FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 37395/97
by Costas and Elli HADJIPROCOPIOU and Maria HADJIPROCOPIOU-IACOVIDOU
against Turkey
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section) sitting on 8 June 1999 as a Chamber composed of
MrsE. Palm, President,
MrL. Ferrari Bravo,
MrGaukur Jörundsson,
MrB. Zupančič,
MrT. Pantiru,
MrR. Maruste, Judges,
MrF. Gölcüklü, Judge ad hoc,
withMrM. O’Boyle, Section Registrar;
Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 22 July 1997 by Costas and Elli Hadjiprocopiou and Maria Hadjiprocopiou-Iacovidou against Turkey and registered on 19 August 1997 under file no. 37395/97;
Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;
Having regard to the fact that the Government’s observations were not submitted within the time-limit;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The first applicant was born in 1916. He is a doctor. The second applicant is his wife. She was born in 1928 and is a housewife. They both reside in Ayia Napa. The third applicant is their daughter. She was born in 1959. She is a psychologist and resides in Limassol. All three applicants are Cypriot citizens. In the proceedings before the Commission they are represented by Mr. Achilleas Dimitriades and Ms. Vicky Loizides, lawyers practising in Nicosia.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows:
The applicants are the only owners of a plot of land with a building at 21 Franklin Roosevelt street, Famagusta. The building comprises eight shops, a cafeteria and six flats. Until 14 August 1974 one of these flats was used by the three applicants as their home and another by the first applicant as his surgery. On 14 August 1974, as the Turkish army was advancing, the applicants had to leave Famagusta. Ever since, they have not been able to return or enjoy in any manner their property.
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complain that their rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and to respect for their home under Article 8 of the Convention are violated. They also complain that they are subjected to discrimination in the enjoyment of the above-mentioned rights contrary to Article 14 of the Convention.
PROCEDURE
The application was introduced on 22 July 1997 and registered on 19 August 1997.
On 15 September 1997 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.
On 8 April 1998 the Government applied for an extension of the time-limit. On 15 April 1998 the Secretary to the Commission noted that that their request had been submitted after the expiry of the time-limit. He informed them that, when the Commission resumed the examination of the case, it would decide whether it should take into consideration any observations the Government might submit.
On 1 November 1998, by operation of Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the case fell to be examined by the Court in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol.
THE LAW
The applicants complain that their rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and to respect for their home under Article 8 of the Convention are violated. They also complain that they are subjected to discrimination in the enjoyment of the above-mentioned rights contrary to Article 14 of the Convention.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 protects property. Article 8 of the Convention guarantees the right to respect for home. Article 14 of the Convention prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights and freedoms.
The Court notes that the respondent Government have not provided any observations on the admissibility of the case, although they have been given ample opportunity to do so. It must, therefore, be assumed that they do not contest the admissibility of the application.
The Court considers that the application raises serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination on the merits. It cannot, therefore, be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Michael O’BoyleElisabeth Palm
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy