J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. the United Kingdom [GC]

Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi

Karar Metni

Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 100

August-September 2007

J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. the United Kingdom [GC] - 44302/02

Judgment 30.8.2007 [GC]

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

Article 1 para. 2 of Protocol No. 1

Control of the use of property

Loss of registered land by application of the law on adverse possession: no violation

Facts: The second applicant company was the registered owner of a plot of 23 hectares of agricultural land with development potential that was occupied by a farmer and his wife under a grazing agreement. In December 1983 the farmer was instructed to vacate the land as the grazing agreement was about to expire. However, he remained in occupation without permission and continued to use the land for grazing. In 1997 the farmer registered cautions at the Land Registry against the applicant companies’ title on the ground that he had obtained title by adverse possession. The applicant companies applied to the High Court for cancellation of the cautions and repossession of the land. The farmer contested their claims under the Limitation Act 1980, which provided that a person could not bring an action to recover land after the expiration of 12 years of adverse possession by another, and under the Land Registration Act 1925, which provided that after the expiry of the 12-year period the registered owner held the land in trust for the adverse possessor. The High Court found in favour of the farmer, holding that the applicant companies had lost their title to the land under the 1980 Act and that the farmer was entitled to be registered as the new owner. Although the Court of Appeal reversed that decision on the ground that the farmer did not have the necessary intention to possess the land, the House of Lords restored the order of the High Court. However, Lord Bingham of Cornhill stated that the decision was one he had reached “with no enthusiasm” and added: “Where land is registered it is difficult to see any justification for a legal rule which compels such an apparently unjust result, and even harder to see why the party gaining title should not be required to pay some compensation”. The value of the land was disputed but on any estimate came to several million pounds sterling.

The Land Registration Act 2002 – which does not have retroactive effect – now enables a squatter to apply to be registered as owner after ten years’ adverse possession and requires that the registered owner be notified of the application. The registered proprietor is then required to regularise the situation (for example, by evicting the squatter) within two years, failing which the squatter is entitled to be registered as the owner.

Law: (a) Applicability: There was nothing in the Court’s case to support the Government’s contention that the case should be considered only under Article 6 of the Convention and indeed it would be unusual for the Court to decline to deal with a complaint under one head solely because it was capable of raising different issues under a separate provision. The applicant companies had lost the ownership of 23 hectares of agricultural land as a result of the operation of the 1925 and 1980 Acts. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was therefore applicable.

(b) Nature of the interference: The applicant companies had lost their land as a result of the operation of the generally applicable rules on limitation periods for actions for the recovery of land. The statutory provisions were part of the general land law and were concerned to regulate, among other things, limitation periods in the context of the use and ownership of land as between individuals. It followed that the applicant companies were affected not by a “deprivation of possessions”, but by a “control of use” of the land.

(c) Aim of the interference: The 12-year limitation period for actions for the recovery of land in itself pursued a legitimate aim in the general interest. However, there also existed a general interest in the extinguishment of title at the end of that period. The States had a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere as it concerned the implementation of social and economic policies and the Court would only interfere if the legislature’s judgement as to what was in the public interest was manifestly without reasonable foundation. That was not the case here: a large number of member States possessed similar mechanisms, while the fact that the statutory amendments introduced in 2002 had not abolished the relevant provisions of the earlier legislation showed that the traditional general interest remained valid. Moreover, even where, as here, title to real property was registered, it had to be open to the legislature to attach more weight to lengthy, unchallenged possession than to the formal fact of registration. To extinguish title where the former owner was prevented, as a consequence of the application of the law, from recovering possession of the land could not be said to be manifestly without reasonable foundation.

(d) Fair balance: As to whether a fair balance had been struck between the demands of the general interest and the interest of the individuals concerned, the relevant rules had been in force for many years before the applicants acquired the land and it was not open to them to say that they were not aware of the legislation, or that its application to their case had come as a surprise. While no clear pattern had emerged from the comparative materials as regards the length of limitation periods, the fact was that very little action would have been required on the applicant companies’ part to stop time running: for example, they could have requested rent or other payment or brought an action for recovery of the land. Nor was the absence of compensation relevant as (a) the Court’s case-law on compensation for the deprivation of possessions was not directly applicable to cases concerning the control of their use and (b) a requirement for compensation would sit uneasily alongside the concept of limitation periods, whose aim was to further legal certainty by preventing parties from pursuing an action after a certain date. The applicant companies had not been without procedural protection (they could have brought an action for repossession or sought to show that the occupiers had not as a matter of law been in “adverse possession”). Although (by requiring notice of an application for adverse possession to be given by the squatter) the 2002 Act had now put registered owners in a better position than the applicant companies had been, legislative changes in complex areas such as land law took time to bring about and judicial criticism of legislation could not of itself affect the conformity of the earlier provisions with the Convention. Likewise, while it was not disputed that the land concerned would have been worth a substantial amount, limitation periods, if they were to fulfil their purpose, had to apply regardless of the size of the claim, so that the value of the land was not of any consequence. In sum, the requisite fair balance had not been upset.

Conclusion: no violation (ten votes to seven).

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