Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 114
December 2008
Juppala v. Finland - 18620/03
Judgment 2.12.2008 [Section IV]
Article 10
Article 10-1
Freedom of expression
Conviction of criminal defamation for reporting suspected child abuse to a doctor: violation
Facts: The applicant took her three-year-old grandson to a doctor on account of a bruise on his back. She voiced concern that the injury had been caused by the boy's father and informed the doctor that the boy had said that he had been punched. The doctor wrote in his report that the bruising was consistent with a punch and that, on being interviewed, the boy had repeated that he had been hit by his father. He then alerted the child-protection services. The applicant was subsequently charged with criminal defamation on the ground that she had given information to the doctor which implied, without reasonable cause, that the boy had been assaulted by his father. She was convicted on appeal and ordered to pay EUR 3,365.67 compensation for non-pecuniary damage and legal costs. The court of appeal found that the fact that she had discussed the bruise with the boy, who was only three years old at the time, and that he had told the doctor that his father had hit him did not constitute a sufficiently reasonable ground for the allegation of abuse. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
Law: The applicant's conviction constituted an interference with her right to freedom of expression and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others. Both the conviction and the order requiring the applicant to pay damages had been “prescribed by law”. The essential question raised by the case was how to strike a proper balance when a parent was wrongly suspected of having abused his or her child, while, given the difficulties in uncovering child abuse, protecting children at risk of significant harm. The seriousness of child abuse as a social problem required that persons acting in good faith in what they believed were the best interests of the child should not be influenced by fear of being prosecuted or sued when deciding whether and when their doubts should be communicated to health care professionals or social services. An alarming feature of the applicant's case was that the court of appeal had taken the view that, even though there was no doubt that she had seen her grandson's bruised back, the applicant had not been entitled to repeat what the boy had told her, that is, that he had been hit by his father. In the Court's view, people should be free to voice a suspicion of child abuse, formed in good faith, in the context of an appropriate reporting procedure without fear of a criminal conviction or an obligation to pay compensation for harm suffered or costs incurred. There had been no suggestion that the applicant had acted recklessly: on the contrary, even a health care professional had decided that the case should be reported to the child welfare authorities. In sum, it was only in exceptional cases that restriction of the right to freedom of expression in this sphere could be accepted as necessary in a democratic society. In the applicant's case, sufficient reasons for the interference with her right to freedom of expression had not been provided and the interference had therefore failed to answer any “pressing social need”.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41 – EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 3,616.41 in respect of pecuniary damage.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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