AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY
Application No. 12597/86
by K.W. HAUGHTON
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
8 May 1987, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
G. SPERDUTI
F. ERMACORA
G. JÖRUNDSSON
G. TENEKIDES
S. TRECHSEL
B. KIERNAN
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
G. BATLINER
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. F. MARTINEZ
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 21 August 1986
by K.W. Haughton against the United Kingdom and registered
on 10 December 1986 under file No. 12597/86;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen born in 1959 and resident
in Gillingham, Kent. She is represented by Robin Murray, a solicitor.
The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows.
The applicant commenced employment with Olau Lines (United
Kingdom) Ltd on 24 June 1983 and worked as a cashier on a ferry boat
owned by the parent company of her employers, which was a German
company.
On or about 4 November 1983, the applicant alleges that she
was sexually harassed by a Purser, who asked her personal questions
concerning sexual relationships and who, when the applicant refused to
answer, threw some cigarette-lighters at her. The Purser then
suggested that the applicant was having a sexual relationship with a
particular member of the crew, which was untrue and threatened to
arrange for the applicant to lose her job.
The applicant complained of this harassment to her employers
in the United Kingdom. On 8 November 1983, she was informed by the
Personnel Officer that her complaint would not help her career. On or
about 9 November 1983 she was informed that the Pursers on both the
ship where she worked and its sister ship refused to allow her on
board as result of her complaint and that she could therefore no
longer work for the company.
The applicant commenced proceedings before an industrial
tribunal alleging that she had suffered unlawful sexual discrimination
by being sexually harassed and that she had been unlawfully victimised
in being dismissed after having made a complaint.
Before the industrial tribunal, her employers argued that the
tribunal had no jurisdiction pursuant to the wording of S. 6 (2) of
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. Section 6 (2) provides "It is
unlawful for a person, in the case of a woman employed by him at an
establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against her..." The
industrial tribunal accepted this argument and held that they had no
jurisdiction in the case. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully to
the Employment Appeal Tribunal and Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal found that the applicant worked on a
German registered ship that 58.8% of her working hours were spent
outside the United Kingdom territorial waters and that accordingly she
was employed wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom. The court
rejected the applicant's argument that a ship cannot be regarded as an
establishment or that the establishment with which the applicant had
her closest connection was her employers' offices in the United
Kingdom. Her application for leave to appeal to the House of Lords
was refused on 7 March 1986.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains of a violation of her private life in
that she has suffered sexual harassment and of discrimination. She
also complains that she is denied any effective remedy before a
national authority in respect of her complaints.
The applicant invokes Articles 8 para. 1, 13 and 14.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that she has suffered an interference
with her private life and discrimination contrary to Articles 8 and
14 (Art. 8, 14) of the Convention as a result of being sexually
harassed by a fellow employee and of being dismissed by her employers
following her complaint against the employee.
However, under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the
Convention, the Commission may only admit an application from a
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals, where
the applicant alleges a violation by one of the Contracting Parties of
the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and where that Party
has recognised this competence of the Commission. The Commission may
not, therefore, admit applications directed against private
individuals. In this respect the Commission refers to its constant
jurisprudence (see e.g. the decisions on the admissibility of
applications Nos. 172/56, Dec. 20.12.57, Yearbook 1 pp. 211, 215 and
3925/69, Dec. 2.1.70, Collection of Decisions 32 pp. 56, 58).
The Commission also finds that the applicant's complaints as
submitted by her do not disclose any elements which indicate that the
United Kingdom Government was subject to a duty imposed by Article 1
(Art. 1) of the Convention in respect of the alleged matters.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible
ratione personae within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant also complains that she has been denied any
effective remedy before a national authority in respect of her
complaints contrary to Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.
The Commission observes that this provision is only applicable
when an applicant has an arguable claim that there has been a breach
of other rights and freedoms contained in the Convention (see e.g.
Boyle, X and Y v. United Kingdom, Application Nos. 9658 and 9659/82,
Comm. Report 7.5.86). However, in the present case, the Commission
has already found that the applicant's complaints under Article 8 and
14 (Art. 8, 14) of the Convention fall outside the scope of the
Convention and it has not found any appearance of a violation of any
of the other provisions of the Convention. There is therefore no
basis in the present case for the application of Article 13 (Art. 13)
of the Convention.
It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione
materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of
Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)