AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 14170/88
by William Christopher HARWARD
against Norway
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
12 March 1990, the following members being present :
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
G. BATLINER
J. CAMPINOS
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
Mr. L. LOUCAIDES
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 13 November 1987
by William Christopher Harward against Norway and registered on
31 August 1988 under file No. 14170/88;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen, born in 1950. He
is a businessman and when introducing his application he was serving a
13-year prison sentence in Norway. Before the Commission he is
represented by the law firm Sears Blok, Solicitors, London.
The applicant was arrested in Sweden on 27 May 1986 and
charged with drug trafficking. On 14 August 1986 he was extradited to
Norway. On 15 August 1986 he was brought before the Oslo City Court
(byrett) where he was informed of the charges brought against him in
Norway. At the end of the court session the City Court decided on the
basis of the documents and information then available to detain the
applicant on remand in solitary confinement. This measure was
considered necessary in order to prevent the applicant from
absconding and from obstructing the gathering of further evidence in
the case. Restrictions on correspondence and visits were imposed in
accordance with Section 186 of the Criminal Procedure Act
(Straffeprosessloven) which reads:
(translation)
"When under arrest or in detention everyone has the right to
uncontrolled written and oral communications with his public
defence counsel.
Otherwise the court may decide, insofar as it is necessary for
the investigation, that the detainee shall not be allowed to
receive visits or send or receive letters or other mail, or
that visits or correspondence are allowed only under police
surveillance. This does not apply to correspondence with or
visits from a public authority unless this is expressly
mentioned in the court decision. The court may also decide
that the detainee cannot have access to newspapers or
television."
Through the British Embassy in Norway the applicant's closest
relatives in the United Kingdom were informed of the procedure to
follow if they wanted to visit him while in solitary confinement. It
furthermore appears that the applicant's fiancée visited him on
17 December 1986.
The applicant was kept in detention on remand until his conviction
by the Eidsivating High Court (Lagmannsrett) on 3 November 1987.
Solitary confinement, however, ended on 15 April 1987 whereas the ban
on social visits was lifted from about the middle of March. The
applicant's case was examined by the High Court together with the case
of five other persons, all accused of drug trafficking. By the
above-mentioned judgment they were all found guilty and sentenced to
imprisonment ranging from 41/2 to 13 years.
The applicant and four of his co-accused appealed against
the judgment to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) which pronounced
judgment on 25 March 1988. In the judgment Justice Bugge stated on
behalf of the unanimous Court inter alia:
(translation provided by the applicant)
"With respect to (the applicant) ... the appeal concerns,
firstly, the application of the rules of procedure (and) ...
furthermore an appeal against the application of the law ...
I. The appeal against the application of the
procedural rules
Preliminary remarks
It is maintained by (the applicant) that a number of errors
and omissions have been committed in the handling of (his)
case, during the investigation and the preparation of the case
as well as during the main hearing before the High Court. In
(the applicant's) view, the errors entail an infringement
both of actual provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act and
of the minimum requirements pertaining to the court procedure
in criminal cases listed under Art. 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights of 4 November 1950, particularly
para. (3) (a)-(c) and (e). Even if each individual error
might not be of the kind to which importance may be attached
under Norwegian statutes of legal procedure, the errors must
be seen as a whole, and in (the applicant's) opinion, there is
no doubt that, in an overall sense, they may have influenced
the decision on the question of guilt (and) must lead to the
quashing of the High Court sentence, cf. the first subsection
of Section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Act. (The applicant
has) not, it is alleged, received a proper and impartial trial
here in Norway, a fair trial ...
In the light of the above, I find it necessary - before
looking at each of the representations - to give a somewhat
more detailed account of the handling of the criminal case by
the Public Prosecution Authority and the Courts of Law.
(The applicant) was arrested by Swedish police in Gothenburg on
27 May 1986, and subsequently extradited to Norway ... (He was)
charged by the Norwegian Prosecution Authority with serious
narcotics offences - the importation of a very considerable
quantity of heroin - which pursuant to the third subsection of
Section 162 of the Penal Code may carry up to 15 years'
imprisonment. The case has been the subject of an extensive
investigation. This seems principally to be a consequence of
the fact that (the applicant) has refused to make statements
to the police in order to elucidate the punishable acts ... In
order to ascertain the extent of the punishable acts, the
police (has) been obliged to carry out the painstaking task of
obtaining and checking information, partly in collaboration
with foreign police authorities.
After (his) arrest and extradition to Norway, (the applicant
has) been in custody. In order to safeguard evidence, it has
been necessary to subject (him) to a ban on letters and visits
for long periods, and for fear that (he) might abscond, (his)
release has been out of the question. The custody period up
until the judgment was protracted. This is due not only to
the extent of the investigations, but also to the fact that it
was regarded as crucial in terms of the evidence to be able to
bring the case against the convicted persons collectively ...
(T)he fixing of a date for the main hearing had to fit in with
the work schedule of the six defence counsel appointed. I
would, however, underline that, in the High Court sentence,
(the applicant has) been given full deduction from the
punishment for endured periods of detention on remand,
including time spent abroad. (He) will also be credited with
the detention on remand period from the passing of the High
Court sentence until the time of the Supreme Court decision.
Next, I would mention that from the time of (his) arrest, (the
applicant) has by his own choice had defence counsel appointed
at public expense to assist (him) not only during detention on
remand sessions in court, but also otherwise during the
investigation and the preparation of the case. During the
court sessions as well as in connection with the rest of the
prosecution, an interpreter has been placed at the disposal of
(the applicant) and (his) defence counsel. During the court
sessions and the taking of statements by the police, (the
applicant has) been informed of (his) right to refuse to make
a statement, and whenever the police have been taking
statements, the statement taken down has been translated into
English and read out to (him). During the preparation of the
case, the defence counsel have, in the customary manner, been
given the opportunity of familiarising themselves with the
documents in the case, which - and I will come back to this -
have, in part, also been translated into English.
The main hearing in the High Court began on 12 October 1987
and lasted until 30 October, a total of 15 court days. 13
witnesses were examined, and extensive documentation was made.
The six defendants appeared with their individual defence
counsel briefed at public expense. It appears from the court
records that the defence counsel for (the applicant), after
counsel for the prosecution had given an account of the
formal indictment, was allowed to address the Court with
comments relating to the preparation of the case, and that the
other defence counsel also availed themselves of their right
under the third subsection of Section 289 of the Criminal
Procedure Act, cf. Section 313, to comment in connection with
the prosecution counsel's account. It further appears that
following the examination of each witness and the reading out
of each written piece of evidence, the defendants were allowed
to comment. It has not been alleged that (the applicant was)
debarred by the Court from presenting any evidence offered by
(him). The proceedings of the High Court were, in their
entirety, given a running translation - simultaneous
translation - by court interpreters appointed. I would add
that the cost of the assistance of defence counsel and the
service of interpreters in the High Court and during the
preparation of the case was covered, in the customary manner,
by the State, (the applicant) being free of any liability for
costs.
It appears from the court records that (the applicant did not
wish) to give evidence on (his) own behalf before the High
Court ... On the 9th day of the court proceedings, 22 October,
(the applicant) was allowed to address the Court in order to
read out a declaration - 'Appeal' - containing criticism of
the procedure in the High Court under three items, demanding
that this be referred directly to the Supreme Court. In this
connection, he requested that the case be postponed until such
time as the Supreme Court had come to a decision with regard
to his complaints. The High Court did not comply with this.
I will be coming back to this declaration.
(The applicant has) also been given the opportunity of being
present during the hearing of the appeal case in the Supreme
Court, where (he was) presented from custody. Before the
Supreme Court, (he was) represented by new defence counsel,
appointed at public expense ... The appeals proceedings took
two court days. In the Supreme Court also, the entire
proceedings were given a simultaneous translation into English
by authorised interpreters.
Finally, I would stress that concerning the appeals against
the application of procedural rules, the Supreme Court has
the full competence to try both the procedural issues and the
factual basis for the appeals, according to the usual free
assessment of the evidence. The content of the court records
of the subordinate court may optionally be supplemented and
corrected using the information that is otherwise available.
The individual objections to the application of
procedural rules
As has been mentioned, a number of objections have been cited
in the declarations of appeal against the handling of (the
applicant's) case by the police and the Prosecution
Authority, partly during the early stages of the
investigation. In the case of some of the representations, it
has not been attempted to prove before the Supreme Court that
they may have been of significance to the decision made by the
High Court; thus I shall leave them out of account. The most
important complaints associated with the application of
procedural rules are, according to the defence counsel, the
ones I shall be discussing under 1-3 in the following.
1. Assistance by a British lawyer
...
2. Prejudgment
...
3. Translation of case documents
At an early stage of the investigation, (the applicant),
through his defence counsel ... presented a demand that the
documents in the case be translated into English. The demand
was put forward to the Police as well as, at a later stage, to
the Public Prosecutors of Eidsivating. (The applicant) claims
that the demand was not met, and that (he) and (his) defence
counsel were thereby prevented from preparing (his) defence in
a satisfactory manner. (He has) referred to the provisions in
Sections 242 and 264 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which
must, in (his) opinion, presuppose that any foreigner subject
to criminal prosecution, shall be allowed to familiarise
himself with the documents in the case presented in his own
language. They have further referred to Sections 2-8 of the
Prosecution Instructions and Art. 6 para. 3 (a) and (b) of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which stipulate that the
accused shall be unconditionally entitled to be informed of
the basis for the charges and the content of the same in a
language he understands, and to be given sufficient time and
opportunity to prepare his defence.
During the appeal hearing, the defence counsel has argued
partly that (the applicant) was unconditionally entitled at
public expense, to have all case documents translated into
English, and partly that the defence counsel must at least be
unconditionally entitled to evaluate what documents it was
necessary to have translated for the sake of the defence.
I find it clear that this challenge of the application of the
procedural rules is also groundless.
As has been mentioned, (the applicant's) defence counsel had
every opportunity to familiarise (himself) with all the
documents in the case during the investigation and the
preparation of the case, and interpreters have been placed at
their disposal to the extent required by the defence counsel
for the sake of communication with (the applicant). It has
also been established that the content of the charges and the
formal indictment, all court records, and important statements
made to the police by the accused, were translated into
English and placed at their disposal.
In reply to (the applicant's counsel's) request for
translations, the Eidsivating Public Prosecutors stated in a
letter of 30 July 1987:
'In your letter of 16.07.87, you ask that the case documents
be translated into English. This cannot be complied with. As
you point out, the case is an extensive one, and a complete
translation would be highly time-consuming, highly expensive,
and would, in my view, not be required out of consideration
for the accused's interests in the case. The formal
indictment will, of course, be translated into English, in
accordance with the first subsection of Sections 2-8 of the
Prosecution Instructions. If there are certain documents whose
translation is regarded as being of particular importance,
this will be considered. I expect to receive further
information in detail from you about this.'
To a renewed enquiry on the same matter, the Public Prosecutors
replied in a letter of 31 August 1987:
'Neither the Law Courts Act nor the Criminal Procedure Act
entitle a defendant to have the case documents translated into
his mother tongue. During the main hearing, an English
interpreter will of course be present. I can inform you that
simultaneous interpretation is being planned. Moreover, an
interpreter may be used during the preparation of the case to
the extent to which you find it necessary.
Thus, I see no reason to comply with your request for
translation into English of all the documents in the case.'
Sections 242 and 264 of the Criminal Procedure Act concern
the right of the suspect or accused and the defence counsel to
familiarise themselves with the case documents, at the
investigative stage and after the issue of a formal
indictment, respectively. The Act does not mention
translation in cases where the person in question does not
understand Norwegian. On the other hand, the Prosecution
Instructions contain the following provision in Sections 2-8:
'If the accused does not understand Norwegian, the Prosecution
Authority's decision on the question of prosecution, cf.
Chapters 17 to 22, or the legal remedies declaration, cf.
Chapter 27, shall be translated into a language which the
person in question can understand. The translation should
normally be in writing, unless it seems that no objections may
be raised against the content of the decision being
translated verbally when the decision is served on or
announced to the accused.
The provision in the first subsection also applies to service
of a sentence, cf. Sections 26-3, and to notification of
decisions and other court rulings.
Furthermore, the case documents shall be translated at public
expense to the extent seen as necessary in order to safeguard
the accused's interest in the case.'
In the report from the committee which prepared the revision
of the Prosecution Instructions - NOU 1984: 27 - a statement
is quoted on page 89, made by the Chairman of the Norwegian
Bar Association's Permanent Legislation Committee on Criminal
Law and Criminal Procedure, subscribed to by the Main
Committee of the Bar Association. On the question of
translation, it says here, among other things:
'Otherwise, I agree with Public Prosecutor (...) who states
that a complete translation of the documents in a criminal
case would be a task of such magnitude, both as regards time
and expense, that this should not occur as a general rule.
Anyway, it has been my experience that this is not normally
required.
On the other hand, I do not rule out the possibility that in
exceptional cases, a translation of part of the documents may
be required. I am thinking particularly of translations into
the mother tongue of the person in question of the statements
made by the accused himself during the investigation.
Thus, I would suggest that the Bar Association support the
view that the documents in a criminal case shall not
automatically be translated into the mother tongue of the
person in question, but that the opportunity shall be provided
for the defence counsel to ask for the translation of
specifically selected documents as required. This right of
the defence counsel should be anchored in a provision in the
Prosecution Instructions.'
On its own behalf, the Committee then states in the same
reference as follows:
'In the Committee's opinion, it should not be stipulated as a
general rule that all the documents in a criminal case should
be translated if the defendant does not understand Norwegian.
Such a system would lead to great financial and practical
problems, and it also seems unnecessary, cf. the statement by
the Bar Association. A concrete assessment should be made of
the degree to which the documents in a criminal case should
be translated, and, as a matter of course, importance must
here be attached to the defence counsel's views on the
subject. But the accused and the defence counsel should
probably not be given the right to demand that specific
documents be translated. The crucial factor should be to what
degree a translation is regarded as necessary in order to
safeguard the accused's interest in the case, cf. the third
subsection.'
The provision proposed by the Committee, Sections 2-20, is
identical to Sections 2-8 of the Instructions.
Thus, it is clearly presupposed in the above that the accused
or the defendant is not entitled to have all case
documents translated into his own language or into another
language that he understands. Importance should be attached
to what the defence counsel regards as required in order to
safeguard the interest of his client, and it is presupposed
that he may ask to have specially selected documents
translated. But the defence counsel and his client have no
unconditional right to demand that specific documents be
translated; the decisive factor is, as stated in the
Instructions, what is regarded as necessary in order to
safeguard the client's interest in the case. The provision
must naturally be seen in connection with the provisions of
the Act and the Instructions pertaining to the use of
interpreters in criminal cases, which I have previously
mentioned as far as this case is concerned. Moreover, the
report points out that the question of translations may be
referred to the Court at any stage of the case.
The provisions of the Prosecution Instructions on this point
must be assumed to meet the requirements set up by the
European Court of Human Rights relating to the requirement for
translation of documents in criminal cases under Art. 6 of
the Convention. In Paul Sieghart: The International Law
of Human Rights, the following is quoted on p. 298, with
reference to several decisions:
'EHR 6 (3) (a) requires that any summons served on an accused
person should be accompanied by a translation in a language
which he understands. It does not, however, give a general
right for the accused to have the court files translated, but
only those procedural documents which are necessary for his
defence.'
In view of the above, there seems to me to be no doubt that
the standpoint adopted by the Eidsivating Public Prosecutors on
the question of translation in their letters of 30 July and
31 August 1987, was in accordance with the rules in force. The
defence counsel (was) informed that (he) could expect special
documents which (he) might regard as being of special
importance to be translated. What the defence counsel had
demanded, and what is argued in the appeal case, is, however,
that provisions should have been made for all the case
documents to be translated - a highly demanding task,
incidentally, in a case where the number of document pages has
been given as approx. 1,100. No request was made for
specially selected documents, beyond the ones already available
in translation, to be translated, which has also been admitted
by the defence counsel. Also, the question of the magnitude
of the translation work was not raised at any stage of the
proceedings with the Examining and Summary Court or with the
High Court.
...
In view of the above, I cannot see that any error has been
demonstrated in the application of procedural rules in the
criminal case against (the applicant), or that there is any
foundation for the assertion that (he) has not received a fair
trial in the High Court. Consequently, the appeal lodged
against the application of procedural rules must be
rejected."
COMPLAINTS
1. Under Article 6 para. 3 (a) of the Convention the applicant
complains that he was not informed promptly, in a language which he
understood and in detail, of the cause of the accusation against him.
He also complains, under Article 6 para. 3 (b) of the Convention, that
he was not given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defence. The applicant bases this complaint on the refusal of the
prosecution to translate the case documents and on his limited
possibilities of obtaining these documents.
2. The applicant furthermore complains that the regime to which
he was subjected while in detention on remand was in violation of his
right to respect for his private and family life and for his
correspondence contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.
3. Finally the applicant maintains that his solitary confinement
from 14 August 1986 until 15 April 1987 violated his right to freedom
of association with others within the meaning of Article 11 of the
Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant has complained that he was not informed
promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him as guaranteed to him by
Article 6 para. 3 (a) (Art. 6-3-a) of the Convention. Under Article 6
para. 3 (b) (Art. 6-3-b) of the Convention the applicant has also
complained of inadequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defence; he has referred to the lack of possibilities of obtaining
documents and the lack of translation of the case file. As regards
the translation of documents the Commission has considered these
complaints not only under the provisions invoked by the applicant but
also under Article 6 para. 3 (e) (Art. 6-3-e) of the Convention, which
guarantees the free assistance of an interpreter if the accused cannot
understand or speak the language used in court.
The European Court of Human Rights has observed in the Kamasinski
case (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Kamasinski judgment of 19 December 1989,
Series A no. 168, para. 74):
"74. The right, stated in paragraph 3 (e) of Article 6
(Art. 6-3-e)), to the free assistance of an interpreter
applies not only to oral statements made at the trial
hearing but also to documentary material and the pre-trial
proceedings. Paragraph 3 (e) (Art. 6-3-e) signifies that a person
charged with a criminal offence who cannot understand or
speak the language used in court has the right to the free
assistance of an interpreter for the translation or
interpretation of all those documents or statements in the
proceedings instituted against him which it is necessary for
him to understand or to have rendered into the court's
language in order to have the benefit of a fair trial (see
the Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç judgment of 28 November 1978,
Series A no. 29, p. 20, para. 48).
However, paragraph 3 (e) (Art. 6-3-e) does not go so far as to
require a written translation of all items of written evidence or
official documents in the procedure. The interpretation
assistance provided should be such as to enable the defendant
to have knowledge of the case against him and to defend
himself, notably by being able to put before the court his
version of the events."
The Commission recalls that the applicant was extradited to
Norway on 14 August 1986 after the extradition procedures had come to
an end. Even assuming that the applicant was unaware, until then, of
the charges brought against him in Norway the Commission recalls that
the reasons for his arrest and subsequent detention were thoroughly
explained to him with the assistance of an interpreter in the Oslo
City Court the following day. The Commission also notes the judgment
of the Supreme Court of 25 March 1988 which thoroughly sets out the
applicant's possibilities of obtaining a translation of documents and
the assistance of interpreters. It appears that interpreters were
placed at the applicant's and his counsel's disposal as required by
them for the sake of communication and the contents of the charges,
the formal indictment, court records as well as important statements
made to the police by the applicant were translated into English and
placed at their disposal.
The Commission is satisfied that, in these circumstances, the
applicant's rights under Article 6 para. 3 (a) (Art. 6-3-a) and
(e) (Art. 6--3-e) were respected (cf. also No. 8361/78, Dec. 17.12.81,
D.R. 27 p. 37). It follows that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
With regard to the applicant's complaint under Article 6
para. 3 (b) (Art. 6-3-b) it is true that the applicant's access to the
case file was limited. However, a system whereby the right to inspect
the file is restricted to the defendant's lawyer is not in itself
incompatible with Article 6 para. 3 (b) (Art. 6-3-b) of the Convention
(cf. above-mentioned Kamasinski judgment para. 88). Furthermore it
follows from the judgment of the Supreme Court that the applicant's
defence counsel had every opportunity to familiarise himself with all
the documents in the case during the investigation and the preparation
of the case, that the applicant could freely communicate with his
counsel during this period and could receive translations of documents
which he found would be of importance. Furthermore, the Commission
recalls that the pre-trial period was more than one year.
In these circumstances the Commission finds that the applicant
had adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence
and it follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant has complained that his detention on remand
violated Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, i.e. his right to respect for
his private and family life and his correspondence. The Commission
assumes that the applicant in particular intends to refer to the fact
that he was placed in solitary confinement from 14 August 1986 until
15 April 1987 and that restrictions under Section 186 of the Criminal
Procedure Act were imposed during most of this period.
The Commission considers that while detention, lawful under
Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention, is by its nature a limitation on
private and family life, it is an essential part of a prisoner's right
to respect for family life that the authorities assist in maintaining
effective contact with his close family members (mutatis mutandis No.
9054/80, Dec. 8.10.82, D.R. 30, p. 113). Furthermore, as regards the
applicant's correspondence the Commission recalls the judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights in the case of Silver and Others
(judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61) in which the Court set
out general principles from which it appears that the Contracting
States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation in the
matter of the imposition of restrictions on correspondence.
Nevertheless, the aim of preventing disorder or crime may justify
wider measures of interference in a case of a person held on remand
and against whom inquiries with a view to bringing criminal charges
are being made since in such a case there is often a risk of collusion
(cf. Eur. Court H.R., Schönenberger and Durmaz judgment of 20 June
1988 Series A no. 137, p. 13, para. 25).
In the present case the Commission recalls first of all that
during the period of time to which the applicant refers he was not
serving a sentence but was placed in detention on remand pending
trial. The applicant had been charged with grave narcotics offences
and the solitary confinement and the restrictions on visits and mail
had been imposed on him by the courts as being necessary to prevent
him from escaping or impeding the investigations by removing evidence or
by warning or influencing others. Furthermore, the Commission is
satisfied that the restrictions imposed were lifted when they were no
longer deemed necessary and, finally, visits by close family members
were not excluded.
In these circumstances the Commission finds that there were
sufficient grounds for justifying the restrictions imposed and that
the authorities cannot be considered as having gone beyond the margin
of appreciation left to them. The limitations on the applicant's
private and family life and on his correspondence were therefore in the
Commission's view proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and
necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder or
crime within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention
(cf. also No. 10263/83, Dec. 11.3.85 unpublished as regards Article 8,
(Art. 8) otherwise D.R. 41 p. 149). It follows that this part of the
application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicant has finally complained, under Article 11
(Art. 11) of the Convention, that his right to associate with others has
been violated during his solitary confinement from 14 August 1986
until 15 April 1987.
However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or
not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a
violation of this provision, as Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention
provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter ... within
a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was
taken".
In the present case the applicant's solitary confinement ended
on 15 April 1987 whereas the application was submitted to the Commission
on 13 November 1987, that is, more than six months later. Furthermore,
an examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any
special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the
running of that period.
It follows that this part of the application has been
introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3
(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy