AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 34180/96
by Ladislav HAAS and Zlatica HAASOVÁ
against the Slovak Republic
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 4 March 1998, the following members being present:
MM J.-C. GEUS, President
M.A. NOWICKI
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
Mrs G.H. THUNE
MM F. MARTINEZ
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
A. ARABADJIEV
Ms M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 17 October 1996
by Ladislav HAAS and Zlatica HAASOVÁ against the Slovak Republic and
registered on 16 December 1996 under file No. 34180/96;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are Slovak nationals born in 1948 and 1953
respectively. They are spouses and reside in Levoca. Before the
Commission the applicants are represented by Mr. M. Taragel, a lawyer
practising in Spisská Nová Ves.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be
summarised as follows.
A. The particular circumstances of the case
On 6 September 1989 the applicants bought a house in Levoca for
295,570 Czechoslovak crowns. They concluded the purchase contract with
the State which had transferred the house to its ownership in 1988
after the spouses F., its original owners, had emigrated from
Czechoslovakia. On 7 December 1988, i.e. prior to the date when the
house was offered to the applicants, an expert appointed by the State
had evaluated the house at 306,810 Czechoslovak crowns, and the
evaluation was later adjusted to 301,260 crowns.
After the entry into force of the Law on Extrajudicial
Rehabilitation (Zákon o mimosúdnych rehabilitáciách, see "The relevant
domestic law" below) the spouses F. requested that the applicants
restore the house to them. Since the applicants failed to do so,
spouses F. brought an action for restitution of the house before the
Spisská Nová Ves District Court (Okresny súd). On 9 November 1994 the
latter granted the claim and ordered the applicants to vacate the
house.
The District Court noted that the house had been transferred to
State ownership without any relevant legal ground within the meaning
of Section 6 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation.
An expert appointed by the court evaluated the house, at the
moment of its purchase by the applicants, at 391,000 crowns. A chief
expert opinion ordered by the court stated that in accordance with
Price Regulation No. 205/88 (Vyhláska o cenách stavieb, pozemkov,
trvalych porastov, úhrade za zriadenie práva osobného uzívania
pozemkov, trvalych porastov a náhrade za docasné uzívanie pozemkov),
the value of the house had been 430,908 crowns. Since the actual
purchase price had been considerably lower, the court concluded that
the applicants had acquired the house contrary to the legal rules then
in force within the meaning of Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on
Extrajudicial Rehabilitation.
The District Court further dismissed the applicant's request that
they should be ordered to vacate the house only after they were
provided with alternative accommodation.
The court noted that the applicants had not been responsible for
the erroneous evaluation of the house and held that they had not
benefited from an unfair advantage in the purchase within the meaning
of Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation. It
therefore decided that the applicants did not have to reimburse the
costs of the proceedings. Since the applicants were unsuccessful in
the proceedings, the court charged them the court fees of 17,200 Slovak
crowns.
The applicants appealed and claimed, inter alia, that they had
acquired the house in good faith. They alleged that Price Regulation
No. 205/88 provided for maximum permissible prices and that the sale
of real property at a lower price could not, therefore, be considered
as being contrary to the rules in force. Finally, the applicants
requested that they should be granted alternative accommodation.
On 25 September 1995 the Kosice Regional Court (Krajsky súd)
upheld the first instance judgment. It noted that Price Regulation
No. 205/88 had been binding and that the purchase price paid by the
applicants had been considerably below the value of the house under
that Regulation. The Regional Court therefore concluded that the sale
of the house had not conformed to the rules then in force.
The Regional Court further found that the applicants' claim for
alternative accommodation had no legal basis in Slovak law.
On 8 December 1995 the applicants restored the house to the
spouses F.
On 7 February 1996 the applicants claimed compensation for all
costs relating to the purchase of the house and to its restitution to
the original owners.
On 30 May 1996 the Ministry of Finance decided to reimburse the
purchase price to the applicants pursuant to Section 11 of the Law on
Extrajudicial Rehabilitation. The Ministry further informed the
applicants that their remaining claims for compensation had no legal
basis in Slovak law.
B. Relevant domestic law
In the preamble to Law No. 87/1991 of 23 March 1991 on
Extrajudicial Rehabilitation the Federal Assembly of the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic affirmed its will to prevent wrongs which had
been committed in the past from re-occurring.
Section 1 para. 1 of the Law defines its aim as follows:
"This Law shall mitigate certain material and other wrongs arisen
between 25 February 1948 and 1 January 1990 and caused by acts
falling within the sphere of civil law, labour law and by
administrative acts which are incompatible with the principles
of a democratic society respecting the rights of citizens as
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations [and] the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights..."
Pursuant to Section 4 para. 2 of the aforesaid Law, individuals
who acquired property from the State are liable to restore it if such
an acquisition was either contrary to the legal rules then in force or
if they benefited from an unfair advantage and provided that the State
had taken possession of such property in circumstances defined in
Section 6.
Under Section 6 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial
Rehabilitation, the obligation to restore property includes cases when
the State took possession of such property without any legal ground.
Section 11 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation entitles
individuals who are under the obligation to restore property to recover
the price for which they had acquired such property from the State.
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complain, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and
Article 8 of the Convention, that they were ordered to vacate the house
which they had acquired in good faith. In particular, they allege that
the erroneous evaluation of the house, which resulted in its
restitution to the original owners, is imputable to the State and
complain that they were not compensated in full for the damage in this
respect and that they were not provided with alternative accommodation.
They add that the value of the house at the time of its restitution was
945,961 crowns.
THE LAW
1. The applicants complain that they were ordered to vacate the
house which they had acquired in good faith. They allege a violation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which reads as follows:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary
to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions
or penalties."
The Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)
comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in the first
sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates
the principle of peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The second rule,
contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers
deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions.
The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that
Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the
use of property in accordance with the general interest (see Eur. Court
HR, Fredin v. Sweden judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192,
p. 14, para. 41).
In the present case the applicants were ordered, pursuant to the
relevant provisions of the Law on Extrajudiciary Rehabilitation, to
vacate a house which they had earlier purchased in good faith from the
State. In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the
applicants were deprived of their possessions within the meaning of the
second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(P1-1).
In order to be justified, it must be shown that the deprivation
of possessions was in accordance with the conditions provided for by
law and in the public interest. Furthermore, not only must the aim of
the deprivation of property be in the public interest, but there must
also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realised (see Eur. Court HR, Holy
Monasteries v. Greece judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-A,
p. 34, para. 70). This implies that a fair balance must be struck
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the
requirement to protect the individual's fundamental rights, which
balance would not be found if the individual was found to have bornean
excessive burden (see Eur. Court HR, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden
judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, pp. 26-28, paras. 69-
73).
The Commission observes in this respect that the applicants were
ordered to restore the house to its original owners pursuant to
Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation as they
had purchased it at a price which had not conformed to Price Regulation
No. 205/88 then in force. Thus the deprivation of possessions in
question was provided for by law.
As to the requirement of a legitimate aim in the public interest,
the Commission recalls that the deprivation of property in pursuance
of legitimate social, economic or other policies may be in the public
interest, even if the community at large has no direct use or enjoyment
of the property (see Eur. Court HR, James and Others v. the United
Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 32,
para. 45). Moreover, because of their direct knowledge of their
society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better
placed than the international judge to appreciate what is "in the
public interest". In performing their assessment the national
authorities therefore enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (ibidem,
p. 32, para. 46).
The Commission recalls that the aim of the Law on Extrajudicial
Rehabilitation is to mitigate certain wrongs caused by acts which are
incompatible with the principles of a democratic society respecting the
rights of citizens. When adopting this Law, the legislators affirmed
that it was their intention to prevent wrongs which had been committed
in the past from re-occurring. Thus the Law on Extrajudicial
Rehabilitation pursues a legitimate aim to safeguard the legality of
legal transactions. It promotes the principles of a democratic society
and provides redress in cases where wrongs were committed in disrespect
of such principles. In these circumstances, and having regard to the
State's margin of appreciation, the Commission accepts that the
deprivation complained of took place not only in the interest of the
original owners of the house, but also in the general interest of the
society as a whole.
There must, however, also be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
realised. In this respect, the Commission finds that in view of the
wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States in this
area, an order to restore property which was not acquired in conformity
with the relevant legal rules may be regarded as proportionate to the
legitimate aims pursued (see, mutatis mutandis, No. 33456/96, Zvolensky
and Others v. the Czech Republic, Dec. 14.1.98, unpublished). The
Commission has also noted that the applicants received the purchase
price, and had been living in the house for more than five years.
Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in the particular circumstances of this case.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicants further allege a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8)
of the Convention which provides as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
The Commission considers that the order to vacate the house in
which the applicants were residing amounts to an interference with
their right to respect for their home as guaranteed by Article 8
para. 1 (Art. 8-1). It must therefore be established whether this
interference was compatible with the requirements set out in para. 2
of this Article.
The Commission has found above that the interference complained
of had as its basis Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial
Rehabilitation and it sees no reason why this basis should not be
considered as being accessible, foreseeable and in accordance with the
rule of law (see Eur. Court HR, Kruslin v. France judgment of
24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-A, p. 20, para. 27).
The Commission further notes that by the interference complained
of the Slovak authorities sought, inter alia, to protect the rights of
the original owners of the house, which is a legitimate aim under
Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
It remains to be determined whether the interference in question
was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of the
aforesaid Article. The Commission recalls that the notion of necessity
implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need
and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. In determining whether an interference was "necessary in a
democratic society" the Convention organs have to take into account
that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States (see,
mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Olsson v. Sweden judgment of
24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, pp. 31-31, paras. 67-68).
The Commission has found above, when examining the applicants'
complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), that an order to
restore property which was not acquired in conformity with the relevant
legal rules may be a proportionate measure for enforcement of the
legitimate aims pursued, and it sees no reason why it should depart
from this conclusion when examining the case under Article 8 (Art. 8)
of the Convention. In the Commission's view, the domestic courts'
finding that the applicants had no right to alternative accommodation
under Slovak law cannot affect the position in the present case.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.-T. SCHOEPFER J.-C. GEUS
Secretary President
to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy