THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 62235/00
by Darren JENNINGS
against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 30 January 2003 as a Chamber composed of
MrG. Ress, President,
SirNicolas Bratza,
MrL. Caflisch,
MrP. Kūris,
MrR. Türmen,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrsH.S. Greve, judges,
and Mr V. Berger, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 18 February 2000,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Darren Jennings, is a United Kingdom national, who was born in 1967 and lives in Tameside, Lancashire.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
In 1985, when he was seventeen, the applicant was convicted of an offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and was sentenced to three years’ youth custody.
On 1 November 1999, the applicant pleaded guilty to six counts, including one for possession of a firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence, a “serious offence” for the purposes of section 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (“the 1997 Act”). He was sentenced to life imprisonment, it being his second serious offence and the judge finding no exceptional circumstances to avoid imposition of the life sentence. The judge indicated that he would otherwise have passed a determinate sentence of four years’ imprisonment and the tariff was fixed at one year and one month. The applicant did not apply for leave to appeal against the conviction or sentence.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. The Crime (Sentences) Act 1997
The 1997 Act came into force on 1 October 1997. Section 2(1), (2) and (3) provide as follows:
“(1) This section applies where -
(a) a person is convicted of a serious offence committed after the commencement of this section; and
(b) at the time when that offence was committed, he was 18 or over and had been convicted in any part of the United Kingdom of another serious offence.
(2) The court shall impose a life sentence, that is to say -
(a) where the person is 21 or over, a sentence of imprisonment for life;
(b) where he is under 21, a sentence of custody for life under section 8(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982,
unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances relating to either of the offences or to the offender which justify its not doing so.
(3) Where the court does not impose a life sentence, it shall state in open court that it is of that opinion and what the exceptional circumstances are.”
Section 2(5) listed the offences considered “serious” for the purposes of the section. The offences listed in section 2(5) were already punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment and they include an offence under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and possession of a firearm or imitation firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence, contrary to section 18 of the Firearms Act 1968.
2. Regina v. Offen ([2001] 1 WLR 253
The judgment in this case was delivered by the Court of Appeal on 9 November 2000. The appellants had contended that section 2 was incompatible with, inter alia, Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention.
The Court of Appeal agreed that the manner of interpreting section 2 in the past meant that that section could clearly operate in a disproportionate manner, it not being difficult to find examples of situations where it would be wholly disproportionate to impose a life sentence even for a second serious offence. If, however, the words “exceptional circumstances” in section 2 were construed in a manner which accorded with the policy of Parliament in adopting the section, that section would no longer operate arbitrarily. That policy was to protect the public. Accordingly, a finding that an offender does not constitute a significant risk to the public should be considered to constitute “exceptional circumstances” which approach would accord, not only with parliamentary intent, but with the provisions of the Convention.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Articles 3 and 7 of the Convention that the imposition of a life sentence pursuant to section 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 amounted to inhuman and retrospective punishment.
PROCEDURE
On 10 July 2001 the Court decided to invite the Government to submit observations on the admissibility and merits of the applicant’s complaints about section 2 of the 1997 Act, albeit under Article 5 §§ 1 and 5 of the Convention. By letter dated 5 February 2002 the Government’s observations in the case were submitted. They were sent to the applicant by letter dated 13 February 2002 and the applicant was requested to submit any observations by 29 March 2002.
In a letter dated 13 March 2002 the applicant indicated that he was seeking legal advice and requested an extension of time for the submission of his observations. An extension was granted to 31 May 2002. When no response was received from the applicant, he was advised by way of letter dated 30 July 2002 that the Court would proceed to consider his case. The letter was subsequently returned by the prison to which it had been addressed.
By letter of 4 September 2002 the letter of 30 July was copied to the applicant at the home address provided on his application form. A further letter was sent to the applicant by registered post on 23 October 2002 seeking confirmation as to whether he wished to continue with the application. He was advised that if no response was received by 22 November 2002 the Court would consider striking the case out of its list. No response has been received from the applicant.
THE LAW
The Court notes that the applicant has failed to submit his observations in reply by the extended time-limit and has not responded to the recent correspondence from the Registry.
The Court considers that in the circumstances the applicant may be regarded as no longer wishing to pursue his application within the meaning of Article 37 § 1(a) of the Convention. There is no indication that respect for human rights requires the further examination of the case.
Accordingly, the case should be struck out of the Court’s list of cases.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases.
Vincent BergerGeorg Ress
RegistrarPresident
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