Legal summary
September 2025
Hora v. the United Kingdom - 1048/20
Judgment 23.9.2025 [Section II]
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
Vote
Ineligibility of prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment to vote in 2019 general (parliamentary) election: no violation
Facts – In 2005 the Court found in Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No. 2) [GC] that the disenfranchisement of all convicted prisoners under section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”) was incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. In light of section 3 the Court has subsequently found a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of a number of applicants disenfranchised in United Kingdom elections which took place up to and including 8 June 2017.
In 2010 in Greens and M.T. v. the United Kingdom the Court indicated specific measures under Article 46 of the Convention, stipulating a timetable for the introduction of legislative proposals to address the impugned provision. No amending legislation has been enacted, however, and in a 2017 Action Plan, the respondent Government proposed administrative measures aimed at ensuring the execution of Hirst. This was followed by an Action Report explaining how the measures had been implemented. On the basis of the implementation of those measures, in 2018, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe closed its examination of the Hirst group of cases, concluding its supervision of the execution of the judgments handed down against the United Kingdom before that.
In 2007 the applicant was convicted of rape and sexual assault and, having been previously convicted of rape, was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for the public protection. The minimum term of his sentence expired in 2011, however, pursuant to domestic law, he remains in detention as the Parole Board has not yet recommended his release due to public protection concerns.
On 12 December 2019 a general (parliamentary) election took place. Under section 3 of the 1983 Act the applicant was prevented from voting in that election. The applicant did not bring any domestic proceedings concerning his ineligibility to vote. He complains his ineligibility was in violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
Law – Article 3 of Protocol No. 1:
The restriction on the applicant’s right to vote under section 3 of the 1983 Act amounted to an interference under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The Court reaffirmed that the disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners pursued the legitimate aims of “preventing crime by sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners” and “enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law”.
(1) Proportionality –
(a) The scope of the Court’s review –
(i) Introduction – The present case was the first to come before the Court concerning an election which had taken place following the completion by the Committee of Ministers of its supervision of the execution of the judgments in the Hirst group of cases. It could not be said that the Committee of Ministers powers were being encroached on where the Court has to deal with relevant new information – the applicant’s ineligibility to vote in the 2019 election after the application of the new administrative measures – in the context of a fresh application. However, the Court’s approach to the examination of the complaint had to take account of relevant developments since its Hirst judgment had been adopted. It was therefore necessary to consider the scope of its review, taking into account its Article 46 indication in Greens and M.T., subsequent relevant developments, and the 2018 Resolution of the Committee of Ministers.
(ii) The Article 46 indication in Greens and M.T. – In Greens and M.T. the Court’s Article 46 indication stipulating a timetable for the introduction of legislative proposals, was with a view to “the enactment of an electoral law to achieve compliance with the Court’s judgment in Hirst according to any time-scale determined by the Committee of Ministers”. Despite no amending legislation being ultimately enacted the Court could not accept that such an enactment had been a necessary condition for execution of the Hirst judgment and that no weight could therefore be accorded to the Committee of Ministers Resolution in respect of the Hirst group of cases. The use of the pilot judgment procedure by the Court was pursued with due respect for the Convention organs’ respective functions. An approach which limited the supervision process to the Court’s explicit indications would remove the flexibility needed by the Committee of Ministers to supervise, on the basis of the information provided by the respondent State and with due regard to the evolving situation, the adoption of measures that were feasible, timely, adequate and sufficient.
At the time the Court had made its Article 46 indication legislative proposals had been under active consideration by the respondent Government. The indication had not stipulated that legislative amendment had been required but rather proceeded on the basis that the Government and the Committee of Ministers had already identified such amendment as the relevant specific measure necessary for the execution of the Court’s judgment in Hirst. In setting out a timetable for the introduction of these proposals, the indication had been complementary to the supervision exercise being undertaken by the Committee of Ministers to encourage the speedy execution of the Hirst judgment with a view to ensuring the effectiveness of the Convention machinery as a whole. That complementarity was further clear from the Court’s reference to the anticipated role of the Committee of Ministers in determining any time-scale for the enactment of the measures.
(iii) Relevant developments since Hirst – In light of the developments in the Court’s case-law after Hirst, there was clear guidance on whether the disenfranchisement of a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence following conviction of a serious offence would be compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. In addition, there had been a number of consultations culminating in the preparation of a draft bill and its examination by a Joint Committee of Parliament. That Joint Committee had recommended the enfranchisement of those sentenced to a term of twelve months or less – resulting in an amendment in Scotland where those sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding twelve months are now entitled to vote in local and Scottish parliamentary elections. To the extent that there remained some divergence of views within or among the democratic institutions in the United Kingdom as to which prisoners ought to be permitted to vote, it was now quite clear that there was no general support for the enfranchisement of prisoners convicted of serious offences and serving lengthy or indeterminate sentences of imprisonment. It could therefore be said with some confidence that if Parliament chose to amend the current law as it applies to general elections in the United Kingdom, restrictions on the right to vote would still apply to prisoners, such as the applicant, convicted of serious offences and serving indeterminate sentences. Finally, the Supreme Court had examined the disenfranchisement of a prisoner serving a life sentence, in the light of the further guidance given Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) [GC]. It had declined to make a declaration that section 3 of the 1983 Act was incompatible with the Convention because it was clear, following Scoppola, that the ineligibility to vote of the particular claimant in the case before it had been compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The view that legislation might be found to be compatible with the Convention rights in the circumstances of one applicant, while incompatible with Convention rights in the circumstances of another was also supported by the Court’s case-law.
(iv) The Committee of Ministers 2018 Resolution – The 2018 decision of the Committee of Ministers to close its examination of the Hirst group of cases, while not precluding the Court from examining the present case concerning the subsequent 2019 election, did have a bearing on its approach to the applicant’s complaint. Having widely debated the issue at domestic level and engaged in enhanced dialogue with the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, the respondent State had chosen to maintain its existing legislative approach and to make administrative changes to the disenfranchisement regime in place. Those changes had been accepted by the Committee of Ministers as sufficient, in light of the applicable wide margin of appreciation, to address the concerns regarding the general legislative framework expressed in Hirst. This was not, therefore, a case where the closure of the supervision process had been based on the introduction of significantly revised legislation intended to address the problems identified and whose ultimate compatibility with the Convention had fallen to be examined carefully by the Court.
The Court’s judgments were intended to promote the practical and effective application of Convention rights. The process of dialogue in respect of the applicable legal framework, rendered possible by the interaction of the processes before the Court and the Committee of Ministers with the engagement of the respondent Government, plays a crucial role in securing the practical and effective protection of Convention rights in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Once that dialogue has reached its conclusion, it remained for the Court to determine whether the application of the legislative framework in the case of a particular applicant had resulted in a Convention violation. The focus of the Court’s examination at that stage remained on securing the practical and effective observance of the Convention.
(v) Conclusion – In view of the foregoing considerations, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation applicable in this area, it was not justified to examine the Convention compatibility of section 3 of the 1983 Act in the abstract or to identify particular categories of prisoners whose disenfranchisement might be incompatible with the right to vote. Instead, the Court had examined the manner in which section 3 had been applied to the applicant, in his particular circumstances, in order to determine whether the restriction on his right to vote had been compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Although it had not been argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies by not seeking a declaration of incompatibility, the Court noted that had the domestic courts been given the opportunity to perform a proportionality review it would have had the benefit of their views in determining the compatibility of the applicant’s ineligibility to vote.
(b) Proportionality of the present applicant’s inability to vote at the 2019 general election – The applicant had been convicted of rape and sexual assault and also had a previous conviction for rape. There could be no doubt as to the gravity of those offences which resulted in the imposition of an indeterminate sentence of which he had yet to be released due to ongoing public protection concerns. The Court had previously accepted as compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 the removal of the right to vote from prisoners convicted of serious offences warranting a particularly harsh sentence of imprisonment. Taking into account its case-law, it could not be said that the disenfranchisement of the applicant, on account of the seriousness of his offending, his conduct, the risk he had been found to pose to the public and the resulting imposition of a harsh sentence of indeterminate detention, had been disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued by restrictions of the franchise applied to convicted prisoners. That conclusion was not affected by the expiry of the minimum term imposed by the sentencing court. The applicant’s continued disenfranchisement, pursuant to his continued detention under an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, remained proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued by that measure, and in particular to the aim of enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law. It was noteworthy that once the applicant had been deemed safe for release by the Parole Board and had, consequently, been released, his right to vote would be restored to him.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
(See Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], 74025/01, 6 October 2005, Legal Summary; Greens and M.T. v. the United Kingdom, 60041/08 and 60054/08, 23 November 2011, Legal Summary; Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) [GC], 126/05, 22 May 2012, Legal Summary; Kalda v. Estonia (no. 2), 14581/20, 6 December 2022, Legal Summary; Resolution CM/ResDH(2018)467 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Five cases against the United Kingdom, adopted on 6 December 2018)
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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