Communicated on 15 May 2014
SECOND SECTION
Application no. 375/13
Éva Julianna HORVÁTH and Irma KULCSÁR
against Hungary
lodged on 11 December 2012
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicants, Ms Éva Julianna Horváth and Ms Irma Kulcsár, are Hungarian nationals, who were born in 1950 and live in Budapest. They are represented before the Court by Mr A. K. Kádár, a lawyer practising in Budapest.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
Following legislation (enshrined in the Fundamental Law and Act no. CLXIV of 2011) aimed at lowering the compulsory retirement age of prosecutors from 70 years to the general retirement age (in the applicants’ case, 62 years), criticised by the Court of Justice of the European Union ("ECJ"), on 11 March 2013 Parliament adopted an amendment to the impugned new rules (Act no. XX of 2013). According to the modified scheme, the reduction of the compulsory retirement age to a unified limit of 65 years will be effective as of 1 January 2023. Transitional provisions apply to the period between 2 April 2013 (the entry into force of the amendment) and 31 December 2022. During this interval, the age-limit for compulsory retirement varies between 70 and 65 years according to the date of birth of the person concerned (the older a prosecutor is, the longer the preparation time accorded to him before compulsory retirement). The applicants would reach the modified age-limit in April and June 2019, respectively.
However, they had been already dismissed from service, with effect from 31 December 2012.
For those prosecutors – such as the applicants – who had already been affected by the rules of compulsory retirement and dismissed, the new law introduced the possibility to choose, within a 30-days’ time-limit to be counted from the amendment’s entry into force, from three options.
Firstly, they could request a stand-by post at the prosecution office from which they had retired, meaning that they would receive the difference between their pension allowance and 80 per cent of their last base salary and, once in every three-year period, they might be ordered to perform prosecution tasks for a maximum of two years.
Secondly, they could claim to be reinstated to their normal prosecution service. In that case, they would also be entitled to their salary arrears for the period of their unlawfully ordered retirement. However, they could have been reinstated not only in their former positions but in any other position and service place.
Thirdly, those who did not request reinstatement or placement in a stand-by post became entitled to lump sum compensation, equalling the amount of one year’s salary. Moreover, they could bring an action for compensation for their residual damages.
Since the reinstatement to their former position and service place seemed unlikely to them, the applicants chose the lump sum compensation.
COMPLAINTS
Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicants claimed that their legitimate expectation to enjoy their status and remuneration as prosecutors until the age of 70 had been violated.
The applicants also complained that they had been subjected to discrimination, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, in that the regulation provides for a unified amount of lump sum compensation, without taking into account the actual expectation lost by the person concerned.
QUESTION TO THE PARTIES
Has there been an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 21722/11, §§ 165, 166, 186, ECHR 2013)? If so, was that interference in accordance with the law and necessary in pursuit of a legitimate aim?
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