FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 63859/00
by Augustín HANULIAK and Others
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 18 September 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrS. Pavlovschi,
MrL. Garlicki,
MsL. Mijović,
MrJ. Šikuta,
MrsP. Hirvelä, judges,
and Mr T. L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 6 August 2000,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
Each of the first four applicants was, and the fifth applicant is, a Slovakian national. Their particulars appear below.
The respondent Government were represented by Ms A. Poláčková, their Agent, who was succeeded in that function by Ms M. Pirošíková.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Applicants
The first applicant, Mr Štefan Hanuliak, was born in 1913 and died in 2006. He was the father of the fifth applicant. The second applicant, Mrs Kamila Hanuliaková, was born in 1915 and died on 14 January 2001. She was the wife of the first applicant and the mother of the fifth applicant. The third applicant, Mr Jozef Hanuliak, was born in 1919 and died on 4 March 2000. He was the husband of the fourth applicant, Mrs Ľudmila Hanuliaková, who was born in 1918 and died in 2005. The third applicant was the uncle of the fifth applicant and the fourth applicant was his aunt.
The fifth applicant, Mr Augustín Hanuliak, was born in 1941 and resides in Topoľníky. He originally represented the first four applicants and then expressed the wish to continue the application in their stead.
2. Land
In 1924 family F. bought real property located in Okoč. In 1939 they exchanged that property with another family for different real property.
In 1946 the real property in Okoč was confiscated. The area was subsequently divided into plots, some of which were allocated to the first four applicants as “assigned owners” (prídeloví vlastníci) under a deed of 1948.
In 1952 the allocated plots were effectively taken over by an agricultural cooperative and in 1958 the allocation was formally quashed and the ownership of the plots passed to the State.
The fifth applicant submits that in 1997 the first four applicants donated their claims to the title to the relevant plots to him and that he became their legal successor in respect of these plots.
3. Applicants’ restitution claims
In 1991 the first applicant and the third applicant lodged, unsuccessfully, demands with the above agricultural cooperative for restitution of the assigned plots and for compensation. The claims were based on a special law of 1991, the Land Ownership Act (Law no. 229/1991 Coll. - “the Act”). However, they were not lodged with the competent Land Office, as required under section 9(1) of that Act.
In 2004 the applicants lodged a claim for restitution of the land in question under a newly adopted special law, the Restitution of Title to Real Property Act of 2003 (Law no. 503/2003 Coll.). It is still pending.
4. Restitution claim by family F.
In 1992 several members of family F. lodged a claim under the Act with the Dunajská Streda Land Office for restitution of the land in Okoč. They submitted that it had belonged to their legal predecessors at the time of the confiscation in 1946.
On 7 July 1992 the claimants and the agricultural co-operative which was using the land entered into an agreement on restitution (dohoda o vydaní) of the property in question to the claimants. The agreement was submitted for approval to the Land Office as envisaged under the Act.
Considering that it was questionable whether the claimants had any title to the land, the Land Office invited them to seek a determination of their rights before a court and stayed the restitution proceedings pending the outcome of such judicial proceedings.
On 17 February 1993 the Dunajská Streda District Court (Okresný súd) found that the land had been in the co-ownership of the claimants’ legal predecessors at the time of their death in 1961 and 1986, respectively.
On 15 July 1993 the Land Office approved the restitution agreement of 7 July 1992. The decision became final on 9 August 1993.
In 1996 the first four applicants unsuccessfully challenged the decision of 15 July 1993 before the Ministry of Agriculture in a special procedure outside the framework of ordinary appellate proceedings (mimo odovlacieho konania). Nevertheless, the decision of 15 July 1993 was finally quashed on a protest lodged by the prosecution service.
The restitution agreement of 7 July 1992 was then examined anew, by the Dunajská Streda District Office (legal successor to the Land Office), which decided – twice - not to approve it. Both decisions were judicially reviewed and quashed by Trnava Regional Court (Krajský súd).
The proceedings are still pending
5. Ownership action of 1993
On 14 December 1993 the first two applicants brought an action against the Slovak Land Fund in the District Court for a determination of ownership in respect of the relevant plots.
In 1994 the proceedings were discontinued on the ground that the matter fell outside the jurisdiction of the courts.
6. Ownership actions of 1994
(a) Action by first two applicants (file no. 9C 205/94)
On 21 November 1994 the first two applicants brought an action against family F. They sought a ruling declaring them to be the owners of the land in question and an interim measure suspending the above-mentioned court rulings concerning the title of family F. to the land.
All judges of the District Court declared that they were unable to sit in the case further to a previous incident when the fifth applicant and his son had insulted the president and one of the judges of that court.
On 17 January 1995 the Regional Court ruled that there were no grounds for disqualifying the entire bench of the District Court from dealing with the case.
In March and April 1995 the District Court requested the defendants’ observations in reply and other information from the Land Office and the Šaľa District Archive.
On 13 April 1995 the District Court dismissed the request for an interim measure, discontinued the proceedings and decided to transmit the matter to the administrative authorities within the jurisdiction of which it fell. The plaintiffs appealed and challenged all judges of the District Court for bias.
Between May and July 1995 the District Court sought the defendants’ observations in reply to the appeal, an explanation of the plaintiffs’ challenge of bias, information from the District Archive and the Nitra Register Office and an amendment to the action in view of the fact that one of the defendants had died.
On 29 September 1995 the Regional Court quashed both the decision concerning the interim measure as well as that concerning the discontinuation of the proceedings. The former ruling was found to be premature and the latter ruling to be erroneous given that the defendants were natural persons.
In November and December 1995 and January 1996 the District Court requested three times that the plaintiffs substantiate the challenge of bias, pay the court fees and complete the request for an interim measure. In the meantime they had withdrawn the power of attorney from their lawyer.
In February 1996, in response to the District Court’s request, the plaintiffs’ new representative submitted the missing information.
A hearing was scheduled for 14 March 1996. Two days before that hearing the plaintiffs’ representative apologised for not being able to attend due to health reasons. The plaintiffs did not appear. The hearing was adjourned until 2 May 1996.
The defendants’ lawyer then requested a postponement of the hearing which was planned for 2 May 1996 due to health reasons and the plaintiffs withdrew the power of attorney from their representative. The hearing was adjourned until 27 May 1996. Following the latter hearing, on the same day, the District Court decided to join the present action to the action of the third and fourth applicants (see below).
(b) Action by third and fourth applicants (file no. 9C 200/94)
On 21 November 1994 the third and fourth applicants brought separate proceedings against family F. for a determination of ownership in respect of the land in question. They also sought an interim measure, similar to that sought by the first two applicants.
On 31 May 1995 the Regional Court ruled, in the context of the incident mentioned above, that there were no grounds to disqualify the District Court’s judges from dealing with the case.
In July 1995 the District Court requested information concerning the case from the Land Office and the District Archive. In November 1995 it demanded that the plaintiffs bring their request for an interim measure in line with the applicable formal requirements and specify who the actual defendants were, given that one of the original defendants had died. In response, their legal representative informed the District Court that the plaintiffs had withdrawn his power of attorney. The request was reiterated.
In January 1996 the plaintiffs submitted that they had new legal representation but they submitted no power of attorney. The District Court again requested that they specify the action and the request for an interim measure and sought further information from the District Archive.
A hearing scheduled for 14 March 1996 had to be adjourned until 2 May 1996 owing to the absence of the plaintiffs and their legal representative who had informed the court that he had been unable to appear for health reasons two days before the hearing. The plaintiffs then again cancelled their legal representation.
On 27 May 1996 the District Court held a hearing and the proceedings in the present action were joined with the proceedings in the action of the first two applicants. Following the hearing, on the same day, the District Court dismissed both actions. A copy of the judgment was served on the first two applicants in June 1996. The third and fourth applicants refused to accept the service. All the plaintiffs appealed.
On 8 July 1996 the District Court corrected clerical errors in its judgment and requested the defendants’ observations in reply to the appeal.
On 12 November 1996 the Regional Court held a hearing following which, on the same day, it quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the District Court for re-examination. It pointed out, inter alia, that it was the plaintiffs’ responsibility to substantiate the scope, the legal nature and the factual basis of their claims.
In December 1996 and January 1997 the District Court invited the plaintiffs’ representative to submit valid powers of attorney from all the plaintiffs and to substantiate the action.
In March and April 1997 the plaintiffs’ legal representative demanded that the court proceedings be stayed pending the outcome of the administrative proceedings on the restitution claim of family F. in view of the fact that the administrative decisions on that claim had been quashed (see above). In April and May 1997 the plaintiffs appointed a lawyer to represent them in the proceedings. The lawyer submitted the missing information on 24 July 1997.
On 25 July 1997 the District Court appointed a geodesy and cartography expert to draw up a report on the land in question and ordered the parties to pay an advance on his fees.
On 14 July 1997 the plaintiffs appealed against the ruling concerning the expert’s fees and requested an exemption from the obligation to pay the court fees. On 22 July 1997 they submitted further information.
On 5 September 1997 the District Court sought information from the Sereď and Ťerchová municipal authorities concerning the plaintiffs’ material standing. It was supplied in October 1997.
On 7 November 1997 the District Court decided not to exempt the plaintiffs from the obligation to pay the court fees. They appealed and stated that they would supply the reasons for their appeal later.
On 12 January 1998 the District Court invited the plaintiffs’ lawyer to submit the reasons for their appeal of 7 November 1997, which they finally did on 10 February 1998.
On 23 April 1998 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 July 1997.
On 2 June 1998 the District Court admitted the Land Fund to the proceedings as the eighth defendant.
On 5 March 1999 the expert submitted two reports. The parties were then requested to submit observations in reply to the reports.
On 31 March and 17 May 1999, respectively, the defendants’ lawyer informed the District Court that one of the defendants had died in 1998 and submitted the death certificate.
On 13 May 1999 the District Court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the fees of the expert. They all appealed.
On 19 May, 9 June and 19 July 1999 the District Court repeatedly requested the plaintiffs’ lawyer to bring the action in line with the applicable requirements. On 23 July 1999 the lawyer informed the court that the third and fourth applicants had withdrawn the power of attorney from her.
On 27 July 1999 a new lawyer informed the District Court that the third and fourth applicants had appointed him to represent them in the proceedings. On 24 September 1999 he responded to the court’s request for further and better particulars.
On 14 October 1999 the District Court informed the plaintiffs’ lawyer that the particulars of their claim did not reflect the specification of the land as in the expert’s reports and warned him that he would be fined if he failed to correct the claim within 7 days. The lawyer responded on 19 October 1999 but did not change the identification of the land as instructed.
On 9 March 2000 the Regional Court quashed the decision of 13 May 1999 concerning the expert’s fees and remitted the question to the District Court for re-examination.
In May 2000 the plaintiffs’ representative submitted that they had cancelled his power of attorney. The District Court ruled again on the expert’s fees and warned the plaintiffs that the proceedings would be discontinued if they failed to correct their claim.
Between May and July 2000 the District Court made inquiries following a finding that the third applicant had died.
On 14 December 2000 the District Court discontinued the proceedings under Article 43 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to pursue the case. They refused to accept the service of the decision. It became final on 20 January 2001.
(c) Fifth applicant’s attempts to continue the proceedings
On 17 May 2001 the fifth applicant made a written submission by which he sought to appeal against the decision of 14 December 2000. He made similar submissions later.
On 21 May 2001 the District Court informed the fifth applicant that there were doubts as to his power of attorney to act in the name of the first four applicants and invited him to show that he was authorised to do so. In a letter of 24 June 2002 the District Court warned the fifth applicant that it would be unable to continue communication with him unless he produced evidence that he was empowered to act on behalf of the first four applicants. There is no indication that any formal proceedings ensued from the fifth applicant’s submissions.
5. Constitutional petition of 2000
On 26 January 2000 the first four applicants, who were represented by the fifth applicant, filed a petition (podnet) with the Constitutional Court. They complained about the length of the proceedings concerning the restitution claim of family F. and their ownership actions of 1994.
On 22 June 2000 the Constitutional Court rejected their motion as falling short of the statutory requirements.
6. Criminal proceedings against the fifth applicant
(a) Criminal charge of 1995
On 7 November 1995 the fifth applicant was charged with the offence of unauthorised use of someone else’s property under Article 249 of the Criminal Code. The charge was based on the suspicion that he had been using illegally a plot which belonged to the real estate in dispute.
On 30 January and 29 April 1996, respectively, the applicant was committed for trial and found guilty as charged by the Komárno District Court in summary proceedings by way of a penal order (trestný rozkaz).
The applicant successfully appealed (protest). The order was ex lege vacated and the matter fell to be determined in ordinary proceedings.
In 1997 the proceedings were stayed under Article 173 § 1 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that the fifth applicant had become unable to understand them owing to the state of his mental health.
In 1999 the proceedings were stayed under Article 173 § 1 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that it was not possible to secure the fifth applicant’s presence.
On 19 December 2003 the proceedings were resumed and joined with the proceedings concerning the charge of 2002 (see below).
(b) Criminal charge of 2002
On 30 August 2002 the fifth applicant was charged with the offences of violence and grave disturbance under Articles 197a and 2002 § 1 of the Criminal Code.
In October 2002 the Dunajská Streda District Court ordered examination of the fifth applicant’s mental health by two experts.
On 19 December 2003 the proceedings on the charges of 1995 and 2002 were joined. The proceedings are still pending.
COMPLAINTS
1. The first four applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length and unfairness of (i) the administrative proceedings on their restitution claim of 1991; (ii) the proceedings concerning the restitution claim of family F.; and (iii) the proceedings on their ownership actions of 1993 and 1994.
2. The first four applicants also alleged a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of the above three sets of proceedings in that they had been unable to use their property peacefully.
3. The fifth applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length and unfairness of the two sets of criminal proceedings against him.
4. Finally, the fifth applicant alleged a violation of Article 7 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the criminal proceedings concerning the alleged offence of unauthorised use of land.
THE LAW
1. The first four applicants complained of the length and unfairness of several sets of proceedings. The fifth applicant complained of the length and unfairness of the criminal proceedings against him. The applicants relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
(a) As for the restitution claim of the first four applicants of 1991, it is to be noted that it was not raised in accordance with the formal requirements of the Act, namely the requirement to raise it with the competent Land Office. Consequently, no formal proceedings within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention ensued in that respect. It follows that the complaint under that provision in relation of the 1991 restitution claim is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
(b) As for the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the proceedings on the restitution claim of family F., the Government argued, primarily, that these proceedings had not been decisive directly for the applicants’ civil rights and obligations. Moreover, the applicants had clearly failed to lodge their restitution claim within the time-limit and in accordance with other requirements of the Act. In so far as such claim might have been of any relevance in the proceedings under examination, it had had no arguable basis in the domestic law. The Government concluded that the complaint of the first four applicants in respect of the restitution proceedings of family F. was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.
Furthermore, the Government submitted that domestic remedies had not been exhausted, as required under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, in that the first four applicants had failed to raise their complaint of the length of the proceedings by way of an administrative complaint, an action in the administrative courts and a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution.
The applicants disagreed.
The Court considers that it is not called upon to determine separately whether from the point of view of the first four applicants the proceedings in question were subject to the procedural protection under Article 6 of the Convention, because the relevant part of the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reason.
The proceedings are still pending. The complaint of their unfairness is therefore premature (see, for example, Macková and Macko v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 51543/99, 1 April 2003).
There is no indication that the first four applicants have challenged the length of the proceedings by way of an administrative complaint (see Kuráková v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 37895/97, 1 February 2001), an action in the administrative courts (see Csepyová v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 67199/01, 8 April 2003) and a complaint to the Constitutional Court (see Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), nos. 57984/00, 60226/00, 60237/00, 60242/00, 60679/00, 60680/00 and 68563/01, ECHR 2002-IX), lodged in accordance with the applicable requirements (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 IV, p. 1210, § 66).
It follows that the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the proceedings on the restitution claim of family F. must in any event be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
(c) As for the ownership action of 1993, it is to be noted that the proceedings ended in 1994, which is clearly more than six months before the date of introduction of the application.
It follows that the complaint about these proceedings has been introduced out of time and must in any event be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
(d) As regards the fairness of the proceedings in the actions of 1994, the Government argued that the first four applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies by appealing against the discontinuation of the proceedings.
The applicants maintained their complaint.
The Court notes that the actions of 1994 were joined in 1996 and that the proceedings in respect of them were discontinued by the District Court on 14 December 2000. Although an appeal was available against this decision, there is no indication that a valid appeal has ever been lodged against it.
As for the subsequent attempts by the fifth applicant to challenge the discontinuation of the proceedings in the name of the first four applicants, there is no indication that they have ever resulted in any formal proceedings or, as the case may be, that the failure to open such official proceedings has been contested before the state administration of the judiciary and, ultimately, before the Constitutional Court.
It follows that the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of the unfairness of the proceedings in the 1994 actions must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
(e) As for the length of the proceedings in the 1994 actions, the Government pointed out that they were discontinued due to the applicants’ inactivity without any decision on the merits. It was therefore questionable whether the proceedings could be said to have had any direct impact on the applicants’ civil rights and obligations and, consequently, whether they enjoyed ratione materiae the protection of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Government further argued that the proceedings had been in any event compatible with the “reasonable time” requirement under the Article invoked, most of the delays having been imputable to the applicants.
The applicants maintained the complaint.
The Court finds no reasons to uphold the Government’s objection of incompatibility of the complaint ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention (see, among may other authorities, Pudas v. Sweden, judgment of 27 October 1987, Series A no. 125-A, p. 14, § 31). It will accordingly examine the length of these proceedings.
The period to be taken into consideration began on 21 November 1994 and ended on 14 December 2000. It thus lasted slightly more than 6 years for 2 levels of jurisdiction.
The reasonableness of this period must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court finds that the case was of some procedural and substantive complexity, mainly owing to the number of parties involved, the fact that some of them had died in the course of the proceedings and the fact that it concerned the title to land which was subject to different referencing systems and ownership concepts at various points over the relevant time.
As for the conduct of the applicants, the Court observes that on numerous occasions they had to be asked to substantiate their claim, interim-measure requests, challenges of bias and other procedural applications. They frequently changed their legal representation, once requested that a hearing be postponed and twice demanded that the proceedings be stayed. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the first four applicants submitted the reasons for their appeal against the decision of 7 November 1997 no earlier than 10 February 1998, after having been reminded, and that the third and fourth applicants refused to accept service of the judgment of 27 May 1996. The Court finds that these actions and omissions caused delays in the proceedings which are imputable to the first four applicants.
As regards the conduct of the authorities, the merits of the case were examined once at two levels of jurisdiction and a number of procedural decisions were taken. The actions were ruled on for the first time relatively promptly, on 27 May 1996, that is to say some 1 ½ years after they had been brought. The judgment was then quashed on appeal on 12 November 1996, that is to say after less than 6 months. Except for the first-instance judgment on the merits, two procedural decisions were also quashed on appeal. The case then remained pending before the first-instance court for about 4 years. Although the length of this period as such appears problematic, it is to be observed that there were no instances of substantial inactivity on the part of the authorities and that a significant part of that period was spent on making the plaintiffs specify their claims and on obtaining evidence, including expert evidence.
Having regard to all the elements at its disposal, in particular the applicants’ procedural conduct, the Court concludes that there is no indication that it was contrary to the requirements laid down in Article 6 § 1 (compare Kandráčová and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 48674/99, 27 January 2004, and Bleyová v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 69353/01, 17 October 2006; and also, for example, Katte Klitsche de la Grange v. Italy, judgment of 27 October 1994, Series A no. 293-B, §§ 49-63; Ciricosta and Viola v. Italy, judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A no. 337-A, § 28; Sergi v. Italy (dec.), no. 46998/99, 26 September 2000; and Viscomi v. Italy (dec.), no. 52927/99, 8 February 2001).
It follows that the complaint of the length of the proceedings in the actions of 1994 is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
(f) As for the criminal proceedings against the fifth applicant, the Government submitted that the proceedings were still pending and objected that the complaint of their length was inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
The fifth applicant maintained the complaint.
The Court observes that in 2003 the proceedings against the fifth applicant on the 1995 and 2002 charges were joined and that they are still pending.
It follows that the complaint of the unfairness of these proceedings is premature (see, mutatis mutandis, Macková and Macko, cited above).
There is no indication that the fifth applicant has challenged the length of these proceedings by way of a complaint to the Constitutional Court (see Andrášik and Others, cited above).
It follows that the whole of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the criminal proceedings against the fifth applicant must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies.
2. The first four applicants also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that they had been unable to enjoy their possessions peacefully in connection with the proceedings concerning their restitution claim, the restitution claim of family F. and their ownership actions. They alleged a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The Court observes that the first four applicants sought restitution of property that had been taken away from them during the communist regime, i.e. prior to the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Slovakia on 18 March 1992. However, in 1991, they did not raise the claim in accordance with the applicable statutory requirements and their restitution claims of 2004 are still pending.
In these circumstances, in so far as the application has been substantiated, the Court finds no indication that the applicants’ restitution claims gave rise to any “legitimate expectation” that they would be realised. Therefore, irrespective of whether the first four applicants exhausted domestic remedies in that respect, they failed to show that they had any possessions falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 39794/98, ECHR 2002‑VII and, for a summary of the relevant principles, Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004 IX).
It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
3. Lastly, the fifth applicant alleged a violation of his rights under Article 7 § 1 of the Convention.
The criminal proceedings against the fifth applicant are still pending. The complaint under Article 7 § 1 of the Convention is therefore premature and must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
4. Having regard to the above conclusions, the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention to the case should be discontinued.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
T.L. EarlyNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy