EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST CHAMBER
Application No. 16052/90
Kurt Heydasch
against
Germany
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 6 April 1993)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION
(paras. 1 - 5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
(paras. 6 - 14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
(paras. 15 - 27). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A. Complaint declared admissible
(para. 15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
B. Point at issue
(para. 16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
C. The alleged violation of Article 6 para. 1
of the Convention
(paras. 17 - 26) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CONCLUSION
(para. 27). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
DISSENTING OPINION OF SIR BASIL HALL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. J. LIDDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
APPENDIX: DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION . . . . 8
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The present report concerns Application No. 16052/90 by
Kurt Heydasch against the Federal Republic of Germany, introduced on
19 October 1989 and registered on 25 January 1990.
The applicant, born in 1917, is a German national and resident
in Hamburg. He is a businessman by profession. Before the Commission
he is represented by Mr. V. Westphal, a lawyer practising in Hamburg.
The Federal Republic of Germany are represented by their Agent,
Mr. J. Meyer-Ladewig, Ministerialdirigent, of the Federal Ministry of
Justice.
2. The application was communicated to the Government on
7 January 1991. On 27 May 1991 the application was referred to the
First Chamber. Following an exchange of memorials, the complaint
relating to the length of proceedings (Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention) was declared admissible on 9 December 1991. The decision
on admissibility is appended to this Report.
By letter of 6 July 1992 the Government requested the Commission
to take a decision under Article 30 para. 1 (b) of the Convention,
considering that, by the decision of the Public Prosecutor's Office to
discontinue the proceedings, the matter was resolved. The Commission
finds no ground to proceed under Article 30 para. 1 of the Convention.
3. Having noted that there is no basis upon which a friendly
settlement within the meaning of Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the
Convention can be secured, the Commission (First Chamber), after
deliberating, adopted this Report in accordance with
Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention, the following members being
present:
MM. F. ERMACORA, Acting President of the First Chamber
J.A. FROWEIN
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
G.B. REFFI
4. In this report the Commission states its opinion as to whether
the facts found disclose a violation of the Convention by the German
Government.
5. The text of the Report is now transmitted to the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with
Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
6. On 16 January 1984 the Hamburg Fiscal Investigation Office
(Steuerfahndungsstelle) started investigations against the applicant
on the suspicion of having evaded taxes concerning his capital abroad.
The Office had been informed, apparently by the applicant's brother,
that the applicant had a place of residence relevant for tax purposes
in Hamburg, contrary to his declaration in 1975 that he had moved to
Freeport/Bahamas. If so, he would in principle have had to pay income
tax in respect of his capital gains abroad.
7. On 4 April 1984 the applicant filed a declaration with the
Investigation Office that his place of residence was in Costa Rica.
8. On 21 September 1984 the Investigation Office formally instituted
preliminary investigations against the applicant. It transferred the
proceedings to the Hamburg Public Prosecutor's Office (Staatsanwalt-
schaft) on 27 September 1984.
9. On 26 November 1984 the Hamburg District Court (Amtsgericht)
issued a warrant of arrest. The District Court found that, according
to the investigations of the Fiscal Investigation Office, there was a
strong suspicion that the applicant had evaded tax between 1974 and
1982 in that he had pretended not to have a place of residence and thus
no taxable income in the Federal Republic of Germany.
10. The applicant was arrested on 22 January 1985 and detained on
remand. On 15 February 1985 his detention was suspended on bail,
apparently in view of his bad health. On 7 November 1985 the Hamburg
District Court set the search warrant aside for lack of reasonable
suspicion. The District Court found, that although the applicant
continued to have a place of residence in Germany, there was no
sufficient evidence of taxable income abroad.
11. On 16 January 1988 the applicant filed a hierarchical complaint
(Dienstaufsichtsbeschwerde) with the Hamburg Public Prosecutor's Office
about the continuing proceedings and also complained about the public
prosecutor and the two investigators involved in the proceedings
against him.
12. On 21 June 1988 the applicant requested the Public Prosecutor's
Office to discontinue the investigations against him for lack of
suspicion. On 18 July and 18 August 1988 he filed complaints about the
further conduct of the proceedings. On 23 August 1988 the Public
Prosecutor's Office refused to discontinue the proceedings on the
ground that there was still a reasonable suspicion of a criminal
offence.
13. On 11 May 1989 the Hamburg District Court acquitted the applicant
of defamation in relation to his allegations of corruption in his
complaint of 16 January 1988. The District Court considered that he
had acted in protection of his own interests.
14. On 10 April 1992 the Hamburg Public Prosecutor's Office
discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant under
S. 153 para. 1, first sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Strafprozeßordnung), according to which proceedings may be
discontinued in cases of, if proven, minor guilt. The Office
considered that the length of the proceedings and the statutory time-
limit coming nearer outweighed the public interest in prosecution.
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Complaint declared admissible
15. The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaint
that his case was not heard within a reasonable time.
B. Point at issue
16. The only point at issue is whether the length of the proceedings
complained of exceeded the "reasonable time" referred to in Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
C. The alleged violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
of the Convention
a. The applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
17. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention includes the
following provision:
"In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time
by (a) ... tribunal ..."
18. The Government submit that the requirement of "reasonable time"
in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) does not apply to preliminary
investigations by the Public Prosecutor's Office "within a reasonable
time", but only to proceedings before the trial court, although, in
cases of court proceedings, the relevant period to be considered could
start at an earlier date. Where a person suspected of a criminal
offence was arrested and detained on remand, Article 5 para. 3, second
sentence, (Art. 5-3) of the Convention secured the right to trial
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.
19. The Commission observes that the investigations against the
applicant concerned charges of tax evasion, which are of a criminal
nature within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.
20. The Commission recalls that, in criminal matters, the "reasonable
time" referred to in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) begins to run as soon
as a person is "charged"; this may occur on a date prior to the case
coming to the trial court, such as the date of arrest, the date when
the person concerned was officially notified that he would be
prosecuted or the date when preliminary investigations were opened.
"Charge", for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), may be
defined as "the official notification given to an individual by the
competent authority of an allegation that he has committed an offence",
a definition that also corresponds to the test whether "the situation
of the [suspect] has been substantially affected" (cf. Eur. Court H.R.,
Eckle judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A no. 51, p. 33, para. 73 with
further references). The official notification may in some instances
take the form of other measures which carry the implication of such an
allegation and which likewise substantially affect the situation of the
suspect (Eur. Court H.R., Foti judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A
no. 56, p. 18, para. 52).
21. In the present case, preliminary investigations on the suspicion
of tax evasion were instituted against the applicant in September 1984
and subsequently conducted by the Hamburg Public Prosecutor's Office.
In 1992 the Public Prosecutor's Office discontinued the proceedings
against him. The criminal proceedings against him thus never attained
the trial stage.
22. The Commission cannot share the restrictive view proposed by the
respondent Government. The Commission considers that the aim of
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is to protect the individual against the
prejudice created by criminal proceedings exceeding a reasonable time.
The specific rights under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of a person
arrested or detained in the context of criminal proceedings to a trial
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial are intended to
limit the length of a person's detention, and not to prevent an
unreasonable length of criminal proceedings as such. In order to
afford a practical and effective protection under Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1), the right, in criminal matters, to a hearing within a
reasonable time covers the initial period of investigations to the
extent that the person concerned was charged within the meaning of the
principles set out above, irrespective of whether his case has come
before a trial court or not (cf., Eur. Court H.R., Deweer judgment of
27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, pp. 21 et seq., paras 41-47; Viezzer
judgment of 19 February 1991, Series A no. 196-B, pp. 19 et seq.,
paras. 9, 14-17).
b. The relevant period
23. The period to be taken into consideration started at the latest
on 21 September 1984 when the Hamburg Fiscal Investigation Office
formally opened preliminary investigations against the applicant. It
ended on 10 April 1992 when the Hamburg Public Prosecutor's Office
discontinued the proceedings against him. The proceedings thus lasted
more than seven and a half years.
c. The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
24. The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of
proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular
circumstances of the case and having regard to the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the parties and the conduct of the authorities
dealing with the case. In this instance the circumstances call for an
overall assessment (see Eur. Court H.R., Ficara judgment of
19 February 1991, Series A no. 196-A, p. 9, para. 17).
25. The respondent Government submit that the investigations against
the applicant were particularly difficult on the ground that they
involved rogatory proceedings in order to establish the applicant's
capital gains abroad.
26. The Commission considers that the investigations were complex to
some extent due to the nature of charges against the applicant. There
is no indication that the applicant contributed to the delay of the
proceedings. Even taking into account the difficulties caused by the
fact that the applicant had apparently foreign sources of income and
used different places of residence, the Commission finds that the
proceedings against him, which lasted more than seven and a half year
at the stage of investigations, exceeded the "reasonable time" referred
to in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
CONCLUSION
27. The Commission concludes, by 9 votes to 2, that there has been
a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
Secretary Acting President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (F. ERMACORA)
DISSENTING OPINION OF SIR BASIL HALL
This case differs from comparable cases considered by the Court
and the Commission in that the investigation of a suspected offence has
been terminated without any charge against the applicant having been
formulated. Furthermore a ground for the termination was the length
of time the investigation had so far taken.
In these circumstances I do not consider that there has been a
violation of the right conferred by Article 6 that in the determination
of a criminal charge against him everyone is entitled to a hearing
within a reasonable time.
DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. J. LIDDY
In this case the Hamburg Public Prosecutor's Office decided on
10 April 1992 against prosecuting the applicant. It is true that the
applicant was under suspicion for several years, but no trial against
him actually took place. I am unaware of any case where the
requirement of trial within a reasonable time has been found to have
been violated in circumstances where no trial was held. I agree with
the Government's submission that the requirement of trial within a
reasonable time in Article 6 does not apply to preliminary
investigations by the Public Prosecutor's Office but only to
proceedings before the trial court, although, in cases of court
proceedings, the relevant period to be considered could start at an
earlier date.
Accordingly I have voted against a finding of violation in this
case.
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy