FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 38267/97
by H.A.L.
against Finland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 4 February 2003 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrsE. Palm,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrR. Maruste,
MrS. Pavlovschi,
MrL. Garlicki, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 29 September 1997,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr H.L., is a Finnish national, who was born in 1953 and lives in Helsinki. He is represented before the Court by Mr Markku Fredman, a lawyer practising in Helsinki. The respondent Government were represented by Mr Arto Kosonen, Director in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 4 October 1995 the local office of the Social Insurance Institution (kansaneläkelaitos, folkpensionsanstalten) granted the applicant a daily sickness allowance on account of his incapacity for work from 11 September 1995 onwards. On 16 October 1995 the allowance was extended until 31 October 1995.
On 16 October 1995 Dr M.M., a psychiatrist treating the applicant, considered him incapacitated for work from 11 September 1995 until 31 March 1996 on account of his depression and anxiety. On the strength of that opinion the applicant requested that he be granted a daily sickness allowance for the period 1 November 1995-31 March 1996.
The medical expert consulted by the local office of the Social Insurance Institution, Dr U.L., found in his opinion of 24 October 1995 that the applicant’s alleged incapacity for work was principally of subjective nature, although the criteria for serious mental distress were not met. While not considering the applicant incapable for work, Dr U.L. recommended that an opinion be obtained from an expert in psychiatry before a new decision was reached on the applicant’s request.
In his opinion of 27 October 1995 psychiatrist K.K. found, on the basis of the information available, that the applicant had been capable of working as of 1 January 1995.
Neither Dr U.L. nor Dr K.K. examined the applicant in person. Their identities and opinions were not known to the applicant until submitted by the Government in the course of the Convention proceedings.
On 15 November 1995 the Social Insurance Commission (sosiaali-vakuutustoimikunta, socialförsäkringskommissionen) of Helsinki refused the applicant’s request for an extension of his daily sickness allowance until 31 March 1996. The Commission, relying on section 14 of the Sickness Insurance Act (sairasvakuutuslaki, sjukförsäkringslag 364/1963), reasoned as follows:
“A person who is incapacitated for work shall be entitled to a daily allowance. Incapacity for work is defined as a condition caused by an illness and during which the person is unable to perform his or her ordinary, or closely comparable, work. Your function as a tourist secretary has been regarded as your ordinary work.
On the basis of the material adduced you cannot be considered unable to perform this work or a closely comparable one.
For this reason, you are not entitled to a daily allowance.”
The applicant appealed to the Social Insurance Board (sosiaalivakuutuslautakunta, socialförsäkringsnämnden) for Southern Finland, adducing a report of 24 November 1995 in which his treating physician, Dr K.R., agreed with Dr M.M. that the applicant was incapacitated for work during the period in question, on account of his depression, panic feelings and neurosis. In its opinion to the Board dated 2 January 1996, but not forwarded to the applicant for his possible comments, the Social Insurance Commission explained the challenged decision as follows:
“On the basis of medical certificates of the A category, [the applicant] was granted a daily allowance until 31 October 1995 on the basis of his incapacity for work which had commenced on 11 September 1995. Subsequently he adduced a certificate of the B category in which a psychiatrist considered him incapacitated for work until 31 March 1996 on account of his depression and undefined anxiety. In the opinion of the medical expert, a psychiatrist, the insured had to be considered fit for work. A further certificate of the B category, issued by a different doctor, has been appended to the appeal. The medical expert is of the opinion that there is no reason to amend the previous decision.
Since the appellant has not adduced any new information which was not known to the [Social Insurance] Commission at the time of its decision, it is proposed that the appeal be rejected.”
On 29 March 1996 Dr M.M. considered that the applicant remained incapacitated for work until 30 June 1996 on account of his depression. Relying on this opinion, the applicant sought a daily sickness allowance for the period 1 April-30 June 1996.
On 10 April 1996 the Social Insurance Commission refused the request for exactly the same reasons as in its decision of 15 November 1995 and again relying on section 14 of the Sickness Insurance Act.
The applicant appealed. In its opinion to the Social Insurance Board dated 18 April 1996, and again not forwarded to the applicant for possible comments, the Social Insurance Commission stated as follows:
“[The applicant’s] earlier request for a daily allowance for the period 1 November 1995-31 March 1996 was refused and that decision has been appealed against as well. The insured sought to have his daily allowance granted for a further period, relying on a certificate of the B category issued by a psychiatrist. According to the opinion of the medical expert, the insured has to be considered fit to work.
Since nothing new has been adduced in the [applicant’s current] appeal, it is proposed that it be rejected.”
In a further opinion of 30 May 1996 Dr M.M., without taking a position in regard to the applicant’s incapacity for work, maintained his diagnosis that the applicant was suffering from undefined anxiety. Relying on this opinion and on all previous evidence, the applicant sought a daily sickness allowance from 1 July 1996 onwards.
In an opinion of 3 July 1996 submitted in support of the applicant’s pension request, Dr K.R. considered that the applicant remained incapacitated for work until 30 September 1996 on account of his anxiety, panic feelings and depression.
On 4 July 1996 the Social Insurance Board rejected the applicant’s appeals against the Social Insurance Commission’s decisions of 15 November 1995 and 10 April 1996, relying on the reasons and the legal provision invoked in those decisions. According to the Board’s decision, it had taken note of the Social Insurance Commission’s opinions to the effect that no new material had been adduced which would justify a change in the challenged decisions. The Board’s decision did not mention the existence of any opinions issued by the consulting medical experts. The applicant appealed to the Appellate Board for Social Insurance (tarkastuslautakunta, prövningsnämnden).
On 17 July 1996 the Social Insurance Commission refused the applicant a daily sickness allowance from 1 July 1996 onwards, with the following reasoning:
“A person who is incapacitated for work shall be entitled to a daily allowance. Incapacity for work is defined as a condition caused by an illness and during which the person is unable to perform his or her ordinary, or closely comparable, work.
On the basis of the material adduced you cannot be considered unable to perform this work or a closely comparable one.
For this reason, you are not entitled to a daily allowance.”
On 16 September 1996 the Social Insurance Board rejected the applicant’s appeal against the aforementioned decision, to which he had appended Dr K.R.’s opinion of 3 July 1996. The Board took note of the Social Insurance Commission’s opinion to the effect that no new material had been adduced which would justify a change in the challenged decision. The Board then relied on the reasons and the legal provision invoked by the Social Insurance Commission. The Board’s decision did not mention the existence of any opinion issued by the consulting medical experts.
The applicant again appealed to the Appellate Board for Social Insurance, inter alia adducing a fresh medical opinion of 15 October 1996 in which Dr K.R., maintaining his previous diagnosis, had considered that the applicant remained incapacitated for work until 30 May 1997.
On 25 March 1997 the Appellate Board for Social Insurance rejected the applicant’s appeals against the Social Insurance Board’s decisions of 4 July and 16 September 1996 by relying on the reasons given by the Social Insurance Commission in its decisions of 15 November 1995 and 10 April 1996. The Appellate Board’s decisions were dispatched to the applicant on 8 April 1997. No further appeal lay open.
On 13 October 1997 the Social Insurance Institution refused the applicant’s request to undergo an examination of his capacity for work by a specialist of the Social Insurance Institution’s own choosing. It recalled that the applicant’s capacity for work had been assessed on the basis of written documentation on three separate occasions and each time by different persons. The decisions refusing him an extended daily sickness allowance had been upheld by all appellate instances and concerned the years 1995-96. The applicant’s capacity for work at that point in time could no longer be assessed by a doctor who had not been treating him at the time. The applicant’s capacity for work at that time had already been assessed by doctors who knew him then, and his requests for a further allowance had been decided on the basis of their opinions.
The applicant has repeatedly sought to be granted a disability pension either on the basis of the Social Insurance Act (kansaneläkelaki, folkpensionslag 347/1956) or as an employment-based entitlement. In so far as the Court has been informed his requests and appeals to that effect were refused in the final instance by the Insurance Court (vakuutusoikeus, försäkringsdomstolen) in decisions of 15, 19 and 29 January and 28 May 1998 as well as 8, 9 and 16 December 1999.
On 8 May 2000 Dr. U.A., a professor of psychiatry, certified that the applicant had been incapable of working at the latest from 1995 on account of his chronic depression coupled with, inter alia, his unusual physical appearance (reddish and completely hairless skin) which were hampering his social interaction. Dr. U.A. saw no realistic prospects for the applicant’s rehabilitation.
On 27 June 2000 the Social Insurance Institution again refused the applicant a disability pension as the fresh information post-dating “the Insurance Court’s decision” was not such as to warrant the conclusion that his incapacity for work had been reduced in a significant manner. (The date of the relevant decision was not stated.) The inconvenience caused by his illness, his fear of situations involving social interaction as well as his anxiety were not of such a serious degree as to warrant the conclusion that he was incapacitated for work within the meaning of the Social Insurance Act. The Social Insurance Institution relied on sections 20 and 22, subsection 1, of the Act.
The applicant’s appeal was refused by the Appellate Board for Social Insurance on 22 February 2001. The Appellate Board considered that the medical findings were so minor as to permit the conclusion that the applicant still retained some capacity for work. He therefore did not qualify as disabled within the meaning of the Social Insurance Act. The Board invoked section 22 of the Act.
On 29 May 2002 the Insurance Court upheld the Appellate Board’s decision, relying on the reasons invoked by the lower bodies.
Meanwhile, on 22 June 2000 the Local Government Pension Institution (Kuntien eläkevakuutus, Kommunernas pensionsförsäkring) again refused the applicant an employment-based disability pension. While noting that the evidence adduced showed that he was suffering from depression, the Pension Institution considered that the medical findings had been sparse and the functional failures caused by the illness had been of minor nature. His incapacity for work had not therefore decreased by at least two fifths, as required by the relevant pension regulations.
The applicant’s appeal was refused by the Local Government Pension Board (kuntien eläkelautakunta, kommunernas pensionsnämnd) on 13 December 2000. It agreed with the Pension Institution that the objective medical findings had been sparse and the functional failures due to the applicant’s depression had been of minor nature. Neither had any of his other illnesses resulted in a deterioration of his capacity for work to such an extent as to entitle him to a disability pension. In light of the information received, the Pension Board concluded that he was capable of carrying out the same work which he had formerly done or corresponding work.
On 30 May 2002 the Insurance Court upheld the Pension Board’s decision, relying on the lower body’s reasoning.
In the various sets of proceedings ending with a decision of the Insurance Court the applicant was able to comment on the various opinions which the relevant lower body had submitted to the court.
B. Relevant domestic law
According to section 14 of the Sickness Insurance Act, a daily allowance shall be payable to anyone suffering a loss of income due to his or her incapacity for work. Section 14 defines such incapacity as a condition caused by an illness and during which the person is unable to perform his or her ordinary, or closely comparable, work.
The members of the Appellate Board for Social Insurance are appointed by the Council of State (valtioneuvosto, statsrådet) for a maximum of four years but with a possibility of being re-appointed (section 54, subsections 2 and 3 of the Sickness Insurance Act).
According to the 1964 Decree on the Appellate Board (asetus tarkastuslautakunnasta, förordning om prövningsnämnden 422/1964), that Board shall consist of a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen and the requisite number of further members who shall either be lawyers or medical doctors, or be experienced in the conditions of insured persons. The Chairman and the Vice-Chairmen must have a law degree and possess experience as judges (section 2, as amended by Decree no. 1121/1995). The Appellate Board may sit in chambers consisting of a Chairman, at least one lawyer and one doctor and two members experienced in the conditions of the insured (section 7, as amended by Decree no. 1121/1995). The casting vote both in plenary and chamber sessions rests with the Chairman (section 14). The Council of State may, when necessary, appoint a Chairman ad interim or appoint a member to replace a member of the Board temporarily (section 6, as amended by Decree no. 1044/1994). According to section 54, subsection 3, of the Sickness Insurance Act (as amended by Act no. 279/1999 as from 1 April 1999), the right of a member of the Appellate Board to remain in office shall be governed by the provisions concerning professional judges.
Although, at the relevant time, the procedural rules applicable to regular courts in principle also applied to the Appellate Board, its procedure was merely written (section 8; repealed by Decree no. 380/1999 adopted in connection with the amendment to section 54 of the Sickness Insurance Act by Act no. 279/1999 which entered into force on 1 April 1999).
The rules concerning the possible bias of a member of the Appellate Board are to be found in the Code of Judicial Procedure (Oikeudenkäymiskaari, Rättegångs Balk), as read in conjunction with section 76 of the 1996 Act on Judicial Procedure in Administrative Matters (hallintolainkäyttölaki, förvaltningsprocesslag 586/1996). All members of the Appellate Board must have sworn or must swear a judicial oath before taking up office (section 9 of the 1964 Decree).
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings concerning his entitlement to an extended daily sickness allowance were unfair. The authorities failed to reason adequately why they chose to disregard the medical reports issued by specialists who had repeatedly examined him in person and had consistently maintained that he remained incapacitated for work. The Social Insurance Institution’s refusal to have him undergo a specific examination of his capacity for work by an expert of its own choosing was also detrimental to the outcome of his request. Moreover, given that the Social Insurance Board’s decisions failed to mention that consulting medical experts had opposed his requests, the applicant was unable to challenge their opinions in his final appeals to the Appellate Board for Social Insurance. Even the identity of those experts remained unknown to the applicant during the whole of the proceedings.
2. The applicant further complains, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the aforementioned proceedings were unreasonably lengthy, also considering that they involved an important source for his livelihood.
3. In his observations of 31 May 1999 the applicant also complained that the proceedings regarding his entitlement to a disability pension had been unreasonably lengthy.
4. In his observations of 30 September 1998 and 24 July 2002 the applicant further complained of having been refused a disability pension in spite of the various opinions of doctors attesting to his incapacity for work after having examined him in person. In particular, the opinion of a professor of psychiatry finding the applicant to have been incapable of working at the latest since 1995 was not at all discussed in the decisions of 2000-2002 refusing him a pension and dismissing his appeals. He invoked no explicit Convention provision in support of this complaint.
5. The applicant further complains that he was denied an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention whereby he could have challenged the alleged violations of his rights in the aforementioned proceedings.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings concerning his entitlement to an extended daily sickness allowance were unfair. The authorities failed to reason adequately why they disregarded the medical evidence submitted by his own doctors and failed to communicate to him the identities and opinions of the consulting medical experts. He was therefore unable to challenge that expertise in his final appeals to the Appellate Board for Social Insurance.
The applicant invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which reads, in so far as relevant to the present case, as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...”
The Government question whether the applicant exhausted domestic remedies in an adequate manner, given that in his appeals to the Appellate Board for Social Insurance he could have referred to the allegedly deficient reasoning which the Social Insurance Commission and the Social Insurance Board relied on when refusing him a daily sickness allowance.
Were the Court to have another view, the Government leave it to the Court to determine whether the requirements of Article 6 § 1 were satisfied in the particular circumstances. Although a more substantial reasoning might have been desirable, the Social Insurance Commission and, by implication, the Appellate Board for Social Insurance gave succinct reasons for rejecting the applicant’s requests and appeals, and the proceedings in issue were therefore not rendered unfair or otherwise arbitrary. The Appellate Board did address the essence of the points which the applicant had asked it to consider. In upholding the decisions of the Social Insurance Commission – which it appended to its own – the Appellate Board essentially incorporated the reasoning provided by the first-instance organ and concluded that the applicant had not presented any new submissions which would have had a bearing on the outcome of his appeal. In its reasoning the Social Insurance Commission had briefly referred to the requirements imposed by the legislation, had noted the applicant’s work description and had observed that on the basis of the material adduced by him he could not be considered unable to perform such work or a closely comparable one.
The Government admit, however, that the Social Insurance Commission’s decisions and, consequently, the decision of the Appellate Board did not explain how the general grounds referred to in the relevant legal provision had been applied to the applicant’s specific circumstances. The reasons stated by the Social Insurance Commission being partly of a general nature, the Appellate Board could have specified those reasons. Nevertheless, in cases involving daily sickness allowance a detailed statement of reasons may often be difficult to produce because the conclusion as to whether or not someone is capable of working is based on an overall assessment.
The Government concede that the various decisions did not mention the two medical experts’ views on the applicant’s requests for a sickness allowance. Nevertheless, he would have had the right to see the relevant material had he expressed a wish to obtain such access. He could also have submitted further evidence during the appeal proceedings. At any rate the consulting experts were under a duty to provide objective opinions so as to ensure the principle of equality between various applicants for social insurance benefits.. For the purposes of social insurance, the assessment of a patient’s capacity for work shall be made by a doctor treating him or her. The applicant was not referred to further examinations as it was considered that the various opinions submitted by his doctors were adequate. His physical examination by the consulting experts might have led to a treatment relationship between him and them, which would have disqualified the experts.
The applicant maintains, with regard to the exhaustion requirement in Article 35 § 1, that he should be excused for not having included in his appeals his misgivings about the deficient reasoning in the challenged decisions. A layman cannot be expected to appeal on such a ground if the decision-making authority itself fails to provide adequate reasons.
As for the merits of the complaint, whether or not the applicant had a theoretical right of access to the documents which the relevant authorities failed to communicate to him, the Court in a similar case placed the onus on the competent court to ensure an appellant’s proper participation in the proceedings, including by communicating all documents on file, even if only potentially relevant to the outcome (Kerojärvi v. Finland, judgment of 19 July 1995, Series A no. 322, p. 16, § 42). At any rate the Social Insurance Board did not indicate in its decision that it had received opinions from the consulting experts.
The insufficient reasoning provided by the Social Insurance Commission and the Social Insurance Board and their failure to indicate their reliance on the views of the medical experts rendered it impossible for the applicant to challenge those decisions and views. A more elaborate reasoning would have been particularly necessary since the opinions of the two doctors treating the applicant were being disregarded.
Whereas it may be permissible under Article 6 for an appellate court to endorse a lower body’s reasons without adducing any of its own, deferring to the lower body’s reasons requires that those are sufficient in themselves, thereby enabling the appellant to exercise his right of appeal in an effective manner. The reasons given to the applicant did not meet that requirement.
Finally, the applicant contends that instead of disregarding the opinions of the two doctors treating him and adopting the views of two other doctors who had never examined him, the Social Insurance Institution should have referred him to further examinations with a view to assessing his incapacity for work.
The Court notes that the Government’s preliminary objection concerns only the grievance relating to the allegedly insufficient reasoning provided by the Social Insurance Commission and the appellate bodies in their decisions. The Court joins this objection to the merits, considering in the light of the parties’ submissions that the complaint as a whole raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.
2. The applicant originally complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings concerning his entitlement to a sickness allowance had been unreasonably lengthy, in particular considering that they had involved an important source for his livelihood.
In assessing whether these proceedings exceeded the reasonable time required by Article 6 § 1 the Court must take into account the particular circumstances of the case while having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and the importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the litigation (see, for example, Duclos v. France, judgment of 17 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, pp. 2180-2081, § 55).
The Court considers that the proceedings concerning the applicant’s entitlement to a sickness allowance began in October 1995 and ended in April 1997, which amounts to a total length of a year and a half. Making an overall assessment of the various relevant criteria, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was not excessive.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
3. In his observations of 31 May 1999 the applicant also complained that the proceedings regarding his entitlement to a disability pension had likewise been unreasonably lengthy.
Under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention the Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.
The Court observes, in so far as this complaint has been substantiated, that the two sets of proceedings addressed in this grievance ended with decisions dispatched to the applicant in February 1998. His complaint in this respect was lodged with the Court in May 1999, which is more than six months after he must be deemed to have been informed of those decisions.
It follows that this complaint is introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
4. In his observations of 30 September 1998 and 24 July 2002 the applicant complained that he had repeatedly been refused a disability pension in spite of the various medical opinions attesting to his incapacity for work after having examined him in person. In particular, the opinion of a professor of psychiatry finding the applicant to have been incapable of working at the latest since 1995 was not at all discussed in the decisions of 2000-2002 refusing him a pension and dismissing his appeals.
(i) The Court notes that in so far as the various pension proceedings ended with decisions taken over six months before the date when this complaint was introduced, namely on 30 September 1998, it has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
(ii) It follows that the remainder of this complaint concerns the pension proceedings ending with the Insurance Court’s decisions of 28 May 1998, 8, 9 and 16 December 1999 as well as 29 and 30 May 2002.
The Court will first consider this part of the complaint under the aforementioned Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It notes that in the various sets of proceedings the applicant was able to adduce any evidence of his choosing as well as to submit comments to the Insurance Court on the various opinions which the relevant lower body had submitted to the organ examining his respective appeals. Nor is there any indication that the reasons relied on for refusing his pension requests and appeals were arbitrary. Accordingly, there is no appearance of any violation of Article 6 § 1.
It follows that this part of the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
(iii) The Court has also considered this part of the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The Court reiterates that while this provision guarantees to the applicant a right to derive benefit from a pension system if he has been contributing to the funding thereof, this provision cannot be interpreted as giving him a right to a pension of a particular amount (Leinonen v. Finland (dec.), no. 33898/96, unreported).
Given the wide margin of appreciation which the Contracting States enjoy in matters of social policy and assuming that the applicant could be considered as a contributor to one or both of the disability pension systems, the Court finds no appearance of any violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the particular circumstances.
It follows that this part of the complaint is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
5. The applicant further complains that he was denied an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The Court reiterates that the requirements of Article 13 are less strict and in the present case absorbed by those of Article 6 § 1, the applicability of which is not in dispute (see, for example, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 32, § 88). Accordingly, whatever the outcome of the Court’s examination of the merits of the grievance under that provision – as declared admissible – no separate issue will arise under Article 13.
As for the applicant’s grievances other than those under Article 6 the Court considers that he had no arguable claim of a violation of his rights under the Convention or its Protocols which would have required a remedy within the meaning of Article 13.
It follows that this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaint concerning the allegedly unfair proceedings concerning his entitlement to an extended daily sickness allowance;
Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.
Michael O’BoyleNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy