AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 25994/94
by Josef JUPIN
against Sweden
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 22 October 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs G.H. THUNE, President
MM J.-C. GEUS
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
F. MARTINEZ
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
A. ARABADJIEV
Ms M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 2 September 1994
by Josef Jupin against Sweden and registered on 19 December 1994 under
file No. 25994/94;
Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent
Government on 26 November 1996;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, a Swedish citizen born in 1934 and residing in
Uppsala, is a businessman.
In so far as relevant to the remaining complaint following the
Commission's partial decision as to the admissibility of 15 May 1996,
the facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised
as follows.
By decision of 24 May 1988, the Local Tax Assessment Board
(taxeringsnämnden) fixed the applicant's taxable income at 8,200 SEK
for the income year 1987. Save for a miscalculation, it was fixed in
accordance with the information supplied by the applicant in his annual
tax return.
After a tax audit of the applicant's companies, the County Tax
Authority (länsskattemyndigheten) of the County of Uppsala, on
28 June 1989, appealed to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten)
of the County of Uppsala to have the applicant's taxable income raised.
The tax authority further claimed that a tax supplement (skattetillägg)
should be imposed on the applicant.
By judgment of 3 December 1992, the County Administrative Court
raised the applicant's taxable income to 87,300 SEK. The court found
that the applicant should be taxed, inter alia, for a swimming pool
which had been constructed at the applicant's summer house and for
certain purchases of private items, all of which had been entered in
the books of one of the companies as deductions to set off its profits.
As the raised taxable income, in its entirety, was considered to be
related to incorrect information supplied by the applicant in his tax
return, the court further decided, under Sections 116 a and 116 b of
the Taxation Act (Taxeringslagen, 1956:623), to impose a tax supplement
equivalent to 40 per cent of the tax levied on 79,100 SEK, i.e. on the
amount by which the taxable income was raised.
The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal
(kammarrätten) in Stockholm, claiming that his taxable income should
be fixed in accordance with the decision of the Local Tax Assessment
Board. He did not appeal against the decision to impose the tax
supplement. Nevertheless, Section 116 p of the Taxation Act provides
that if there are reasons to reduce the taxable income fixed by an
appealed decision, the courts examining the appeal shall ex officio
make a corresponding recalculation of the tax supplement imposed.
However, a review on the merits of the tax supplement decision as such
can only be obtained by lodging an appeal against that decision.
On 2 May 1994 the appellate court, agreeing with the County
Administrative Court's assessments, upheld its judgment.
On 7 March 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court (Regerings-
rätten) refused the applicant leave to appeal.
COMPLAINTS
Following the Commission's partial decision of 15 May 1996, the
only remaining complaint concerns the length of the proceedings in the
case concerning income tax and tax supplement. The applicant has
invoked Article 6 of the Convention.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 2 September 1994 and registered
on 19 December 1994.
On 15 May 1996 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to adjourn
the examination of the applicant's complaint that the case in which a
tax supplement was imposed on him was not determined within a
reasonable time and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the
application. The Commission further decided to give notice of the
adjourned complaint to the respondent Government and invite them to
submit written observations on the admissibility and merits thereof.
On 19 June 1996 the applicant applied for legal aid and he was
requested to submit the necessary documents by 25 July 1996. This
request remained unanswered.
The Government's observations were submitted on 26 November 1996,
after two extensions of the time-limit fixed for that purpose. The
Government maintained that the application is inadmissible for failure
to exhaust domestic remedies or for being incompatible ratione materiae
with the provisions of the Convention.
A copy of the Government's observations was forwarded to the
applicant on 3 December 1996. He was invited to submit his
observations in reply before 4 February 1997.
By letter of 12 February 1997, the applicant was reminded that
the period for the submission of his observations had expired without
any request for an extension of the time-limit having been received.
He was further informed that, under Article 30 para. 1 (a) of the
Convention, the Commission may strike an application out of its list
of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the
applicant does not intend to pursue his application.
On 22 February 1997 the applicant asked for an extension of the
time-limit until May/June 1997. On 3 March 1997, the applicant was
informed that the President of the Second Chamber had agreed to extend
the time-limit until 30 April 1997.
By letter of 7 May 1997, the applicant was reminded that the new
time-limit had been exceeded. Again, the applicant's attention was
drawn to Article 30 para. 1 (a) of the Convention. The applicant did
not reply to this letter, nor did he submit a reply to the Government's
observations. The reminder sent to him by registered mail on
11 June 1997 also remains unanswered.
REASONS FOR THE DECISION
The Commission observes that the first time-limit fixed for the
submission of the applicant's reply to the observations submitted by
the Government was exceeded without the applicant having requested an
extension of that time-limit. Reminded thereof, the applicant later
made such a request and was granted an extension until 30 April 1997.
However, the applicant has also failed to observe this time-limit,
despite the reminders sent to him on 7 May and 11 June 1997. Thus, he
has not submitted any reply to the Government's observations.
In these circumstances and having regard to Article 30
para. 1 (a) of the Convention, the Commission concludes that the
applicant does not intend to pursue his application. Moreover, as
regards the issues raised in the present case, the Commission finds no
reasons of a general character affecting respect for human rights, as
defined in the Convention, which require a further examination of the
application by virtue of Article 30 para. 1 in fine.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECIDES TO STRIKE THE APPLICATION OUT OF ITS LIST OF CASES.
M.-T. SCHOEPFER G.H. THUNE
Secretary President
to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy