SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 34753/97
by Eva JÓRI
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section) sitting on 23 February 1999 as a Chamber composed of
MrC. Rozakis, President,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrG. Bonello,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrE. Levits,
withMrE. Fribergh, Section Registrar;
Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 15 November 1996 by Eva JÓRI against Slovakia and registered on 4 February 1997 under file no. 34753/97;
Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 22 June 1998 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 10 August 1998;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Hungarian national born in 1951. She is a translator and resides in Bratislava. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
In July 1992 the Bratislava - Staré mesto municipality restored a block of flats in which the applicant and her parents lived as tenants to its original owners. Subsequently the house was purchased by other individuals.
On 28 October 1994 the applicant and fifteen other persons living in the house lodged an action before the Bratislava I District Court (Obvodný súd) pursuant to Section 80 (c) of the Code of Civil Proceedings which gives everyone the right to bring civil proceedings with a view to having the existence of a right determined provided that it is justified by a pressing legal interest.
The plaintiffs challenged the lawfulness of the restitution and the subsequent sale of the house on the ground that the original owners had not been entitled to have the house restored as they had not permanently resided within the territory of the Slovak Republic as required by Section 3 (1) of the Extrajudicial Rehabilitation Act (Zákon o mimosúdnych rehabilitáciách). They stated that they had particular legal interest in lodging the action since the unlawful restitution of the house had prevented them “from having the flats transferred to them for the remainder of their value in accordance with the law”. They further complained that the new owners were attempting to make them move out of the house in that, for example, they had deliberately broken the central heater.
The Bratislava I District Court started proceeding with the case on 16 February 1995. On 14 March 1995 the action was sent to the defendants for observations.
The first hearing was held on 12 June 1995. Another hearing was scheduled for 11 September 1995. It was adjourned as the case had been transmitted to another judge.
On 12 January 1996 the applicant and several other plaintiffs complained about delays in the proceedings. On 29 February 1996 the vice-president of the Bratislava I District Court noted that the judge who had taken over the case in September 1995 had needed time to study the file and that a hearing was scheduled for 10 April 1996. He considered that there had been no undue delays in the proceedings.
On 18 February 1996 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice that the proceedings lasted unreasonably long while the same court had proceeded with the new owners’ actions for eviction of the tenants speedily. Upon the request of the Ministry of Justice the vice-president of the Bratislava I District Court submitted an analysis of the proceedings and concluded that there had been no unjustified delays.
On 10 April 1996 the court held another hearing and decided to adjourn the proceedings with a view to obtaining further information.
On 18 June 1996 the Bratislava I District Court granted an action of 10 March 1995 by which the new owners of the house had requested that the tenancy of the applicant’s parents be terminated. The applicant’s parents were ordered to vacate the flat within fifteen days after they were provided with alternative accommodation.
On 30 June 1996 the applicant lodged a petition with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). She complained that the proceedings concerning the lawfulness of the restitution of the house in question lasted unreasonably long.
On 19 March 1997 the Constitutional Court declared the petition admissible and on 2 July 1997 it found a violation of the applicant’s right to have her case examined within a reasonable time as guaranteed by Article 48 (2) of the Constitution and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Constitutional Court established that the District Court had not proceeded with the case in a due manner. In particular, it noted that the court had not undertaken all necessary steps with a view to establishing the addresses of the defendants to whom the house had been restored and considered it irrelevant that the judge dealing with the case had been ill. It pointed out that the District Court had remained inactive between 12 September 1995 and 22 February 1996 and also between 10 April 1996 and 24 March 1997. The Constitutional Court found no delays in the proceedings that could be attributed to the applicant.
On 20 November 1997 the vice-president of the Bratislava I District Court informed the applicant that following the finding of the Constitutional Court the judges who had dealt with the case had been disciplined, and that the case had been transmitted, as from 1 November 1997, to another judge.
On 28 January 1998 the applicant complained to the president of the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) that after the delivery of the Constitutional Court’s finding of 2 July 1997 the District Court had not held a single hearing in her case.
On 3 July 1998 the applicant extended the action of 28 October 1994 claiming that the house was owned by the Bratislava - Staré mesto municipality.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings in her case have not been fair and have lasted unreasonably long.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT
The application was introduced before the European Commission of Human Rights on 15 November 1996 and registered on 4 February 1997.
On 16 April 1998, the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.
The Government’s written observations were submitted on 22 June 1998. The applicant replied on 10 August 1998.
On 1 November 1998, by operation of Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the case fell to be examined by the Court in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that the proceedings in her case have not been fair and have lasted unreasonably long. She alleges a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides, so far as relevant, as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by a[n] ... tribunal established by law.”
a)To the extent that the applicant alleges a violation of her right to a fair trial, the Court notes that the proceedings concerning the applicant’s action are still pending. This complaint is, therefore, premature.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 34 § 3 of the Convention.
b)The applicant further complains that the proceedings concerning her case have lasted unreasonably long.
The Government contend that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is not applicable in the present case. In particular, they submit that the proceedings brought by the applicant concern exclusively the validity of the restitution and of the subsequent purchase of the house in which the applicant lived. In the absence of a specific claim to this effect, the courts are not, in the Government’s view, called upon to determine the ownership of the house. For this reason, even a possible finding that the restitution and the subsequent sale contracts were void, the individuals who currently possess the house would continue being registered as its owners in the land registry. The Government therefore consider that the outcome of the proceedings is not directly decisive for the applicant’s “civil rights”. They admit, however, that the situation could be different if the applicant extended her action of 28 October 1994 and claimed that the courts determine also the ownership of the house.
The applicant submits that on 3 July 1998 she extended her action of 28 October 1994 with a view to having the ownership of the house determined and maintains that Article 6 § 1 is applicable to the proceedings concerning her case. She further contends that her right to have her case heard within a reasonable time has not been respected.
The Court considers that the issues to be determined in the present case are whether the decision on the applicant’s action of 28 October 1994, as extended on 3 July 1998, is decisive for the applicant’s “civil” rights within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and, if so, whether the reasonable time requirement set out in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention has been respected.
Having examined these issues the Court finds that they raise serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits. Accordingly, this part of the application cannot be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaint that the proceedings concerning her case have lasted unreasonably long;
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy