Legal summary
July 2025
Hayes v. the United Kingdom - 56532/22, 56889/22 and 3739/23
Judgment 1.7.2025 [Section II]
Article 3
Degrading treatment
Inhuman treatment
Extradition
No risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole which would be irreducible de facto and de jure in the event of the applicants’ extradition to, and conviction in, the USA: no violation
Facts – The applicants are nationals of the United States of America (“the USA”) currently being detained in the United Kingdom (Scotland). The US government requested their extradition as they are wanted on federal charges concerning an alleged conspiracy to kidnap children and kill witnesses, and an alleged attempt to effect that conspiracy involving the brandishing of a firearm. Conspiracy to kill witnesses – count (2) – carries a minimum sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The applicants unsuccessfully challenged their extradition at first instance and on appeal.
Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the Court has indicated to the United Kingdom Government that the applicant should not be extradited for the duration of the proceedings before it.
Law – Article 3:
(1) Is there a real risk that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole would be imposed on the applicants? – The national courts had focused on the question of reducibility, the second stage of the test laid out in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], having apparently assumed that the first stage, whether there was a real risk that the applicants would be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, had been satisfied. While it was in principle for the applicants to demonstrate that a whole life sentence would be imposed, they appeared to rely solely on the fact that they faced, in respect of count (2), a mandatory life sentence without parole. In Sanchez-Sanchez the Court had held that a real risk would “more readily be established” where an applicant faced a mandatory life sentence, although such a risk would not be established automatically. However, in view of the restrictions on judicial discretion in such cases, it was not entirely clear what further evidence an applicant could be expected to adduce in order to demonstrate the existence of a real risk. Evidence of the kind considered by the Court in Sanchez-Sanchez (sentencing practice and the treatment of co-conspirators or other defendants with similar records to the applicant) was of considerably greater significance where a criminal charge carried a discretionary, as opposed to a mandatory, life sentence. Therefore, as the applicants faced a mandatory life sentence in the event of their conviction on count (2), there existed a rebuttable presumption that the first stage of the Sanchez-Sanchez test had been met. Accordingly, it was for the Government to demonstrate on the facts that the mandatory minimum sentence would not be imposed.
In that regard, firstly, the Government contended that in view of the US prosecutor’s assurance that the applicants would be offered a plea bargain, if they pled guilty they could avoid the imposition of a mandatory life sentence. Secondly, the Government submitted that the sentencing judge would have discretion to reduce even a mandatory life sentence were the applicants to provide “substantial assistance” to the prosecuting authorities. The Court could not base its assessment of risk on the likely sentence an applicant would receive if they pled guilty. Consequently, the availability of a plea bargain in the event of a guilty plea could not be a relevant consideration in its assessment of risk. The Court also recognised that the length of a prison sentence might be affected by pre-trial factors, such as the defendant agreeing to cooperate with the US Government. However, no indication had been given as to the assistance the US authorities considered that the applicants could provide; and there had been no obvious scope for them to provide such assistance since the fourth member of the alleged conspiracy had been arrested and had pled guilty. It had been understood that he had offered substantial assistance to the authorities and it had been anticipated that he would give incriminating evidence against the applicants at trial. The Government had not sought to challenge either submission and had not, therefore, rebutted the presumption that in the event of the applicants’ conviction on the second charge, the mandatory minimum life sentence would be imposed. Accordingly, in view of the domestic courts’ decision not to engage with the first stage of the Sanchez-Sanchez test, the applicants’ extradition to the US would expose them to a real risk of being sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.
(2) Do the review mechanisms in the US satisfy the second stage of the Sanchez‑Sanchez test? –Two review mechanisms had been available to the applicants if they had been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole: compassionate release and executive clemency. The First Step Act 2018 had significantly expanded access to compassionate release and empowered courts to reduce sentences where the relevant criteria were satisfied. Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code (“U.S.C.”), § 3582(c)(1)(A), compassionate release might be granted either where the prisoner was at least 70 years of age, had served at least 30 years in prison, and was not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community; or where extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted a reduction of their sentence. Eligibility for compassionate release under both heads would be considered by reference to the factors set out in § 3553(a) of the U.S.C. According to the US Supreme Court, evidence of post‑sentencing rehabilitation might be “highly relevant” to several of the § 3553(a) factors.
The first head was clearly linked to the prisoner’s age but did not require that they be experiencing any deterioration in physical or mental health. Each of the applicants, if convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, would, after thirty years, be at least seventy years old and therefore potentially eligible to apply for compassionate release under that head. For the second head, according to the federal sentencing guidelines, “extraordinary and compelling reasons” existed under various circumstances or a combination thereof. Compassionate release might also be available if a prisoner had received an unusually long sentence and had served at least ten years of imprisonment. Full consideration would also have to be given to the prisoner’s individualised circumstances, and it was clear from the case-law that evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation would be relevant to that assessment. While rehabilitation alone was not considered an extraordinary and compelling reason, the courts appeared to give due consideration to a prisoner’s progress towards rehabilitation in deciding whether or not to grant a motion for compassionate release. Indeed, there was clear evidence of sentences (including life sentences) being reduced by the US courts with progress towards rehabilitation weighing heavily in their reasoning. Moreover, if a prisoner could produce “significant and extensive evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation”, the court would have to provide a “more robust” and “individualized” explanation when it ruled on a compassionate release motion. A failure to obtain release on such a motion did not prevent a prisoner from requesting release again.
Therefore, notwithstanding that a motion could not be granted on the basis of rehabilitation alone, compassionate release undoubtedly constituted a review mechanism that allowed the domestic authorities “to consider a prisoner’s progress towards rehabilitation or any other ground for release based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances”. As such, it satisfied the second stage of the Sanchez‑Sanchez test. In light of that conclusion, it was not necessary to consider whether executive clemency would also satisfy the second stage of the test.
(3) Would a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment on count (2) be grossly disproportionate? – The Court agreed with the domestic courts that a mandatory life sentence would not be grossly disproportionate in view of the gravity of the offences charged. Although the applicants had not been charged with homicide, that fact alone could not render their cases sufficiently “rare and unique” as to meet the high threshold of exceptionality required to establish gross disproportionality. According to the allegations, the applicants’ plan had involved obtaining firearms, achieving armed entry to two private homes, kidnapping five children (all under the age of eight) and murdering their four parents with a view to eliminating them as witnesses. The plan had proceeded to the extent of one of the parents being held at gunpoint ready to be executed when law enforcement had intervened. Although the victims had not died, the fact that the applicants had been carrying out the agreed plan when the police had arrived meant that although the full intended harm had been prevented, the level of culpability involved in the alleged offending had not been greatly reduced. The decision of the US Congress to punish such acts with the most severe punishment available – being a mandatory life sentence – therefore fell well within the boundaries of “legitimate and reasonable differences between States”.
(4) Conclusion – The foregoing considerations were sufficient to conclude that the applicants’ extradition to the US would not be in breach of Article 3 on account either of the risk that if convicted they would receive a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, which would be irreducible de facto and de jure; or because a mandatory life sentence on count (2) would be grossly disproportionate.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
Rule 39: The Court considered that the indications made to the Government under Rule 39 should remain in force until the present judgment became final or the Court took a further decision in this connection.
(See Harkins and Edwards v. the United Kingdom, 9146/07 and 32650/07, 17 January 2012, Legal Summary; Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, 24027/07, 10 April 2012, Legal Summary; Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 66069/09, 9 July 2013, Legal Summary; Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 22854/20, 3 November 2022, Legal Summary)
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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