Published on 16 March 2026
THIRD SECTION
Application no. 11885/25
Ljiljana JOVIĆ ZAJIĆ
against Serbia
lodged on 10 April 2025
communicated on 26 February 2026
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The applicant was employed by a Socially/State-owned enterprise based in Serbia. In 2005, the applicant and the enterprise reached a mutual agreement to terminate her employment. As part of this agreement, the applicant was granted ownership rights over certain agricultural land, which was managed by the enterprise and held in social ownership at the time.
Following the company’s insolvency in 2015, judicial proceedings were initiated to determine the agreement’s validity. During these proceedings, the domestic courts found that the company had disposed of immovable property held in social ownership contrary to applicable national legislation. Accordingly, on 14 October 2021, the Appellate Commercial Court issued a final judgment declaring the provisions of the agreement relating to the severance compensation null and void. Ultimately, the Constitutional Court also ruled against the applicant.
Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complains that the judgment that annulled the 2005 agreement in the civil proceedings was arbitrary. Additionally, she relies on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention to complain that she was deprived of a possession without adequate compensation or procedural safeguards.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, having regard to reasons given by the Appellate Commercial Court, was the impugned decision sufficiently reasoned and free from arbitrariness (see, mutatis mutandis, Anđelković v. Serbia, no. 1401/08, §§ 24 and 27 in fine, 9 April 2013; Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, §§ 61-65, ECHR 2015; and Khamidov v. Russia, no. 72118/01, § 170, 15 November 2007)?
2. Has there been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention? In particular, did the annulment of the 2005 severance agreement constitute an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of her possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?