Application No. 12794/87
Jutta HUBER
against
SWITZERLAND
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 10 April 1989)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION
(paras. 1-12) .................................... 1
A. The application
(paras. 2-4) ............................. 1
B. The proceedings
(paras. 5-7) ............................. 1
C. The present Report
(paras. 8-12) ............................ 2
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
(paras. 13-33) ................................... 3
A. The particular circumstances of the case
(paras. 13-24) ........................... 3
B. Relevant domestic law
(paras. 25-33) ........................... 6
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
(paras. 34-49) ................................... 8
Conclusion
(para. 49) ............................... 10
CONCURRING OPINION OF Mr. H. VANDENBERGHE ................. 11
DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. F. MARTINEZ ..................... 12
DISSENTING OPINION OF Mrs. J. LIDDY ....................... 14
APPENDIX I: HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS ............... 15
APPENDIX II: DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY ............ 16
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The following is an outline of the case, as submitted to the
European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the
Commission.
A. The application&_
2. The applicant, born in 1958, is a Swiss citizen residing
in Zurich. Before the Commission, she is represented by
Messrs. E. Schönenberger and K. Mäder, lawyers practising in Zurich.
The application is directed against Switzerland whose
Government are represented by their Agent, Mr. O. Jacot-Guillarmod,
Head of the Division of International Affairs of the Federal Office of
Justice.
3. The application relates to a warrant of arrest, issued against
the applicant by the Zurich District Attorney (Bezirksanwalt) D.J., on
suspicion of having taken part in a prostitute ring and having given
false testimony. A bill of indictment was subsequently issued against
the applicant by D.J. on the ground, inter alia, of false testimony in
court proceedings. The applicant was subsequently acquitted by the
Zurich District Court (Bezirksgericht), though the Zurich Court of
Appeal eventually convicted her of attempted false testimony and
sentenced her to a fine of 4,000 SFr.
4. The applicant complains that, contrary to Article 5 para. 3 of
the Convention, the same District Attorney decided on her detention
and later indicted her. Thus, the District Attorney could not be
regarded as having been independent, as required by that provision.
B. The proceedings&_
5. The application was introduced on 27 February 1987 and
registered on 13 March 1987.
On 7 October 1987 the Commission decided in accordance with
Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure to give notice of the
application to the respondent Government and to invite them to present
their observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the
application. The Government submitted their observations on
18 December 1987, the applicant her reply on 13 April 1988.
6. On 9 July 1988 the Commission declared the application
admissible.
Further observations were submitted by the Government on
6 October 1988.
7. After declaring the application admissible, the Commission,
acting in accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, also
placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a
friendly settlement of the case. Consultations with the parties took
place between 11 July and 5 October 1988. In the light of the
parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis
upon which a settlement can be effected.
C. The present Report&S
8. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in
pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberation and
votes, the following members being present:
MM. J. A. FROWEIN, Acting President
S. TRECHSEL
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. WEITZEL
H. G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
9. The text of this Report was adopted on 10 April 1989 and
is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.
10. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of
the Convention, is:
i) to establish the facts, and
ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found
disclose a breach by the State concerned of its
obligations under the Convention.
11. A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before
the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's
decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.
12. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the
documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the
Commission.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. The particular circumstances of the case&_
13. In connection with criminal investigations against one Mr. K.
in Hamburg and one Mr. B. in Zurich concerning procuring (Zuhälterei)
and pandering (Kuppelei), the Zurich District Attorney's Office
(Bezirksanwaltschaft) issued an order against the applicant to
appear on 8 August 1983 as witness (Vorführungsbefehl). The order was
signed by the District Attorney D.J.
14. On 11 August 1983 the applicant was brought by the Zurich Town
Police before the District Attorney's Office where she was interrogated
by District Attorney D.J. Thereby she admitted having lived of the
proceeds of prostitution. However, she stated that she had known
Messrs. K. and B. only by name and that she did not hand over to
anybody part of her income as a prostitute. As a result, the District
Attorney D.J. remanded the applicant in custody on the same day.
15. According to the warrant of arrest (Verhaftsverfügung) signed
on 11 August 1983 by the District Attorney D.J., there was the urgent
suspicion that members of the group "Hell's Angels" of Zurich and
Hamburg had brought German prostitutes to Zurich. There, in return
for payment, some had married Swiss men. These women had been urged,
partly under threat, to commit professional prostitution whereby the
"Hell's Angels" had protected the women who in turn had given them
part of the proceeds. The applicant was urgently suspected of having
been one of these women.
The warrant of arrest stated that as a witness and under
threat of punishment on account of false testimony she had denied any
connection with the "Hell's Angels". The warrant referred in
particular to a danger of collusion and the danger that evidence would
be destroyed. It also stated that an appeal against the order of
arrest could be filed within 48 hours with the Public Prosecutor's
Office (Staatsanwaltschaft) of the Canton of Zurich.
16. The applicant was released from detention on remand on
19 August 1983.
17. On 12 October 1984 the Zurich District Attorney's Office
indicted the applicant before the Judge in Criminal Cases at the
Zurich District Court (Einzelrichter in Strafsachen am Bezirksgericht)
on the grounds of false testimony in court proceedings and
alternatively (eventualiter) of the hindrance of criminal proceedings
and requested a punishment of 5,000 SFr. The bill of indictment was
signed by the District Attorney D.J. who had also signed the warrant
of arrest.
18. The trial took place on 10 January 1985. According to the
minutes of the trial, the applicant's representative stated as
follows:
"In this case the first thing to note is a violation
of the human right embodied in Article 5 para. 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights which states that anyone
who is arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of Article 5 para. 1 (c) of the Convention has to
be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power. This never
happened in the present case. Rather, the person who
remanded the accused in custody, District Attorney J., is
today at the same time the author of the bill of
indictment."
"Vorliegend wurde zunächst das in Art. 5 Ziff. 3 der
Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und
Grundfreiheiten (EMRK) statuierte Menschenrecht verletzt,
wonach jede nach der Vorschrift von Art. 5 Ziff. 1 c) EMRK
festgenommene oder in Haft gehaltene Person
unverzüglich einem Richter oder einem anderen, gesetzlich zur
Ausübung richterlicher Funktionen ermächtigten Beamten
vorgeführt werden muss. Eine solche Vorführung hat
vorliegend nie stattgefunden; vielmehr ist derjenige, der
die Angeklagte in Haft genommen hat, heute gleichzeitig
Ankläger, nämlich der Bezirksanwalt J."
19. On 10 January 1985 the Zurich District Court acquitted the
applicant on the grounds that she had never been invited (vorgeladen)
to an interrogation for which reason her testimony was invalid and
could not be considered. The judgment does not refer to the issues
raised at the trial by the applicant's lawyer under Article 5 para. 3
of the Convention.
20. Upon appeal (Berufung) by the Public Prosecutor's Office the
Zurich Court of Appeal (Obergericht) on 13 September 1985 convicted
the applicant of attempted false testimony and sentenced her to a fine
of 4,000 SFr. The Court found that her testimony was not invalid and
could be used. It further referred to the monitoring of telephone
conversations between the applicant and Mr. K. which had been lawfully
undertaken by the authorities in Germany and the minutes of which had
been transmitted by way of legal cooperation to Switzerland. The
Court concluded on the basis of these minutes that the applicant had
in fact known Messrs. K. and B.
21. The judgment of the Court of Appeal also refers to the issue
under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention:
"Finally it must be noted that the applicant's
lawyer unjustifiably put forward the objection that in the
context of her arrest and in contravention of Article 5
para. 3 of the Convention the accused had not been brought
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to
exercise judicial power. For, according to the case-law of
the Federal Court, the Zurich District Attorney exercises in
the procedural stage of investigation also judicial power
within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention
(ATF [Arrêts du Tribunal Fédéral] 102 Ia 179)."
"Schliesslich ist festzuhalten, dass der Einwand der
Verteidigung, die Angeklagte sei im Zusammenhang mit ihrer
Verhaftung in Verletzung von Art. 5 Ziff. 3 EMRK keinem
Richter oder einem anderen gesetzlich zur Ausübung
richterlicher Funktionen ermächtigten Beamten vorgeführt
worden, zu Unrecht erfolgte. Nach der Rechtsprechung des
Bundesgerichtes übt nämlich der zürcherische Bezirksanwalt
im Verfahrensstadium der Untersuchung auch richterliche
Funktionen im Sinne von Art. 5 Ziff. 3 EMRK aus (BGE 102 Ia
179)."
22. The applicant filed a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeits-
beschwerde) which was dismissed by the Zurich Court of Cassation
(Kassationsgericht) on 1 July 1986. The Court found that the issue
under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention was irrelevant for the
present case. If the applicant therefore challenged the District
Attorney she should have done so already during the investigation.
23. The applicant then lodged a public law appeal with the Federal
Court (Bundesgericht) in which she complained, inter alia, that,
contrary to Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention, the Zurich District
Attorney had not only remanded the applicant in custody but also
indicted her.
24. The Federal Court dismissed the applicant's public law appeal
on 24 November 1986. The decision was served on the applicant on
18 December 1986. In respect of the applicant's complaint under
Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention the Federal Court held:
"As the applicant has long since been released from
detention on remand, she no longer has an actual practical
interest in a response to this complaint for which reason
the Court can no longer deal with it. The objection would in
any event be unfounded since both the Federal Court (ATF 102
Ia 179 et seq.) and the European Court of Human Rights
(judgment of 4 December 1979 in the Schiesser case) have
declared that the Zurich District Attorney qualifies in the
procedural phase of the investigation as an 'officer authorised
by law to exercise judicial power' within the meaning of
Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention."
"Nachdem die Beschwerdeführerin längst aus der
Untersuchungshaft entlassen worden ist, hat sie jedoch kein
aktuelles praktisches Interesse mehr an der Behandlung
dieser Rüge, weshalb darauf nicht einzutreten ist. Der
Vorwurf wäre übrigens unbegründet, da sowohl das
Bundesgericht (BGE 102 Ia 179ff.) als auch der Europäische
Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (Urteil vom 4. Dezember 1979
in Sachen Schiesser) erklärt haben, der zürcherische
Bezirksanwalt sei im Verfahrensstadium der Untersuchung ein
'gesetzlich zur Ausübung richterlicher Funktionen
ermächtigter Beamter' im Sinne von Art. 5 Ziff. 3 EMRK."
B. Relevant domestic law and practice&S
25. According to S. 32 of the Judiciary Act (Gerichtsverfassungs-
gesetz, GVG) of the Canton of Zurich of 1976 the District Court
examines as a criminal court all matters not falling within the
jurisdiction of another court. S. 44 and 57 GVG state the various
offences which the Court of Appeal and the Jury Court, respectively,
are competent to deal with; they do not include the charges brought
against the applicant.
26. S. 72 GVG provides that the District Attorney's Office acts as
the indicting authority (Anklagebehörde) at the level of the District
Court, and the Public Prosecutor's Office before the Court of Appeal
and the Jury Court (Geschworenengericht). S. 73 GVG states that the
investigation of offences is conducted by the District Attorney's
Office and the Public Prosecutor's Office. In practice, most
investigations are carried out by the District Attorney. As a rule,
District Attorneys are elected for office by the people for four years
(S. 86 para. 2 GVG).
27. S. 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung,
StPO) of the Canton of Zurich of 1919 authorises the District Attorney to
issue a warrant of arrest. Against the latter an appeal may be filed.
S. 64 StPO obliges the District Attorney to hear an arrested suspect
within twenty-four hours. According to S. 65 StPO, the suspect must
thereby be clearly informed of the reasons prompting the suspicion held
against him and must be given the opportunity to invalidate these
reasons. S. 31 StPO generally obliges the investigating officer to
consider exculpating and inculpating circumstances with equal care.
28. Detention on remand ordered by the District Attorney may not
exceed 14 days, except if continuation is ordered by the President of
the District Court or of the Prosecuting Chamber (Anklagekammer) of
the Court of Appeal, depending on the jurisdiction of the respective
Court (S. 51 StPO).
29. Once the investigation has been closed and the District
Attorney's Office does not intend to prosecute the accused, the
investigation is discontinued (S. 39 StPO). Otherwise, the indicting
authority, i.e. the District Attorney's Office or the Public
Prosecutor's Office, commences the main proceedings (Hauptverfahren)
by submitting the bill of indictment (S. 161 StPO). The President of
the District Court or of the Prosecuting Chamber of the Court of
Appeal will then decide whether or not to admit the bill of indictment
(S. 165 StPO).
30. S. 178 StPO states:
"The indicting authority is a party to the main
proceedings. It has as such all the rights and duties of a
party.
In his statement the indicting officer should not
one-sidedly confine himself to stressing items that tell
against the accused, but should also take into account items
in his favour."
"Die Anklagebehörde ist im Hauptverfahren Prozesspartei.
Sie hat alle einer solchen zustehenden Rechte und Pflichten.
Der Ankläger soll bei seinen Vorträgen nicht einseitig
nur dasjenige hervorheben, was den Angeschuldigten beschweren
kann, sondern auch das berücksichtigen, was zu seinen Gunsten
spricht."
31. The District Attorney remains under the control of the Public
Prosecutor's Office (S. 86 GVG), and the latter is authorised to issue
directives to him (S. 27 StPO). In practice District Attorneys
receive no special orders or instructions from the Public Prosecutor's
Office concerning their powers of placing individuals in detention.
32. Apart from the power to order arrest and detention and to
interrogate the arrested suspect, the District Attorney has the power
to issue a summons order (Strafbefehl) if the accused has confessed
and admitted his guilt, and if a fine (Busse) or prison sentence of a
maximum of one month is considered to be adequate (S. 317 StPO).
33. After conviction, S. 419 StPO allows an appeal to the Court
of Appeal in which complaints may be raised alleging defects
(Mängel) both of the investigation and of the procedure (Verfahren) and
the decision of the first instance court.
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
34. The issue to be determined in the present case is whether there has
been a violation of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, in that the
applicant, upon her arrest and detention, was not brought before an "officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power".
Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) states:
"3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article shall be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised
by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for
trial."
35. The Commission recalls that the "officer" referred to in
Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, while not identical with a
"judge", must nevertheless have some of the latter's attributes.
First, he must be independent of the executive and of the parties.
Secondly, he must be under an obligation to hear the individual
brought before him. Thirdly, he must review the circumstances
militating for or against detention (see Eur. Court H.R., Schiesser
judgment of 4 December 1979, Series A No. 34, p. 13 et seq. para. 31).
36. In the present case the second and third criteria have not
been called in question. However, there is disagreement between the
parties as to whether the District Attorney met the requirement of
independence. In this respect, his independence of the executive is
not disputed. In fact, as the Court found in the Schiesser case, the
Zurich District Attorney acts without instructions, supervision or
advice, from the Department of Justice or the Public Prosecutor's
Office of the Canton of Zurich (ibid. p. 15 para. 35).
37. Rather, in the present case the issue arises whether the
District Attorney can be considered as having been independent of
the parties.
38. The applicant submits that the District Attorney was not
independent within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3), since he later
also indicted her.
39. The Government submit that for purposes of Article 5 para. 3
(Art. 5-3) the decisive moment must be the time of arrest. At that stage, the
District Attorney's status and powers are not affected by the fact
that he may later draw up the bill of indictment. The Government fail
to see what advantage there would be for the accused if the indictment
was drawn up by an officer other than the District Attorney ordering
the arrest of the accused. Indeed, the applicant did not claim during
the domestic proceedings to have suffered any specific injury as a
result of the complaints she is now raising before the Commission.
40. The Commission and the Court were confronted with a similar
issue in the Schiesser case. There the Court found:
"the District Attorney intervened exclusively in his
capacity as an investigating authority, that is in
considering whether Mr. Schiesser should be charged and
detained on remand and, subsequently, in conducting
enquiries with an obligation to be equally thorough in
gathering evidence in his favour and evidence against him
(Article 31 StPO). He did not assume the mantle of
prosecutor: he neither drew up the indictment nor
represented the prosecuting authorities before the trial
court... He therefore did not exercise concurrent
investigating and prosecuting functions" (ibid. p. 15
para. 34).
41. Subsequently, in the Skoogström case the Commission found that
the officer who decided on the applicant's continuing detention on
remand was not independent of the parties since she could have been
called upon to perform tasks of a prosecutor. The Report continues:
"The fact that Mrs. M did not herself perform the subsequent
prosecution in court could not retroactively make her
independent of the parties at the time when she took the
detention decision. It was a mere coincidence that all the
tasks were not performed by the same prosecutor". (Comm.
Report 15.7.83, Eur. Court H.R., Series A No. 83, p. 16
para. 78).
42. In two cases concerning military arrest and detention in the
Netherlands, the Court found that the auditeur-militair concerned was
liable to act in one and the same case also as the prosecuting
authority after the case had been referred to trial. He could
therefore not be regarded as being independent of the parties at the
preliminary stage (see Eur. Court H.R., de Jong, Baljet and van den
Brink judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A No. 77, p. 24 para. 49; van
der Sluijs, Zuiderveld and Klappe judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A
No. 78, p. 19 para. 44).
43. Recently in the Pauwels case the Court concluded that the
impartiality of the Belgian auditeur militaire was called in question
as he combined, with regard to the same applicant, the functions of
both investigation and prosecution (see judgment of 26 May 1988,
Series A No. 135, p. 19 para. 38).
44. With regard to the present case the Commission observes that
according to S. 31 StPO the District Attorney, when undertaking the
investigations and in particular remanding a person in custody, must
consider with equal care exculpating and incriminating circumstances.
Subsequently, according to S. 178 para. 1 StPO, the District Attorney
as the indicting authority becomes a party to the trial proceedings.
45. The Commission further considers that, as under Article 6 para. 1 (Art.
6-1) of the Convention, also under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) the "officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power" must inspire in the public
confidence in his independence, and that in such areas even appearances may be
important (see Eur. Court H.R., Piersack judgment of 1 October 1982, Series A
No. 53, p. 14 et seq. para. 30).
46. In the Commission's opinion, if an accused is heard by a District
Attorney, who may order detention, and later in the trial risks again to be
confronted with the same person, now as the opponent who is prosecuting the
accused, the public are entitled to fear that, when remanding the accused into
custody, the District Attorney does not offer sufficient guarantees of
independence, as required by Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.
47. In the present case, the District Attorney concerned was likely to, and
indeed did, become one of the parties to the proceedings. It follows that he
lacked the required independence when hearing the applicant upon her arrest.
48. Consequently, the Commission finds that the District Attorney cannot be
considered an "officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" within the
meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.
Conclusion
49. The Commission concludes, by 12 votes to 2, that there has been a
violation of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention in that the
applicant, upon her arrest and detention, was not brought before an "officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power" within the meaning of this
provision.
Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (J.A. FROWEIN)
&-OPINION CONCURRENTE DE M. H. VANDENBERGHE&S
Pour arriver à la conclusion de la violation de l'article 5
par. 3 de la Convention, la Commission, se référant à la jurisprudence
développée par la Cour dans l'arrêt Schiesser et suivie
ultérieurement, constate aux par. 44 et svts que le procureur de
district zurichois qui a ordonné l'arrestation de la requérante a,
par la suite, également dressé l'acte d'accusation. Elle en déduit
que le procureur manquait d'indépendance envers la requérante au
moment de l'arrestation et ne répondait donc pas aux critères exigés à
l'article 5 par. 3.
Je suis au regret de constater que je ne puis suivre cette
argumentation a posteriori. Il me semble que c'est au moment de
l'arrestation qu'on doit pouvoir contrôler si la décision a été prise
par un magistrat qui satisfait aux conditions posées par l'article 5
par. 3. Une circonstance de fait dépendant du déroulement postérieur
de la procédure pénale, circonstance qui n'est donc pas accessible au
moment de la décision de l'arrestation, ne me semble pas rentrer en
ligne de compte pour ce contrôle.
A l'instar de la Commission, je suis d'avis qu'il y a
violation de l'article 5 par. 3. En ce qui concerne la motivation, je
me réfère à l'opinion dissidente exprimée par le Président Ryssdal
dans l'arrêt Schiesser où il déclare : "Un principe fondamental
commande de séparer poursuite et pouvoir judiciaire. Selon moi, il
vaut également pour l'interprétation de l'article 5 par. 3 et au sens
de ce texte un magistrat qui agit comme autorité de poursuite ne peut
passer pour un 'magistrat habilité par la loi à exercer des fonctions
judiciaires' "(Cour eur. D.H., arrêt Schiesser du 24 octobre 1989,
Série A no 34, p. 19 et svt).
Je voudrais ajouter que dans la mesure où le parquet est uni
et indivisible, la réponse à la question de savoir si c'est la
même personne qui a ordonné l'arrestation et a, par la suite, prononcé
l'acte d'accusation, ne me semble pas pertinente sur le point organique.
&-OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. F. MARTINEZ&S
1. A mon très grand regret je ne peux pas suivre la majorité de
la Commission dans son raisonnement.
La Commission trouve que le cas d'espèce se distingue de
l'affaire Schiesser dans le fait que le procureur de district qui a
ordonné l'arrestation a, par la suite, également dressé l'acte
d'accusation. Et elle en déduit que la détention provisoire qu'il a
ordonnée n'aurait pas été conforme à l'article 5 par. 3 de la
Convention.
Je ne saurais être d'accord avec une telle analyse.
2. Mon point de départ est l'arrêt Schiesser, dans lequel la Cour
européenne examine le statut du procureur de district zurichois pour
conclure qu'il répond bien à la notion de "magistrat habilité par la
loi" prévue par l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention.
Certes, la Cour dit, en examinant le rôle du procureur dans
l'affaire Schiesser, qu'il n'avait ni rédigé l'acte d'accusation ni
exercé la poursuite devant les juges du fond. Mais je ne pense pas
que, dans les circonstances de notre cas d'espèce, le simple fait que
le procureur ait dressé l'acte d'accusation puisse avoir le poids
nécessaire pour faire adopter une position autre que celle prise par
la Cour dans son arrêt.
D'une part, je crois que la doctrine de l'arrêt Schiesser
demeure solide sans le soutien du membre de phrase "he neither drew up
the indictment" (par. 34 de l'arrêt), que la Commission a estimé être
la clef de voûte. A mon avis cette seule circonstance ne suffit pas à
contrecarrer l'ensemble de tous les autres éléments pris en
considération par la Cour.
D'autre part, il me semble important de souligner certaines
circonstances concrètes qui - je le pense - enlèvent beaucoup de poids
au fait que le même procureur a dressé l'acte d'accusation. Ce sont
les suivantes :
a) Le procureur accorde la mise en détention provisoire le
11 août 1983, la révoque le 19 août 1983 et ne dresse l'acte
d'accusation que le 12 octobre 1984, soit quatorze mois plus
tard.
b) Il n'a jamais été requis contre la requérante une peine
privative de liberté, mais seulement une amende.
c) Le procureur en question n'a pas exercé l'accusation pendant
la procédure au fond.
d) On ne peut imaginer aucun avantage que la requérante aurait pu
tirer du fait que l'acte d'accusation aurait été signé d'un
autre procureur, par exemple celui qui a exercé l'accusation
pendant la procédure par devant les juges du fond.
3. Cela dit, il me faut constater qu'il existe une certaine
analogie entre la position qu'a prise le procureur de Zurich et celle
d'un juge d'instruction français. Celui-ci statue sur la détention
provisoire et dresse aussi l'acte d'accusation. Car il n'y a pas de
différence fondamentale entre l'acte d'accusation du procureur
zurichois et l'ordonnance de renvoi du juge d'instruction français.
Et personne n'a songé à contester que le juge d'instruction français
peut remplir le rôle mentionné à l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention.
4. La conclusion de la Commission rend extrêmement difficile la
structure juridique de la violation qu'elle trouve, parce qu'à
l'origine existe un acte valable selon l'arrêt Schiesser :
l'intervention du procureur de district du 11 août 1983. Ce n'est que
plus d'une année aprés - le 12 octobre 1984 - que l'acte, valable
à l'origine, devient violateur de la Convention, parce que le même
procureur - et non l'un de ses collègues - dresse l'acte d'accusation
pour requérir une peine d'amende.
Mais comment envisager à bon droit cet effet rétroactif ?
S'agirait-il dès l'origine d'un acte constituant une violation
soumise à la condition suspensive que le même procureur dresse plus
tard l'acte d'accusation ? S'agirait-il d'un acte en principe
conforme à la Convention mais sous condition résolutoire ?
5. Serait-il raisonnable d'avoir un délai d'incertitude -
quatorze mois dans notre cas - sans vraiment savoir s'il existera ou
non une violation de l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention ?
Il ne me semble pas que cette situation puisse se concilier
avec le principe de sécurité juridique.
Et pourtant la sécurité juridique est inhérente au
fonctionnement de la Convention.
Une publication de la Convention préparée au sein du Conseil
de l'Europe est assortie d'un avant-propos dans lequel on peut lire
ceci:
"La Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme constitue la
garantie collective sur le plan européen de certains des principes
énoncés dans la Déclaration universelle des Droits de l'Homme,
renforcée par un contrôle international judiciaire dont les décisions
doivent être respectées par les Etats." (C'est moi qui souligne).
Ainsi les arrêts de la Cour européenne guident les Etats
membres pour leur dire ce qu'ils peuvent faire et ce qu'ils doivent
éviter pour respecter leurs engagements vis-à-vis de la Convention.
La Cour européenne a dit à la Suisse dans l'arrêt Schiesser
que la détention ordonnée par le procureur de Zurich était conforme à
l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention. La Suisse a ainsi reçu un gage
de sécurité de la part de la Cour européenne, au point que le Tribunal
fédéral a fait état de cette sécurité dans l'arrêt qu'il a rendu le
24 novembre 1986 sur le recours de droit public introduit par la
requérante.
Je pense donc que notre Cour européenne, pour ébranler la
sécurité qu'elle-même a donné à la Suisse, aurait besoin d'un argument
beaucoup plus fort que la simple signature de l'acte d'accusation
(pour requérir une peine d'amende) par le même procureur qui, quatorze
mois auparavant, avait ordonné la détention provisoire et ensuite la
mise en liberté de la requérante.
&-DISSENTING OPINION OF Mrs. J. LIDDY&S
I consider that the course which the proceedings actually took
at domestic level in relation to the District Attorney's exercise of
his powers and consequently the facts as established in the present
Report provide an insufficient basis for distinguishing the present
case from the Schiesser case (Judgment of 4 December 1979, Series A
no. 34), particularly taking account of the considerations set out in
Mr. Martinez' dissenting opinion. Accordingly, I was unable to join
the majority and have voted for no violation of Article 5 para. 3 of
the Convention.
.IG
***
&-APPENDIX I&S
HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS
Date Item
----------------------------------------------------------------------
27 February 1987 Introduction of the application
13 March 1987 Registration of the application
Examination of admissibility
7 October 1987 Commission's decision to invite
the Government to submit observations
on the admissibility and merits of the
application
18 December 1988 Government's observations
13 April 1988 Applicant's observations in reply
9 July 1988 Commission's decision to declare
the application partly admissible
Examination of the merits
6 October 1988 Government's supplementary observations
10 December 1988 Commission's consideration of the state
of proceedings
10 April 1989 Commission's deliberations on the merits
and final vote and adoption of the Report