FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 31745/02
by Colin Christoph HEIDECKER-TIEMANN
against Germany
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 6 May 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
Karel Jungwiert,
Volodymyr Butkevych,
Mark Villiger,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, judges,
Eckart Klein, ad hoc judge,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 6 September 2002. Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Colin Christoph Heidecker, is a German national who was born in 1986 in Edinburgh and lives in Hamburg. In his everyday life the applicant uses the compound name Heidecker-Tiemann. The application was originally filed by his parents, Mrs Gisela Heidecker and Mr Axel Tiemann. Having reached legal age, the applicant informed the Court in March 2004 that he wished to pursue the application himself. He is represented by his father, Mr A. Tiemann.
The German Government (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent, Mrs A. Wittling-Vogel, Ministerialdirigentin, of the Federal Ministry of Justice.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
I. Background to the case
According to the initial regulation of Article 1616 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) of 18 August 1896, a child born in wedlock would obtain the surname of the father, which was also the common family name. With the introduction of the Act on the Reform of the Marital and Family Law (Erstes Gesetz zur Reform des Ehe- und Familienrechts) of 14 June 1976, a married couple could choose any of the spouses’ surnames as the family name. Their children would then obtain the same family name. If the parents were unable to choose a family name,
the husband’s name would automatically become the family name according to the then applicable version of Article 1355 § 2 of the German Civil Code. That provision was held to be unconstitutional and incompatible with the prohibition of discrimination (Article 3 § 2 of the Basic Law)
by the Federal Constitutional Court on 5 March 1991. The Federal Constitutional Court ordered that, until the legislator had formulated a new regulation, couples who married after the day of the delivery of the judgment and who were unable to agree on the choice of a common family name would provisionally keep their surnames. In such an instance, their children were provisionally able to obtain a compound name composed of both surnames of the parents, in order to leave to the legislator the option to introduce the possibility to obtain such names.
On 1 April 1994, the Act on the Regulation of the Law of Family Names (Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Familiennamensrechts) came into force which corrected the above constitutional flaws. Article 1355 of the Civil Code was amended by giving both spouses the possibility to keep their surnames. According to the henceforth relevant Article 1616 § 2 (replaced in 1997
by 1617 § 1) of the Civil Code, a child would either obtain the surname of the father or the mother. A compound name for the child was not provided for by the new Act.
II. Proceedings before the domestic courts
The applicant’s parents married in 1984. While the applicant’s father kept his surname, “Tiemann”, the applicant’s mother adopted the compound name “Heidecker-Tiemann”. The applicant was born in 1986 in Edinburgh where he was subsequently registered by the Registry Office as “Colin Christoph Heidecker-Tiemann”, bearing a surname composed of both his parents’ original surnames (“Heidecker” and “Tiemann”). The applicant was registered under the surname “Tiemann” in the Family Register (Familienbuch) at the Registry Office of Neubrandenburg, where the family resided at the time. The applicant’s birth was not registered within the meaning of the Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages Act (Personenstandsgesetz).
After the Act on the Regulation of the Law of Family Names entered into force on 1 April 1994, the applicant’s mother changed her surname back to her original maiden name (“Heidecker”) in May 1994. Subsequently, the applicant’s parents declared before the Neubrandenburg Registry Office that the applicant’s surname should be “Heidecker-Tiemann”. When the Registry officer refused the registration because compound names were not permitted by the Civil Code, the parents opted for the registration of the name “Heidecker” and instituted proceedings in order to be able to register a compound name.
On 28 March 1995, the Neubrandenburg District Court dismissed the parents’ claim and found that the Registry Office was not compelled to authenticate (öffentliche Beglaubigung) the applicant’s parents’ declaration and register the applicant with a compound name.
The appeal was dismissed by the Neubrandenburg Regional Court on 26 February 1996. The court found that the claimants had not demanded the authentication and the certification of their declaration, but the registration of the requested surname of the applicant.
Upon the applicant’s immediate appeal, that decision was quashed by the Rostock Court of Appeal on 22 August 1996. The latter ordered the Neubrandenburg Registry Office to authenticate the declaration of the applicant’s parents. It also found that the Neubrandenburg Registry Office was not competent to register the applicant’s surname. As the applicant had been born abroad, the competent authority was the Berlin Registry Office. The application had been given the file number “III 16/94” by the Neubrandenburg District Court, which was subsequently quoted by the Neubrandenburg Regional Court and the Rostock Court of Appeal.
On 17 January 1997, the Neubrandenburg Registry Office authenticated the declaration of the applicant’s parents (that is, that the applicant’s last name should be “Heidecker-Tiemann”) of 10 May 1994 and forwarded a verified copy to the Berlin Registry Office which received it on 20 January 1997. The Berlin Registry Office did however not receive the original.
On 4 February 1997, the Berlin Registry Office refused to certify the validity of the declaration. It found that the application was ill-founded for formal reasons, because section 7(1) of the Act on the Regulation of the Law of Family Names provided that a declaration had to be issued within one month after one parent changed his or her last name. Thus, the time-limit had already expired with the receipt of the declaration in January 1997.
On 4 December 1997, the Schöneberg District Court dismissed the motion of the applicant’s parents to register the applicant under a compound name. The court found that, irrespective of formal requirements, the applicable law did not provide for the possibility to obtain compound names.
The parents’ appeal was dismissed by the Berlin Regional Court on 2 July 1998.
On 17 August 1999, the Berlin Court of Appeal (Kammergericht) dismissed the parents’ further appeal (weitere Beschwerde). The application had been given the file number “70 III 257/97” by the Schöneberg District Court, which was subsequently quoted by the Berlin Regional Court and the Berlin Court of Appeal.
On 19 June 2000, the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant and his parents’ constitutional complaint against the above decisions because the complaint was inadmissible.
The applicant’s parents subsequently obtained a required permit of their declaration of 10 May 1994 by the guardianship court (vormundschaftliche Genehmigung) by order of the Neubrandenburg District Court of 29 September 1999. The original copy of the declaration was subsequently sent to the Berlin Registry Office on 7 February 2000.
On 11 February 2000, the Berlin Registry Office issued a statement to the applicant to the effect that he was registered under the last name “Heidecker” as from 19 May 1994. The applicant’s parents argued that the above-mentioned permit would satisfy the procedural requirements for the registration of the applicant’s surname as “Heidecker-Tiemann”.
The Registry Office however refused to register the compound name.
On 12 July 2000, the Schöneberg District Court dismissed the applicant and his parents’ motion against the refusal because the applicable law did not provide for compound names and did not violate fundamental rights. The court found it therefore unnecessary to rule whether or not the certified declaration of 10 May 1994 was introduced out of time.
On 20 October 2000, the Berlin Regional Court dismissed the applicant and his parents’ appeal. On 19 June 2001, their further appeal was dismissed by the Berlin Court of Appeal (Kammergericht). The application had been given the file number “70 III 98/00” by the Schöneberg District Court, which was subsequently quoted by the Berlin Regional Court and the Berlin Court of Appeal.
On 21 February 2002, the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant and his parents’ constitutional complaint against the decision by the Berlin Court of Appeal (Kammergericht) of 19 June 2001 by referring to a leading judgment of 30 January 2002 (see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below) in which the constitutionality of Article 1617 of the Civil Code had been confirmed.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
I Relevant domestic law
Article 1355 of the Civil Code provides:
Ҥ 1 Spouses should designate a common family name (marital name). The spouses shall use the marital name which they have designated. If the spouses do not designate a family name, they will continue to bear those surnames after the marriage which they bore at the time when entering into the marriage.
§ 2 By declaration to the registrar, the spouses may designate, as their marital name, the birth name of the husband or the wife or the name he or she has at the time of the designation of the marital name. (...)
§ 4 A spouse whose name does not become the marital name may, by declaration to the registrar, attach, before or after the marital name, his or her birth name or the name he or she has at the time of the declaration on the designation of the marital name. This shall not apply if the marital name consists of more than one name. If the name of one of the spouses consists of more than one name, only one of these names may be attached. (...)”
Article 1617 of the Civil Code provides:
Ҥ 1 If the parents do not have a marital name but if they have joint parental responsibility, they shall, by declaration to the registrar, designate the surname that the father or the mother has at the time of the declaration as the birth name of the child. (...)
§ 2 If parents make no designation within one month of the birth of the child, the family court shall transfer the right of designation to one of the parents. Subsection (1) applies mutatis mutandis. The court may impose a time-limit on the parent for the exercise of the right of designation. If, after the time-limit has expired, the right of designation had not been exercised, the child shall be given the name of the parent to whom the right of designation was transferred.”
Under German law, authentic compound names are permitted only in very specific circumstances. For example, compound names may be retained if they were used prior to State regulation of the law governing names. Moreover, pursuant to the Act on Change of Family Names and Forenames, compound names may come into being when persons with surnames which are highly common in Germany such as “Schmidt” or “Müller” (so-called Sammelnamen) add another name to render their family name easier to distinguish. Compound names created in this way may be passed on to children.
Under Section 10 § 1 of the Law Introducing the Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch), a person’s name falls to be decided by the law of the State of his or her nationality.
II. Case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court
In a leading judgment of 30 January 2002, the Federal Constitutional Court held, by six votes to two, the former version of Article 1616 § 2 of the German Civil Code (which is identical to Article 1617 § 1 of the current version of the Civil Code) to be constitutional. In particular, the Federal Constitutional Court found that the provision neither constituted a violation of the right to a family (Article 6 § 1 of the Basic Law), the right to educate one’s own children (Article 6 § 2 of the Basic Law) nor the children’s right to protection of their personality rights as guaranteed by Articles 2 § 1 and
1 § 1 of the Basic Law.
The Federal Constitutional Court considered that, once children would be allowed to obtain compound names, the number of surnames could exponentiate with each future generation. The next generation would already be able to obtain a last name comprised of four names. Such growing “chains of surnames” would not only be impracticable, they would also be to the detriment of future generations whose last names would be at risk of losing their function as a means of identification. The Basic Law would not prohibit the legislator from reducing the number of possible last names to avoid such “name chains” in order to secure the function of the surnames of future generations.
The Federal Constitutional Court considered that a different way of avoiding “name chains” would have been to allow compound names, but to restrict the number of last names to two. This method, however, would prevent parents who already bore a compound name from giving their children a compound name comprised of both parents’ last names,
or obtaining such a last name themselves. A person with a compound name could no longer keep his or her last name after marriage and add the last name of his or her partner, as currently provided for by Article 1355 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the introduction of an option to let one’s children obtain compound names would at the same time reduce the choice of last names for those who already bore a compound name. Such a situation,
in which one fundamental right restricted another, would consequently require a balancing of interests, which the legislator had done when introducing the former version of Article 1616 § 2 of the German Civil Code (now Article 1617 § 1). The Federal Constitutional Court stated that the legislator had had several options to balance the above interests.
The option which the legislator chose was thereby neither required nor prohibited by the Basic Law.
Lastly, the Federal Constitutional Court found that the former version of Article 1616 § 2 of the German Civil Code did not violate the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex as guaranteed in Article 3 § 2 of the Basic Law. If each spouse kept his or her last name after marriage, married couples could choose one of their last names as the surname for their children. Article 1616 § 2 of the German Civil Code reduced the possible options to give their children a last name, but this concerned spouses of both sexes alike. The fact that married couples with different last names were in practice more likely to choose the husband’s last name for their children was not considered to suggest a different finding. Even though this could possibly indicate a widespread affirmation of traditional marriage patterns, Article 3 § 2 of the Basic Law could not be interpreted as containing a positive obligation on the State to introduce the parents’ right to choose a compound name for their children. In any case, such a regulation had only minor effects on the State’s positive obligation to secure equality of the sexes as contained in the second sentence of Article 3 § 2 of the Basic Law.
That children could still obtain a compound name in cases in which one parent already bore a compound name was not regarded as a violation of the prohibition of discrimination against those children who could not obtain a compound name. In both instances, children were only allowed to obtain either the last name of the mother or the father.
C. Relevant practice of the European Court of Justice
In the case of Standesamt Stadt Niebüll v. Stefan Grunkin,
Dorothee Regina Paul (C-96/04; Official Journal of the European Union of 17 June 2006), the Niebüll District Court made a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty regarding the interpretation of section 10(1) of the Law Introducing the Civil Code (“EGBGB”, see “Relevant domestic law and practice” above) in the light of Article 12 EC Treaty (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality) and Article 18
EC Treaty (freedom of movement). That case concerned a married couple of German origin who had kept their surnames and whose son (who also had German citizenship) was born in Denmark, where he was subsequently registered with a compound name composed of the surnames of his parents in the Danish birth register. The German authorities refused to recognise the compound name because of section 10(1) of the Law Introducing the Civil Code, according to which a person’s name falls to be decided by the law of the State of his or her nationality. Under German law, the son was not entitled to bear a compound name composed of the surnames of his parents. The parents’ appeal against that decision and their subsequent constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court were to no avail.
When the parents, who in the meantime divorced, refused to make a declaration before the Registry Officer regarding the surname of their child, the Niebüll District Court had to refer the right to determination to one parent pursuant to Article 1617 §§ 2 and 3 of the Civil Code. The District Court subsequently referred the matter to the European Court of Justice pursuant to Article 234 EC Treaty with the following question: “In light of the prohibition on discrimination set out in Article 12 EC and having regard to the right to the freedom of movement for every citizen of the Union laid down in Article 18 EC, is the provision on the conflict of laws contained in Article 10 of the EGBGB valid, in so far as it provides that the right to bear a name is governed by nationality alone?”. The European Court of Justice (First Chamber) decided on 27 April 2006 that it had no jurisdiction to answer the question referred by the District Court because the latter, when making a decision pursuant to Article 1617 §§ 2 and 3 of the Civil Code, exercised administrative authority, without at the same time being called on to decide a dispute. Therefore, the District Court could not be regarded as exercising judicial function.
On 30 April 2006 the parents lodged a fresh request to register the compound surname. Following the Registry Officer’s refusal to grant the request, the parents lodged a complaint with the Flensburg District Court which referred the matter with the same question to the European Court of Justice. The case is currently pending before the latter court (C-353/06).
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention about the refusal of the German authorities and courts to register his compound name “Heidecker-Tiemann” because of Article 1617 § 1 of the Civil Code.
He further complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the proceedings regarding his case was excessive.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention about Article 1617 § 1 of the Civil Code and the domestic court decisions confirming the constitutionality of that provision. Article 8 of the Convention provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The Government maintained that the legislator’s stipulation pursuant to Article 1617 § 1 of the Civil Code that parents may not give their children compound surnames composed of their respective surnames did not constitute an interference with Article 8, since that provision does not establish any right for parents to pass on their birth names to their children as a compound name. The same applied to the right of the child to bear such a name. There was no common human rights standard in the Contracting States either specifically in respect of a child’s family name or generally within the field of law governing names. The law in Europe governing children’s names was extremely varied in nature, and was influenced by objectives, social developments and traditions which differed widely.
As different States had extremely diverse systems of regulation, they enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in this respect. The different models range from simply adopting the name of the father as the child’s surname (Turkey) to the possibility of the person with parental responsibility freely designating the name (Denmark and Norway). The Government submitted an expert opinion by the President of the German Section of the International Commission on Civil Status entitled “On the law relating to the naming of children in Europe” in this connection. Under German law, compound names were permitted only in very specific exceptional circumstances. Nothing could be derived from these exceptional circumstances that would apply to the “normal” case of a family with children. Given the situation as a whole, a fair balance was established under the German law governing family names between individuals’ interests and those of the general public.
The Government further submitted that the compound name
“Heidecker-Tiemann”, under which the applicant was registered in the Registry Office in Edinburgh after his birth, was not possible from the outset under German law. However, the designation of the surname was subject to German law from the applicant’s birth because of his German nationality. The applicant’s compound name was hence not “taken away” by the German authorities. Moreover, the applicant did not suffer any disadvantage in his everyday life. Until now, he had been able to use his compound name – although incorrect in terms of the civil status law – within his social sphere, and will be able to continue to do so. He would also later be able to have the compound name entered in his passport and identity card as a pseudonym or professional name, as well as to use it
vis-à-vis the registration authorities.
The applicant submitted that Article 1617 § 1 of the Civil Code and the domestic court decisions confirming the constitutionality of that provision deprived him of the possibility to obtain a compound name, which was not “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. This was particularly the case since the Federal Constitutional Court, in its leading judgment of 30 January 2002, found that the legality of the passing on of a compound name to one’s children was not unconstitutional. The German courts, when considering the proportionality of the interference, failed to take into account that persons with compound names were free to abandon them upon marriage. If they did not get married or have children, there was no danger of “name chains” for future generations. When read in detail, the report submitted by the Government entitled “On the law relating to the naming of children in Europe” revealed that the German approach was a minority model, whereas recent developments in Luxembourg or France showed a move towards greater recognition of compound names. The applicable law had been a political compromise which took into account various diverging convictions.
The margin of appreciation in regulating the law of names which the Court accorded to the Contracting Parties should not be misinterpreted as being unlimited or unfettered. The applicable law had therefore failed to establish a fair balance between the different interests at issue. A compound name served best the purpose of identifying the applicant.
The applicant also argued that he had acquired a compound name in accordance with Scottish law upon his birth in Edinburgh, which he could not officially maintain in Germany due to a law which had been held unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1991. This put him in a different position than children who acquired their definite surnames at birth. Referring to the opinion of the Advocate General dated 30 June 2005 in the “Standesamt Stadt Niebüll” case before the European Court of Justice (see “Relevant practice of the European Court of Justice” above)
the applicant submitted that the rule of a Member State which did not allow a citizen of the European Union whose name had been lawfully registered in another EU State to have that name recognised under its own laws was incompatible with the freedom of movement and residence in the territory of the Member States under Article 18 § 1 EC Treaty.
The Court notes that Article 8 of the Convention does not contain any explicit provisions on names (see G.M.B. and K.M. v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 36797/97). As a means of personal identification and of linking to a family, a person’s name nonetheless concerns his or her private and family life (see Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, no. 29865/96, § 35, ECHR 2004‑X (extracts) and, mutatis mutandis, Niemietz v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 251-B, § 29). The fact that society and the State have an interest in regulating the use of names does not exclude this, since these public-law aspects are compatible with private life conceived of as including, to a certain degree, the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings (see Burghartz v. Switzerland, judgment of 25 November 1994, Series A no. 299-B, p. 61, § 24).
Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private and family life. The boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition. The Court has held that not all regulation of names will necessarily constitute an interference. While it is true that an obligation to change one’s name would be regarded as an interference, the refusal to allow an individual to adopt a new name cannot necessarily be considered an interference (see Stjerna v. Finland, judgment of 25 November 1994, Series A no. 299‑B, pp. 60-61, § 38; Johansson
v. Finland, no. 10163/02, § 29, ECHR 2007‑...). The applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In particular, in both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the competing interests; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation
(see, among other authorities, Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC],
no. 6339/05, § 75, ECHR 2007-...).
In the present case, the Court finds that the principal issue is whether in the special circumstances of the case the German authorities struck a fair balance between the competing public and private interests involved when refusing registration of the compound name. The Court’s task is not to substitute itself for the competent German authorities or legislator in determining the most appropriate policy for the attribution of family names to children in Germany, but rather to review under the Convention the grounds adduced in respect of the decisions taken in the present case
(see, mutatis mutandis, Stjerna, cited above, p. 61, § 39).
The margin of appreciation which the State authorities enjoy in the sphere under consideration is wide (see, inter alia, Stjerna, cited above, ibid. and Johansson, cited above, § 31), having particular regard to the fact that, as demonstrated by the expert opinion by the President of the German Section of the International Commission on Civil Status submitted by the Government, there appears to be little common ground amongst Convention States in this area.
Having regard to the above considerations, the Court will examine whether the respondent State’s refusal to register the chosen name in the instant case raises an issue of failure to respect the applicant’s private and family life. In weighing up the different interests at stake, consideration should be given, on the one hand, to the applicant’s interest to be allowed officially to use both parents’ surnames and, on the other hand, the public interest in regulating the choice of names.
With regard to the public interest, the Court has accepted that legal restrictions on changing one’s name may be justified in the public interest; for example, in order to ensure accurate population registration or to safeguard the means of personal identification (see Stjerna, cited above, p. 61, § 39). It may also be justified in the public interest to restrict the attribution of compound surnames. As the Commission found in the case of Fornaciarini, Gianettoni and Fornaciarini v. Switzerland (no. 22940/93, Commission decision of 12 April 1996), the refusal to register a compound name composed of both parents’ surnames for a child born out of wedlock did not constitute a lack of respect for the applicant’s private life within the meaning of Article 8, having particular regard to the fact that the applicant had not established that he suffered any inconveniences by being prevented from bearing both parents’ names.
Turning to the reasons adduced by the German authorities for refusing registration of compound surnames, the Court notes the leading judgment of 30 January 2002 of the Federal Constitutional Court which held that the applicable law on compound names was constitutional, in particular because the general possibility to obtain compound names would lead to growing “chains of surnames” which would not only be impracticable, but also to the detriment of future generations whose surnames would be at risk of losing their function as a means of identification. The situation in which one fundamental right restricts another would consequently require a balancing of interests, and the option which the legislator chose had neither been required nor prohibited by the German constitution. In the light of the wide margin of appreciation left to the domestic authorities in such matters,
the Court finds that the German legislator’s general decision in this connection had neither been incomprehensible nor unreasonable.
In the Court’s view, the legislator’s general decision to restrict the passing on of compound names to children in order to avoid disadvantages for future generations is not contradicted by the fact that the use of the applicant’s compound name in everyday life did not create any practical problems. As far as the applicant referred to the judgment of the European Court of Justice in the case of Standesamt Stadt Niebüll v. Stefan Grunkin, Dorothee Regina Paul (C-96/04), the Court finds that the matter at issue in that case is not comparable with the present case. The case before the European Court of Justice, which in any event decided that it did not have jurisdiction, and the case still pending before that court, both concerned the compatibility of section 10(1) of the Law Introducing the Civil Code with provisions of the EC Treaty, whereas the present issue concerns a different provision in the German Civil Code.
Having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the Court notes that the applicant had been able to use his compound name within his social sphere and would continue to do so. It further observes that the use of the unregistered compound name in everyday life does not appear to create any serious practical problems or inconveniences to the applicant. In view of these circumstances the Court finds that the refusal by the German authorities to register the compound surname did not constitute a lack of respect for the applicants’ private and family life under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
2. The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the proceedings regarding his case was excessive. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government contested that argument. They submitted that there had been two sets of proceedings. The first ended with the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 19 June 2000. Those proceedings had not been excessively long, though the applicant had caused unnecessary delays by addressing the Registrar of births, deaths and marriages in Neubrandenburg, which had no jurisdiction. The responsibility for addressing the authority with jurisdiction had lain in principle with the applicant, in particular because he had been represented by his father, who is a lawyer. The second set of proceedings had not been excessively long.
In the applicant’s view, the period at issue lasted from the date of his parents’ application to the Neubrandenburg Registry Office on 10 May 1994 until the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 21 February 2002, totalling seven years and nine months.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender
v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
In the present case, the Court finds that there had been two sets of proceedings which, despite the fact that they were both connected to the applicant’s parents’ declaration of May 1994, had different file numbers and were brought against different decisions by the Berlin Registry Office (namely, decisions taken in 1997 and 2000 respectively). The first set of proceedings ended with the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 19 June 2000. Since the application was lodged on 14 August 2002,
the complaint under Article 6 was introduced outside the six-month time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. It is not open to the Court to set aside the application of the six-month rule (Belaousof and Others v. Greece, no. 66296/01, § 38, 27 May 2004).
The second set of proceedings commenced in February 2000 with the introduction of the applicant’s motion against the refusal of the Berlin Registry Office of 11 February 2000 to register the applicant with
a compound name. It ended with the decision by the Federal Constitutional Court of 21 February 2002. The total period of two years which involved three levels of jurisdiction as well as a constitutional complaint cannot be regarded as excessive.
The Court therefore finds that the complaint as regards the length of the proceedings in so far as it is within its jurisdiction is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court by a majority
Declares the application inadmissible.
Claudia WesterdiekPeer Lorenzen
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy