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest. Journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation (see Pedersen and Badsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, § 71, 17 December 2004).
57. However, protection of the right of journalists to impart information on issues of general interest requires that they should act in good faith, on an accurate factual basis, and provide “reliable and precise” information in accordance with the ethics of journalism. Under the terms of paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention, freedom of expression carries with it “duties and responsibilities”, which also apply to the media even with respect to matters of serious public concern. Moreover, these “duties and responsibilities” are significant when, as in the present case, there is a question of undermining the “rights of others”. Also of relevance for the balancing of competing interests which the Court must carry out is the fact that, under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, individuals have a right to be presumed innocent of any criminal offence until proved guilty (see Worm v. Austria, 29 August 1997, § 50, Reports 1997-V and Du Roy and Malaurie v. France, no. 34000/96, § 34, ECHR 2000-X).
58. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court first notes that the domestic courts established beyond doubt that the statements challenged by the applicant had sufficient factual basis. They were based to the large extend on the official documents, in particular on the bill of indictment prepared by the public prosecutor in the case of murder of Ms W.K (see Eerikäinen and Others v. Finland, no. 3514/02, § 69, 10 February 2009). The journalists reporting in two series of articles in Angora and Expres Ilustrowany were present at the hearings which were public. They reported on their observations and published their opinions on the person of the accused and the witnesses. The journalists also quoted the statements of the witnesses and the accused. The articles indicated that the accused had been charged with the crime and repeated the standpoint of the public prosecutor. The domestic courts considered that at no point the statements disregarded his right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. In the reasoning of the domestic courts a great weight was given to the fact that the public had had a right to be informed about this crime and the character of the accused. From the standpoint of the press there were justified grounds supporting the need to encourage public discussion on the possible dangers of dating people met on the internet. The matter of the murder trial of Ms W.K. was thus of legitimate public interest. The Court accepts this assessment.
59. At no point the applicant’s full name was published however the press published his photographs taken at the trial. This was allowed by the prosecutor and later by the trial court and was justified by the nature of the offences allegedly committed by him as more victims contacted the authorities having seen the applicant’s photographs.
Although freedom of expression also extends to the publication of photos, this is an area in which the protection of the rights and reputation of others takes on particular importance (see Eerikäinen and Others v. Finland, no. 3514/02, § 70, 10 February 2009). In the present case the publication of the applicant’s photograph had been allowed already at the investigation stage and later reiterated at the hearing. The trial in the case of murder of Ms W.K. attracted a broad media interest and the court had to accommodate the needs of public and media to attend and to report to the outside on what they observed. The press was thus allowed to be present at the hearings and to record some parts of it. It should be noted in this connection that the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in regulating the freedom of press to record the hearings and transmit images from it (see mutatis mutandis P4 Radio Hele Norge ASA v. Norway (dec.), no. 76682/01, ECHR 2003‑VI).
In the particular circumstances of the case the Court considers that the State acted within their margin of appreciation in assessing the needs to protect the applicant’s privacy and those of fair administration of justice (see Egeland and Hanseid v. Norway, no. 34438/04, § 65, 16 April 2009).
60. The domestic courts found that the applicant had suffered no prejudice in connection with the impugned publications. At the material time he was detained and the allegations against him were confirmed by the first‑instance court in 2008. This conviction was finally upheld in 2012. The applicant failed to substantiate either before the domestic courts or before the Court that he had suffered particular harm to his moral and psychological integrity or to his private life (see, a contrario, A, cited above, § 74).
61. The Court further observes that the domestic courts in three civil proceedings under consideration clearly recognised the conflict between the two opposing interests and applied the domestic legal provisions by weighing the relevant considerations in the case. The domestic courts referred in their analysis to the case‑law of the Court and the principles formulated in connection with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and the protection of the rights of others. They carried out a careful balancing exercise between the competing interests at stake, in the light of a legitimate interest for the public to be informed of occurrence of an unusually violent and serious crime. Undoubtedly, such a crime and the circumstances of it were matters of serious public interest and concern.
There is thus no appearance that the domestic courts failed to strike a fair balance between the two conflicting values guaranteed by the Convention, namely the protection of the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and the newspaper’s and the journalist’s freedom of expression. In doing that the court applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention.
62. Having regard to the reasoning of the six judgments of the domestic courts, given in three sets of impugned proceedings, the Court finds that they made a thorough examination of the case and balanced the opposing interests involved, in conformity with Convention standards, and relied on grounds which were both relevant and sufficient (see Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 88). The articles fell within the context of a debate on a matter of public interest, thus calling for a high level of protection of freedom of expression, with a particularly narrow margin of appreciation accordingly being afforded to the authorities. It was thus justified to find that the public interest in publishing the information in question, which originated in public criminal proceedings, outweighed the applicant’s right to the protection of his private life. Consequently, the Court does not find that there has been a failure on the part of the Polish State to afford adequate protection of the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
C. Other complaints made by the applicant
63. Lastly, the applicant complained that the facts of the case gave rise to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. He alleged that his right to fair trial had been breached, in particular on account of the assessment of evidence. He also alleged that the length of the proceedings had been excessive.
64. The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national court (see, García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I, with further references).
65. As regards the complaints about the unreasonable length of the proceedings against Angora and Polskapress the Court notes that it is not clear whether the applicant lodged complaints about the unreasonable length of both sets of the proceedings with the relevant domestic courts. In any event the proceedings against Angora lasted less than three years at three levels of jurisdiction. The second set of proceedings complained of lasted 14 months at two levels of jurisdiction. The applicant failed to submit any evidence of periods of inactivity attributable to the domestic courts. It follows that those complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
66. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
67. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Decides to join the applications;
Declares the applications inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 8 October 2015.
Françoise Elens-PassosGuido Raimondi
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy