FOURTH SECTION
PARTIAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 15479/02
by Dariusz JARZYŃSKI
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 4 May 2004 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrR. Maruste,
MrS. Pavlovschi,
MrL. Garlicki,
MrJ. Borrego Borrego, judges,
and Mr M. O'Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 29 March 2002,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Dariusz Jarzyński, is a Polish national, who was born in 1972 and lives in Rumia, Poland. The application was lodged on his behalf by his mother, Mrs Teresa Jarzyńska, who submitted a duly signed written authorisation from the applicant.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 1 June 1999 the Gdańsk District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered that the applicant be detained on remand in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed several counts of armed robbery. Later, several other persons were detained and charged in connection with the same set of offences.
During the investigation, the applicant's detention was prolonged several times.
On 13 December 2000 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) prolonged the applicant's detention pending investigation until 31 March 2001, considering that the strong suspicion against him of having committed the serious offences with which he had been charged, the severity of the anticipated sentence and the risk of his tampering with evidence justified holding him in custody.
The applicant has not specified dates on which further decisions were given.
On 15 May 2001 the applicant was indicted on several charges of armed robbery before the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). He has not submitted any information as to the conduct of the trial. Nor has he supplied dates of hearings or any relevant documents.
During the trial the applicant filed numerous but unsuccessful applications for release on health grounds and appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against the decisions prolonging his detention. He maintained that the length of his detention was excessive and unreasonable and that the charges against him lacked a sufficiently strong basis. He also relied on his family's situation.
On the basis of the material produced by some of the applicant's co-defendants in support of their applications to the Court, the Registry established that the trial continues and the applicant is still in custody.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that his detention is inordinately lengthy.
2. Under Article 6 § 1 he complains that he did not have his case heard within a “reasonable time.”
3. The applicant further alleges a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, laid down in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. He also alleges a breach of Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention in that the prosecution failed in its duty to prepare the case for a hearing.
4. Lastly, he generally complains under Article 8 of the Convention, maintaining that his prolonged detention put a severe strain on him and his family.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention about the length of his pre-trial detention.
The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.
2. Under Article 6 § 1 the applicant submits that he did not have his case heard within a “reasonable time”.
That provision reads, in so far as relevant:
“In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by ... [a] tribunal ... . “
The reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court's case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 124, ECHR-2000-X).
However, in the present case, despite the Court's instruction to that effect, the applicant has not submitted any accurate factual information or documentary evidence in support of his complaint. In particular, he has not supplied any dates of hearings held by the Regional Court or other information enabling the Court to establish whether or not the above-mentioned criteria for the “reasonable time” requirement have been satisfied. The Court therefore finds, on the material before it, that the complaint, as presented by the applicant, has not been substantiated.
It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to paragraph 4 of that Article.
3. The applicant alleges a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, laid down in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. He also alleges a breach of Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention in that the prosecution failed in its duty to prepare the case for a hearing.
However, pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention:
“The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law ... “
The Court notes that the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending. Accordingly, the applicant still can, and should, put the substance of these complaints before the domestic authorities and ask for appropriate relief.
It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
4. Lastly, the applicant generally complains under Article 8 of the Convention, maintaining that his prolonged detention put a severe strain on him and his family.
However, the Court notes that the applicant's claims are made in vague and general terms. Despite that fact, the Court does not, on the material before it, find any indication that the effects that the applicant's detention entailed on him were such as to go beyond the inevitable level of suffering inherent in detention or that his separation from the family had more severe consequences than those normally involved in such a situation (see, mutatis mutandis, Kudła v. Poland cited above, §§ 93-94).
It follows that the remainder of the application is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to paragraph 4 of that Article.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant's complaint concerning the length of his pre-trial detention;
Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.
Michael O'BoyleNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy