AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 22640/93
by Raymond HALL
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 1
December 1993, the following members being present:
MM. A. WEITZEL, President
C.L. ROZAKIS
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
G.B. REFFI
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber,
assisted by Mrs. K. REID.
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 11 March 1993 by
Raymond HALL against the United Kingdom and registered on 16 September
1993 under file No. 22640/93;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen born in 1953 and resident in
Southampton. The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised
as follows.
The applicant was involved in an incident 11 March 1990 in which
two men were injured. He was arrested on 19 April 1990 and charged with
inflicting grievous bodily harm and assault. He was released on bail.
At his trial in February 1991, the applicant pleaded self-
defence. He was convicted on 15 February 1991 on one count of grievous
bodily harm and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment.
The applicant applied for leave to appeal against conviction on
14 March 1991, alleging, inter alia, that the judge had misdirected the
jury as to the defence of self-defence.
Leave to appeal was granted by a single judge of the Court of
Appeal on 16 June 1991. The applicant was informed of this by letter
from his solicitor of 17 July 1991 and told to contact counsel for
further information. He appears to have experienced some difficulty in
contacting counsel. On 14 October 1991, he contacted the Registrar of
Criminal Appeals who on 25 October 1991 informed him that due to the
limited availability of court time the appeal was unlikely to be heard
before Christmas.
On 18 February 1992, the Court of Appeal heard the applicant's
appeal. It found that the judge's direction to the jury as to self-
defence had been fundamentally wrong and that the conviction should
therefore be quashed.
On 12 May 1992, the applicant applied to the Secretary of State
under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for compensation for
the period of time which he had spent, in his view, wrongfully
imprisoned pending his appeal. By letter dated 27 May 1992, the Home
Office stated that it would consider the application in the context of
the 1988 Act and the Home Secretary's statement to the House of Commons
dated 29 November 1985 concerning payment of compensation where a
person has spent a period of custody as a result of serious default on
the part of a public authority. The applicant's application was refused
by letter dated 18 August 1992.
The applicant applied for judicial review of the Secretary of
State's refusal.
Leave was refused on 29 November 1992. His renewed application
was refused on 18 January 1993. The High Court judge found that the
Home Secretary had not erred in his application of the statutory
machinery for compensation and rejected the submissions of the
applicant's counsel that the delay in the hearing of the appeal
disclosed serious default on the part of a public authority.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that he had to wait an unreasonable time
before his appeal contrary to Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
He also invokes Article 5 paras. 1, 4 and 5 in relation to the
delay in his appeal and the lack of compensation. He further complains
under Article 3 of the degrading experience of being imprisoned.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains of the length of proceedings in relation
to his appeal against conviction.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), as relevant, provides in its first
sentence:
"1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within
a reasonable time by (a) ...tribunal established by law..."
Since the proceedings concerned the applicant's appeal against
conviction on a criminal charge, the above provision applies.
According to the constant case-law of the Court and the
Commission, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be
assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case and having
regard in particular to the following criteria: the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the applicant and that of the competent
authorities (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R., Kemmache judgment of
27 November 1991, Series A no. 218, p. 27, para. 60). Persons held in
detention are also entitled to special diligence (see, for example,
Eur. Court H.R., Tomasi judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A,
p. 35 para. 84).
In the present case, the period complained of is the time
elapsing between conviction on 15 February 1991 and the determination
of the appeal on 18 February 1992, a period of one year and three days.
The applicant did not however lodge his appeal for leave until
14 March 1991. Leave was then granted on 16 June 1991. The applicant
appears to have experienced some difficulty in contacting counsel and
was informed by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals that due to the
limited availability of court time the appeal was unlikely to be heard
before Christmas. There is therefore a period between June 1991 and
February 1992, a period of 8 months, during which nothing was
apparently done.
The Commission, having regard to the case as a whole however,
considers that the delay that occurred is not sufficient to justify the
conclusion that the total length of proceedings (i.e. 22 months for two
instances) was excessive and thereby raise an issue under Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicant also complains under Article 5 paras. 1, 4 and 5
(Art. 5-1, 5-4, 5-5) of the Convention. These provide insofar as
relevant:
"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in
the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law:
a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a
competent court...
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which
the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not
lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or
detention in contravention of the provisions of this
Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation."
The Commission notes first of all that there is no indication
that the applicant's detention was unlawful within the meaning of
Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention. While the Court of
Appeal quashed his conviction on the basis of a misdirection of the
trial judge, this does not deprive his detention of the character of
"lawful" within the meaning of the Article 5 para. 1 (a)
(Art. 5-1-a) of the Convention.
As regards the delay between conviction and appeal, this does not
raise any issue under Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention.
That provision applies to proceedings concerning the lawfulness of
detention and not to the original trial and appeal which, as concerning
the determination of a "criminal charge", fall to be examined under the
requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
The Commission lastly notes that the applicant complains that he
was unsuccessful in obtaining compensation for his period of detention
and invokes Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5). The right to compensation
under this provision presupposes that a violation of one of the other
paragraphs of Article 5 (Art. 5) has been established either by a
domestic organ or by the Convention organs (see eg. No. 7950/77, Dec.
4.3.80, D.R. 19, p. 213). In the present case however, the Commission
has found above that the applicant's complaints disclose no appearance
of a violation of Article 5 paras. 1 and 4 (Art. 5-1, 5-4) of the
Convention.
It follows that these complaints must be dismissed as manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
3. The applicant also invokes Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention
in respect of the treatment he suffered from being detained in prison.
Article 3 (Art. 3) provides:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."
The case-law of the Convention organs establishes that
ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall
within the scope of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The
assessment of that minimum is relative and depends on all the
circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and
its physical or mental effects (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R.
Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series a no.
25, p. 65, para. 162).
In the present case, the applicant complains in general terms of
the degrading experience of being detained in prison. He complains of
no specific aspect and makes no reference to any physical or mental
ill-effects. In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the
applicant's experience, unpleasant though it undoubtedly was, does not
disclose treatment of such a nature or degree as to render it either
inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the
Convention.
It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission unanimously
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (A. WEITZEL)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy