SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 42065/04
by Nodar JAVAKHISHVILI
against Georgia
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 2 October 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
MrsF. Tulkens, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrI. Cabral Barreto,
MrM. Ugrekhelidze,
MrV. Zagrebelsky,
MrsA. Mularoni,
MrD. Popović, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé , Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 18 November 2004,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,
Having regard to the applicant’s letter of 28 June 2007 and the Government’s comments in reply, submitted on 12 July 2007,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Nodar Javakhishvili, is a Georgian national who was born in 1954 and lives in Tbilisi. He was represented before the Court by Mr N. Legashvili, Ms M. Kobakhidze, Ms N. Katsitadze, Ms M. Gioshvili and Ms Tamar Gabisonia, lawyers practising in Tbilisi. The respondent Government were represented by their Agent, Ms I. Bartaia of the Ministry of Justice.
The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 5 October 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for a traffic accident which had occurred the same day. As the applicant enjoyed parliamentary immunity from criminal liability, the proceedings were stayed.
On 8 August 2004, due to the expiry of the applicant’s immunity, the criminal proceedings were resumed. On 12 August 2004 the applicant was arrested and taken to the General Prosecutor’s Office where he was later charged with the offence of violating traffic regulations causing a death.
On 13 August 2004 the General Prosecutor requested the Krtsanisi‑Mtatsminda District Court in Tbilisi to authorise the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The Prosecutor’s main argument was that, if released, the applicant could negatively interfere with the investigation of the case by influencing witnesses and, in fear of a severe punishment, might abscond.
During the judicial review of his detention, the applicant claimed that the detention measure should not be imposed, since the prosecution could not refer to any circumstance or evidence remotely substantiating the risk of absconding. Referring to his oversees voyage in July 2004, the applicant argued that he had had ample opportunity to abscond, had he wished so. The applicant further claimed that, even as a parliamentarian, he had never tried to influence the investigation but, on the contrary, had always cooperated with the prosecution. He requested the imposition of police supervision instead of detention.
On 13 August 2004 the Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court ordered the applicant’s detention on remand for three months, reasoning as follows:
“The collected evidence discloses a reasonable suspicion that the accused has committed the incriminated offence... The fact that [he] is charged with a serious offence should also be taken into account... If released, the accused might influence the victim or witnesses. In view of the prospect of a severe punishment, the accused might abscond.”
The court did not refer to any specific circumstances of the case to substantiate these conclusions.
In his appeal, the applicant requested his release on the same grounds as those raised before the District Court. In a decision of 20 August 2004, the Tbilisi Regional Court dismissed the appeal. The sole reason was the prospect of a severe punishment. The decision was final and not subject to any further appeal.
On 15 October 2004 the applicant requested, under Article 140 § 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the annulment of the detention measure in view of newly discovered circumstances. He referred in this regard to a number of procedural breaches allegedly committed by the authorities in the course of the investigation. On an unspecified date, the Tbilisi Regional Court allowed the request and released the applicant from pre-trial detention.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention about his conditions of detention. Under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, he claimed that his pre-trial detention had been unlawful. Invoking in substance Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, he complained that he had not been promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest. Relying on Article 5 § 3, the applicant contended that the judicial decisions concerning his detention had lacked reasonable motivation. Invoking Article 5 § 4, he claimed that the reviews of his detention had been devoid of due process. Under Article 6 § 3 a), b) and d) of the Convention, the applicant reiterated the same complaints as those under Articles 5 §§ 1 and 3. Invoking Article 13 in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant denounced the fact that the gravity of the charge had been a ground for the detention measure.
PROCEDURE
On 6 March 2007 the complaints under Article 5 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention were communicated to the Government (Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court) and the applicant was informed thereof.
In reply, the applicant informed the Court on 28 June 2007 that he no longer intended to pursue his application and requested that it be struck out of the list of cases. Without providing any details, he simply stated that “the matter had been resolved”.
In a letter of 12 July 2007, the Government commented that they saw no reason for maintaining the proceedings and likewise requested that the case be struck out.
THE LAW
In view of the parties’ submissions of 28 June and 12 July 2007, the Court considers that the applicant is no longer interested in pursing his application, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention. Moreover, in accordance with Article 37 § 1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the further examination of the case. Accordingly, the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention should be discontinued and the case struck out of the list.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases.
S. DolléF. Tulkens
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy